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Editor’s Preface to the Spring Edition

Here at Elon University, we are extremely grateful to host The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics for the sixth semester. We are proud to present the Spring 2023 issue and congratulate all authors published in this issue for their high achievement.

This publication seeks to highlight the intellectual curiosity that leads to innovative scholarship in all subfields of political science, scholarship that addresses timely questions, is carefully crafted, and utilizes diverse methodologies. We are committed to intellectual integrity, a fair and objective review process, and a high standard of scholarship as we showcase the work of undergraduate scholars, most of whom pursue questions that have been traditionally ignored in scholarship but that drive our discipline forward.

Following the lead of the American Political Science Review (APSR) Editorial Board, we are excited to publish research in the areas of “American politics, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, public law and policy, racial and ethnic politics, the politics of gender and sexuality and qualitative and quantitative research methods.” This publication also values the relationships formed through student-faculty collaboration and aims to build a culture of scholarship that expands beyond the college campus. We hope to encourage and empower students to seek out knowledge and pursue their potential, contributing to scholarship in a variety of disciplines.

This year, we thank our advisors Dr. Baris Kesgin and Dr. Aaron Sparks for their support, without which the issue would not have been possible. We would also like to thank the entirety of the Political Science and Policy Studies Department at Elon University; our Faculty Advisory Board; and all the students who shared their exceptional work with us this semester.

We are excited to present the Spring 2023 edition of the Journal. Thank you for your continued support and readership of our publication; we hope you enjoy the edition.

Sincerely,

The Editorial Board at Elon University
Submission of Manuscripts

The *Journal* accepts manuscripts from undergraduates of any class and major. Members of Pi Sigma Alpha are especially encouraged to submit their work. We strive to publish papers of the highest quality in all areas of political science.

Generally, selected manuscripts have been well-written works with a fully developed thesis and strong argumentation stemming from original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their work before being accepted for publication.

Submission deadlines are September 15th for the Fall edition and February 15th for the Spring edition. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis; therefore, early submissions are strongly encouraged.

Students may submit their work through Elon University’s submission portal, found here: https://www.elon.edu/u/academics/arts-and-sciences/political-science/psa-journal/

Alternatively, students may email psajournalelon@gmail.com with an attached Word document of the manuscript. In the body of the email, students are asked to include their name and university, the title of the manuscript, and the closest subfield of political science to which their manuscript pertains (American politics, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, or policy studies). Due to the time committed to the manuscript review process, we ask students to submit only one manuscript per submission cycle.

Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (approximately 150 words) and citations/references that follow the *APSA Style Manual for Political Science*. Please do not exceed the maximum page length of 35 double-spaced pages, which includes references, tables, figures, and appendices.

The *Journal* is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board that are undergraduate students and Pi Sigma Alpha members at Elon University. The Editorial Board relies heavily on the help of our Faculty Advisory Board, which consists of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council.

Please direct any questions about submissions or the Journal’s upcoming editions to the editors at Elon University: psajournalelon@gmail.com.
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When Logic Trumped Anger: A Case Study of Political Rhetoric’s Impact on the Outcome of NAFTA Renegotiation

Gerardo Cardoso, Mary Baldwin University
When Logic Trumped Anger: A Case Study of the Impact of Political Rhetoric on the Outcome of NAFTA Renegotiation

Gerardo Escalera Cardoso, Mary Baldwin University

The logical underpinnings of international trade theory suggest that trade agreement renegotiation should consistently result in greater trade liberalization for the parties involved but taken at face value, Trump's intense scrutiny of NAFTA and populist rhetoric presented an ostensible challenge to the theory. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign frequently criticized the condition of the United States’ foreign policy, and NAFTA served as the focal point for much of this criticism. Trump’s eventual inauguration set the stage for an inevitable renegotiation of the trade deal. Testing whether international trade theory would hold in light of apparent opposition to free trade from one party, this paper examines Trump’s rhetoric during NAFTA renegotiation and trade volume patterns before and after USMCA implementation. Key patterns in Trump’s rhetoric consisted of belligerence toward traditional allies, the prioritization of American manufacturing and agriculture, threats of withdrawal, and anti-globalization; additionally, this paper discusses the strategic value of these rhetorical patterns. With different industries experiencing varying shifts in trade volume patterns, an analysis of post-USMCA trade flows demonstrates mixed results for trade liberalization. Implications for international relations are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is more prevalent in the twenty-first century than ever before, but an apparent resurgence of nationalism and domestic populism has amplified the choir of anti-globalist voices on the international stage. Both politically and economically, countries have become increasingly interconnected with one another. Politically, globalization through increased international cooperation has allowed countries to tackle issues that transcend borders; economically, globalization through international trade has allowed countries to yield mutual benefits. In many ways, the political and economic interdependence of states has become the global status quo. In recent years, however, populist agents, like former President Donald J. Trump, have increasingly gained power within the international system. As their international clout grows, many populists have voiced a desire to use their newfound power to disrupt the global order. For example, Jair Bolsonaro, the former president of Brazil, sought to rein in his nation’s participation in multilateral affairs, deciding to pursue a “Brazil above everything” agenda (Roy 2022). Marine Le Pen, who has transformed France’s National Rally into a competitive political party, has long embraced skepticism of the European Union and other multilateral organizations (Ganley 2022). During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump similarly promised to take actions as president that would effectively roll the international system; the renegotiation of, and potential withdrawal from, NAFTA was one of these promises. At first glance, this developing situation implies that the contemporary world will experience a higher level of uncertainty than in recent years; however, this case study’s closer look serves to undermine this implication.

This case study of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) renegotiations during the Trump administration will examine changes in the degree of trade liberalization within the resultant United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) and the extent to which former President Donald Trump’s rhetoric affected any changes. The case study will measure and compare the degrees of trade liberalization within NAFTA and USMCA through two methods, one qualitative and one quantitative. Qualitatively, this case study will use content analysis to examine textual differences between key provisions in NAFTA and USMCA and determine whether these differences imply a shift toward liberalization or restriction of trade. Quantitatively, this case study will examine differences in trade flows between the trading partners before and after USMCA; Q1 2002-Q2 2020 will constitute the time period before USMCA, and Q2 2020-Q2 2022 will constitute the time period after USMCA. Indicators of a shift toward trade liberalization would include a softening of trade barriers between the agreements’ texts as well as increased trade flows, and indicators of a shift toward protectionism would include a tightening of trade barriers between the agreements’ texts as well as decreased trade flows.
Trade theory suggests that trade agreement renegotiation should rationally end in greater trade liberalization. The case study will assume that trade theory holds despite the populist disposition of one of the parties involved in renegotiation. Maggi and Staiger’s (2015) model for trade agreement renegotiation is the primary reason for this assumption, and this case study will, in effect, evaluate the model. As a result, the hypothesis is that USMCA resulted in greater trade liberalization than during NAFTA despite any potentially negative impacts that resulted from Trump’s populist rhetoric. During an age in which populist, seemingly unconventional figures increasingly appear to be ascendant within the international system, and during an age in which this increased resistance to globalization implies greater uncertainty for the future, this case study may actually suggest that logic governs even the most ideologically driven state leader.

BACKGROUND

In 1990, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico began free trade talks with President George H.W. Bush, and Canada joined these talks in 1991 (Alire and O’Boyle 2017); these negotiations would mature into NAFTA. On December 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Salinas and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney were able to reach a trade agreement (Alire and O’Boyle 2017). Because the proposed agreement would integrate the markets of developed countries with the market of a developing country, controversy surrounded the negotiations almost as soon as they were initiated (Villarreal 2017). American critics of the negotiations argued that liberalized trade with a developing country would result in the loss of jobs within the United States while supporters predicted that free trade would generate more, higher-paying jobs (Cooper 1996, 483). During the 1992 American presidential election, Ross Perot functioned as the ideological representative of those opposed to NAFTA; Perot bashed the agreement repeatedly during the campaign, emphasizing the potential for job loss by claiming that all of the jobs leaving the country would produce a “giant sucking sound” (Cooper 1996, 483). Both Bush and Bill Clinton, the two other major candidates in the race, endorsed NAFTA on the campaign trail. Ultimately, NAFTA critics were unable to sway the public to their side; Clinton won the 1992 election and signed NAFTA into law on December 8, 1993 (Villarreal 2017).

However, Perot’s defeat in 1992 did not mark the end of NAFTA scrutiny; the desire and need to identify and evaluate the trade deal’s benefits and detriments persisted. Since NAFTA entered into force, empirical studies have attempted to identify its effects on the trading partners. Analyses that focus on Mexico have generated largely mixed results; whereas Polaski (2003) claims that the Mexican economy suffered large job losses as a result of the agreement, Moreno-Brid, Rivas Valdivia, and Santamaria (2005) indicate that NAFTA has helped create Mexican jobs but less than desired. Similarly, studies have provided conflicting reports on the United States; Polaski (2003), Wilson (2017), and Moran and Oldenski (2014) all indicate that the United States largely benefited from NAFTA, generally identifying the U.S. as NAFTA’s main beneficiary, whereas Scott (2011) claims that NAFTA has largely hurt American employment. Despite the existence of evidence suggesting that NAFTA benefited the United States, American public opinion remained mainly divided between 1997 and 2017; in 1997, 37% of Americans viewed NAFTA as good for the country while 48% viewed it as good in 2017 (Jones and Saad 2017). The enduring split in American public opinion on NAFTA kept alive the possibility of another national debate and referendum on the agreement, one in which a NAFTA critic could capitalize on the division and now succeed against NAFTA’s supporters.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conventional wisdom among contemporary economists generally consists of the notion that free trade among nations results in a net benefit for all parties involved. The concept of comparative advantage is the theoretical bedrock that explains the source of international trade’s net benefits. A producer has a comparative advantage in the production of a good or service when they suffer the lowest opportunity cost for engaging in the activity among all other producers; comparative advantage differs from absolute advantage, which arises when a producer can produce more than another when given the same amount of, or fewer, resources. According to David Ricardo, an early nineteenth century economist, when producers specialize in goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage, consumers can enjoy a greater quantity and quality of goods and services (Rodrik 2018, 80). Even when a producer has an absolute advantage in the production of all goods, they can still increase their consumption and benefit by practicing comparative advantage specialization and engaging in trade. Although the theory of comparative advantage functions as a powerful enough incentive for individuals to engage in trade with one another, governments’ approaches to international trade require a more complicated analysis.

The game theory framework of international trade demonstrates that the trade relationship between countries, whether they enjoy more liberalized trade or restrictive trade, depends on the level of cooperation between said countries. When acting unilaterally, countries will typically choose to enact protectionist trade policies (The Political Economy of Trade 2021). For example, if Country A chooses to engage in protectionism, Country B is better off by also engaging in protectionism (Harrison and Rutström 1991, 420). An elevated risk of unfair trade practices, like dumping or foreign governments subsidizing exports, explains why protectionism would be best for both countries if only one country adopts it as a policy. Dumping occurs when a foreign firm sells their exports at a lower price than a domestic market’s equilibrium.
trading partners have recognized that they experience a net trade policy (Maggi and Staiger 2015, 119). The existence of costs is greater than the gains, the country will elect a free trade or protectionism. If a country's gains from protectionism are always greater than their costs, it will leave the agreement or choose to re-introduce protectionist policies that may lead to a spiral of tariff escalation; instead, they will convince Country B to further liberalize (Maggi and Staiger 2015, 124).

While Maggi and Staiger's (2015) model and the logical underpinnings of trade theory suggest that NAFTA renegotiations would inevitably lead to greater trade liberalization between the trading partners, Donald Trump's populist rhetoric on the issue presented an ostensible challenge to the theory. Although not much literature exists on populism's effects on substantive trade policy, some work does exist on how populist rhetoric may affect domestic perceptions on trade policy and how these domestic perceptions may affect trade policy. Boucher and Thies' (2019) definition of populist rhetoric includes three primary criteria: “antielitism, a virtuous people, and a dangerous ‘other’ who threatens the sovereign people” (2019, 713); the authors identify Trump's rhetoric as populist, and this case study's analysis of Trump's rhetoric during NAFTA renegotiation results in a similar conclusion. The great majority of Donald Trump's rhetoric on NAFTA renegotiation occurred through social media, specifically Twitter, and Boucher and Thies (2019) note that social media as an instrument is especially conducive to populists’ ends of “[mobilizing] and [shaping] how people frame issues” (2019, 713). A pluralist political economy trade theory framework explains trade policy decisions as a result of interest groups demanding policy change (Goldstein 1986, 162); within this framework, if Trump's hostile framing of NAFTA successfully stirred up negative American attitudes on the issue, Trump would have more leeway to substantially reform NAFTA in a more protectionist light. However, Goldstein (1986) dismisses the pluralist political economy trade theory framework by highlighting the fact that American policymakers have consistently moved toward trade liberalization despite instances of political resistance (1986, 162). For this reason, contemporary trade theory remains the most appropriate theoretical framework to investigate the extent to which Trump's rhetoric affected the NAFTA renegotiation process and its outcome.
to identify patterns and themes within Trump's rhetoric as well as to characterize the nature of his rhetoric. The case study will use the Trump Twitter Archive's search engine, filtered for tweets with the keywords “NAFTA,” “Mexico,” and “Canada,” and further filtered for tweets between May 4, 2009, and October 1, 2018, to find the former president's tweets regarding his sentiments toward NAFTA and NAFTA renegotiation. To find quotes provided to the media by Trump and members of his administration, the case study will primarily rely on Politico's “NAFTA” tag to search for articles related to the renegotiation. To minimize any potential bias from the Politico website's authors that may negatively affect the objectivity of this research, the case study will rely on the website's articles solely for direct quotes. A content analysis of significant differences between NAFTA and USMCA will rely on each USMCA party's official objectives, Regimi (2020), and Villarreal (Villarreal 2021) as orienting documents.

The quantitative analysis of trade volumes will use annualized trade volume data for dairy products, poultry products, margarine, peanut products, automobiles, and automobile parts, ranging from 2002 to 2021, from the U.S. Census Bureau's USA Trade Online database; the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes used for each commodity category, respectively, are 3115, 1123, 311225, 311911, 3361, and 3363. However, because the database only provides nominal values for each year, the case study will apply GDP price deflators, obtained from the St. Louis Fed's Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), to all USA Trade Online data; this must be done to ensure that changes seen across time are the result of changes in volumes and not price levels. The study obtained price deflators for its base year, 2021, from FRED's “Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPC1)” series by setting the series' units of measurement to an index and selecting 2021 as the year equal to 100; additionally, the study modified the series' frequency and aggregation to annual average measurements. Because the USMCA entered into effect during the second quarter of 2020, and because the analysis will be relying on annualized data, the case study will annualize 2020's quarterly data to estimate the trade volumes that would have occurred through the whole year under NAFTA or USMCA.

### DATA ANALYSIS

#### Donald Trump's Rhetoric Regarding NAFTA Renegotiation

This case study's content analysis of former President Donald Trump's rhetorical patterns, themes, and narratives regarding NAFTA renegotiation will span a timeline beginning from Trump's presidential campaign to September 30, 2018, the day that all three USMCA parties agreed on a trade deal. Because NAFTA renegotiation did not officially start until after Trump had assumed the office of the presidency, a rationale for beginning the period of the content analysis with Trump's presidential campaign may not be readily apparent. However, many of the patterns, themes, and narratives in Trump's rhetoric during NAFTA renegotiation can be traced back to those during his presidential campaign. Chrystia Freeland, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2017 to 2019, implied that even the Canadian government recognized the 2016 U.S. presidential election as the unofficial beginning of NAFTA renegotiation. “We began planning [for renegotiation] as soon as NAFTA emerged as an issue in the U.S. [p]residential campaign,” Freeland stated when she presented Canada's official objectives for a new trade agreement. For these reasons, this case study's period of interest appears appropriate. Patterns, themes, and narratives in Trump's rhetoric during this period of renegotiation included: belligerence toward traditional allies, the prioritization of American manufacturing and farmers, threats of withdrawal, and anti-globalization.

Hostility and skepticism were primary characteristics of Trump's rhetoric regarding Mexico before, and during, the NAFTA renegotiation process. While campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination in 2015, Donald Trump repeatedly used words with violent connotations to describe interactions between Mexico and the United States. Specifically, Trump repeatedly referenced a variety of situations in which Mexico was “killing” the United States. Whether Mexico was “killing” the United States “economically” (Trump 2015c), “on trade” (Trump 2015d), “at the border”, or “on jobs” (Trump 2015b), Trump consistently painted the relationship between the two countries with a violent hue. During the 2016 presidential election, a massive wall along the U.S.-Mexico border became a flagship of Trump's campaign; once sworn into office, Trump combined his previously negative and violent connotation of Mexico with his cornerstone policy idea in an attempt to cement the United States' leverage during NAFTA renegotiation. “We need the Wall [sic] to help stop the massive inflow of drugs from Mexico, now rated the number one most dangerous country in the world. If there is no Wall [sic], there is no Deal [sic]!” Trump tweeted nearly a year into his administration (Trump 2018), firmly interlinking the two policy debates into one. Trump justified his belligerence toward Mexico by portraying Mexico as one of the United States' enemies, and he justified this portrayal through the use of negatively connoted rhetoric. Because “Mexico [stole jobs from the United States]” (Trump 2016b), “has taken advantage of the U.S.” (Trump 2017a), and “[laughs] at [the United States'] dumb immigration laws” (Trump 2018e), they are “not [the United States'] friend” (Trump 2015b). Responses from Mexican officials involved in NAFTA renegotiation arguably never reached the same level of hostility as Trump's rhetoric.

The revitalization of American manufacturing and agriculture was a crucial theme throughout NAFTA renegotiation, and these themes originated during the 2016
presidential campaign trial. During his campaign and the early days of his administration, Trump relied on the alleged loss of American manufacturing jobs as the primary criticism with which to attack NAFTA; as NAFTA renegotiation experienced new developments, however, American agriculture became a more prominent subject of Trump’s rhetoric. While still campaigning for the Republican nomination, Trump frequently criticized one of his opponents for their support of NAFTA, claiming that NAFTA had resulted in the loss of “300,000 manufacturing jobs” in North Carolina and 400,000 in Ohio between 2000 and 2016 (Trump 2016a).

After progressing to the general election, Trump used the presidential debates to disseminate similar statements to an even more national audience. At the first presidential debate, Trump claimed that, as a result of NAFTA, “manufacturing is down 30, 40, sometimes 50 percent” in an array of states (Severs 2016). At the third debate, Trump stated that Americans’ “jobs are being sucked out of the economy” (Cheney 2016); this rhetoric heavily mirrored Ross Perot’s 1992 comments about NAFTA. During the 1992 presidential election, Ross Perot’s “giant sucking sound” comment received an abundance of media coverage and functioned as a contributing factor to the initial divisiveness surrounding NAFTA (Beren 1999). By mirroring Perot’s comments, Trump effectively established himself as the new anti-NAFTA candidate in a similar attempt to politically weaponize NAFTA’s divisiveness to boost his election chances. After assuming office, Donald Trump largely shifted the focal points of his NAFTA criticism from Mexico and manufacturing to Canada and agriculture.

As his NAFTA focus evolved, Trump used American agricultural grievances to frame Canada as one of the United States’ economic exploiters and enemies. During NAFTA’s original negotiations, Canadian public officials were able to exempt dairy and poultry products from tariff elimination; as a result, Canada could continue to restrict American access to these industries (Johnson 2017, 3). Throughout NAFTA renegotiation, Trump publicly blackened Canadian officials with this fact. “Canada has treated our Agricultural [sic] business and Farmers [sic] very poorly for a very long period of time. Highly restrictive on Trade! [sic]...They report a really high surplus on trade with us,” Trump tweeted as NAFTA renegotiation entered a tense phase. Trump constructed a NAFTA renegotiation narrative in which Canada, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau specifically, was untrustworthy and covertly working against the United States’ interests. During 2018, Trump repeatedly referenced examples and instances of Trudeau and Canada’s dishonesty. “Why isn’t… Canada informing the public that they have used massive Trade Tariffs [sic] and non-monetary Trade Barriers [sic] against the U.S. [sic] Totally unfair to our farmers,” he tweeted in one instance (Trump 2018b). In another, Trump wondered why Canada “didn’t tell [Americans] that [they charge the U.S. a 270% tariff on dairy products]” (Trump 2018b). Trump further accused Trudeau of making “false statements” (Trump 2018a) about the NAFTA renegotiation process and characterized him as “[v]ery dishonest and weak” (Trump 2018f). At this point, even officials involved in the formal renegotiation talks, like U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and White House economic adviser Larry Kudlow, adopted the accusatory and hostile tone of Trump’s rhetoric. Lighthizer referred to comments made by Canadian Ambassador to the U.S. David McNaughton as “inaccurate” and “counterproductive” (Doug Palmer 2017), and Kudlow referred to some of Trudeau’s actions as “sophomoric” and accused him of stabbing the Trump administration in the back (Temple-West 2018).

Growing tensions between the United States and Canada during NAFTA renegotiation resulted in both parties threatening to withdraw from the agreement altogether on multiple occasions. Trump first introduced the threat of withdrawal from NAFTA as a negotiatory cudgel during his presidential campaign. “[If Mexico and Canada] don’t agree to renegotiation…then I will submit under Article 2205 of the NAFTA agreement that America intends to withdraw from the deal,” Trump stated during a rally in 2016 at an aluminum plant (McCaskill and Stokols 2016). Even once Trump had been sworn into office and NAFTA renegotiation was underway, he did not ease up on his threats to withdraw from NAFTA if the renegotiated agreement did not meet his expectations. During a moment in which Trump described negotiations with Mexico and Canada as “difficult,” Trump publicly signaled that he may have to terminate NAFTA (Trump 2017b). As Trump began to direct his NAFTA criticism primarily at Canada over American agriculture, Trudeau warned that Canada’s withdrawal from NAFTA was not an impossibility. “Canada is willing to walk away from NAFTA if the United States proposes a bad deal,” Trudeau stated during a town hall in early 2018 (Alexander 2018). As renegotiation talks between Trump’s administration and Trudeau’s government dragged on and further deteriorated, Trump only intensified the negative narrative about Canada that his rhetoric had previously crafted. Trump stated that Canada had “taken advantage of [the United States] for many years” (Trump 2018d) and accused Canada of “decades of abuse” (Trump 2018i). On August 31, 2018, the United States and Mexico reached a deal on a renegotiated agreement; at the time, Canada had still not expressed their commitment to the new deal (Doug Palmer 2017, 3). Throughout NAFTA renegotiation, the possibility of Canadian withdrawal became increasingly real. “We’ll walk away and not sign a deal rather than sign a bad deal for Canadians,” Trudeau stated as late as September 2018 (Behsudi and Rodriguez 2018). Despite both parties’ threats of withdrawal, the United States and Canada reached a deal on a renegotiated agreement on September 30, 2018.
As Trump rebuked many of NAFTA’s features throughout the renegotiation process, he simultaneously channeled a broader, populist message of anti-globalization; in the midst of this messaging, Trump suggested that only he could protect Americans from the negative effects of globalization. In a similar manner to his previous rhetorical patterns during NAFTA renegotiation, Trump’s anti-globalist theme first emerged during his presidential campaign. While running for the Republican nomination in 2015, and while marketing border security as one of his top priorities, Trump indicated that the United States should “protect [its] borders from people”, not just from Mexico, but “from all over” (Trump 2015a). Trump crystallized his anti-globalist sentiments during a rally while campaigning in 2016. “This wave of globalization has wiped out totally, totally our middle class….It doesn’t have to be this way. We can turn it around and we can turn it around fast,” he said (McCaskill and Stokols 2016). Trump consistently pointed to trade deficits as the primary method by which other countries economically exploit the United States through “[m]assive trade deficits” (Trump 2017a), as a result of their “smarter [leaders and negotiators]” (Trump 2015c), “NAFTA is a bad joke” (Trump 2018b). The European Union (Trump 2018k), Canada, China, and others (Trump 2018c) have also enjoyed trade surpluses. Because of this, according to Trump, the United States is a “piggy bank that’s being robbed” (Trump 2018g); however, because “nobody beats Trump” (Trump 2015c), he will ensure that the United States experiences “[m]assive trade deficits no longer” (Trump 2018c). By depicting trade deficits with other nations as inherently damaging to the American economy and the everyday American worker, and by simultaneously portraying himself as a smart and daunting leader that will not quiver in the face of difficulty, Trump’s rhetoric attempted to create domestic support for his anti-globalist ideology and his tough stance on NAFTA renegotiation.

Official Objectives for Renegotiation and Textual Differences Between NAFTA and USMCA

The Office of the United States Trade Representative published the United States’ official objectives for NAFTA renegotiation on July 17, 2017; the Secretariat of the Economy of Mexico published Mexico’s official objectives on August 2, 2017, and Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered a speech on August 14, 2017, in which she detailed Canada’s official objectives. Given that Trump’s rhetoric regarding dairy and other agricultural concerns did not intensify until early 2018, the official objectives lack concrete requests for concessions on this front; however, the agricultural objectives do notably call for change while the manufacturing objectives do not. Regarding manufactured goods, the United States primarily called on Mexico and Canada to “[m]aintain existing reciprocal duty-free market access” without making any requests for further tariff reduction (Lighthizer 2017, 4). Regarding agricultural goods, however, the United States did request that Mexico and Canada “[e]xpand competitive market opportunities for U.S. agricultural goods in NAFTA countries…by reducing or eliminating remaining tariffs [and eliminating] non-tariff barriers to U.S. agricultural exports” (Lighthizer 2017, 4). In their official objectives, Mexico did not request any inherent changes to NAFTA’s manufacturing or agricultural schemes; instead, similarly to the American objectives’ language, the Secretariat called for the parties to “[m]aintain preferential access to Mexican goods and services in the markets of the NAFTA countries” (Guzardo 2017). The Canadian official objectives, however, indicated opposing intentions to those of the United States. In their objectives, Canada reaffirmed their determination to “uphold and preserve the elements in NAFTA that Canadians deem key to our national interest…[including] Canada’s system of supply management” (Freeland 2017); this “system of supply management” included the protectionist policy regarding Canada’s dairy market and other agricultural industries. Whereas Mexico’s objectives did not necessarily clash with the United States’, Canada’s objectives did set up a clash on the United States’ eventual demand for greater American access to the Canadian dairy and agricultural markets; this may provide context for why Trump’s NAFTA renegotiation rhetoric largely pivoted from Mexico and manufacturing to Canada and agriculture.

Under the USMCA, Canadian officials committed themselves to the gradual liberalization of Canadian agriculture to allow for greater American access to its markets. Canada principally accomplished this trade liberalization by establishing U.S.-specific tariff-rate quotas higher than those of non-favored nations. Regarding its dairy market, in which tariffs could reach 313.5% on out-of-quota imports, Canada agreed to raise its quota for American products on an annual basis for a prolonged period of time (Regimi 2020, 3–4). Regarding its poultry market, Canada agreed to expand its quota for American imports from 47,000 to 57,000 tons after six years and to subsequently increase this quota by 1% for ten years (Villarreal 2021, 14); similarly, Canada made a commitment to raise the quota for American egg imports to 10 million dozen by 2025 and subsequently increase this quota by 1% for ten years (Regimi 2020, 4). American officials simultaneously committed themselves to gradually allow more Canadian access to American agricultural markets, including their dairy and poultry industries (Regimi 2020, 7). Canadian officials were also able to obtain greater access to the United States’ peanut and sugar markets for Canadian producers (Villarreal 2021, 14).

Although public NAFTA renegotiation rhetoric largely avoided addressing the automobile industry directly, the USMCA did introduce significant changes to the industry’s terms of trade; these changes possess a protectionist nature. Under NAFTA, the United States did not apply tariffs on
motor vehicle imports from Mexico or Canada as long as 62.5% of a vehicle's content originated from North America; the USMCA elevated the requisite content level to 75% (Villarreal 2021, 11). Additionally, whereas NAFTA did not stipulate labor requirements for the auto industry, the USMCA requires that 40-45% of a vehicle's North American content “be made by workers earning at least 16 per hour” (Villarreal 2021, 11). Villarreal (2021) notes that, because producers may struggle to achieve the USMCA’s requirements, these changes hold the potential to lower automobile trade volumes between the USMCA parties as more imports become “ineligible for USMCA benefits” (2021, 12). American domestic production could function as a substitute for a decrease in imports, but many imports would simply have to be subject to duties (Villarreal 2021, 11). Villarreal (2021) also highlights the fact that auto manufacturers' attempts to meet the USMCA requirements could result in higher production costs, and these higher costs could subsequently result in “higher auto prices, reduced U.S. demand, lower auto exports, and more rapid substitution of machines for workers” (2021, 12–13). The USMCA’s automobile industry changes risk harming Mexico the most as “they may lose market share to Asian manufacturers” because producers may simply shift their supply chains to Asian nations, such as South Korea, that now enjoy more favorable auto industry access (Villarreal 2021, 13); a decrease in market share would be the result of a decrease in Mexican exports.

Examining Trade Flows of Selected Industries Pre- and Post-USMCA

Dairy Products Between the United States and Canada.

Figure 1 demonstrates that, post-NAFTA, dairy product trade volumes between the United States and Canada have
been increasing. However, Figure 2A, through a flattening slope, reveals that dairy industry trade volumes became somewhat stagnant between 2010 and 2020, the ten years prior to the USMCA's implementation. Following the USMCA's implementation, however, dairy market trade volumes have generally increased and have done so at a faster rate than that between 2010 and 2020 as shown in Figure 2B. The faster rate of increase in dairy product trade volumes is consistent with the liberalization of dairy product provisions between NAFTA and the USMCA. Overall, the dairy industry's post-USMCA trade performance has been consistent with Maggi and Staiger's prediction that trade agreement renegotiation results in trade liberalization.

**Poultry Products Between the United States and Canada.**

Figure 3 reveals that, post-NAFTA, poultry product trade between the United States and Canada experienced an upward trend until hitting a peak in 2015; trade volumes within the industry subsequently peaked in 2019 before experiencing another instance of decline up to 2020. Figure 4A, through a flat slope, reveals that, overall, the volatility in trade experienced by the industry cumulatively resulted in little growth in trade volumes. Following the USMCA's implementation, however, poultry product trade volumes have generally increased as indicated in Figure 4B.; similarly to the dairy industry, the rate of increase in poultry product trade volumes have also become faster than in the ten years prior to USMCA implementation. The faster rate of increase in poultry product trade volumes is consistent with the liberalization of poultry product provisions between NAFTA and the USMCA. Overall, the poultry industry's post-USMCA trade performance has been consistent with Maggi and Staiger's prediction that trade agreement renegotiation results in trade liberalization.
When Logic Trumped Anger: A Case Study of the Impact of Political Rhetoric on the Outcome of NAFTA Renegotiation

Figure 4A. U.S.-Canada: Pre-USMCA Poultry Trade Volumes and Trendline 2010-2020

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2020 data has been annualized.

Figure 4B. U.S.-Canada: Post-USMCA Poultry Trade Volumes and Trendline

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2020 and 2022 data have been annualized.

Figure 5. U.S.-Canada: Total Trade Volumes, Selected Agricultural Industries 2002-2022

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2022 data has been annualized.
Agriculture Between the United States and Canada.

Figure 5 displays the cumulative trade volumes of the dairy, poultry, margarine, and peanut products; overall, post-NAFTA, the industries have seen an increase in trade volumes. However, Figure 6A demonstrates that, between 2010 and 2020, these industries, collectively, experienced a slow average rate of increase from year to year. Following the USMCA’s implementation, however, the rate of increase has become faster than in the ten years prior as Figure 6B demonstrates above. The faster rate of increase in the collective trade volumes of these industries is consistent with the liberalization of agricultural provisions between NAFTA and the USMCA. Overall, these commodities’ post-USMCA trade performance has been consistent with Maggi and Staiger’s prediction that trade agreement renegotiation results in trade liberalization.

Automobiles Between All USMCA Parties.

Figure 7 demonstrates that, post-NAFTA, the automobile industry has seen little growth overall in trade volumes. In 2009, trade volumes for the industry reached a trough before entering a period of slow growth that ultimately peaked in 2019; a subsequent decline nearly erased the gains in trade volume made between 2002 and 2020. Figure 8A’s almost entirely flat slope confirms an almost nonexistent post-NAFTA year-to-year increase. Unlike previously discussed sectors, however, post-USMCA, the automobile industry’s trade volumes neither experienced a faster rate of increase nor generally increased; in fact, post-USMCA, the industry’s trade volumes have, on average, declined as shown in Figure 8B. The decrease in this industry’s trade volumes is consistent with the protectionist changes made between NAFTA and USMCA’s automobile provisions. Overall, the automobile industry’s
Figure 7. U.S.-Mexico-Canada: Total Trade Volumes, Auto Industries 2002-2022

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2022 data has been annualized.

Figure 8A. Pre-USMCA Auto Industry Trade Volumes and Trendline 2010-2020

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2020 data has been annualized.

Figure 8B. Post-USMCA Auto Industry Trade Volumes and Trendline

Source: Author’s calculations based on NAICS District-level data from USA Trade Online and FRED (series GDPC1). 2020 and 2022 data have been annualized.
post-USMCA trade performance has not been consistent with Maggi and Staiger’s prediction that trade agreement renegotiation results in trade liberalization.

**IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

The path from 2016, in which Trump frequently lambasted NAFTA on the campaign trail, to September 30, 2018, on which all USMCA parties were satisfied with the renegotiated deal, is not an immediately apparent one; however, an overall more liberal trade deal did emerge from a rhetorically hostile and tense renegotiation. Two assumptions could explain this outcome. The first assumption is that, although Trump’s NAFTA renegotiation rhetoric, including both criticism of the trade deal and occasional personal attacks, was mainly directed toward his international counterparts, the goals he wished to accomplish with this rhetoric were likely domestic. As noted earlier in the case study, American public opinion on NAFTA remained largely divided from its enactment onward; on the other hand, international trade and globalization have become staples within the international system. When a political issue spurs division among voters, the issue is considered a position issue; when an issue generates consensus among voters, the issue is considered a valence issue (Green 2007, 629). NAFTA may have held the status of a position issue among the American public but because policymakers understand the well-known mutual benefits of free trade among nations, the international system predominantly considers NAFTA a valence issue. While Trump’s criticism of NAFTA was likely legitimately felt, the difference in the domestic and international perceptions of this issue provided Trump with leeway to loudly beat the anti-NAFTA drum, even to the sound of threatened withdrawal, to receive support from his base while avoiding the consequences of actual withdrawal. Between 1993 and 2018, net Republican approval of U.S.-Canada trade policy fell from 74 percentage points to 8; during the same time period, net Republican approval of U.S.-Mexico trade policy fell from 8 percentage points to -33 (Newport 2018). Goldstein (1986) notes that free trade and its benefits are fixtures of contemporary American intellectual tradition (1986, 164). While free trade may now be rooted in American policymakers’ garden-variety positions, the state must still present itself as concerned with globalization’s effects on the domestic economy; state leaders can convey this concern through “symbolic support” (Goldstein 1986, 166). In the case of NAFTA renegotiation, Trump’s response to his base of support amounted to more than symbolism but less than the radical changes promised on the campaign trail.

The second assumption that may explain the renegotiation’s outcome is that trade negotiators, through their bureaucratic and diplomatic experience, salvaged a deal from the decomposing situation that the political leaders had brought about with their clashing personalities. Under this assumption, Trump and Trudeau legitimately considered withdrawal at varying points of renegotiation but were unable to effectively convince their negotiators to act on their sentiments. Further research for this assumption would likely be dependent on either the Homo Psychologicus or Homo Bureaucraticus models of foreign policy analysis. The Homo Psychologicus model, in which policymakers’ personal experiences, beliefs, and personalities play fundamental roles in their decision making (Houghton 2013, 71–72), would be well-suited to investigate the first proposition of this assumption. The Homo Bureaucraticus model, in which a state’s domestic organizations and their “standard operating procedures” determine a state’s foreign policy decisions (Omar 2022), would be well-suited to investigate the second proposition of this assumption.

The automobile’s post-USMCA protectionist trend proved to be the most surprising result of the case study as the finding does not align with Maggi and Staiger’s prediction that renegotiation results in trade liberalization; interestingly, based on this case study’s calculations, automobile trade between the United States and Mexico is considerably higher than automobile trade between the U.S. and Canada. Two circumstances may provide partial explanations for this protectionist outcome. First, differences in economic development between the two nations may have provided the United States with greater leverage during the process of renegotiation; this may have allowed Mexico to become more amenable to the U.S.’ protectionist demands. Second, and potentially as a result of the first, Mexican negotiators were not publicly as proactive as American and Canadian negotiators. A greater degree of proactivity may have resulted in less dramatic changes to automobile provisions between NAFTA and USMCA. This challenging, contradictory finding requires more research for its satisfying resolution.

Through one mechanism or another, trade theory’s perspective on trade agreement renegotiation largely prevailed despite the populist disposition and hostile rhetoric from an involved party. The first assumption discussed above describes a situation in which a perceptual difference allowed the populist party to amplify their supporters’ conception of them as an effective, restorative fighter on behalf of the people when, in reality, the party would inevitably run into practical constraints. The second assumption describes a situation in which seasoned veterans of the international system withstood the ardor of fresh, fleeting politicians and navigated them to a rational conclusion. These assumptions originate from the case study’s end result: large distortions within the international system, in the form of a drastically different balance of trade in this case, did not transpire despite said distortions being one party’s purported objective. Populism poked, but failed to penetrate, the international system; the system’s encasement, its logical shell, did not break.

While the underlying logic of trade theory and the greater international system remained resilient in this case, a growing force may challenge this resiliency moving forward. This case study has already explored this force: the
growing frustrations of the “losers of globalization.” Certain demographics, such as the less educated or the working class, feel adversely affected by globalization. Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck (2016) identify three dynamics of globalization that highlight the vulnerability that these groups experience in a changing world: “increased economic competition, heightened cultural diversity and cultural competition, and increased political competition between the state and all kinds of supra-national organizations” (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, 337). Less educated individuals lack the skills to be competitive in evolving markets, changing public attitudes can ostracize working class individuals who struggle to keep up, and these groups may ultimately feel unrepresented by policymakers (Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck 2016, 37); all of these conditions can make populism appealing to these groups. While Goldstein (1986) argues that states need not substantively respond to their citizens’ complaints about globalization, recent history has demonstrated that mounting frustrations can eventually boil over into violence. As the potential for violence grows, grievance poses an ever-greater threat to the international system.

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