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### Editorial Board

### Advisory Board

# Editor's Preface to the Fall Edition

Here at Elon University, we are extremely grateful for the opportunity to host the Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics for the coming years. We are proud to present the Fall 2020 issue, and congratulate all authors published in this issue.

This journal seeks to highlight the intellectual curiosity that has led to innovative scholarship in all subfields of political science, scholarship that addresses timely questions, is carefully crafted, and utilizes diverse methodologies. We are committed to intellectual integrity, a fair and objective double-blind review process, and a high standard of scholarship. Through this publication, we aim to accentuate student achievements in political science research and showcase the works of undergraduate scholars, some of which has been traditionally ignored in the broader field of political science literature, despite representing the future of this discipline.

As an editorial team composed entirely of women, we understand that this occurrence is not a common one. Following the lead of the all-female American Political Science Review (APSR) Editorial Board, we are excited to promote research in the areas of "American politics, comparative politics, international relations, political theory, public law and policy, racial and ethnic politics, the politics of gender and sexuality and qualitative and quantitative research methods." This journal values the relationships formed through student-faculty collaboration and aims to inspire a culture of intellectual curiosity that expands far beyond the college campus. In addition to recognizing the academic endeavors of undergraduate students, we hope to further encourage and empower students to seek out knowledge and realize their potential in contributing to growing scholarship in a variety of disciplines.

In the journal's first year, we want to emphasize our appreciation for all the individuals who have made this first publication possible. Our advisors, Dr. Laura Roselle, Dr. Baris Kesgin, and Dr. Aaron Sparks, have been unwavering in their support of us throughout this entire process. Without their consistent support and insights, this issue would not have been possible. In addition, we would like to thank the entirety of the Political Science and Policy Studies Department at Elon University, as well as our Faculty Advisory Editorial Board reviewers for all of their hard work and support.

Going forward, we are excited to create a culture within our Editorial Board that embraces these values and continues to strive for excellence for the remainder of the journal's tenure at Elon University. Thank you for your continued support and readership of our publication, we hope you enjoy our first edition.

Sincerely,

*The Editorial Board at Elon University*

# Submission of Manuscripts

The Journal accepts manuscripts from undergraduates of any class and major. Members of Pi Sigma Alpha are especially encouraged to enter their work. We strive to publish papers of the highest quality in all areas of political science.

Generally, selected manuscripts have been well-written works with a fully developed thesis and strong argumentation stemming from original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their work before being accepted for publication.

Submission deadlines are October 1st for the Fall edition and February 15th for the Spring edition. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis; therefore early submissions are strongly encouraged.

To submit your work, please email psajournalelon@gmail.com with an attached Word document of the manuscript. Please include your name, university and contact details (mailing address, email address, and phone number) in a separate document.

Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (approximately 150 words), citations and references that follow the *APSA Style Manual for Political Science*. Please do not exceed the maximum page length of 35 double-spaced pages, which includes references, tables, figures, and appendices.

The Journal is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board that are undergraduate students and Pi Sigma Alpha members at Elon University.

The Editorial Board relies heavily on the help of our Faculty Advisory Board consisting of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council. Due to the time committed to the manuscript review process, we would like to remind students to submit only one manuscript at a time.

Please direct any questions about submissions or the Journal's upcoming editions to the editors at Elon University: psajournalelon@gmail.com.

# Contents

# The Australian Foreign Aid-Immigration Nexus: A Tool to Uphold Policies of Detention and Deportation

**Ava Bowman Thomas, Saint Olaf College**

*As international migrant stocks around the world continue to grow, immigrant recipient countries employ different tools to reduce irregular migration. In addition to traditional border controls, many countries utilize foreign aid to increase development and reduce migration push factors. Research shows this tactic is conditionally effective, however, little is known about whether governments choose to use foreign aid instead of, or in addition to, traditional border control policies. In order to understand this relationship, this paper explores the following question: do states that utilize foreign aid in order to reduce irregular migration do so as a substitute for, or compliment to, traditional border control methods? Through a case study of Australian border control and foreign aid regimes, this paper identifies a nuanced relationship between foreign aid and border control, and one that is subject to change depending on migrant arrival levels. Between 2001-2013 hardline policies and foreign aid were used concurrently to support immigration-related goals. This shifted in 2013 after a spike in arrivals caused the government to lose confidence in the ability of aid to reduce migration and increase funding for border patrol. Additionally, this paper explores Australia's recent practice of offering aid to third-party countries that agree to host migrant processing centers, demonstrating that aid is not always a substitute to border control, but can be used to increase capacity of hardline policies.*

## INTRODUCTION

As global wealth inequality continues to grow and international transportation becomes more readily available, international migration has become a more attractive, accessible and often necessary option for people around the globe (UN International Migrant Stock 2019). Though the majority of migration occurs through legal channels, the public conversation about migration has largely focused on increases in irregular migration, asylum seekers, and undocumented immigrants. Increases in migrant arrivals can lead a country towards employing hardline border control policies, but this is only one of many tools states use to control irregular migration. Scholars have recently focused on the practice of using foreign aid to address the root causes of migration, such as poverty and underdevelopment, and the conditions under which it is most effective (Phillips and Spinks 2014; Bermeo and Leblang 2015). However, there is very little literature examining the interactions between foreign aid and traditional border control regimes. This paper aims to close this gap by exploring the following question: do states that utilize foreign aid in order to reduce irregular migration do so as a substitute for, or compliment to, traditional border control methods? In other words, when a government earmarks foreign aid for immigration-related goals, does funding for traditional border control decrease?

To test this question, this paper engages in a case study of the Australian foreign aid-immigration nexus through the examination of government documents, NGO reports, and aid disbursements. Australia presents a suitable case to examine the interactions between foreign aid and border control policies given its participation in the OECD Development Assistance Committee and use of hardline immigration policies. This research predicts that because states have finite resources, and the majority of the research shows foreign aid is conditionally successful in decreasing irregular migration, foreign aid will be used as a substitute for border control policies. Therefore, if Australia has used foreign aid to meet immigration-related goals, the amount of funding necessary for traditional border control policies would subsequently decline.

An in-depth investigation of the Australian immigration regime provided two main findings, neither of which clearly confirm or reject this research's hypothesis of a substitutionary relationship. Instead, it revealed a more nuanced interaction between aid and border control, one that was subject to significant change depending on levels of irregular arrivals. An analysis of aid disbursements shows that for more than ten years, aid was used as a complement to hardline deportation policies, but this ended in 2013 when aid disbursements were drastically cut, and funding was shifted towards border control. Several factors that typically impact foreign aid allocation are

explored in order to understand why this shift occurred, with the conclusion that an increase in irregular arrivals led to the belief that aid was not an effective migration control tactic.

Additionally, this paper also explores Australia's tendency to bypass the typical bilateral relationship between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, by offering aid to countries that agree to host migrant processing centers. This shows that aid is not always a clear alternative to hardline detention and deportation systems, but rather, an increase in foreign aid disbursements can sometimes lead to an increase in capacity for traditional punitive policies.

This paper begins with a review of existing scholarly literature on the domestic and international factors that impact aid allocation, and the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing irregular migration. A justification of the use of the case study method as well as this research's process for case selection will follow. This research will then present background about irregular immigration and the use of foreign aid in Australia to provide context for the current state of affairs. An analysis of the Australian foreign aid-immigration nexus is presented, followed by a discussion section that includes opportunities to build upon this research.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

For decades scholars have understood that migration is fueled by wage differentials between immigrants' country of origin and destination country (Sjastaad 1962), and that the function of foreign aid is not purely altruistic, but rather countries "usually give because they expect to get something in return" (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976: 133). Only more recently have scholars honed in on the potential intersections of these processes: the use of foreign aid to reduce immigration flows. Multiple studies conclude that countries that produce large migrant flows are prioritized in aid budgets (Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Vásquez and Sobrao 2016), and many scholars have noted the EU's recent focus on using development aid to address the root cause of the surge of migrant arrivals in 2015 (Dennison et al. 2019). While not having found any research about how countries choose to balance the use of foreign aid and border control policies to meet immigration goals, scholarship focused on aid allocation strategies and the effectiveness of foreign aid as a tool to meet immigration goals helps to situate this paper in the scholarly conversation.

Many scholars have investigated the complex calculation donor countries make when allocating foreign aid. During the cold war and post-cold war eras, aid was typically allocated using a calculation of donor geopolitical interest and recipient need. However, Blodgett Bermeo (2016) argues that in the post-911 world, states include the desire for targeted-development in this calculation due to the belief that underdevelopment has exacerbated problems such as regional instability and migration. This shift in aid priorities can be seen within the EU's proposed Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation

Instrument, which calls for each member state to donate 10 percent of the allocated funding to fight the root causes of irregular migration (European Parliament 2019). However, aid allocation is also affected by domestic politics and other pressures. Public opinion and party ideology, both its place on the right-left continuum and its relative focus on international affairs, have an impact on the amount of aid and the purpose for which it is given (Greene and Licht 2018, Heinrich et al. 2016). Additionally, actors outside of a states' government can also have an impact on both the recipient and amount of aid donated. Youngwan Kim's (2014) research concluded that NGOs heavily influence aid allocation in the United States. While Australia has far fewer NGOs than the United States, their recent growth and unified focus signals they may have the ability to influence aid allocation (Australian Council for International Development 2015).

Most of the literature that examines the use of foreign aid to manage migration focuses on economic aid and its potential to promote development and reduce poverty-related push factors (Bermeo and Leblang 2015; Berthélemy et al. 2009; Lanati and Thiele 2018; Gamso and Yuldashev 2018a), though some scholars have investigated the effectiveness of governance aid in reducing political push factors for immigration (Gamso and Yuldashev 2018b). The majority of this research finds that aid is conditionally effective. Several decades ago, Vententuri and Faini (1993) introduced the inverse-U or hump-shaped model, to show that while income growth in middle-income countries will decrease emigration, income growth in lower-income countries will lead to increased emigration. Another, more recent, study confirmed the continuing validity of this model (Berthélemy et al. 2009). The inverse-U model implies that foreign aid will better achieve immigration goals when given to middle-income countries rather than lower-income countries. This is due to the fact that in lower-income countries the additional income is not enough to reduce push factors, and is instead used to cover the costs of migration. For immigrants in middle-income countries that previously had enough income to migrate, the additional capital improves conditions and reduces immigration push factors. However, using newly available migration flow data rather than traditional migrant stock data, scholars at the Max Weber Institute dispute the validity of the inverse-U model, and claim that economic development reduces immigration flows from even the most poor countries (Lanati and Thiele 2018). Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yudashev present extensive research on ways to maximize effectiveness of foreign aid contributions. They find that disaggregating aid types is important, as democracy aid is much more effective at reducing immigration than economic aid (2018b). Additionally, they claim that focusing aid on rural development decreases migration flows, while giving to urban areas increases urbanization and ultimately international migration (2018a). These claims that aid is only conditionally effective provides evidence of why some countries choose

to use foreign aid as part of their immigration regime while others may not. Depending on the country of origin of their immigrant populations, giving may reduce immigration in some cases but increase it in others.

While almost all of the research done on the foreign aid-immigration nexus is quantitative, qualitative work looking at the impacts of foreign aid on individual decisions suggests that it would be effective in reducing immigration. Half of Guatemalans interviewed in a study by Monica Spohn stated that they "would not have emigrated if development programs had offered educational opportunities and jobs" (Spohn 2017:1), but in the absence of opportunities felt they had no choice but to migrate. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), funded three Centers for Returned Migrant Care in Honduras (Ruiz Soto et al. 2019). These centers help deported migrants reintegrate into society through caring for their health and safety during the tumultuous first weeks after arrival, reducing incentives for repeat migration.

In short, the literature about the use of aid to manage migration is overwhelmingly focused on the effectiveness of the practice. Scholarship regarding factors that influence aid allocation may offer clues, but no existing literature has explored if certain attributes make a state more or less likely to use foreign aid as a tool to meet immigration-related goals. Additionally, existing literature has not explored the interactions between foreign aid regimes and traditional immigration policies such as border control, for example if they are substitutes for one another or used concurrently. It is this gap in the literature that this paper aims to fill using a case-study of Australia.

## METHODOLOGY

### Case Study Method

While many articles examine the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing irregular migration (Berthélemy et. al 2009, Lanati and Thiele 2018, Venturini and Faini 1993), existing literature does not conclude whether governments use foreign aid in addition to or as a substitute for traditional border control. The research method best equipped to answer this question is a qualitative case study. A strength of case studies is the ability to "closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases and their capacity for addressing causal complexity" (George and Bennett 2005, 19). These strengths are important to this study as they will help determine if the hypothesized causal mechanisms of finite resources and aid efficacy impact the hypothesized outcome, decreased funding for border control policies, as well as uncover other potential causal mechanisms. Additionally, because aid allocation calculations are complex, impacted by domestic and international pressures as discussed in the literature review, the ability of a case study to "accommodate complex causal relations" (22) makes the method more appropriate than a quantitative analysis.

Much of the decision making in both foreign aid and immigration policy circles happens behind closed doors, and it is difficult to find direct evidence of the thought process of government officials. Therefore, this investigation required careful examination of parliamentary budgets, previous scholarly investigative work, aid disbursement documents, online newspaper articles, and NGO reports. In the beginning stages of this research, NGO and human rights organizations, such as the Australian Refugee Council, provided key terms used in government documents and the context needed to locate these documents online.

Through these government documents, information was gathered about the interesting interactions between the Australian immigration and aid regimes. While certain pieces of evidence were explicitly stated within the documents, the majority had to be pieced together through multiple sources over multiple years. For example, to understand the benefits Nauru received for hosting a processing facility, one had to understand how little Australian foreign policy documents mentioned Nauru before 2001 in comparison to the country's position of prominence after the establishment of the processing center. To give another example, even though they made no mention of border security, government documents that explained the foreign policy relationship between Australia and hosts of processing facilities often provided information about the quid-pro-quo of foreign aid and border security.

My research explores aid and immigration policy between the years preceding the 2001 Pacific Solution and present day. The implementation of this zero-tolerance program marked a shift in Australia's hardline stance towards irregular maritime arrivals, and therefore when the nexus of border patrol and foreign aid policies can be distinguished. Thus examining aid before and after this period is crucial to proving the link between foreign aid and border control. This research includes the most up to date research possible, utilizing budgets and aid disbursement information from 2019-20. However, the Australian government has not updated maritime arrival data since 2017, and does not regularly release information about the populations of Nauru and Manus Island.

### Case Selection

When deciding on a country of focus for this research, Australia became a country of interest due to the intense focus on immigration in their domestic political conversation. Their zero-tolerance policy for irregular maritime entries has been praised by far-right world leaders like Donald Trump (Henriques-Gomes 2019). Due to the attention devoted to immigration, data on irregular arrivals in the past few decades is readily available, unlike many other countries that do not publish such statistics. In addition to these statistics, there was a wealth of research about Australian immigration and foreign aid regimes which provided enough context to justify an examination into the interactions between the two. Given that this research question requires the examination of foreign

aid disbursements, it was imperative that the country of study would consistently give enough aid that the disbursement data could be analyzed. Australia presented a suitable case in this regard, as they give a sizable amount of aid, and government budgets and aid disbursement data are relatively accessible via official government websites. Of the 30 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Australia ranked 12th in aid volume, and 19th in aid as a percentage of GNI in 2017 (Australian Aid Tracker 2019). Because Australia gives a large amount of aid, it can be tracked and trends can be compared over years or decades. It is also beneficial that Australia is not the most generous of the DAC members, as this could skew the results and reduce generalizability. Although there is a wealth of research about the EU's use of aid to address the root causes of irregular migration, the funding landscape is "fragmented and incoherent, with limited coordination" between member states (den Hertog 2016). This would make it difficult to analyze the behavior of a single EU member state, and may also make the results less generalizable. Therefore, even though there is less information available about the Australian foreign aid-immigration nexus, it presents a more transparent, generalizable subject.

## BACKGROUND ON THE CASE
### Irregular Immigration to Australia

Australia's history of irregular immigration is distinct. Unlike the US or Canada, countries where economic migrants represent the majority of irregular migrants, most irregular migrants in Australia are refugees seeking asylum. In the grand majority of cases, when migrants reach the country, they turn themselves in to authorities and claim asylum. Additionally, irregular migrant flows are much lighter than those to the US. In 2013 at the peak of the largest wave of migration in recent history, Australia received just over 20,000 irregular maritime arrivals. In comparison, the US Department of Homeland Security apprehended 662,000 migrants in the 2013 fiscal year (Simanski 2014). However, Australia received significantly more than the 3,237 irregular migrants apprehended by Spain in 2013, another OECD country that receives the majority of its irregular migrants by boat (European Commission 2014). Given the clandestine nature of irregular immigration, statistics about migration flows typically only include apprehensions or are projections. For this reason, it is difficult to rank Australia amongst other OECD countries, but it is clear that Australia is not a clear outlier in the number of migrants received per year.

Historically, the response to increased levels of irregular maritime arrivals has been harsh. Following a spike in asylum seekers in 2001, Australia implemented the Pacific Solution. This program funded the off-shore immigrant processing facilities in Nauru and Manus Island (PNG) with the goal of keeping track of all irregular migrants during the processing period. The Australian government ended this program in 2008, but it resumed in 2012 after a new spike in arrivals.

In 2013 the government implemented Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), committing Australia to a zero-tolerance policy for the resettlement of irregular maritime arrivals. From this point on, all irregular migrants that reached Australian shores would be turned away. Due to concerns about the unfit conditions reported at the Manus processing center, it was officially closed by the government in October 2017. However, some immigrants refused to leave the camp due to fears of violence from locals, and continued living there for weeks (The Straits Times 2017). The Nauru camp continues to operate and as of September 30th, 2019 there were 562 people at the facility (Refugee Council of Australia 2019). Figure 1 demonstrates the impact of the Pacific Solution and Operation Southern Borders on irregular migration: the implementation of these policies led to a sharp decline in maritime arrivals. Between 2002-06, fewer than 100 migrant arrivals were reported by the Australian government. The zero-tolerance promise of OSB was taken seriously, and in 2015-16 no irregular migrants were reported to have reached Australia by boat.

### Foreign Aid Disbursement

Australia has historically been a reliable aid donor, and has been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee since 1961. Participation in the DAC shows Australia's commitment to reducing global poverty and willingness to assist developing countries enter into the global economy. Between the years of 1995 and 2015, Australia consistently fell near the middle of DAC members for total aid disbursements as a percentage of Gross National Income. Though exact amounts fluctuate year to year, Australia has historically designated approximately .3% of its Gross National Income (GNI) to be used as official development assistance (Australian Aid Tracker). While this is far less than many of the Nordic countries that earmark more than 1% of their GNI for aid, it is more substantial than many Eastern European DAC members, whose aid represents between .1%-.15% of their GNI.

Aid amounts increased in pace with inflation for decades, before a period of scale up that far outpaced inflation between 2004-2013. Both Labor (progressive) and Liberal (conservative) party administrations allocated additional money to foreign aid programs during this period. This ended in 2013, when the government began cutting aid dramatically. After five consecutive years of cuts, Australian aid disbursements reached their lowest levels since 2005 (Larking 2017). These cuts coincided with the integration of AusAID, the agency formerly tasked with distributing foreign aid, into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (Tomar and Bruere 2014). After this readjustment, the government changed the frameworks used to distribute foreign aid, focusing on "effectiveness and the accountability of aid partners" (Dept. Foreign Affairs and Trade 2014).

Figure 1: Number of Illegal Maritime Arrivals to Australia 1989-2016



Number of Illegal Maritime Arrivals to Australia 1989-2016 as reported by the Department of Immigration (1989-2008) and Customs and Border Patrol (2009-2016). Statistics do not include crew members. Because of the wide variance in maritime arrivals, some years appear to have zero arrivals but actually have a non-zero amount. To better represent these years, a full table of maritime arrivals by year is in appendix I.

Figure 2: Total Australian Aid 2000-2023 in billions of Australian Dollars



Australian Aid 2000-2023 in billions of Australian Dollars. Aid amounts for 2019-2023 are estimates given in the 2018-19 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade budget. Data from Australian Aid Tracker.

# THE IMMIGRATION-AID NEXUS

## Concurrent use of Border Protection and Foreign Aid

Since the adoption of the Pacific Solution in 2001, Australia has consistently utilized hardline policies in an attempt to reduce irregular immigration. Of these policies, off-shore detention in processing centers on Nauru and Manus Island receive the most attention, as they are the most clear examples of the extreme methods the Australian government is willing to use to reduce irregular migration. However, between 2001 and 2013, Australia also utilized foreign aid to meet immigration goals, proving that these tactics can be used concurrently.

As noted in the literature review, there are many domestic policy priorities and international expectations that ultimately factor into the equation a state uses when allocating aid. While it's difficult to definitively prove that Australia allocated aid with the goal of reducing migration, comparing the nationalities of migrants in the Nauru and Manus detention facilities to the countries that receive development aid reveals correlations between the two. Between 2013 and 2017, the top countries of origin for migrants in processing centers were Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Sudan (Figure 3; Australian Refugee Council). Some of these countries are part of the Asian-Pacific region, the traditional recipient of the majority of Australian aid due to geographic proximity and the importance placed on regional

stability (Australian Aid Tracker; "Making Performance Count"). It is therefore difficult to decipher whether aid is given due to these countries for traditional interests or for immigration purposes. However, looking specifically at the Middle Eastern countries of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan helps to identify the connection between immigration flows and foreign aid priorities.

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan may have not otherwise received aid due to their geographic distance from Australia, yet each received millions of dollars in aid in the first decade of the 21st century, providing evidence that the government used foreign aid to meet immigration goals. Pakistan received only A$2 million in aid in 2001, but was granted more than A$100 million in 2012, far outpacing the overall growth of aid. Similarly, aid to Afghanistan increased almost eightfold, from A$26.5 million to A$197 million in 2012 (Australia Aid Tracker). Aid to Iraq does not present as clear of a pattern, as aid disbursements have been tumultuous and closely tied to the ongoing war. In 2001, Australia gave over A$100 million in humanitarian assistance (AusAID 2002). In 2012-13, Iraq received A$26.9 million in aid (AusAID 2012). Though it did not undergo the explosion in growth that Afghanistan and Pakistan received, this amount of aid is still notable given its geographic distance from Australia. The rapid growth of aid to these countries shows that they were a priority to AusAID, even though they are not part of the Asian-Pacific region, the



Figure 3: Nationalities of Immagrants at Nauru and Manus Detention Facilities 2013-2017

Legend: ■ Nauru   ■ Manus Island

Nationalities of Immigrants sent for offshore processing at Nauru and Manus Detention Facilities between 2013 and 2017. Data from Refugee Council of Australia.

Figure 4: Australian Aid Disbursements Listed in the 2012-13 AusAID BlueBook

A map of Australian aid disbursements listed in the 2012-13 AusAID BlueBook. An interactive map can be accessed at https://arcg.is/rG8Hi. Data from AusAID.

traditional recipients of Australian aid. Immigration patterns offer an explanation, seeing that these three countries are the origins of many irregular immigrants from the Middle East, as evidenced by populations on Nauru and Manus. Neighboring countries that do not produce heavy migration flows receive less aid and attention in AusAID annual reports. This can be clearly seen in Figure 4, which displays Australian aid disbursements at the height of the scale-up in 2012-13. Both Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq receive large amounts of aid given their geographic position.

The map also indicates a large amount of aid was given to Palestine. It is probable that Palestinians are represented amongst the migrants who identify as stateless in the processing centers, given that the general delegation of Palestine to Australia reports that the 2011 census counted more than 10000 Australians with Palestinian ancestry. However, it is difficult to decipher if aid was allocated with regards to migration seeing that Palestine would likely receive aid in any case due to the on-going humanitarian crisis.

It is important to note that the populations of the processing centers are constantly changing due to international economic and political factors. Given that the Australian government does not regularly release or update statistics about the facilities, (Refugee Council of Australia 2019), using data that compiles migrant populations from 2013-2017 is the most accurate way to compare irregular migration flows and foreign aid disbursements.

## Reducing Foreign Aid in Favor of Border Protection Policies

After several years of nearly zero irregular maritime arrivals, boat landings increased significantly in 2008. Arrivals continued to grow exponentially for several years, reaching a high point of more than 20,000 migrant arrivals in 2012-13 (Phillips 2017). The increase in arrivals led to the creation of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) in 2013. OSB took Australia's hardline policies to a new extreme, asserting a zero-tolerance policy for irregular immigration. After the implementation of the program, no one, who traveled to Australia without a visa would be able to stay in the country, including asylum seekers. Upon arrival, all migrants would be returned to their home country or point of departure (Operation Sovereign Borders). The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has only released budgets for the 2015-20 fiscal years on their website, but it is clear that since OSB, the government has spent exuberant amounts of money to keep Australia's borders closed. Despite saying each year that the next year's costs will drop significantly, the government has consistently spent A$1 billion or more per year on operating offshore detention facilities (Figure 5). In addition to these staggering amounts, border enforcement costs more than A$1 billion each year and is steadily increasing (DHA Budgets 2015-2020).

During this same period, Australian aid disbursements significantly decreased for the first time in decades, with

countries producing large populations of irregular migrants bearing the brunt of these cuts. Between 2013 and 2017, total aid was reduced by 20%. The same countries that saw the most growth under the previous period received significant cuts in aid. By 2017, Afghanistan received 50% less aid, and Pakistan received 40% less aid. Iraq continued to receive high amounts of humanitarian aid, including a A$100 million humanitarian relief package for the country. Despite continued aid to Iraq, the disproportionate decrease in aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan is evidence of Australia moving away from using foreign aid as a tool to reduce immigration. Decreases in aid were largely due to the perception that aid is not effective in reaching its specific stated goals. Following the absorption of AusAID into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013, DFAT released a report highlighting the new framework that would be used when allocating aid. The report repeatedly emphasizes that in the future, aid partners would be held accountable for improving conditions designated by the Australian government or would suffer aid cuts. These changes signal that the government believed that the aid program, including aid used to meet immigration goals, was ineffective. Even after large increases in aid, migrant arrivals surged between 2009-2013. This could be interpreted as the failure of development aid to meet its goals and cause the outsized reduction in aid given to countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, as mentioned above. During the years

following the implementation of OSB, the government shifted its attention towards border control and away from foreign aid when working to reduce irregular migration.

## Giving aid to third party states willing to detain migrants

As mentioned, the off-shore detention camps have been costly and receive significant scrutiny from human rights organizations and the international community at large. Why would any state choose to host one of these centers, given their poor reputation and that the immigrant resettlement process would not likely affect their domestic affairs? The answer lies in a quid-pro-quo; Australia promised large sums of aid to countries that agreed to host migrant processing centers or accept unwanted asylum seekers.

The two countries that currently host migrant processing centers receive large amounts of aid from Australia. In 2017, Nauru, a small island with a population of 13,000 received more than A$25 million in aid, amounting to more than 25% of their GDP (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019). As a tiny state in Micronesia, Nauru is not a security threat or potential trade partner, and therefore does not fit the aid partner priorities the government set out in 2014. Rather, the aid to Nauru is intimately tied to hosting a migrant processing facility. Prior to the creation of this center in 2001, Nauru was not an important part of the Australian aid regime.



Figure 5: Australian Offshore Detention Estimated vs. Actual Management Costs, 2014-2020

Actual operation costs of offshore detention compared to the estimate given by the previous year's budget. Amounts in billions of Australian dollars. Data from Australian Department of Home Affairs.

The country was mentioned only briefly in earlier annual aid reports, to acknowledge a scholarship program and the eradication of a species of fly (AusAID 1999, AusAID 2000, AusAID 2001). This changed dramatically in 2001-2002, as Nauru was mentioned 17 times in the annual aid report. This report included specific challenges on Nauru that the Australian government intended to combat, specifically the end of phosphate-mining and lack of basic medical services (AusAID 2002). These problems did not occur spuriously in 2001. It is likely the increased attention on Nauru is due to the detention center built on the island the same year, and that these problems were simply a way of justifying the A$19 million given to the island. Interestingly, the subtotal for the Pacific region in the 2002 AusAID report includes only A$.2 million of this aid, while the vast majority, A$18.8 million was listed as "Nauru additional" and excluded from the subtotal. This extra aid was committed "as part of Australia's response to "people smuggling" (AusAID 2002).

The term "people smuggling", though indirect in phrasing, is a reference to irregular maritime immigration. Many of the migrants arriving by boat pay smugglers to help them in their journey (UNHCR 2015), and thus a response to people smuggling is synonymous with a response to irregular migration. This is confirmed by examining the original text of the Pacific Solution that called for the creation of the Nauru processing facility. According to a Senate Committee report on the terms of the Pacific Solution, the agreement with Nauru to build a processing center included "extra development assistance under the FAA and MOU [totaling] A$26.5m. A$19.5m was allocated for 2001-2002 and A$7 million in 2002-2003" (Select Committee 2013, 10.38). According to the Development Policy Institute, aid has continued to flow to Nauru at around A$20 million per year (Australian Aid Tracker), yet there could potentially be more aid that is not published in official documents. For example, budget papers in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 "did not even reveal the amount of additional aid allocated for Nauru, stating that the figure [was] 'not for publication'" (Maclellan 2013). It is clear that Australia used foreign aid to support an offshore processing center in Nauru, and ultimately their zero-tolerance policy for irregular maritime arrivals.

While Papua New Guinea did not receive an increase in aid to incentivize the creation of the Manus Island processing center, a quid-pro-quo can also be observed in the fine print of the agreement. Unlike Nauru, PNG fits the framework for an aid partner given its size, colonial ties to Australia, and history of instability. Australia has consistently given millions of dollars in aid to the country since its independence. Additionally, the Pacific Solution explicitly states that unlike the agreement with Nauru, there would be "no additional development aid provided to PNG under the MOU" (Select Committee 2013, 10.54). Nonetheless, there is evidence that the deal between the two countries relied heavily upon previously allocated foreign aid. While the country did not receive additional aid,

projects already in place were prioritized. In 2002, the PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed that the establishment of the processing center "resulted in the fast tracking of important AusAID projects for Manus, such as the Papitalia High School, Police Housing and upgrading of the Momote airport" (Select Committee 2013, 10.54). Additionally, in order to equip the island to hold more than a thousand refugees, sewage, water, and electricity systems were upgraded, presenting obvious advantages to the government of PNG.

While Australia did not give additional aid during the construction of the detention center, PNG received aid in response to the reopening of the facility in 2013 after a five year hiatus of the Pacific Solution. A MOU signed between the two countries in 2013 stated in exchange for accepting refugees Australia "would develop a package of assistance and other bilateral cooperation, which will be in addition to the current allocation of Australian development cooperation assistance to PNG" (Memorandum 2013). This resulted in an increase in aid to PNG in a time when many countries saw major cuts in assistance. During the aid scale down, when many countries saw reductions of 50% or more, Papua New Guinea's budget received a cut of only 4.6% (Tomar 2015). It is also important to note that as Australia's largest recipient of aid, receiving more than A$500 million each year, PNG most likely feels pressure to grant Australia's requests, even if no additional aid is promised. The loss of Australian aid would be an enormous blow to the PNG economy, and given that Australia has proven that they are willing to cut aid by up to 70% in a single year (Tomar 2015), PNG may feel that they have no choice but to implement Australia's border control regime.

Nauru and PNG avoided the majority of aid cuts discussed in the previous section, showing that the government viewed this aid as effective under the new guidelines set forth by the DFAT. This is not surprising given that Operation Sovereign Borders, a plan that revolved around the offshore processing centers, reduced arrivals to zero within a few years of implementation.

## DISCUSSION

An analysis of the Australian foreign-aid immigration nexus reveals a more nuanced interaction between the policies than the predicted substitutionary relationship. Following the literature that finds foreign aid to be effective, this research predicted that the success of foreign aid would act as a catalyst for the reduction of funding for hardline policies, as they would become less necessary. However, as discussed in section 5b, the shift away from using aid reflects the opposite, a lack of confidence in the efficacy of this policy. Although an analysis of the reasons why Australia's development aid failed to yield a reduction in migration is beyond the scope of this paper, a possible explanation is that aid was not given enough time to meet its goals. Alternatively, the states with the highest migration flows to Australia could be those in which

an increase in income will lead to an increase in migration as predicted by the inverse-U model (Venturini and Faini 1993). Understanding why targeted development aid didn't result in decreased irregular migration rates is a promising topic for future study.

The case study also showed that the second hypothesized causal mechanism, finite resources available for immigration control, did not play a role in the Australian aid-immigration nexus. While Australia was committing more aid to immigrant-sending countries, as described in section 5a, the government also exponentially increased funding committed to border control (Parliament of Australia 2013). The concurrent increase in aid disbursements and funding for border patrol is evidence that, if Australia had a finite amount of money to be allocated towards border patrol, they had not yet reached the limit.

The results of this case study raise a new question, why did Australia stop using foreign aid as a tool to control irregular migration? It appears that a spike in irregular arrivals and a lack of confidence in the efficacy of development aid to meet immigration goals were the drivers of this policy shift. Following the exponential increase in arrivals beginning in 2010, frameworks for aid allocation were changed to focus on "effectiveness" and subsequent cuts to aid allocated to countries with heavy migration flows. An investigation initially focused on this question would help determine if increased arrivals and lack of confidence in aid efficacy caused Australia to shift its focus from development aid to border control. Additionally, given that an increase in arrivals to Europe led the EU to increase focus and funding for development aid, this finding also presents an interesting question for further study: why does an increase in irregular migration lead some countries to increase funding for development aid, while others abandon the practice?

Other potential mechanisms such as public opinion and party ideology that are often considered in the aid allocation process should be considered in other case studies, but do not seem to play a direct role in the Australian case. Poll data reveals that public concern about irregular migration has stayed relatively steady during spikes in boat arrivals (Munro and Oliver 2019). Additionally, both labor (progressive) and liberal (conservative) governments increased aid during the period of scale up, and it was under a labor government that border control funding more than doubled in 2010.

## CONCLUSION

By examining interaction between two migration-control strategies, this paper attempts to understand how states use the tools available to them to control irregular migration, and adds clarity to existing scholarship about the use of foreign aid for immigration-related goals. While the hypothesized causal mechanisms failed to explain the interactions between development aid and border control, the study revealed two potential mechanisms that explain why a state would choose to

stop using development aid and increase its focus on hardline policies. In the Australian case, an increase in arrivals led to a lack of confidence in aid efficacy, ultimately leading to the prioritization of border control over targeted development aid. This conclusion provides an interesting jumping-off point for future research: does an increase in arrivals lead other countries to abandon their targeted-development aid program? A quantitative study investigating how foreign aid budgets change in reaction to rising or falling migration numbers could reveal interactions and trends that would compliment the findings of qualitative study. Ultimately, more research needs to be done to understand how external factors impact which tools governments choose to use in order to meet immigration-related goals.

The findings of this paper also raise several ethical questions about the use of foreign aid as a tool to meet immigration goals. Used in the traditional sense, as is most often discussed in existing scholarship, foreign aid can prevent both the dangers associated with international migration, and potential detention upon arrival to the destination country by improving conditions in a migrant's country of origin and reducing push factors for migration. However, when given to a third party, Australian aid was simply a proxy for hardline policies, encouraging other states to assist with their zero-tolerance regime. The human rights abuses documented at the Nauru and Manus island detention facilities are evidence that using foreign aid to meet immigration-related goals does not necessarily protect the rights or welfare of migrants, but can actively cause harm. ■

| Appendix 1: Number of irregular maritime arrivals, excluding crew, reaching Australia between 1989-2016. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year | Migrant Arrivals | Year | Migrant Arrivals |
| 1989 | 26 | 2003 | 53 |
| 1990 | 198 | 2004 | 15 |
| 1991 | 214 | 2005 | 11 |
| 1992 | 216 | 2006 | 60 |
| 1993 | 81 | 2007 | 148 |
| 1994 | 953 | 2008 | 161 |
| 1995 | 237 | 2009 | 2726 |
| 1996 | 660 | 2010 | 6555 |
| 1997 | 339 | 2011 | 4565 |
| 1998 | 200 | 2012 | 17204 |
| 1999 | 3721 | 2013 | 20587 |
| 2000 | 2939 | 2014 | 160 |
| 2001 | 5516 | 2015 | 0 |
| 2002 | 1 | 2016 | 0 |
| Data from Australia Department of Immigration (1989-2008) and Customs and Border Control (2008-2016) | | | |

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# The Political Preferences of Activist CEOs

**Joshua Hochberg, Tufts University**

*Recent scholarship on the political preferences and behaviors of CEOs report that CEOs hold conservative political views and that these views influence both their firms' and employees' behavior. Most recently, Chatterji and Toffel (2019) suggest CEOs are just as effective as politicians at shaping public opinion. Yet, little is known about the CEOs most likely to influence public opinion by issuing public statements. This research hypothesizes that although most CEOs hold Republican preferences, CEO activism has a Democratic tilt, whereby CEOs who are Democrats engage in it more often than CEOs who are Republicans. Using Bonica's CFscores, self-collected data on CEO activism, and in-depth case studies, this research finds strong evidence to support its hypothesis. Additionally, this research finds that CEO activism frequency is significantly influenced by a CEO's partisan preferences and not the characteristics associated with investment in other forms of corporate political activity (CPA), confirming recent suggestions that CEO activism is distinct from CPA. These findings provide insight into the ideology of the CEOs most likely to be influencing public opinion by making public statements and contradicts the perceived homogeneity of CEOs' political preferences.*

## INTRODUCTION

CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) and business leaders influencing the political process is hardly a new phenomenon. The late nineteenth century saw the rise of corporate titans such as John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, and Cornelius Vanderbilt. Throughout this period, corporate leaders largely did not exercise much individual political power (Mizruchi and Marshall 2016). Rather, business leaders acted in concert, forming organizations such as the National Association of Manufacturers in 1895, the Chamber of Commerce in 1912, and, later, the Council of Economic Advisors (Mizruchi and Marshall 2016).[1] Today, business leaders continue to act collectively, forming industry-specific interest groups, joining associations composed exclusively by CEOs (e.g. The Business Roundtable), and serving on FACs (Federal Advisory Committees). Yet at the same time, business leaders are increasingly individual political actors. For example, the likelihood of a corporate executive running for federal office has doubled in the past 30 years (Babenko, Fedaseyev, and Zhang 2020)[2]. Likewise, 2020 presidential candidates included current or former business leaders Michael Bloomberg, John Delaney, and Tom Steyer, and many others considered running (e.g. Mark Cuban, Robert Iger, and Howard Schultz). Beyond running for public office themselves, corporate leaders serve as informal advisors to legislators, agency executives, and even the President.

The growth of individual CEO political behavior has drawn the attention of scholars across disciplines. To better understand the landscape of CEO political behavior, scholars are increasingly interested in the political ideologies and preferences of CEOs. Recent findings highlight the relationship between a CEO's political preferences and their emphasis on CSR (corporate social responsibility) (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) and the influence CEOs' political preferences have on both firm-level political contributions (Subrahmanyam, Singh, and Pennathur 2019) and even the political contributions of their employees (Babenko, Fedaseyev, and Zhang 2020).[3] Prior research has found CPA (corporate political activity) and corporate PAC (political action committees) contributions skew Republican; likewise, recent research reveals S&P 1500 CEOs have strong Republican preferences (Cohen et al 2019).

In recent years, a new form of CEO influence has emerged: CEO activism, the practice of CEOs speaking out on social and political issues not directly tied to their business interests. Despite the effect CEO activism has on public opinion (Chatterji and Toffel 2019), little is known about the political ideologies of those who speak out. This research hypothesizes that, contrary to other forms of CEO political behavior, CEO activism exhibits a Democratic tilt, whereby CEOs who are Democrats engage in activism more than CEOs who are Republicans. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that a CEO's partisan preferences have a significant and independent effect on how often they engage in activism. To this end, an empirical study of CEO activism between 2010 and 2018 will be conducted, examining the public statements, comments, and quotes of nearly 150 CEOs. This research finds strong evidence in support of its hypothesis, with Democratic CEOs engaging in activism more than four times as often as Republicans; this difference increases when comparing Democratic and Republican CEOs who have prominent public profiles. Moreover, this research finds a CEO's party has a strong and independent effect on how often they engage in activism.

This analysis is organized as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the existing literature on firm corporate activity, focusing on

lobbying and PAC contributions and highlights CEO influence on such activity. Section 2.2. discusses the ways through which CEOs are political actors, and Section 2.3 shows CPA and CEO political behavior to skew Republican. Section 3 summarizes the history and growing research regarding CEO activism and the effects it has on public opinion. Section 4 states this research's hypotheses, rationale, and supporting literature. Section 5 describes the data collected which is merged with existing data. Section 6 contains this paper's findings. 6.1 reveals Democrats engage in CEO activism more than Republicans and 6.2 determines a CEO's party has an independent effect on how often they engage in activism.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that the researcher takes no position on whether CEO activism is socially desirable. Some might argue that CEO activism only increases their influence over the political process and drowns out the voices of average Americans, while others may argue that CEOs should use their platform to advocate for what they believe in. Similarly, the researcher takes no position on whether or not the observed difference between Democrats and Republicans is socially desirable.

## A (BRIEF) REVIEW OF CPA

Employing lobbyists to provide information to lawmakers, rather than to convince them or strongarm them, is the most common method of influence used by business interests (Alpin and Hegarty 1980). This finding is consistent with Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy, whereby lobbyists provide policy expertise to sympathetic legislators. This is especially pronounced in state legislatures, whose members often work part-time and have few, if any, staff; state legislators are therefore more reliant on lobbyists for information (Berkman 2001; Hertel-Fernandez 2014). Business interests also influence the views of legislative staff, as staffers who rely on business interest groups for information have a distorted perception of their constituents' opinions (Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2018). Legislators and their staff are not the sole targets of business lobbyists. Under federal law, federal agencies, which adopt approximately ten rules for each law Congress passes, are required to hold a notice-and-comment period. During this window, lobbyists and hired experts submit comments and opinions regarding the interpretation and implementation of recent legislation. Yackee and Yackee (2006) examine the comments and the subsequent rulings and conclude federal agencies "consistently alter their financial rules to reflect the comments of business interests."

Despite media headlines that suggest otherwise, repeated studies of roll-call voting and corporate PAC contributions find little evidence of campaign contributions 'purchasing' votes (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Bronars and Lott 1997). Though there is strong evidence of campaign contributions facilitating access (e.g. Herndon 1982; Kalla and

Broockman 2016; Langbein 1986), access without influence is unlikely to be the return on the $2.5 billion corporations spend annually on lobbying (Drutman 2015). Rather, business groups and corporate PACs are strategic investors who finance legislators already predisposed to support them (Hall and Wayman 1990). Business PACs, compared to ideological PACs, tend to favor younger members of Congress (they will be in Congress longer) and members from smaller states, as they are more likely to advance to the Senate (Snyder 1992). Similarly, business interests contribute to state legislators before they are appointed to a committee that regulates their industry; business interests then increase their contributions once the legislator is a member of the committee (Fouirnaies and Hall 2018). Conversely, corporate PACs decrease their contributions to members of Congress who leave committees that oversee the corporation's industry (Powell and Grimmer 2016).

CEOs, as leaders of their companies, have a significant impact on corporate PAC contributions and investment in CPA. Liberal CEOs emphasize and invest more in CSR (corporate social responsibility) more than their conservative counterparts (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014), and a CEO's age, tenure, and background influence firm investment in political activity (Rudy and Johnson 2019). Moreover, CEOs can influence both firm-level political contributions (Subrahmanyam, Singh, and Pennathur 2019) and even the campaign contributions of their employees (Babenko, Fedaseyeu, and Zhang 2020). Thus, firm political activities are influenced by their CEO. These findings are consistent with self-reported data on the political activity of business leaders, with more than 66% of corporate leaders reporting they address political issues as part of their job and 60% meet with company lobbyists or related professionals (Nownes and Aitaleiva 2013).

### The Political Behavior of Corporate Leaders

Beyond directing firm resources towards political activities, corporate leaders act in concert to promote their collective interests. Nownes and Aitaleiva's (2013) survey finds 96% of corporate leaders discuss political issues with other leaders, 85% are asked for policy advice by other business leaders, and 72% partner with other leaders to lobby government. Likewise, corporate leaders take part in formal organizations and associations to influence policy; 59% of corporate leaders sit on the board of a trade association and 53% are part of an organization of business leaders. Corporate leaders also serve together on formal advisory bodies, as the majority of the members on President Obama's Council on Jobs and Competitiveness and President Trump's Economic Revival Industry Groups ae private sector leaders (Obama White House 2011; Trump White House 2020).

Prior scholarship has long examined the elite interlocks between private sector leaders and policymakers (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler 2004; Karty 2002; Moore et al 2002). However, the extent to which CEOs get individualized access

to key policymakers has only recently been revealed. In a survey of prominent corporate leaders, Nownes and Aitaleiva (2013)[4] found that 87% met personally with a member of Congress, 64% met with executive agency personnel, 20% met with White House staff, and 11% met with the President himself. Likewise, corporate leaders also report being solicited for advice;[5] 64% say members of Congress or their staff have asked for it, 33% report being asked for advice by executive agency personnel, and 71% are asked for advice by leaders from non-business organizations. Furthermore, corporate leaders are active in the policymaking and legislative processes. 61% reported submitting comments on proposed rules or regulations, 26% help draft regulations, and 24% help draft legislation. Examinations of public records come to similar conclusions; an analysis of the White House visitors log during the Obama administrated revealed that in a given, 11% of S&P 1550 CEOs met personally (and not as part of a large group) with high-level White House officials, the most frequent official being President Obama (Brown and Huang 2020).

## Republican Skew

For decades, the Republican party has been characterized as supporting and being aligned with business interests and their leaders (Drutman 2016; Todd and Dann 2015). Though the existence and potential roots of such an alliance are beyond the scope of this article, the formal policy platforms of the two major parties indicate that businesses preferred economic, fiscal, and tax policies are more aligned with the Republican party than the Democratic party. The Republican's formal platform states the party's opposition to hypertaxation and the high tax rate US businesses pay compared to foreign competitors; the Democratic platform calls for tax loopholes to be closed and for corporate tax breaks to end (Republican Platform 2016; Democrat Platform 2016). Scholarly works on lobbying outcomes lend further support for business support of Republicans, at least for taxation and regulation. Evidence suggests corporate lobbying is an effective approach to promote and, eventually implement, business-friendly tax policies (Kelleher Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009; Walker and Rhea 2014) and business-friendly rules (Yackee and Yackee 2006).

Similarly, analyses of C-Suite political contributions indicate corporate leaders have strong Republican preferences. Burris (2001) examines the political contributions of 592 corporate leaders and finds their contributions to be "skewed towards Republicans." Likewise, Bonica (2016) analyzes the number of Fortune 500 directors and executives contributing to presidential campaigns between 2000 and 2012, reporting that Fortune 500 donors prefer Republican candidates. Furthermore, he finds Fortune 500 donors to be more conservative than other donors and Congress as a whole. More recently, Cohen et al (2019) compiled the political contributions of nearly 4,000 individuals who were CEOs of S&P 1500 companies between 2000 and 2017 and found that more than 70% of CEOs contributed more to Republicans than Democrats.

Though donation-based measures of political ideology are valid predictors of an individual's policy preferences in general (Bonica 2018), one can reasonably question if this is true for corporate leaders; it is possible they are contributing strategically, like corporate PACs, and their contributions are not reflective of their individual ideology. However, comparisons of PAC contributions and corporate leaders' contributions suggest this is not the case. Corporate PACs, as strategic investors, invest heavily in winning candidates, with more than 80% of their funds going to winning candidates (Bonica 2016). In contrast, approximately 65% of corporate leaders' funds go to winning candidates, placing them closer to itemized donors in general, who give 60% of their funds to winning candidates, than corporate PACs. Therefore, corporate leaders' campaign contributions are valid predictors of individual political preferences (see also Bonica 2018).

This section has reviewed the existing literature on CPA, CEO political activity, and the political preferences of corporate leaders. This overview has shown how lobbying is an effective and commonly employed approach by business interests to influence policy, that CEOs have immense access to legislators, agency executives, and the executive branch, and how corporate leaders have, in general, Republican preferences and are more conservative than others involved in the political process. Overall, this paper has highlighted the Republican-leanings of corporations, their political activities, and their leaders. The following section will review the practice of CEO activism.

## CEO ACTIVISM

Historically, business leaders rarely took public positions on political and social issues not directly related to their business (Mayer 2017). Yet within the past decade, CEO activism, when Chief Executive Officers take positions on issues not directly tied to their business, is perceived to be the norm; headlines in major publications have declared "C.E.O. Activism Has Become the New Normal (Gelles 2018)" and "Not a Fad, CEO Activism is Vital (Josephs 2019)." In response, law firms, consulting firms, and PR agencies alike have practices and professionals dedicated to CEO activism.[6] Though pinpointing the exact cause of this rise is beyond the scope of this article, possible factors include Supreme Court's ruling in *Citizens United v. FEC* (2010), increasing consumer demand, especially among millennials, for corporations to stimulate change (Weber Shandwick 2017), and employees' priorities (Figueroa Kupcu and Kristula-Green 2019).

For the average individual, issuing a statement or posting on social media to express a position on salient social and political issues is unlikely to be noticed or widely disseminated. Yet for CEOs, such public statements do not go unnoticed. In 2012, Chick-fil-A CEO Dan Cathy's comments opposing same-sex marriage were widely covered in major national media outlets including the LA Times, the Wall Street Journal, and Bloomberg (Hsu 2012; Passy 2013; Wong 2013). Likewise,

Apple CEO Tim Cook's opposition to Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act was covered in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal (Barbaro and Eckholm 2015; Cook 2015; Wakabayashi 2015).

The rise of CEO activism has led to a new field of inquiry dedicated to exploring the effects of CEO activism. Fitzpatrick (2019) explores its impact on shareholder wealth and finds CEO activism has a short-term negative effect on stock value.[7] Others have modeled its costs and benefits (Melloni, Patacconi, and Vikander 2019), examined its relationship with CPA and CSR (Vahdati 2019), and role in person-organization ideologic misfit (Brown, Manegod, and Marquardt 2020). Though such research is certainly informative and novel, little attention has been paid to its effect on public opinion. Given its widespread coverage in the media, one can expect CEO activism to influence and shape public opinion on salient social issues. Indeed, Chatterji and Toffel (2019) employ a framed field experiment and report this to be the case, suggesting CEOs are as impactful as politicians at shaping public opinion.

## ISSUES EXPLORED AND HYPOTHESIS

Despite immense media and scholarly coverage, little is known about who engages in CEO activism. If CEO activism indeed influences public opinion, we know little about these influencers and the direction of their activism. Perhaps the most we know regarding CEO activists is how many CEOs have ever engaged in activism; Larcker et al (2018) find 28% of S&P 500 CEOs engaged in activism at least once between 2000 and 2018; this analysis, though useful, shines little light on who the CEO activists are. This article seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature on CEO activism by identifying who the CEO activists are, what their political preferences are, and the effect of their preferences on how often they engage in activism.

As shown in the preceding sections, CEOs overall hold Republican preferences. Without any further information, one would expect CEO activism to skew conservative. However, there are reasons to believe CEOs who are Democrats are more likely to be activists than their Republican counterparts. In an article in the Harvard Business Review, Chatterji and Toffel (2018, 12) write "most of the CEO activists have been espousing liberal views." Additionally, a recent survey revealed Democrats support CEO activism more than Republicans (Larcker and Tayan 2018); it is unlikely Democrats would support it if most activism was in support of Republican policy positions. Therefore, this research hypothesizes that Democratic CEOs are more activist than Republican CEOs.

*Hypothesis 1:* CEOs who are Democrats engage in activism more than CEOs who are Republicans.

In addition, this research examines the CEO characteristics associated with engaging in CEO activism.

Scholars have long examined the characteristics associated with firm investment in CPA; most recently, Rudy and Johnson (2019) identify a CEO's age, tenure, and educational background as influencers of firm investment in CPA. However, this research expects these variables to have no effect on how often a CEO engages in activism for two distinct reasons. First, as Chatterji and Toffel (2019) note, CEO activism should be considered distinct from nonmarket strategy because of the agent, its publicity, and its target audience. The significant differences between the two suggest their determinants would be unrelated and different. Second, CEOs themselves describe CEO activism as being related to their personal beliefs. Brian Moynihan, the CEO of Bank of America, said in an interview, "Our jobs as CEOs now include driving what we think is right (Walker 2018)." Former GE CEO Jeff Immelt expressed a similar sentiment, "I just think it's insincere to not stand up for those things that you believe in (Chatterji and Toffel 2018, 5)." Hence, this research expects the characteristics associated with investment in CPA to have no effect on CEO activism frequency, but that a CEO's partisan preferences influence CEO activism frequency.

*Hypothesis 2:* The characteristics associated with investment in CPA do not have a statistically significant effect on CEO activism frequency.

*Hypothesis 3:* A CEO's party has a statistically significant effect on CEO activism frequency.

## METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
### Independent Variable

To determine one's political preferences, researchers across disciplines have relied on the percentage of an individual's contributions to each party and their candidates as a metric of their ideology (e.g. Chilton and Posner 2015; Cohen et al 2019; Elnahas and Dongnyoung 2017; Francis et al 2016). Though this formula is certainly useful, it is flawed in that it does not differentiate among Democrats and Republicans; it makes no distinction between a supporter of Charlie Baker, the "liberal" Republican Governor of Massachusetts (Richards 2018) and Ron Desantis, the Republican Governor of Florida who helped found the ultra-conservative House Freedom Caucus (Taylor 2015). Differentiating between candidates of the same party is important, as it allows for further accuracy of a donor's ideology by accounting for ideological differences between two candidates of the same party running against each other.

To account for intra-party differences, Stanford's Adam Bonica (2014) developed the Campaign-Finance Score (CFscore). CFscores are based on campaign contributions, but instead of focusing on just the party the funds go to, they focus on the ideological extremity of the recipient and the amount donated. Bonica et al (2018, 8) offers a simplified illustration:

"First, if an individual's only donation is to Barack Obama, her CFscore would be −1.16. This is because her CFscore would simply be Barack Obama's CFscore. Second, if an individual made two-thirds of her lifetime donations to Bernie Sanders and one-third of her lifetime donations to Barack Obama, her CFscore would be −1.65. This is because her CFscore would be calculated as two-thirds Bernie Sanders's CFscore of −1.89 and one-third Barack Obama's CFscore of −1.16 ((−1.89 × 2/3) + (−1.16 ×1/3))."

In 2016, Bonica used the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) and automated record-linkage to construct a dataset of the political contributions and CFscores of 3736 CEOs and directors of Fortune 500 companies (Bonica 2016). This research then matches the CEOs and directors with CEOs of S&P 1500 companies still in place in 2017; yielding a sample of 145 CEOs (Appendix A).[8] To confirm the ideologies of this sample of CEOs are representative of the ideologies of all major CEOs, this research compares its sample to the CEOs in Bonica's sample using his replication materials (2017). This results in a finding of this subsample to be representative of the overall population as it skews Republican and has a median score nearly equal to the median of Bonica's sample (Figure 1).[9] In this research's sample, CEOs with positive CFscore are considered Republicans and

CEOs with negative CFscore are considered Democrats.

## Dependent Variable

Next, this research examines the public statements in media outlets and press releases, and earnings calls made by the 145 CEOs between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2018. This systematic process is largely adopted from a similar examination undertaken by Larcker et al (2018). Factiva was used to search for any mention of the CEO's name,[10] their company, and at least one of 40 keywords in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Financial Times, Reuters, Associated Press, and CQ FD Disclosure (Appendix B). Determining what qualifies as CEO activism requires a substantial amount of reviewer discretion. To distinguish between CEO activism and more traditional self-interest and lobbying, statements that advocate for policies that will financially benefit the CEO and their firm are excluded, even if that is not the explicitly stated rationale. For example, Nike CEO Matt Parker's public statements supporting President Obama's trade agreement with Asia are not included, as the trade agreement was projected to increase Nike's gross margins (Pham 2015). Similarly, statements of the CEO of a coal company stating their opposition to increased climate change regulations are excluded as well. However, statements on economic issues are included as activism if the statements are in favor of policies that have the potential to harm the company's bottom line; several CEOs were supportive of increasing the corporate tax rate and/or opposed lowering the corporate tax rate.



Figure 1: Author's and Bonica's Data on the Ideological Distribution of CEOs

*Source: Author's Data and Adam Bonica (2017); Graph by Josh Hochberg*

Figure 2: Proportion of CEOs Who Engaged in Activism



Source: Data collected by Author
Graph by Josh Hochberg

Figure 3: Average Number of Activist Statements per CEO



Source: Data collected by Author
Graph by Josh Hochberg

## CEO ACTIVISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC TILT

First, the proportion of Democratic CEOs and Republican CEOs who engaged in activism during this period are compared. The results suggest CEOs who are Democrats are more likely to be activists (meaning they engaged in activism at least once) than Republicans; 37% of Democratic CEOs engaged in activism whereas 19% of Republicans engaged in activism (Figure 2). This is significant *(p <.02)*. Yet, this comparison is limited in that the dependent variable is whether or not the CEO engaged in activism and not how often a CEO engaged in activism. Therefore, a more suitable independent variable is the number of statements made by Democrats and Republicans, not whether or not a CEO engaged in activism.

Figure 3 depicts the number of activist statements issued by CEOs who are Democrats and Republicans. This comparison lends strong support to this paper's hypothesis that Democrats engage in activism more than Republicans, with Democrats averaging 1.8 statements and Republicans averaging less than 0.3 Importantly, a difference of means test reveals the observed difference is statistically significant *(p <.01)*. Therefore, one can be more than 99% confident that Democrats engage in activism at a higher rate than Republicans.

Though these findings are revealing, they do not differentiate between a CEO's profile. That is, it treats the CEO of a smaller manufacturing company that sells its products to other businesses the same as the CEO of a large technology company that sells directly to consumers. Though they may engage in activism at comparable rates, it is unlikely the manufacturing CEO has the same profile, receives the same media coverage, and has the same influence on public opinion as the technology CEO. To account for this, a dichotomous consumer-facing variable is used to compare CEOs most likely to have a larger public profile and receive more media attention

(Appendix C). Using this sample, this research finds even stronger evidence that Democrats engage in CEO activism more than Republicans; among CEOs most likely to have a public profile, Democrats engage in more than five times the amount of activism as Republicans. The mean number of activist statements for consumer facing CEOs who are also Democrats is 2.3 and 0.35 for Republicans (Figure 4). This, too, is statistically significant *(p <.01)*.

These findings offer evidence in support of a Democratic tilt in CEO activism, as CEOs who are Democrats engage in activism more than CEOs who are Republicans. However, it is possible that CEOs who are Democrats are not espousing liberal policy positions. Although donation-based measures of political ideology are accurate predictors of an individual's policy preferences (Bonica 2018), there is no guarantee that

Figure 4: Average Number of Activist Statements per Consumer-Facing CEO



Source: Data collected by Author
Graph by Josh Hochberg

they are valid predictors for the activist positions CEOs take. That is, it is possible that activist CEOs hold liberal policy positions, but only speak out in support of the few conservative views they hold. To confirm Democratic CEOs are espousing liberal views in their activism, the activist statements of three Democratic CEOs, namely, Tim Cook (Apple Inc), Arne Sorenson (Marriott International), and Lloyd Blankfein (The Goldman Sachs Group) are more closely examined.

## Case Studies

Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple since 2011, engaged in the most activism among CEOs in the sample; between 2010 and 2018, he issued more than a dozen activist statements.[11] Unlike other CEOs, Cook spoke out on a range of issues, though he spoke out the most regarding immigration, LGBTQ issues, and the environment. This evaluation of his statements finds that all of his statements have been in support of Democratic policies and/or positions and against Republican ones. He issued two statements regarding the environment, one critical of Trump's leaving the Paris Climate Accord and one in favor of CEOs and businesses doing more to combat climate change. Cook has also been critical of the Trump administration's immigration policy; he called for Dreamers to be allowed to remain in the United States and for the practice of child-separation to be ended. Cook has received immense media attention for his activism in support of LGBTQ rights and protections, most notably in response to his Op-Ed in the Washington Post in which he called religious freedom laws "pro-discrimination (Cook 2015)," and, more recently, for his opposition to Trump's ban on transgender individuals from serving in the armed forces.

Next, this research looks at the public statements of Arne Sorenson, the CEO of Marriott. Sorenson offers a contrast to the other CEOs examined in this section, as he maintains a lower public profile and his CFscore identifies him as a true centrist.[12] Despite his political centrism, Sorenson's public statements are all aligned with traditional Democratic positions. He has been outspoken in support of LGBT rights and protections, having issued three comments and statements in response to "religious freedom laws" and "bathroom bills" and called on Congress to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination against the LGBT community. In addition, Sorenson met with President Obama in 2012 and announced his support for tax increases on families with an income of over $250,000.

Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs, serves a dual role in Democratic politics. He has been at the forefront of liberal CEO activism, serving as a spokesman in support of gay marriage for the Human Rights Campaign and leading the corporate charge against the Trump administration's child separation policy. Yet at the same time, he has been castigated by Democratic politicians for embodying corporate greed (Collins 2016), his self-declared fiscal conservatism, and for saying he would consider voting for Donald Trump if Bernie Sanders were 'to be the Democratic nominee for president (Luce 2020)." Therefore, it is possible Blankfein's public commentary span the ideological spectrum. However, a close analysis of his public statements reveals that all but one of his statements align with widely held Democratic policy positions such as LGBTQ rights and protections, gender equality, immigration, race, and the importance of diversity. Surprisingly, this is true even for his statements on economic and tax policy, given that his bank, and the financial sector as a whole, stands to gain from less regulation and enforcement. On at least two occasions, Blankfein stated that he supports tax increases to increase government revenue.

The close examinations of these CEO's public statements lend strong support to CFscores being an accurate proxy for the public positions activist CEOs take. Of the 30+ activist statements these four made, only two of them contradict the traditional policy views of their party. Therefore, this research is confident in the validity of CFscores as a proxy for the CEOs' activist statements.

## INFLUENCE OF PARTISAN PREFERENCES ON CEO ACTIVISM

Having found that CEOs who are Democrats engage in activism more than CEOs who are Republicans, this research now considers why this is. As mentioned previously, Chatterji and Toffel (2019) have theorized CEO activism to be distinct from nonmarket strategy for three reasons: the agent, the level of publicity, and the audience. This paper argues CEO activism should be considered distinct from CPA and nonmarket strategy for another reason: it is expected that CEO-level characteristics associated with investment in CPA have no effect on CEO activism. To date, there is a robust body of literature on the antecedents of CPA in general (Brown 2014; Lux, Crook, and Woehr 2011), but little is known about the CEO-level characteristics associated with firm investment in such activities. Rudy and Johnson (2019) are the sole authors to research these characteristics; they find a CEO's age, tenure, and educational background all have independent effects on firm investment in CPA.

To determine the effect of these characteristics on CEO activism, these variables are added to the dataset. For each CEO, this research documents their age, their tenure as CEO (in years), and whether or not they have an educational background in business, law, or economics (1=yes, 0=no). This information is obtained from a range of sources, including press releases, SEC filings, media reports, and their companies' websites. This model also contains control variables, many of which are adopted from Rudy and Johnson (2019). This research controls for whether or not the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Bonica 2016), as CEO duality amplifies a CEO's influence over firm CSR (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino 2013). To ensure the model isolates the effect of party on CEO activism, control variables for characteristics

associated with political activity in general are included; this research controls for a CEO's gender, as female CEOs engage in individualized political behavior less than their male colleagues (Mui 2019) and for firm age, which has been argued to positively impact political activity (Rudy and Johnson 2019).

I expect a CEO's personal beliefs, manifested in their partisan preferences, will have an independent effect on how often they engage in CEO activism. After all, CEOs have stated this to be the case. Brian Moynihan, the CEO of Bank of America, said in an interview, "Our jobs as CEOs now include driving what we think is right (Walker 2018)." Former GE CEO Jeff Immelt expressed a similar sentiment, "I just think it's insincere to not stand up for those things that you believe in (Chatterji and Toffel 2018, 5)." Moreover, as shown in the preceding sections, this research finds Democrats engage in

activism more often than Republicans. Therefore, it is expected that being a Democrat will increase how often a CEO engages in activism.

Table 1 presents the result of the regression analysis. Controlling for other variables, the characteristics associated with increased investment in CPA (background in business, law, or economics, tenure as CEO, and age) have no impact on how often a CEO engages in CEO activism, confirming this paper's hypothesis that these characteristics will have no effect on CEO activism. The regression predicts that controlling for other factors, a CEO being a Democrat will increase the number of activist statements they issue by more than 1.5. Importantly, the estimated coefficient is statistically significant ($p<.01$); therefore, this research is more than 99.9% confident that a CEO's partisan preferences has an independent effect on how often they engage in CEO activism.

| Table 1: Regression Model for Political Preference on CEO Activism | |
|---|---|
| | Dependent variable: CEO Activism Frequency |
| Democrat | 1.580*** (0.403) |
| Background in Business, Law, or Economics | 0.359 (0.413) |
| Tenure as CEO | 0.004 (0.027) |
| CEO Age | -0.002 (0.033) |
| Chairperson of the Board | 0.254 (0.423) |
| Male | 0.041 (0.889) |
| Firm Age | 0.001 (0.004) |
| Constant | -0.145 (2.172) |
| Observations | 122 |
| R2 | 0.124 |
| Adjusted R2 | 0.070 |
| Residual Std. Error | 2.056 (df = 114) |
| F Statistic | 2.297** (df = 7; 114) |
| Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

## CONCLUSION

Like all research, this article has its limitations. First, it is possible that the web scraping used to obtain the CEOs' public statements did not capture all activist statements, as it only included a fixed number of sources and keywords. Second, Bonica's CFscores, arguably the most accurate metric of political ideology, are far from perfect. As politicians run for different offices, especially as a politician goes from a state office to a federal one, they change some of their positions and expand their donor network. Similarly, the scores do not account for a donor or candidate who changes preferences over time (Prokop 2015). Finally, the small sample (144 CEOs) may limit the generalizability of these findings. However, smaller samples are accepted when sampling hard-to-reach populations, such as the ultra-wealthy and corporate executives (e.g. Nownes and Aitalieva 2013; Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013).

This article makes several important contributions to the study of a new form of CEO political behavior, CEO activism. First, despite most CEOs holding conservative political preferences, this research finds that Democratic CEOs are more likely to engage in activism than Republican ones and that they engage in it more often. Second, it is shown that the CEOs most likely to be influencing public opinion, the CEOs of consumer-facing corporations, engage in liberal activism more often than the sample of CEOs as a whole. Third, this research's regression analyses highlight that the characteristics associated with CEO investment in CPA have no effect on CEO activism. Finally, it is discovered a CEO's partisan preferences have a strong and independent effect on how often they engage in CEO activism. These findings come at an especially important time. Within the last few years, CEOs across the political spectrum are engaging in activism on political and social issues ranging from policing to the environment to immigration. Conventional literature on the political preferences of CEOs suggest CEO statements on these issues would skew Republican, reflecting the political preferences of the CEOs. However, the research presented in this article finds the public statements of CEOs on these issues skew Democratic.

This article contributes to the growing body of literature on these topics, shining a light on the policy views of influential CEOs and has introduced quantitative evidence regarding the determinants of CEO activism. CEO activism is a ripe field for further inquiry, and much remains unknown. What explains the increase in CEO activism within the past decade? What impact does the agent, the CEO, have on public opinion? Are liberal views more likely to influence public opinion than conservative ones? What are the antecedents of CEO activism? It is hoped that these findings stimulate more interest in this field, driving further research and spurring additional inquiries. ■

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## NOTES

1 The lone exception was J.P. Morgan, who played a major role in ending the Panic of 1907 and helped create the Federal Reserve Bank.

2 The business-to-government path is not limited to federal offices. As of August 2002, 24% of US Governors are former business leaders (Jared Polis, JB Pritzker, Charlie Baker, Kevin Stitt, Doug Burgum, Phil Murphy, Chris Sununu, Pete Rickets).

3 Although corporate social responsibility is not inherently political, CSR and firm political activity are intertwined. See Frynas and Stephens (2015) for a review of "Political Corporate Social Responsibility."

4 The sample for this survey was not composed exclusively of CEOs; rather, the survey was conducted with a firm's "highest ranking person" listed in a national directory. However, the authors report that the highest ranking person is usually the CEO.

5 Though they report being solicited for advice, the solicitation may have occurred during a "thank you" call for a campaign contribution or as part of asking for the contribution, as 96% of corporate leaders report being contacted by a member of Congress of their staff for a contribution.

6 See Gregory 2019; Ruby 2019; Weber Shandwick 2016

7 Though informative, this generalizability of the results is constrained by the small sample size (n=19 firms) and the vague process through which the author determined what firms to include. Nevertheless, the paper highlights the growing interest in CEO activism.

8 The exact number of CEOs fluctuates depending on the imposed restriction. For example, analysis on the influence of party only includes CEOs who have CFscores.

9 The median CEO CFscore in this subsample is 0.32 and the median CEO CFscore in Bonica's sample is 0.41.

10 Includes derivations of their name and nicknames, when applicable.

11 Many of his statements and comments were each reported in dozens of articles. This figure reflects best efforts to minimize double counting for Cook as well as all others with multiple reports.

12 Schultz and Lloyd Blankfein are often viewed as true centrists. However, their CFscores place them to the left of Andrew Cuomo, whereas Sorenson is to the right of Joe Manchin (Bonica 2016).

## APPENDIX A

| Company | Name | Company | Name |
|---------|------|---------|------|
| Aetna | Mark Bertolini | Comcast Corp | Brian Roberts |
| 3M | Inge Thulin | Community Health Systems Inc | Wayne Smith |
| Abbott Laboratories | Miles White | ConocoPhillips | Ryan Lance |
| AES Corporation | Andres Gluski | CONSOL Energy | J. Brett Harvey |
| Aflac | Daniel Amos | Corning | Wendell Weeks |
| AGCO | Martin Richenhagen | Costco Wholesale Corp | W. Craig Jelinek |
| AK Steel | James Wainscott | Cummins Inc | Thomas Linebarger |
| Allstate | Tom Wilson | CVS Caremark Corp | Larry Merlo |
| Amazon | Jeff Bezos | Dana Holding | Roger Wood |
| American Electric Power | Nicholas Akins | DaVita | Kent Thiry |
| Ameriprise | James Cracchiolo | Dicks Sporting Goods Inc | Edward Stack |
| AmerisourceBergen | Steven Collis | Dillard's | William Dillard |
| Amgen | Robert Bradway | Discover Financial Services | David Nelms |
| Aon Corp | Gregory Case | Dominion Resources Inc | Thomas Farrell |
| Apple Inc | Timothy Cook | Domtar Inc | John Williams |
| AT&T | Randall Stephenson | Dr Pepper Snapple Group | Larry Young |
| Automatic Data Processing | Carlos Rodriguez | DTE Energy | Gerard Anderson |
| AutoNation Inc | Michael Jackson | Ecolab | Douglas Baker |
| AutoZone | William Rhodes | EMCOR Group | Anthony Guzzi |
| Ball | John Hayes | Emerson Electric Co | David Farr |
| Bank of America Corp | Brian Moynihan | Estee Lauder | Fabrizio Freda |
| BB&T Corp | Kelly King | Exelon Corp | Christopher Crane |
| Bed Bath & Beyond | Steven Temares | Facebook | Mark Zuckerberg |
| Bemis Company | Henry Theisen | FedEx Corp | Frederick Smith |
| Berkshire Hathaway | Warren Buffett | Fluor Corp | David Seaton |
| Blackrock | Larry Fink | Franklin Resources | Gregory Johnson |
| Campbell Soup | Denise Morrison | Freeport-McMoRan Copper | Richard Adkerson |
| Capital One Financial Corp | Richard Fairbank | Frontier Communications Corp | Mary Wilderotter |
| Casey's General Stores | Robert Myers | Gannett Co | Gracia Martore |
| CBS Corporation | Leslie Moonves | Goldman Sachs Group | Lloyd Blankfein |
| CenturyLink Inc | Glen Post | Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co | Richard Kramer |
| Charles Schwab Corp | Walter Bettinger | Google | Larry Page |
| Charter Communication | Thomas Rutledge | Group 1 Automotive | Earl Hesterberg |
| Cigna Corp | David Cordani | Henry Schein | Stanley Bergman |
| Cognizant Technology Solutions | Francisco Dsouza | Hess Corp | John Hess |
| Colgate-Palmolive Co | Ian Cook | Insight Enterprises Inc | Kenneth Lamneck |

# APPENDIX A, continued

| Company | Name | Company | Name |
|---------|------|---------|------|
| International Business Machines Corp | Virginia Rometty | Northrop Grumman Corp | Wesley Bush |
| Interpublic Group | Michael Roth | Omnicom Group | John Wren |
| INTL FCStone Inc | Sean Oconnor | Oshkosh | Charles Szews |
| JM Smucker Co | Richard Smucker | Owens-Illinois | Albert Stroucken |
| Johnson & Johnson | Alex Gorsky | PepsiCo Inc | Indra Nooyi |
| JP Morgan Chase & Co | Jamie Dimon | Pfizer Inc | Ian Read |
| Kelly Services | Carl Camden | Ppl Corporation | William Spence |
| KeyCorp | Beth Mooney | Prudential Financial Inc | John Strangfeld |
| Kimberly-Clark Corp | Thomas Falk | Public Service Enterprise Group | Ralph Izzo |
| Kindred Healthcare Inc | Paul Diaz | PVH | Emanuel Chirico |
| Kohls Corp | Kevin Mansell | Quest Diagnostics | Stephen Rusckowski |
| Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings | David King | Regions Financial | Grayson Hall |
| Limited Brands | Leslie Wexner | Reinsurance Group of America | Greig Woodring |
| Lincoln National Corp | Dennis Glass | Reliance Steel & Aluminum | David Hannah |
| Live Nation Entertainment | Michael Rapino | RR Donnelley & Sons Company | Thomas Quinlan |
| Loews Corp | James Tisch | Micron | Sanjay Mehrotra |
| Lowes Cos Inc | Robert Niblock | Sanmina-SCI | Jure Sola |
| Manpower Inc | Jeffrey Joerres | Sonic Automotive | Ollen Smith |
| Marriott International Inc | Arne Sorenson | Southern Company | Thomas Fanning |
| Mastercard | Ajaypal Banga | Southwest Airlines Co | Gary Kelly |
| McKesson Corporation | John Hammergren | Starbucks | Howard Schultz |
| Medtronic Inc | Omar Ishrak | State Street Corp | Joseph Hooley |
| Merck & Co Inc | Kenneth Frazier | SunTrust Banks | William Rogers |
| MetLife Inc | Steven Kandarian | Synnex | Kevin Murai |
| MGM Resorts International | James Murren | Telephone & Data Systems | Leroy Carlson |
| Mohawk Industries | Jeffrey Lorberbaum | Tenet Healthcare | Trevor Fetter |
| Molina Healthcare Inc | Joseph Molina | Texas Instruments Inc | Richard Templeton |
| Monsanto Co | Hugh Grant | Textron Inc | Scott Donnelly |
| Morgan Stanley | James Gorman | Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc | Marc Casper |
| Motorola Solutions | Gregory Brown | Universal Health Services | Alan Miller |
| Mylan | Heather Bresch | Verizon Communications Inc | Lowell McAdam |
| NCR Corp | William Nuti | W. R. Berkley Corporation | William Berkley |
| Newell Rubbermaid | Michael Polk | Walt Disney Co | Robert Iger |
| NextEra Energy Inc | James Robo | Williams | Alan Armstrong |
| Nike Inc | Mark Parker | World Fuel Services Corp | Michael Kasbar |
| Nordstrom Inc | Blake Nordstrom | Xcel Energy Inc | Benjamin Fowke |

## APPENDIX B: KEYWORDS

advocate, abortion, pollution, environmentalism, environmental impact, impact on the environment, climate, global warming, Paris accord, tariffs, NAFTA, sanctions, Brexit, government shutdown, fiscal cliff, debt ceiling, sexual harassment, gender equality, equal pay, pay gap, glass ceiling, inclusion, gun control, universal healthcare, Obamacare, gay marriage, transgender, homosexual, lesbian, gay, immigrants, dreamers, travel ban, income inequality, racial equality, racism, Charlottesville, terrorism, refugee, human rights

## APPENDIX C: CONSUMER FACING VARIABLE

Rather than attempt to create a variable to measure the extent of how consumer facing a CEO's company is, this research opts to use a dichotomous consumer-exposure variable based on the company's sector. Sectors are classified as follows:

- Consumer Facing: consumer cyclical, services, financial, transportation, and technology

- Non-Consumer Facing: basic materials, capital goods, conglomerates, consumer non-cyclical, energy, healthcare, and utilities

# Religious Nationalism, Securitization Narratives, and Hindu-Muslim Tensions in India, 2015-2020

**Kaveri Sarkar, Beloit College**

*According to the Hate Crime Watch, 90% of the 254 cases of violence against religious minorities documented between January 2009 and October 2018 in India have taken place after the BJP assumed power in 2014. In an effort to understand the hike in tensions between Hindus and Muslims in the last five years, I examine the role of religion in the narratives of Indian nationhood, and its contribution to this intergroup conflict. Through the lenses of primordialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, banal nationalism, and orientalism, I conceptualize the Indian nation and outline reasons other scholars have attributed to the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. Central to my argument is the application of a constructivist security approach developed by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998), which follows a paradigm of securitizing actors that make securitizing moves to protect a referent object from "the other," thereby framing intergroup conflict as a security issue. Applying this security paradigm in the Indian context, I identify some key securitizing actors like Hindu nationalist groups, including the BJP, and analyze their securitizing moves like speech acts on Twitter, use of Hindu symbols, and victimization of sacred Hindu traditions in order to draw the Hindu community's attention to a subjective, existential threat that Muslims pose to the Hindu nation. I examine how the securitizing moves have led to the disruption of human rights with the Babri Masjid demolition that took place in 1992, withdrawal of Article 370 that afforded special status and autonomy to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, introduction of controversial citizenship laws, and a general surge in physical and verbal violence over the last five years. The use of this constructivist security paradigm not only adds a security dimension to the work of previous scholars, but also takes the recent instances of intergroup conflict into account to help explain how the increase in tensions are a result of the narratives of Indian nationhood being drawn along religious lines. My thesis suggests that the very secular meaning of India that founding members had envisioned is being challenged as the increasing electoral representation of the BJP and the increase in intergroup violence after the BJP came to power reflect the increased role of religion in the evolution of Indian nationhood, as well as in the collective upper-caste Hindu consciousness.*

## INTRODUCTION

There is a disturbing global trend of right-wing populist authoritarian regimes gaining power and using an exclusive brand of nationalism to create more homogenous societies. Against this background, India, which is constitutionally a democratic and secular state, is observing increasing tensions between the majority religious group—the Hindus and the minority religious group—the Muslims. Since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has come to power in 2014, violence against Muslims has increased. Not only has the number of reported mob lynchings increased, but the BJP's political dominance has also empowered voices that strongly advocate for India to become a Hindu nation.

According to the Hate Crime Watch (Mander 2018), 90% of the 254 cases of violence against religious minorities documented between January 2009 and October 2018 have taken place after the BJP assumed power in 2014. Additionally, with the BJP forming state governments either on its own or with allies in 18 out of 29 states (Iwanek 2020), 66% of these violent cases were carried out in states where the BJP maintains power (Bajoria 2019). There has not only been a drastic increase in physical violence, but also a surge in verbal violence. The period of 2014-2018 has seen a 500% increase in the verbal violence propagated by elected officials in comparison to the five years before 2014, as evidenced by a survey conducted by New Delhi Television (Bajoria 2019). Ninety percent of these communally divisive speeches, many of which include cow protection as a theme, have been made by the BJP members themselves.

In an effort to understand the hike in tensions between Hindus and Muslims in the last 5 years, this paper examines the role of religion in the narratives of Indian nationhood,

and its contribution to this intergroup conflict. This paper begins by reviewing literature on nations and nationalism in general. Through the lenses of primordialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, banal nationalism, and orientalism, the Indian nation is conceptualized and reasons other scholars have attributed to the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India are outlined. Central to this argument is the application of a constructivist security approach developed by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998), which follows a paradigm of securitizing actors that make securitizing moves to protect a referent object from "the other," thereby framing intergroup conflict as a security issue. Applying this security paradigm in the Indian context, some key securitizing actors such as Hindu nationalist groups, including the BJP, are identified and their securitizing moves are analyzed such as speech acts on Twitter, use of Hindu symbols, and victimization of sacred Hindu traditions in order to draw the Hindu community's attention to a subjective, existential threat that Muslims pose to the Hindu nation. This paper examines how the securitizing moves have led to the disruption of human rights with the Babri Masjid demolition that took place in 1992, withdrawal of Article 370 that afforded special status and autonomy to the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, introduction of controversial citizenship laws, and a general surge in physical and verbal violence over the last five years. This research reviews some of the policy outcomes that these moves have led to, and demonstrates how these security actors and moves are defining narratives of Indian nationhood along religious lines and consequently, leading to an increase in inter-religious conflict in India.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

While the academic study of nationalism has been a more recent development in the social sciences, nations and nationalism have been present from much earlier. There are different theories and approaches to the idea and existence of nations and depending on the theory, the question of what and when a nation came about has a different conclusion. Some of the theoretical approaches to nationalism are as follows.

*Modernism:*

The study of nationalism is most saturated with the theory of modernism, which proposes that nations and nationalism emerged as a consequence to modernization. Considering nations and nationalism to be epiphenomenal, this theory views the stages of modernization and industrialization to be necessary precedents of the nation (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005).

Some scholars have tried to answer the rise of communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims by focusing on the problem created by modernity after independence. Freitag (1996) argues that a significant contribution to communalism in India is the gap felt between the state and the civil society in postcolonial India. Van der Veer (1996) takes a slightly

different route to suggest that communalism cannot be attributed to material reasons solely. Instead of only looking at religious motivation, he claims that communalism is entrenched in social power relations of the Indian society. Along similar lines, Sumit Sarkar (1996) claims that Hindutva emerged as an upper-class reaction to lower-castes' and women's social revolutions, which were in alignment with secular ideals and planned economy.

When the Indian nation took birth in the midnight of 14th August 1947, the founders of the constitution advocated for secular ideals—all religions were to be considered equal and the majority religion—Hinduism would not take precedence over the others. However, these ideals may not adequately capture the sentiments of Hindu nationalism that was at play from before the partition in more subtle ways and ultimately advanced the rhetoric of the partition. Leaders like Savarkar, Tilak, and Golwalkar advocated for Hindu nationalism as early as the 1920s in backlash to a pan-Muslim identity (Jaffrelot 2007), and as Tanika Sarkar (1996) outlines, hints of communalism underpin the nationalistic writings of the famous Bengali India writer Bankimchandra Chatterjee. Similarly, Hasan (1996) has highlighted how the Indian National Congress' creation of a separate electorate for the Muslim population before the partition fed into a separate Muslim identity and consequently, shaped the way Muslim elites and the general Muslim population conjured collective religious identities.

*Primordialism:*

In stark contrast to the modernity theory, Primordialism considers nations and nationalism to have existed from time immemorial. Viewing nations as natural, it believes they are a part of human nature, and the birth of a new nation signifies the awakening of an inoperative identity. The concept of ethnicity is central to the primordial theory, and the innate nature of ethnicity is used to explain the loyalty that humans have towards the nation (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005).

Primordialism, in the context of Indian nationhood, would mean that the Indian nation comprises an ethny which has been present for centuries. This essentialist view would thus consider Aryans to be native to the land and Hindus to be their descendants, while framing Muslims to be foreign invaders (Us-Salam 2018). Other scholars draw into Samuel Huntington's idea of "clash of civilizations" to describe India as comprising two religions that bear an ancient hatred (Huntington 1993, 186-194). This myopic view was also conveniently used by the British to understand Indian society as having two mutually hostile religious groups—Hindus and Muslims (Upadhyay and Robinson 2012, 35-37). According to Said (1978), the discourse of Orientalism helped imperial Europe to 'know' the colonized society in a way that would help control it. Thus, imperial Britain used the policies of divide and rule to create new fractures within Hindus and Muslims in Indian society. While this thesis acknowledges this as part of the various

social processes that have contributed to inter-group conflict between Hindus and Muslims, it focuses more on the role of actors and their moves after India attained independence from the British in 1947, particularly after the BJP gained political representation in the 1980s.

Another interpretation grapples with the "Meaning of India" to argue that India at its core has always been equated with Hindu characteristics (Ludden 1996). In Early 1900s, Bal Gangadhar Tilak sought to awaken a pan-Hindu national identity to galvanize people against the British colonial rule (Seth 2006), while M.S. Golwalkar, the second chief of the Hindu nationalist group--the Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh (RSS), was one of the first to equate India with a Hindu nation in response to the Muslim mobilization in the Khilafat movement. Golwalkar cemented religious-nationalism with the notion that Hinduism being the oldest religion to exist in the land, mandated that outsiders who arrived later should be required to operate under the dominant Hindu ideology (Jaffrelot 2007). Subsequent Hindu nationalists have drawn on this to cast Islam as foreign to India, and espouse second-class citizenship for Muslims, if not even encourage their expulsion (Ludden 1996).

My thesis is also inspired by the more contemporary approach of everyday nationalism introduced by Michael Billig (1995). Billig, who has a social psychological background, recognizes national identity as being rooted and reproduced in our mundane everyday routines and habits. He insightfully underscores the role of politicians in producing everyday nationalism. Politicians, even when disliked, are household names that saturate the lives of citizens and effectively disseminate sentiments of patriotism, which Billig (1995) considers to be a national sentiment. This thesis draws upon this approach to show how politicians, especially Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, effectively project the sentiments of nationalism and patriotism through their internet content and lifestyles. It also includes some of the ways Hindu nationalists have appropriated the primordial question of who is native to the land to cast the Indian nation as a Hindu nation, as can be seen with the Babri Masjid demolition of 1992.

*Ethno-symbolism:*

Ethno-symbolism, an approach rather than a theory, provides a more nuanced position on the subject of nationalism. The father of ethno-symbolism, Anthony D. Smith, effectively includes positions from the previous two theories while adding fresh insights to the study of nationalism. Viewing the nation as a social group with strong roots in historicity, overtime, this social group turns into a nation (Smith 2001). Smith describes it as "a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and customs" (Smith 2001). Commenting on the emotions and passions evoked by national identities, he says that, the reasons for the durability and strength of national identities can only be understood by exploring collective beliefs and sentiments about the "sacred foundation" of the nation and by considering their relationship to the "older beliefs, symbols and rituals of traditional religions" (Smith 2003).

My analysis of the narratives of nationhood most aligns with the dynamic approach of ethno-symbolism as it offers flexibility to capture the ongoing social processes that lead to the conceptualization of a nation. Ethno-symbolism accounts for the power the public dissemination of a TV serialized *Ramayana* in the late 1980s had in invoking older beliefs, myths, and symbols. Arvind Rajagopal (2001) in his book *Politics after Television: Hindu Nationalism and Reshaping of the Public in India* claims that featuring the mythical Hindu epic *Ramayana* in the form of a television serial was monumental for Hindu nationalism as it broke a decades long practice of not having religious content being shown on TV. He proposes that it contributed to the narrative and cultural/symbolic imagery of Lord Ram that Hindu nationalists then chanced upon at that time to advocate for a new era of politics (Rajagopal 2001). Further, a monumental historical instance— the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992— was a seminal event in India's communal fabric. This thesis is heavily informed by the Babri masjid demolition as the notable event speaks to the otherness of the Muslim community as well as points to the direct role of Hindu nationalist groups. It also aligns with the conspicuous rise and political influence of these groups for the first time since independence.

In the 1980s, Hindu nationalist groups like the Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh (RSS) and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), through its affiliate political party--the BJP, gained striking electoral support with the use of cultural and religious imagery, hype of the media and rallies to mobilize popular support. Basu (1996) proposes that this advent of Hindu communalism is a complex mixture of both- people on the ground being disillusioned and discontented as well as the cementing of the leadership of Hindu nationalist groups at the top. While the use of symbols have effectively advanced the political rhetoric of Hindu nationalist groups, however, the extraordinary contemporary measures that have marginalized Muslims are rooted in how the differences between Hindus and Muslims have been defined as a security issue.

While narratives of Indian nationhood have often been defined along religious lines from the time of partition, if not before, the blatant use of Hindu jingoistic ideology by Hindu nationalists has brought it to the forefront in recent years. The unprecedented victory in 2014--which for the first time saw a party other than the Indian National Congress score a governing majority on its own--by Narendra Modi in 2014, and subsequently, his re-election in 2019 has progressively stoked the Hindu nationalist movement. While his election win in 2014 was more in response to the lackluster performance by the incumbent Indian National Congress (Varshney 2016),

his reelection could be attributed to a growing sentiment of Hindu nationalism. To make sense of the increasing communal tensions in India, static approaches that draw solely on primordialism and modernism do not provide an adequate explanation. Many social processes that have led to the tightening of religious consciousness as they relate to national identity have happened over the years and have been the product of multiple factors.

## METHODOLOGY

Constructivist Scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wildeand (1998), who together make up part of the Copenhagen school, offer a nuanced definition of security in their book titled *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*. In this book, they argue that groups define their security through narratives that identify a referent object (which can be say a nation, language, culture, economy) something that is treasured and needs to be preserved, a subjective source of a threat or "the other" — which is most often an actor of group of actors that is construed as the other — and the threat itself. This could be military invasion but also other things like erosion of national identity, lack of jobs in the economy, or cultural sovereignty. What Buzan et al. call "securitizing actors" are those who hold cultural, social, political or economic power (like the media, or government) and they make a "securitizing move", which consists of them appealing to an intended audience that the referent object that group values is under threat by an enemy (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998). The intended audience then accepts or rejects the move of the securitizing actor. Depending on the degree of success, the securitizing actors might deem the group to be under "existential threat" and thus propose "extraordinary measures" that require violation of standard civil rights (Buzan, Wæver, and Wildeand 1998). This article attempts to look at the dynamic rise of communal tensions as a result of the security paradigm, which helps provide some insights as to why the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism is gaining traction.

This research uses an inductive process of reasoning to show how Hindu nationalist groups have effectively tapped into events before colonial rule, during colonial period, and after independence to advance their political rhetoric. This methodology strongly relies on the security paradigm laid out by Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde (1998). By delineating some key events, the securitizing actors and the securitizing moves they made are identified to underscore a subjective source of threat posed by the Muslims or "the other" to the Hindu community's referent object — the Hindu nation. While these security threats are subjective, this research will examine the symbols that security actors used to highlight and persuade the community of the perceived security threats facing their referent object. This article also identifies patterns of how securitizing actors have framed narratives in a way that makes the Hindu community fear marginalization. Furthermore,

some of the extraordinary measures and policy outcomes that these securitizing moves have led to are outlined.

I identify securitizing actors in this case study by looking at key members of the Indian society who have been involved in furthering the rhetoric of Hindu nationalism and leading to communal policy outcomes. This article considers securitizing moves to be the speeches and lifestyle choices made by securitizing actors that directly or indirectly frame narratives of Indian nationhood along the lines of Hindu nation and construct Muslims to be a threat to the safety of the Hindu nation. Data not only includes interpretation of some key historical events like the Babri Masjid demolition and Gujarat riots as they relate to the role of securitizing actors who still hold prominence a few decades later and were pivotal in shaping the Hindu-Muslim conflict, but also speeches, Twitter posts and comments on the posts of elected BJP officials and the current prime minister, Narendra Modi.

This research's independent variable, religious narratives of nationhood, is defined as the cultural resources — shared traditions, symbols, myths — that a social group can derive a sense of belonging and religious identity from (Smith 2001). The dependent variable, tensions between Hindus and Muslims, is operationalized in terms of inter-group conflict, physical and verbal, and in terms of anti-Muslim sentiments expressed in public and political forums. Physical violence is operationalized in terms of number of reported inter-group attacks and verbal violence is codified in terms of the ways people demonize Muslims on an administrative level or on social media. In terms of conceptualizing a nation and its origin, this research's use of the term aligns most closely to the definition laid out by Dr. Anthony Smith's theoretical approach of ethno-symbolism. It considers a nation to possess the following characteristics of "self-definition, myth and memory making, territorialisation, public culture and legal standardization" (Smith 2001).

This article's hypothesis is that while religion has had a role in narratives of Indian nationhood since the time of pre-independence, its role in the formation of narratives of Indian nationhood has only seen an upward trajectory since the 1980s. This analysis primarily focuses on the post-1980 period, which saw the rise and electoral representation of Hindu nationalist groups, as well as since 2014 when the BJP made a strong electoral comeback. This paper argues that because of some social processes like the electoral representation of Hindu nationalist groups in the 1980s and 2014, these narratives of nationhood are increasingly being framed along the lines of the Hindu religion. This has granted legitimacy to these groups to mobilize the Hindu community around the banner of homogenous religious symbols and further, highlight a supposed security threat posed to their "Hindu nation" by Muslims thereby leading to the rise of tensions witnessed between Hindus and Muslims. This is not a recent trend but a culmination of social processes taking place over many decades. This research pays close attention to key events that are

interpreted as symbols of religious nationalism today in these narratives. These events include the rise of Hindu nationalist groups in the 1980s, featuring of the Hindu epic Ramayana on state television channels, the Babri Masjid (mosque) demolition, and the role of the current government in power. After summarizing these key events, the role they played in gradually shaping the narratives of Indian along religious lines will be illustrated.

The limitations of this paper include that the statistics of hate crime acts as reported in this analysis are mostly from the organization Hate Crime Watch (Mander 2018). It gathers data primarily from English media. Thus, the statistics most likely aren't able to grasp the scale of the actual violence. National press only records the graver cases with many cases going unreported as the BJP and the police dismiss and even cover up these incidents. The BJP has often attempted to camouflage the severity and intent behind the violence against religious minorities by either ascribing other reasons for the violence or by downplaying them to be instances of common breakdown of law and order (Mander 2018). Furthermore, the data analyzed using the speeches of elected officials and from the comments sections of Facebook and Twitter only consist of those who make their opinions known on the internet. A sizable population in the Internet, particularly those living in the rural areas, do not have routine access to social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter and thus, the impact of securitizing moves on that section of the Hindu community has not been accounted for.

## DATA ANALYSIS
### The Role of Hindu Nationalist Groups

Scattered conflicts between the Hindus and Muslims before the British colonial rule, the divisive colonial policies of the British, and the bloody partition of India and Pakistan carried out along religious lines all make up the social processes that led the narratives of Indian nationhood to be formed along religious lines. However, the recent increase in conflict between Hindus and Muslims can be directly traced back to the rise of Hindu Nationalist groups in the 1980s. While some of the Hindu nationalist groups were extant even during the very time of the partition in 1947, it wasn't until the 1980s that they gained political representation through their political affiliate, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and were effective at making securitizing moves to protect the Hindu community's referent object—the Hindu nation—from the subjective threat posed by Muslims and their religion of Islam.

The rise of the Hindu nationalist groups, and the BJP in particular, is noteworthy because it changed the course of Indian politics. These groups have been crucial in framing the narratives of Indian nationhood along Hindu traditions, mobilizing the support of the Hindu community, as well as making securitizing moves that distort and appropriate history to highlight the supposed threat that Muslims pose to Hindus. In the cases where the political leanings of hate crime

perpetrators have been identified, 83% of them have affiliations to Hindu nationalist groups (Mander 2018).

Below this research will highlight how securitizing moves made by Hindu nationalist groups like the Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya SwayamSevak Sangh (RSS), and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), in addition to the BJP, have aimed at defining Indian nationhood along Hinduism and creating a Hindu national consciousness.

### The *Ramayana*

The Hindu epic, *Ramayana*, was serialized and broadcasted every Sunday on national television between January 1987 to August 1989. This enabled it to reach the Indian masses through the singular entertainment channel on national television, and won historic nationwide viewership. Its release coincided with one of the most important stages of the *Ram Janmabhoomi* (Birthplace of Ram) movement, which sought to demolish a mosque, the Babri Masjid, in order to construct a Hindu temple for the Hindu god Ram in its place. Proponents of this movement claimed that Muslims in the 16th century had built a mosque over a pre-existing Ram temple in the holy city of Ayodhya, which, according to Hindu traditions, is Lord Ram's birthplace. The Hindu nationalist party, the BJP, which was in its nascent stages in the 1980s, leveraged the prominent religious symbol of the God-King Ram from the serial to advance its political agenda of Hindu nationalism (Rajagopal 2001, 23).

The BJP's primary goal became to build "a grand temple to Lord Ram'' on the land where the Babri Masjid existed (18). The BJP, along with other Hindu nationalist groups like the RSS, mobilized volunteers to lead processions from Delhi to Ayodhya. In these processions, volunteers took inspiration from the serial of *Ramayana* to dress up with bows like Ram and his brother Lakshman. They took pictures in front of a lump of bricks which denoted the temple they would be constructing for Ram and labeled the bricks as Ram and the Sanskrit word *shilas*, thus highlighting its religious connotation. Importantly, one of the VHP activists described a tiff with the Ayodhya police as "What you are seeing today is a replay of the battle scenes you have witnessed on the television screen in the Mahabharat epic. Only this time the fight is for who will win the throne of Lucknow and Delhi (Rajagopal 2001).

Sequences of the serial, in turn, directly acknowledged the VHP rally by showing Ram praying on the land of his birthplace as an alternative storyline (Rajagopal 2001). The dissemination of the serial *Ramayana* and the narrative that it created was monetized by Hindu nationalists who used the cultural references to unite Hindus and bolster their sense of history and togetherness. Hindu militancy turned to the epic's battle scenes for inspiration as it instigated Hindus to feel that they had a cause to rise up to. They were attracted by the claims put forth by Hindu nationalist groups that cast Muslims as the enemy, which then led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid.

*Babri Masjid Demolition*

According to popular Hindu belief, the city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh is believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram. Babri Masjid was built in Ayodhya in the 16th century by a Mughal general—Mir Baqi. Members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) were convinced that the Babri Masjid was built on the exact location of Ram's birthplace in the 16th century after destroying a Ram temple which had been constructed in the 11th century.

On 6th December 1992, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and other affiliated Hindu nationalist groups mobilized a total of 150,000 VHP and BJP *kar sevaks* to gather at the disputed site of the Babri Masjid (Jaffrelot 2009, 1-19). BJP leaders like Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and Uma Bharti made instigating speeches. There were police provisions in place but as the crowd got more instigated, one person managed to get past the police barricades to climb onto the dome of the Masjid while waving a saffron flag. This resulted in the crowd hurling past the police and attacking the building with axes, hammers and grappling hooks, ultimately leading to the demolition of the building (Guha 2007, 633-659).

This seminal event gave rise to months of inter-communal riots and violence between Hindus and Muslims. Homes and shops were looted and burnt down, places of worship destroyed, and the violence spread to cities like Mumbai, Surat, Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Delhi, and Bhopal. A total of about 2000 people died, most of them being Muslims. The communal violence that took place in the aftermath of the demolition, contributed to the Mumbai bombings of 1993 as well as other terrorist acts by Jihadi groups (Guha 2007, 633-659).

While there is historical evidence in the form of inscriptions that the mosque was built by Mir Baqi in honor of Emperor Babur, till date there is a lack of concrete evidence that confirms that the Babri Masjid was on the site of a temple. Historians have been unsuccessful in locating literary sources in search for any mention of a destruction of a temple (Gopal et al. 1990, 76-81). The singular piece of evidence used to promote claims of a Ram temple destruction is the Sanskrit text *Skanda Purana*, which according to archeologists and historians, provides no confirmation to the claim put forth by the Hindu nationalist group (Sharma 2003). Furthermore, the Archeological Survey of India (ASI) stated that the land on which the Babri Masjid stood on previously used to be non-Islamic structure, and no concrete evidence was found that suggested that the structure was a Ram temple (Business Today 2019).

While the Babri Masjid which was never a point of contention before India's independence (Udayakumar 1997, 11-26), Hindu nationalist groups like the VHP, RSS and the BJP distorted history to highlight communal identities and advanced their contemporary political rhetoric. These groups conveniently chanced upon Britain's myopic view in addition to Tilak's early revivalist nationalism, to create a narrative that casted Muslims as invaders in the holy land of Hindus.

Their claims of Muslims having destroyed a Hindu temple of the beloved Lord Ram helped the Hindu community construe Muslims as "the other" that posed threats to their religious sanctity and crafted Babri Masjid as something that symbolized the Muslim takeover or destruction of Hindu sacredness and made the demolition as justified. In addition to the symbolic relevance of the Babri Masjid, as Udayakumar (1997, 11-26) wrote, Ayodhaya's mythological significance made it the perfect stage to carry out "communal drama". The securitizing moves consisted of mobilizing the support of people using religious symbols of Ram, the incendiary speeches made on the day of the demolition, as well as the actual destruction of the mosque.

## Narendra Modi

One of the most crucial securitizing actors of the last few years has been India's current prime minister, Narendra Modi. Importantly, Modi started his political career with a RSS affiliated student group and then worked for the RSS itself for almost 10 years. Consequently, he joined the BJP in 1987, and rose up the ranks swiftly to become general secretary of Gujarat for the party (Kaplan 2009). Modi was the chief minister in the Indian state of Gujarat for 12 years, notably during the Gujarat riots of 2002, before becoming the prime minister of the country in May of 2014.

Narendra Modi is one of the key securitizing actors because of the massive political power he has amassed, earlier in the state of Gujarat, and now in the entire country. He also receives unprecedented media attention because of his charismatic personality, passionate speeches and humble background. His popularity among Non-Resident Indians stems from an attempt to elevate India's status on the global stage. Thus, a lot of Modi's supporters, mostly Hindus, look up to him for his popular appeal. These supporters also praise him for his commitment to Hindu nationalist ideologies that aim to glorify Hindu traditions and practices. A major section of the Hindu society finds satisfaction in a leader that helps maintain the status quo of Hindus in Indian society as well as promote the superiority of Hindu culture to the rest of the world. This relates to the primordial belief that one has an inherent conviction in the superiority of one's own nation, in this case—a Hindu nation (Kedourie 1971).

While Modi has never stated anything on Twitter or Facebook that can explicitly be taken to mean that Hindu culture or the nation is under threat after he assumed the role of the prime minister, he has had a pivotal role in defining the narratives of Indian nationhood along religious lines. As this article will outline below, a lot of his tweets and Facebook posts contain cultural symbols that are associated with the Hindu religion. He has actively maintained a social media presence on Twitter and Facebook as well as published his thoughts on his monthly podcast *Mann ki baat* (Talk of the Mind). Through these, he has been effective in maintaining his populism and appeal by making himself relatable to the masses. Not only

has this helped Modi mobilize his Hindu support base, but it also indirectly helped his party members make more explicit securitizing moves. Further, Modi's Twitter and Facebook pages have comments sections, which have become a space where Hindu nationalists are able to bounce ideas off of each other and further convince themselves of the threat Hindus face in the hands of Muslims.

Additionally, while Modi is criticized by some sections of the Indian society for communal politics, his securitizing moves have been adequately successful in indirectly convincing a huge chunk of his intended audience, the Hindus, of the threat their nation faces. Thus, Modi was able to garner their support when he undertook extraordinary and harsh actions like enabling the Gujarat riots of 2002 as the chief minister, reversing Article 370, passing controversial citizenship laws, enabling his party members to instigate violence and maintaining silence during the Delhi riots of 2020.

## Gujarat Riots of 2002

Modi engaged in more explicit securitizing moves prior to becoming the prime minister of India. One of the most noteworthy communal events that some scholars deem to classify as a pogrom, the Gujarat Riots, took place under his term. About 2000 people, most of whom were Muslims, died and over 400 women were raped. The riots were fueled after a fire killed 58 Hindu *kar sevaks* on a passenger train returning from the demolished Babri Masjid site in Ayodhya, after which allegation claimed that the fire was caused by Muslim mobs. This attribution of blame was supported by politically motivated and bribed investigations, however, independent committees after investigation concluded that the fire was an accidental occurrence (Jaffrelot 2011).

Modi declared February 28 to be a day of mourning in order and allowed the display of the victims' dead bodies in the biggest city of Gujarat (Thottam 2012). Through this securitizing move, Modi successfully brought the Hindu community's attention to tangible results of a presumed Muslim threat. The day of mourning, which some said "was a clear invitation to violence" (Luce 2010), witnessed severe dreadful attacks on Muslims. Mobs of Hindu men gang-raped Muslim women and shoved kerosene down the throats of women and men before setting them on fire. Muslim men in many cases were forcefully made to watch before they met the same fate. A lot of the perpetrators were RSS volunteers who were dressed in saffron colours and armed with weapons, gas cylinders, electoral lists and printouts of home addresses of Muslims. Not only did the Gujarat government under Modi not adequately compensate the 20,000 people rendered homeless, but Modi also commented how "Every action has an equal and opposite reaction" (Kaplan 2009). Modi, who held one day of funeral for the loss of the Hindu community, did not do the same for that of the Muslim community, which he even once called "baby-making factories" (Kaplan 2009).

## Kashmir Lockdown

On August 3 2019, just a few months after another sweeping victory in the May general Indian elections, Modi and the BJP in an extraordinary measure passed a law revoking Article 370, which afforded special status to the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state was broken into two federally administered parts—a part combining the Muslim-majority Kashmir and Hindu-majority Jammu, and another part consisting of the Buddhist-majority Ladakh (Pandey 2019).

The Modi government's justification for scraping Article 370, all while arresting Kashmiri leaders and shutting down internet in the region, was the promotion of peace and prosperity in Kashmir. Many Kashmiris view the government's allowance of real estate purchase to non-Kashmiris as a ploy to change religious demographics in the disputed region that hitherto limited property purchase and settlement to permanent residents. This unilateral move was considered unconstitutional by many as the national government did not consult with the leaders of Kashmir and garnered support from nationalists who thought the crack down on people unwilling to subscribe to Hindu nationalism was justified (Yasir, Raj, and Gettleman 2019).

## Controversial Citizenship Laws

The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) is a law passed in December of 2019 that promises citizenship to Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, and Sikhs who arrived in India before 2015 to escape religious persecution from the three neighbouring Islamic countries of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This law received major criticism for clashing with the secular ethos of the country, and for being another tactic by the Hindu-Nationalist group to marginalize the minority Muslims. Narendra Modi dismisses claims of the law being anti-Muslim and blamed the claimed that the opposition was spreading "lies and fear" in an attempt to detract from his good work and oust him from power (The Guardian 2019).

Another controversial law passed last year was the National Register of Citizens (NRC), that aims to remove illegal migrants (both Hindus and Muslims) from the state of Assam, which would leave about 2 million people stateless unless they are able to furnish proof of citizenship. Modi's closest political aide and India's Home Minister, Amit Shah in a speech last April had said, *"First, we will bring the citizenship amendment bill and will give citizenship to the Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and Christian refugees, the religious minorities from the neighbouring nations. Then, we will implement NRC to flush out the infiltrators from our country"* (The Guardian 2019).

These new laws reflect the outcome of the securitizing moves that securitizing actors like Modi, Amit Shah, and their fellow BJP officials have undertaken to further marginalize Muslims and advance Hindu culture. This is evidenced by Amit Shah's use of the word "infiltrators'' to refer to those who are not unwelcome and seen as a threat to those who rightfully belong. In addition to the law blatantly excluding persecuted

minorities like the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan and the Rohingyas in Bangladesh (Human Rights Watch 2019), citizenship laws also directly speak to narratives of nationhood as they serve to politically attest to who belongs in the nation.

*Use of Symbols*

In alignment with what Billig (1995) underscores in his book *Banal Nationalism*, Modi routinely utilizes religious symbols to evoke sentiments of patriotism. His prolific Twitter posts make generous use of symbols that correspond to Hinduism. For example, early in April during the Covid-19 pandemic, he encouraged Indians to switch off and save electricity for 9 minutes at 9pm and to instead light a candle, a *diya* or a flashlight while standing in their balconies to show solidarity during tough times. He posted a picture of himself lighting an elaborate diya and retweeted many pictures of others doing the same (Twitter). Hence, the prime minister makes subtle references to the Hindu religion to relate with the population. He is also a big advocate of yoga, and declared a national yoga day soon after assuming power in 2014. While the health benefits of yoga are undeniable, Modi encourages people to incorporate such Hindu practices and traditions as part of their lifestyles. On the other hand, he has not done the same for other religious traditions. Many of his tweets also make explicit references to ancient Hindu tradition and Hindu gods (see figure 1 and figure 2) as an inspiration to governance and thus bases a lot of his popularity on achieving legitimacy from pious Hindu voters. These moves adopted by Modi for years now, while not securitizing in nature, attempt to mobilize his fan base under unified Hindu symbols, thereby rendering the securitizing moves made by Modi and other BJP members more effective.

## Delhi Riots 2020

In the end of February 2020, violence between Hindus and Muslims erupted in the capital city of Delhi on a scale that hadn't taken place for decades. A mosque in Mustafabad in East Delhi was burned down in a way that raised comparisons to the Babri Masjid demolition almost 40 years ago. Muslim houses were attacked, and shops burned down (Gettleman, Raj, and Yasir 2020). The police, which is under the direct jurisdiction of the federal government, failed to provide safety to the minority population, and in many cases, supported the Hindu mobs that were engaging in violence. These communal riots resulted in over 50 deaths and 200 injuries, with over 75% of the fatalities being Muslims (Ellis-Petersen and Azizur 2020).

In the case of Delhi riots, one of the monumental securitizing actors was a BJP leader, Kapil Mishra. On 23rd February, he publicly made a provocative ultimatum that if the police did not dissolve the protests that were taking place against the new citizenship laws, then his followers will be "forced to hit the streets" (Twitter 2020). According to reports, Mishra had started to gather Hindu young men to act against the Muslims on the morning of 24th February. The witness stated that there were explicit commands to capture and kill any Muslims in sight (Ellis-Petersen and Azizur 2020). Another Hindu, a priest, in the state of Bihar recalled a story of a similar vein, in which Hindu mobs brandished weapons openly as they marched to attack Muslims. The priest mentioned a young man with a gun who was shouting, *"Brothers, we are on a mission in the interest of our nation. Our [BJP] leaders have given the call to come out in the open…There is nothing to worry about. Join us and increase our strength"* (Ellis-Petersen and Azizur 2020). In one mobile footage, the police demonstrated their anti-Muslim sentiment by brutally beating five innocent Muslims and then forcing them to sing the national anthem to show their "loyalty" to India (Ellis-Petersen and Azizur 2020).

The idea of Muslims and their questionable loyalty has semblance in another tweet by Mishra in which he equated the Delhi assembly elections as a fight between India and Pakistan (Twitter 2020). The tweet was later taken down by the Election Commission of India on the grounds that it triggered existing tensions between communities (The Statesman 2020). By categorizing the opposition parties as well as critics of the BJP and their citizenship laws as Pakistan, he is implying that they are anti-nationals, which is in contrast to the "patriotic"

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Figure 1. Narendra Modi mentions Hindu gods in the governance of India in a tweet.

*(taken from Twitter)*

**Narendra Modi** ✔
@narendramodi

Follow ⌄

Lord Ram had shown us the path of good governance-Ram Rajya. Gandhiji has aspired it for free India. Let's strive for it.

10:24 PM - 11 Apr 2011

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Figure 2. Narendra Modi expresses his pride in Hindu traditions in a tweet.

*(taken from Twitter)*

**Narendra Modi** ✔
@narendramodi

Follow ⌄

There will be no achievers in society if we are not proud of our traditions! Addressed Brahmin Mahasammelan at Surat
nm4.in/J78pFE

8:36 AM - 24 Apr 2012

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Figure 3. A tweet by BJP official, Shobha Karandlaje, claiming that the opposition is turning India into an Islamic Republic.

*(taken from Twitter)*

**Shobha Karandlaje** ✔
@ShobhaBJP

Hindus should vote for BJP else their survival in #Kamataka will become extremely difficult as congress is hell bent in turning Kamataka to Islamic republic. Celebrating Tipu Jayanthi instead of Vivekananda/Cariappa Jayanthi is just one e.g. from many antihindu acts. #BaariBJP

30/04/18, 16:59 from Bengaluru, India

BJP supporters. Since Pakistan and India have had consistent security struggles, he makes a securitizing move through which he aims to cast any opposition as a security concern. Those who do not support the BJP are a threat to India or the Hindu nation. Further, as figure 3 shows, other BJP officials too have run their campaign on the threat the Hindu community faces and how the BJP will be a reliable form of protection to the increasingly marginalized Hindus (Twitter 2018).

Afterwards, when Mishra garnered criticism for what many claimed to be an incendiary speech, he again took to Twitter to victimize himself and frame the opposition and criticism as being part of a "hate campaign" (Twitter 2020). This Twitter post got a lot of support from many members of the Hindu community with some examples of comments being as follows:

- "Kapil Mishra will be the next CM [Chief Minister] of Delhi. He raised his voice for Hindu brothers, such people are very few, we should not lose such people. I want to strengthen the hands of Kapil Mishra and I request all of you to also support him."

- "Is preventing another road from getting blocked hate?"

- "Nation wants to know what #Kapil_Mishra did which is against law? Is it crime to say that don't block public road? #CAA is not against any Indian citizen then why r u opposing it?"

- "Call it as it is Anti-Hindu Riots, 2020."

- "The man who stood for right cause but framed in wrong action. He didn't incite riots. It's their intolerance that started pelting stones" (Twitter 2020).

The comments above imply that the Delhi riots was a ploy staged by the opposition to make the party in power, the BJP, look bad. They highlight the perceived threat of marginalization that many Hindus possess, and how they consider the securitizing actor to be their champion for protecting their referent object. These replies on Twitter demonstrate how many Hindus fail to see the contentiousness of the new citizenship laws, as well as the violence being propagated against minorities. They buy into the securitizing moves of the securitizing actors to not only imagine a sense of threat but also dismiss and disregard any possibility of threat that "the other" might be facing. The securitizing moves are quite successful in cases in which members of the Hindu community interpret the same set of events in a way that confirms the subjective sense of threat that the securitizing actor has highlighted. In one comment, a tweeter claims it to be "Anti-Hindu Riots 2020" even though the violence committed against Muslims was overwhelmingly greater with fewer, scattered instances of violence against Hindus. Again, members of the Hindu community are perceiving the intolerance of the Muslims to be the cause of the riots. This can also be connected to the wider stereotypical narrative that is produced regarding militant Islam and Islam's intolerance.

## Cow Protection

Party members of the BJP have made use of striking communal rhetoric that clearly constructs the narrative of Indian nationhood along religious lines. As the Hindu tradition worships cows and forbids its consumption, many BJP members have made speech acts on the topic of cow protection, which has manifested in the dramatic increase in violent cow protection campaigns against those who eat or sell beef. According to a report published by the Human Rights Watch published earlier this year in February, there have been 100 different cases over 20 states in which approximately 280 people have been injured and 44 left dead. These cow vigilante groups have associations with Hindu nationalist groups which in turn are linked to the BJP. The victims are usually Muslim groups and other backward castes and tribes (Bajoria 2019).

Here are some examples of speeches made by elected BJP members that can be interpreted as securitizing moves that fuel the party's communal rhetoric to advance crimes against those engaged in beef consumption or sales.

- "There is only one way to protect Indian culture: to protect gau (cows), Ganga, and (goddess) Gayatri… Only the community that can protect this heritage will survive. Otherwise there will be a huge crisis of identity, and this crisis of identity will endanger our existence." –Adityanath, BJP chief minister, Uttar Pradesh state, November 2017 (Bajoria 2019).

In the above, the securitizing actor is a BJP chief minister of the Indian state which reports the highest numbers of communal violence and his speech is defining Indian culture

strictly in terms of the Hindu religion (Economic Times 2018). Through this speech or the securitizing move, he is bringing the Hindu community's attention to the supposed threat that is being posed to their referent object, Hindu nation, which is being symbolized by the cow, the river Ganga, and the goddess Gayatri, all of which are considered sacred in Hinduism. The source of threat is from those who eat or kill cows—the Muslim community. By wording it as a "crisis of identity" that will "endanger our existence", the securitizing actor constructs it to be a matter of security concern because of how it poses an existential threat to the Hindu community. This securitizing move thus aims to create a justification for any crimes against Muslims as these policies or hate acts would be a result of protection of the Hindu nation.

- "Till cow is not accorded the status of 'Rashtra Mata' [Mother of the Nation] I feel the war for gau raksha [cow protection] will not stop even if gau rakshaks [cow protectors] are put into jails or bullets are fired at them." –T Raja Singh Lodh, BJP lawmaker, Telangana state, July 2018 (Bajoria 2019).

Here the securitizing actor identifies the referent object as the Hindu nation as it is symbolized by the cow. By framing the protection of cows as a "war", he underscores the security threat faced by the Hindu community. Further, not only does he normalize the act of criminalizing or shooting the source of the threat but also deems it to be an inadequate security measure.

- "Those who are dying without eating beef, can go to Pakistan or Arab countries or any other part of the world where it is available." –Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, BJP union minister of state for parliamentary affairs, May 2015 (Bajoria 2019).

Here, the BJP minister is a securitizing actor who casts anyone who doesn't follow ideals of Hinduism, regardless of their religion, as a foreigner who would belong better in an Islamic country. This shows how the narrative of the Indian nation is defined along religious lines and is only limited to those who follow religious rules as they conform to Hinduism. The conflation of a particular religion with the Indian nation construes Muslims as "the other" who deserve to be thrown out if they do not abide by rules of a Hindu nation.

- "We won't remain silent if somebody tries to kill our mother. We are ready to kill and be killed." –Sakshi Maharaj, BJP member of parliament, on the killing of Mohammad Akhlaq, October 2015 (Bajoria 2019).

This securitizing actor is again justifying the violent action taken by cow vigilante groups on Muslims who have engaged in beef consumption and sales through this securitizing move. He identifies "our mother" as the referent object— the Hindu nation and that any threat posed to the referent object deserves a murderous response.

- "We will hang those who kill cows. –Raman Singh, BJP chief minister, Chhattisgarh state, April 2017 (Bajoria 2019).

- "I had promised that I will break the hands and legs of those who do not consider cows their mother and kill them." –Vikram Saini, BJP lawmaker, Uttar Pradesh state, March 2017 (Bajoria 2019).

The above two examples are also securitizing moves made by securitizing actors through speeches in which they explicitly declare that they will undertake violence against those who supposedly weaken the Hindu community's referent object— the Hindu nation— as symbolized by cows. These fiery statements also serve to give a green signal to other members of the Hindu community to commit acts of violence against the threatening Muslims.

Cow protection has also had policy implications. The Haryana government instituted a 24-hour 'helpline' in 2016 where people could lodge complaints regarding cow slaughter and trade as well as staffed police officials to take care of those reports. In Uttar Pradesh, the BJP chief minister, Adityanath, closed butcher houses and meat shops owned by Muslims right after coming to power in 2017 (Bajoria 2019). This goes on to demonstrate the importance occupied by cow protection in the agenda of BJP chief ministers. In a tragic incident in April of 2017, an old dairy farmer from Rajasthan, Pehlu Khan, along with four others, was severely beaten up with belts and sticks by a group of Hindus. His purchase receipts of the cattle were supposedly destroyed in front of him (Bajoria 2019). Even when this violent attack resulted in the death of Pehlu Khan, the home minister of Rajasthan put the onus on the deceased by arguing,

> "People know cow trafficking is illegal, but they do it. Gau bhakts [cow worshippers] try to stop them. There's nothing wrong with that" (Bajoria 2019).

> Another official from the BJP said, "We should not take law into our hands. But we have no regret over his death [Pehlu Khan] because those who are cow smugglers are cow-killers; sinners like them have met this fate earlier and will continue to do so." –Gyan Dev Ahuja, BJP lawmaker, Rajasthan state, April 2017"(Bajoria 2019).

In this example too, the securitizing actor makes the securitizing move of making this statement that expresses a lack of remorse over the death of a Muslim as a result of cow-lynching. Further, his securitizing move creates a foreboding sense of promise that Muslims who threaten the Hindu nation by killing cows are sinning and may very well face violence or death and that it would be completely justified.

The prominence of cow protection was further underscored when the state of Gujarat modified its laws to punish the killing of cows or bulls with increased charges and life imprisonment in 2017. The home minister of Gujarat, Pradeepsinh Jadeja was recorded saying, "We have equaled the killing of a cow or cow progeny with the killing of a human being"

(Bajoria 2019). Since the BJP came to power in 2014, cows have been elevated to the status of a human being whereas the minority Muslims have been dehumanized to occupy a lower status in Indian society. The Cow has been awarded such a valuable symbol for the Hindu nation that its killing warrants the killing of Muslims.

## Evaluation of the Success of Securitizing Moves made against Muslims

Securitizing moves can be successful or unsuccessful depending on whether the community they aim to appeal to accepts or rejects the moves by the securitizing actors. Some securitizing moves have been wildly successful in that they were accepted by a wide section of society to rise up and engage in extraordinary measures. The speech acts made by leaders from the BJP and other Hindu nationalist groups were extremely successful in the case of the Babri Masjid demolition. Similarly, the securitizing move to utilize the narrative of the Hindu epic of *Ramayana* was immensely effective as it proved to be a catalyst in a process that resulted in the destruction of a mosque. Narendra Modi's use of symbols and his explicit securitizing moves in the case of the Gujarat riots only added to his popularity among his Hindu supporters. They regarded him as a reliable champion of Hindu rights and protection.

Some other securitizing moves, on the other hand, witnessed less popularity. For example, opinions regarding the Kashmir lockdown were more divided. Liberals, human rights groups and international organizations criticized the move because of the human rights abuses inflicted on Kashmiri people by the deployed army. Many have even challenged the legality of the Kashmir lockdown (The Guardian 2019). However, a lot of Modi supporters believe this measure to be rightful as it serves to undo the unfair privileges bestowed upon Kashmiris, the majority of whom are Muslims. Supporters justify the violence committed during the Delhi riots by instead citing the violence faced by Hindu Kashmiri Pandits. Thus, Modi's measures have been successful among his support base.

Some of the securitizing moves are still ongoing and in flux. The moves to justify and implement the CAA and NRC were embraced by Modi supporters while strongly rejected by more liberal sections of the Indian society. Those in disagreement with the laws took to the streets to protest. However, these protests and demonstrations were halted as a result of the lockdown imposed by the Covid-19 Pandemic. The implementation of the two controversial laws was also indirectly responsible for giving rise to the 2020 Delhi Riots. While the securitizing moves leading up to the Delhi Riots were successful in inciting mobs of Hindus to attack Muslim communities, the securitizing actor, Kapil Mishra, was also met with a lot of criticism. However, as previously outlined in examples of comments on his Twitter posts, Mishra also had a lot of sympathizers who framed him to be the victim falsely accused.

## Hindu Nationalism and the Demands of Subordinate Castes

Along with the projection of Muslims as a threat to the Hindu nation, the political demands of lower castes and the variations from a strident unified identity constructed by Hindu nationalists are also framed as anti-national and threats to the nation. The ideology of Hindutva rests on a monolithic Hindu identity, and the TV serialized *Ramayana* and religious symbols utilized during the Babri Masjid demolition attempted to mobilize the Hindu community under a homogenous Hindu identity. The BJP government has utilized security moves like censorship in the wake of dissent by non-upper caste Hindus and divergences from mainstream Hindu traditions (Sen 2019). The Modi government, which relies heavily on the upper-caste Hindu vote, has not only painted Muslims as a threat to the supposed Hindu nation, but also other lower-caste Hindus who do not conform to the monolithic Hindu narrative (Economic and Political Weekly, 2013).

## CONCLUSION

For four decades now, securitizing actors, who are mostly members of Hindu nationalist groups and the current political party in power, the BJP, have tried to underscore a supposed threat that the Hindu community and its Hindu nation face from the minority group of Muslims. The findings demonstrate how these actors have been making securitizing moves that distort and appropriate history, advance certain historical myths more than others, and rely on monolithic Hindu symbols to mobilize the support of the Hindu community. This helps these actors gather the support of Hindus on the basis of a more homogenous Hindu religion while also enhancing the subjective sense of threat to the cherished Hindu nation that the Hindu community faces. The securitizing moves consist of speech acts made at political rallies and on internet mediums like Twitter aiming to victimize the Hindu community. The supposed existential threat posed on the Hindu community's status and survival then serves to justify the controversial policy measures that these actors undertake while maintaining the support of the Hindu community.

The literature review delineated some of the reasons for communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims in India. Scholars have looked at the primordial belief that India has always consisted of Hindu characteristics and Islam has been regarded as a foreign element to India. They have also highlighted how the primordial approach to nationhood perceives one's own nation to be superior to others. Other scholars mention the way Western powers construct knowledge about the Orient that helps them dominate it. Some scholars underscore the importance of everyday practices and routines that churn out feelings of patriotism. This paper's thesis aligned with the work of these previous scholars. This reseach looked at how the narrative of *Rama Janmabhoomi* in the case of the Babri Masjid demolition was used to glorify ancient Hindu

traditions and myths, as well as to cast Islam as a foreign religion that had taken over Hindu land. This article also looked at how the British conveniently simplified India to be a land of mutually hostile religious groups in an effort to rule it better. This oversimplification was used by Hindu nationalist groups to advance their ideology of a Hindu nationhood. Additionally, this article focused on how a key securitizing actor like Narendra Modi is making use of everyday symbols that relate to Hinduism to normalize patriotism. The BJP is also indulging in the glorification of traditional Hindu practices in an effort to increase Hindus' sense of pride and identity to then mobilize them to create a Hindu nation.

This article's approach adds a security dimension to the work of previous scholars. It also takes the recent instances of intergroup conflict into account to help explain how the increase in tensions are a result of the narratives of Indian nationhood being drawn along religious lines. This work's thesis suggests that the very meaning of India that founding members had envisioned is being challenged. The increasing political representation of the BJP and the increase in intergroup violence after BJP came to power pose a threat to the very ideals on which the Indian nation was constructed. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that the literature and the different approaches to nationalism are still very relevant. In particular, religion is constituting a huge theme in the direction that Indian nationalism is taking. Regardless of these findings, the securitizing moves made by securitizing actors aren't blindly being accepted by all Hindus or all of the Indian society. There has been a pushback in terms of protests and demonstrations, social media and global criticism.

This research sheds useful light on the tactics adopted by some key actors in the Indian society that help them construct a narrative that makes the dominant upper-caste factions of the Hindu religious group appear to be under threat in an attempt to justify extraordinary policy measures and violations of human rights. However, this article's thesis does not take the other side of the story in account. For example, some Muslim leaders in the Indian society are engaging in counter-securitizing moves that then bring the Muslim community's attention to the threats posed to their religious group by Hindus. Recently, the President of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM), Asaddudin Owaisi, chanted the Islamic religious line of "Allahu Akbar'' when taking oath in the Indian Parliament in June of 2019. This was in direct response to the chants of *"Jai Shri Ram"* and *"Vande Mataram"* by Hindi members of the Parliament as they took oath in the office (India Tribune 2018). Furthermore, student communities in Leftist university of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and the Muslim majority Jamia Milia Islamia University have also been engaging in securitizing moves that aim to mobilize Muslims based on the threat and alienation they face in the hands of the BJP and other Hindu nationalist groups.

Future research can also try and zoom into the other side of the story and identify how members of the Muslim community in India are crucial securitizing actors making securitizing moves that alert Muslim community to the threat it faces in India. This future research would add dimension to this article by showcasing how Muslim and other non-Hindu nationalist security actors are further depending Hindu-Muslim cleavages.

Further, while this paper's constructivist approach is dynamic and flexible, other approaches can help shed new light on the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. For example, future research can draw from Social- and Political Psychology to carry out experimental research that tests concepts like intergroup relations theory, minimal group paradigm, dominant group theory, social identity theory, in-group favoritism, out-group resentment, ethnocentrism, explicit biases, and implicit biases. This may provide better insights into how a huge part of the Hindu-Muslim conflict is based on psychological and cognitive categorization. It would also highlight the psychological reasons why securitizing actors were able to appeal to the psyche of the Hindu community to trigger their in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism. Future research should also adopt a postmodernist approach to look at how those in power, like the BJP, are constructing knowledge about the Indian society in a way that helps them maintain Hindu support. Another limitation of the security paradigm is the way it frames every political issue to be a security issue. However, some securitizing moves made by the BJP are motivated by political reasons and electoral incentives like securing the vote bank of Hindus.

Moreover, future research can also focus on the rise of an international consciousness and how that affects the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India. Narendra Modi has gained popularity among Hindu nationalist groups because of the tough stance that he has exhibited towards Pakistan. Hence, future research can evaluate the role of external actors like Pakistan in informing the domestic security issue of Hindus and Muslims in India. ■

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# "A Black Daughter of the South": An Analysis of Local and National Coverage of Stacey Abrams' Gubernatorial Campaign and Black Descriptive Representation

**Pearl Sullivan, Elon University**

*In 2018, Stacey Abrams, the Minority Leader in the Georgia State House of Representatives, campaigned to be the governor of Georgia. The campaign garnered national attention as Abrams, the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor in the country, excited Democratic hopes of turning Georgia blue (Bacon 2018). Between the start of 2017 and the beginning of 2019, the* Atlanta Journal Constitution *published 611 articles that mentioned Abrams, and the* New York Times *published 285 stories related to her candidacy. This paper explores the differences in the local and national portrayal of Abrams' campaign and how the coverage reflected media trends in the presentation of women of color, specifically female candidates of color. The research finds that the national coverage of Abrams both mentioned and focused on Abrams' identity as a Black woman to a greater extent than the local coverage. Additionally, the paper shows that neither local or national coverage used stereotypical framing common in the coverage of women and people of color in politics.*

## INTRODUCTION

In 2018, Stacey Abrams, the Minority Leader in the Georgia State House of Representatives, campaigned to be the governor of Georgia. The campaign garnered national attention as Abrams, the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor in the country, excited Democratic hopes of turning Georgia blue (Bacon 2018). The campaign was heated as Abrams ran as an unabashed liberal and leaned into her identity as a Black woman in the traditionally conservative state of Georgia (Abrams 2018). Meanwhile, Brian Kemp, the eventual winner of the election, ran a hardline conservative campaign where he specifically highlighted the deportation of undocumented immigrants and gun rights as the central facets of his candidacy (Kemp 2018). The election itself was contentious as Kemp maintained his position as Secretary of State of Georgia, the role responsible for elections in the state, while running for office. This ignited suspicions of conflicts of interest and potential corruption as thousands of voters, specifically voters of color, had their voter registrations revoked by Kemp's office under an Exact Match Law in the months leading up to the election (Valverde 2019). Additionally, as Kemp beat Abrams with only 50.2% of the vote to her 48.8%, Abrams refused to concede, and the election remained undecided through December of 2018 (Politico 2018; Valverde 2019).

The election received intense coverage on the local and national stages due to Democratic hopes that Georgia would become a battleground state, the engagement of southern Black voters, the contentious nature of the race, and, most importantly, due to the charisma of Abrams herself and the groundbreaking nature of her candidacy (McFarland 2019). Stacey Abrams was the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor in the United States and, if she had won, she would have been the first Black woman elected governor in the country. Moreover, she focused her campaign on previously overlooked populations and, instead of focusing on moderate voters in the predominately white Atlanta suburbs, the campaign continued Abrams' legacy of voter registration specifically the registration of Black people in rural areas of the state (Abrams 2018). Due to both her identity and to the focus of her campaign, Abrams was a new type of candidate for the country and for the state of Georgia specifically. Therefore, the national and local coverage of her candidacy could have been definitive for the perception of Abrams as a candidate and almost certainly had implications for the electoral calculus of similar candidates considering running for political office.

Between the start of 2017, almost two years before the election, and the beginning of 2019, two months after Abrams lost a contentious election to Republican Brian Kemp, the *Atlanta Journal Constitution* (AJC) published 611 articles that mentioned Abrams and the *New York Times* (NYT) published 285 stories related to her candidacy. This paper explores the differences in the local and national portrayal of Abrams'

campaign and how the coverage reflected media trends in the presentation of women of color, specifically female candidates of color. The research predicts that national news covered Abrams' identities more than local news, both by focusing on her race and gender explicitly and by mentioning her identities as a qualifier in articles with a different focus. In contrast, the paper hypothesizes that while national news focused more on Abrams' identities, local news used stereotypical frames to allude to her race and gender.

The aforementioned hypotheses are based on the nature of the readerships of the two newspapers analyzed. *The New York Times* is the national paper of record and, while a portion of its readers vote in Georgia, the majority of both its reporters and its readership would not be directly affected by the results of the gubernatorial election due to their residency outside the state. On the other hand, the vast majority of the *Atlanta Journal Constitution's* readers and reporters live and vote in Georgia meaning that the outcome of the election, and the policies of the victor, would directly affect their lives (AJC 2012). These differences in the geography of the readership is what prevents national outlets from covering local elections in general unless the candidate becomes a celebrity, as Abrams did due to both her identity as a Black woman and her intelligence and charisma as a candidate and political messenger (Gulati, et. al 2000). As a large part of Abrams' celebrity, which led to national coverage, was based on her role as the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor, this research hypothesizes that the national news focused more on the groundbreaking nature of her candidacy, both implicitly and explicitly, than the local news which focused on her policies that had the potential to directly affect their readers.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Existing literature examines both the portrayal of political candidates by the media and the portrayal of Black women by the media, but, due to Stacey Abrams' historical significance as the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor, scholarship exploring the coverage of Black women in politics is rare. In previous research on coverage of political campaigns, scholars have examined differences between national and local framing of the campaigns (Stevens, et. al 2006; Gulati, et. al 2000). This scholarship has generally focused on framing of national candidates by national and local media outlets as local elections generally only receive coverage in dramatic contests, such as the Georgia 2018 gubernatorial election. Additionally, previous research discusses how different identifiers affect media coverage of political candidates. Specifically, scholars have examined the impact of gender and race separately as well as the intersectional effects of race and gender on coverage of campaigns. In order to understand the coverage of Abram's candidacy, understanding how the media portrays women, Black people, and, specifically, Black women is crucial.

## National versus local framing of political campaigns

Framing is how media sources present information based on what the source decides to include, exclude, and emphasize (Moghaddam 2017). Framing allows news sources to take complex events and ideas and explain them in an understandable manner that leans towards a specific interpretation and, therefore reaction (Moghaddam 2017; Entman 2010). In their research, Stevens and his colleagues (2006) found that local news focuses more on national campaigns than on local elections, only changing the coverage when local elections become contentious or in the days before the election occurs. Additionally, when campaigns or political issues are covered by the local news, they fail to provide in depth coverage or explain candidates' positions (Stevens, et. al 2006). Finally, research shows that local news coverage of local political issues uses episodic framing instead of thematic framing meaning that the news attributes problems to specific circumstances instead of systemic issues (Stevens, et. al 2006; Entman 2010). However, scholars have found that local newspaper coverage does delve into political issues and campaigns to a greater extent than local television even though the same episodic framing is used (Gulati, et. al 2000).

On the other hand, national news barely covers local elections (Gulati, et. al 2000). Gulati and his colleagues found that the national news predominately focuses on Presidential campaigns with little attention given to senate or congressional elections and even less attention to local elections (2000). However, the same research showed that national news will focus on a smaller election if the candidate becomes a celebrity or faces a scandal (Gulati, et. al 2000; Cook 1989). The Georgia gubernatorial race fulfilled both of these conditions due to Stacey Abrams' national stature based on her historic role as the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor and due to the controversy surrounding Brian Kemp's refusal to resign as Secretary of State amid claims of voter suppression (Valverde 2019). Given that these conditions were met, it can be concluded that the national news framing that is seen in national campaigns – sensationalizing the news or printing stories that are easy to understand and draw readers in — were used in coverage of the Georgia election (Gulati, et. al 2000; Entman 2010).

## Portrayal of women candidates by the media

When discussing the media portrayal of women in politics, a double standard often arises. Scholars have found that if a woman is too warm, she is seen as incompetent, but if she occupies a leadership position she is perceived as cold (Bligh, et. al 2012; Hayes and Lawless 2015). Carlin and Kelly (2009) went farther with their research finding that women in politics are placed in one of four different roles by the media: the Pet, the Mother, the Seductress, or the Iron Maiden. The Pet stereotype, also known as the child role, occurs when a woman is tokenized and "symbolically taken along on group events as a mascot" (Carlin and Kelly 2009, p. 328). The

Mother stereotype means that women in power are portrayed as more compassionate than their male counterparts (Carlin and Kelly 2009). However, the Mother role often raises concerns about how women can hold leadership roles while still being good mothers, leads to a perception of women as emotional, and brings up images of scolding and shrewish behavior (Carlin and Kelly 2009, p. 328). The Seductress stereotype portrays women as sex objects, therefore contributing to an image of women as incompetent and superficial (Carlin and Kelly 2009, p. 327). The Iron Maiden leads to criticism of women being too masculine which can also hurt their candidacy (Carlin and Kelly 2009).

The research demonstrates that women in positions of power, specifically in politics, are relegated to stereotypical roles in order to maintain an appearance of femininity, under which they appear weak and emotional (Gilardi, et. al 2017; Carlin and Winfrey 2009). If women combat these stereotypes, they are portrayed as unfeeling, cold, and calculating (Kittison and Fridkin 2008; Meeks 2013). Research on the coverage of women in politics is extensive and a growing field. However, it generally focuses on white women, ignoring the intersectional challenges faced by female candidates of color.

### Portrayal of Black candidates

Candidates of color face similar challenges to those faced by female candidates, but the challenges are expressed in a different manner. Jeffries (2002) found that the race of nonwhite candidates was mentioned significantly more than the race of their white opponents. As media outlets are predisposed to favor a reality where wealthy white men predominately hold power, a deviation from this norm becomes newsworthy, therefore making the race of a nonwhite candidate more prevalent in their coverage than the candidate's positions on issues (Entman 2007). This framing in turn causes public opinion to view a person of color campaigning for power as abnormal, causing a self-fulfilling cycle where the candidate's race attracts a disproportionate amount of attention (Entman 2007; Hutchings and Valentino 2004).

Furthermore, as public awareness of racism has increased, so has the coded language used by opponents of Black candidates (Hutchings and Valentino 2004). A common example of coded language in campaigns is the use of Willie Horton's image by George Bush's presidential campaign in 1988. Bush used the image of Willie Horton, a Black man convicted of kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder, to accuse the Democratic candidate, Michael Dukakis, of being soft on crime (Hurwitz and Peffeley 2005). Willie Horton is significant in the discussion of race in political campaigns as Horton's race is never explicitly mentioned. Instead, the narrator details Horton's crimes over a menacing photo of Horton, an image which brings to mind the stereotype of the dangerous Black man without directly calling Black men dangerous (Hurwitz and Peffeley 2005; Huchings and Valentino 2004).

The racially coded language first used in the Horton ad is now common in political campaigns and is also present in the media coverage of candidates of color (Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Since the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, scholars have found that the public, specifically the white public, believe that racism was no longer a relevant social issue (Teasley and Ikard 2010; Enck-Wanzer 2011). However, the same scholars found that the coded language that defines Black candidate's campaigns became more common throughout Obama's tenure and have continued to grow since he left office in 2017 (Teasley and Ikard 2010; Enck-Wanzer 2011). Racially coded language reinforces the societal norm where white people hold power and monopolizes the coverage of nonwhite candidates' campaigns.

### Portrayal of Black women candidates

The research on the coverage of women in politics and the coverage of Black people in politics predominantly focus on white women and Black men respectively meaning that the coverage of women of color, who face an intersectional experience, is largely ignored in both areas of study. Women of color in the political sphere face the double challenge of sexist media portrayals in addition to racial stereotypes. While white women and Black men have received more political coverage in recent years, Black women still face significant barriers to even receive coverage (Gershon 2012; Gershon 2013; Ward 2016). Orlanda Ward (2016) found that women of color receive more negative coverage than both white women and nonwhite men, that they are less likely to receive coverage than white women, and that, when they do receive coverage, the coverage is twice as likely to be explicitly based on their gender. Gershon (2012) attributes the disproportionate amount of negative coverage to the fact that women of color face both racial and gender-based stereotypes. These stereotypes shape the coverage of female candidates of color as the framing of news stories is shaped by journalists' biases and beliefs, many of which may be based in the common stereotypes surrounding race and gender (Gershon 2012; Thornton 2010).

There is a long history of stereotyping Black women in the United States. Historically, the governing stereotypes regarding Black women are the Mammy stereotype, the Jezebel stereotype, and the Sapphire stereotype which is more commonly known as the "Angry Black Woman" stereotype today (Carew 2016). In addition to the modern evolution of the Sapphire stereotype into the Angry Black Woman stereotype, the so-called positive stereotype of Black women as Superwomen has also become widespread in recent years (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al-Dobbs, et. al. 2008).

The Mammy stereotype is named for the character (or perhaps more accurately, the caricature) of Mammy in the Civil War era novel Gone with the Wind, who was an enslaved Black woman whose entire character was based on her care of the O'Hara family (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). The stereotype characterizes Black women as motherly, nurturing,

loyal, self-sacrificing, and servant, similar in some ways to the Mother stereotype discussed earlier, but with the crucial added subservient aspect which dates back to the history of slavery in the United States (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). As candidates and in the corporate world, the Mammy stereotype is used to overlook Black women's knowledge and experience and instead view them as compassionate support systems for others (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008; Carew 2016).

The second prominent historic stereotype is the Jezebel stereotype which characterizes Black women as seductive, promiscuous, flirty, manipulative and hypersexual (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). This stereotype builds on the Seductress stereotype discussed earlier and was created to blame Black women for sexual relationships with white men, even when the white man assaulted the Black woman (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). Today, the Jezebel stereotype often applies to lighter-skinned Black women who, according to the stereotype, will do anything to be successful including "sleeping her way to the top" (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). This assumption causes the dismissal of the Black woman's qualifications, accomplishments, talents, and work ethic as the stereotype portrays her as a sex object (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008).

The third historic stereotype is the Sapphire stereotype which portrays Black women as loud, complaining, aggressive, bossy, and angry (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). Interestingly, the Sapphire stereotype is a direct contrast to the Pet stereotype discussed earlier as the Pet stereotype portrays white women as passive and quiet while the Sapphire stereotype paints Black women as hostile, loud, and aggressive (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). While the Sapphire stereotype is still relevant today, it has largely been replaced by the Angry Black Woman stereotype which, similarly, depicts Black women as crazy, vindictive, aggressive, disloyal, and angry (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). There is little research examining the electoral impact of the Sapphire or Angry Black Woman stereotypes, but both are commonly applied to Black women expressing anger or even simple disagreement, devaluing their contribution and perspective.

The final stereotype commonly faced by Black women in the workforce and in politics is the Superwoman stereotype. Examples of the Superwoman ideal include former First-Lady Michelle Obama, TV personality Oprah Winfrey, and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). The stereotype creates an impossible standard for Black women to be overachievers intelligent, articulate, assertive, professional, beautiful, and capable of handling more than the average woman (Reynolds-Dobbs, et. al 2008). The Superwoman stereotype has become increasingly common in the political arena with Democrats consistently talking about Black women "saving" the country from itself, putting impossible pressure on Black women voters and, specifically, on Black women candidates like Stacey Abrams (Crumpton 2020; Connley 2020; Bolduan 2020; Scelfo 2019).

Georgia House Minority Leader Stacey Abrams became the first Black woman to be a major party's candidate for governor in the United States in 2018 (Bacon 2018). As a Black woman, Abrams could have been subject to the stereotypes and coded language that accompany discussions of political women and Black people, specifically Black women, in the media. Therefore, this analysis uses the stereotypes faced by Black women and includes stereotypes faced by women candidates and Black candidates more broadly as necessary. This research will examine the coverage of Abrams' campaign at the national and the local level by looking at stories from the *New York Times* and the *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. The analysis of the randomly chosen articles will explore whether the trends seen in the coverage of female candidates, candidates of color, and, more specifically, female candidates of color is replicated in the coverage of Abrams' gubernatorial campaign. Additionally, this paper seeks to examine how these trends manifested themselves at the local and national level in order to understand the differences between the two types of coverage. The trends come from previous literature, as detailed above, and will demonstrate how Abrams' race and gender played a role in the coverage, and therefore public perception, of her gubernatorial campaign.

## EXPECTATIONS AND THEORY

*H1: The national coverage will focus more on the symbolism of Abram's campaign due to her race and gender than the local coverage will.*

Scholars have found that the coverage of the so-called abnormality of a woman or person of color campaigning for office often outweighs serious coverage of their policy records (Gershon 2012; Gershon 2013; Ward 2016). This research hypothesizes that both the *Atlanta Journal Constitution* (AJC) and the *New York Times* (NYT) will discuss the fact that Stacey Abrams was the first Black women to be a major party's nominee for governor in the United States, but that the NYT's coverage will focus on this fact more than the AJC as the readers of the AJC were more likely to be affected by Abram's policy than the readers of the NYT.

*H2: National and local coverage will focus more on Abram's race and gender than on her policy positions and record, and that national coverage will do this to a greater extent.*

The literature shows that coverage of women in politics often focuses more on their roles as wife and mother, than on the candidate's political positions (Carlin and Kelly 2009; Kittison and Fridkin 2008). This research hypothesizes that the articles will show that the pattern repeated itself in the coverage of Abrams' campaign and was accentuated by the novelty of her campaign especially in a conservative state like Georgia.

*H3: National coverage will explicitly discuss Abrams' race and gender while local coverage will implicitly allude to her identities using the stereotypes discussed in the literature review.*

As previously mentioned, readers of the AJC were more likely to have been directly affected by Abrams' policy platform than readers of the NYT. For this reason, this paper hypothesizes that NYT articles will focus on Abrams' gender and race in the context of her groundbreaking campaign while AJC articles will focus on her platform but will include the roles and implicit biases found typically in the coverage of women of color in government (Teasley and Ikard 2010; Enck-Wanzer 2011).

## METHODOLOGY
In order to explore how local and national newspapers discussed Stacey Abrams' race and gender during her 2018 Georgia gubernatorial campaign, *New York Times* (NYT) and *Atlanta Journal Constitution* (AJC) articles about Stacey Abrams that were published between January 1st, 2017 and January 1st, 2019 are examined. The AJC is the Georgia newspaper with the highest readership, reaching 214,303 readers daily and 405,549 readers each Sunday, it substantially covered the gubernatorial race as it was the largest political event in the state at the time and directly affected the paper's readers. (AJC 2012). The NYT articles were accessed from the NYT website and the AJC articles from Lexis Uni. Every 20th article from the AJC that mentions Stacey Abrams (611 articles) was analyzed for a sample of thirty articles, and every 8th story from the NYT which mentions Abrams (245 articles) was analyzed for another sample of thirty articles. Only articles that have more than 100 words were analyzed. Additionally, in order to ensure that the articles focus to some degree on Abrams, her campaign, or the gubernatorial election only articles that substantively mention Abrams, or mention her at least three times, were used. This restriction limits the number of articles that are usable meaning multiple random samples were taken in order to reach the sample size of thirty articles per source.

As previously mentioned, readers of the AJC were more likely to have been affected by Abrams' policy platform than readers of the NYT. For this reason, this research hypothesizes that NYT articles will focus on Abrams' gender and race in the

context of her groundbreaking campaign while AJC articles will focus on her platform but will include the roles and implicit biases found typically in the coverage of women of color in government (Teasley and Ikard 2010; Enck-Wanzer 2011).

The coding of each article is based on the main focus of the article. This means that each article was read to determine whether the focus is policy, political positioning, or Abrams' identity. Each story is coded based on five categories. First, the focus of the article was analyzed in order to determine whether it is about Abrams' race, gender, the intersection of her race and gender, or a substantive topic such as her policy positions or campaign. Additionally, whether the article mentions Abrams' identity as a Black woman regardless of the focus of the article was tracked. For example, the sentence "Stacey Abrams, the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor, made a speech last week discussing the Hope Scholarship," mentions Abrams' race and gender, but her identity is not the focus of the sentence or the article. This coding examines both the explicit coverage of Abrams' identities and more subtle allusions to her historic position as the first Black woman to be major party's nominee for governor in the United States.

However, the coding used for the first two hypotheses and detailed above does not fully explore the third hypothesis which compares explicit mentions of Abrams' identities (coded for above) with the use of stereotypes related to her race and gender. These stereotypes do not appear in the earlier coding as they do not explicitly describe her race or gender. Instead they rely on the biases discussed in the literature review to allude to Abrams' identities. In order to include these stereotypes in the analysis, each of the modern stereotypical categories described in the literature review was coded for: the pet, the mother, the seductress, the ice queen, the superwoman, and the angry Black woman. Each article was read and coded based on these thematic categories to see if it fits one or more of the categories in order to examine the use of racial and gender stereotypes in the portrayal of Stacey Abrams at the local and national levels.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Stacey Abrams' campaign garnered intense national and local attention, leading both the AJC and the NYT to cover her campaign extensively. The coverage differed substantially (see

| Table 1: Explicit References Results | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Source | Gender Focused | Race Focused | Intersectionally Focused | Mentions Race and/or Gender | Policy or Campaign Focused | Total number of articles |
| New York Times | 1 (3%) | 4 (13%) | 7 (23%) | 27 (90%) | 19 (61%) | 30 |
| Atlanta Journal Constitution | 0 (0%) | 2 (6%) | 1 (3%) | 10 (33%) | 26 (90%) | 30 |
| Totals | 1 (1.6%) | 6 (10%) | 9 (30%) | 36 (60%) | 46 (76.6%) | 60 |

Figure 1: Mentions of Abrams' Identity as a Black Woman in the NYT and AJC



Table 1) with 40% of NYT articles focusing specifically on Abrams' gender, race, or both and 90% of NYT articles at least mentioning the significance of Abrams' race and gender even if the focus of the article was her policy positions and campaign. On the other hand, only 10% of the AJC's articles focused on Abrams' race or race and gender with none focusing on her gender alone. Additionally, only 26.7% of AJC articles mention Abrams' race and/or gender, a significant decrease compared to the number of mentions by the NYT. In terms of stereotypical framing, neither the NYT or the AJC used stereotypes in a majority of articles. The national coverage of Abrams's candidacy was more focused on her identity traits than the local coverage both in terms of explicit foci and mentions while local coverage focused almost exclusively on Abrams' policy positions and campaign decisions.

The finding somewhat supports the first hypothesis which states that the national coverage will focus more on the symbolism of Abram's campaign due to her race and gender than the local coverage will. As Figure 1 demonstrates, a substantial majority of NYT stories mentioned the historical significance of Stacey Abrams' campaign with twenty seven of the 30 articles (or 90% of the articles) mentioning Abrams race, gender, or both. Comparatively, the AJC only explicitly mentioned Abrams' race and/or gender in ten of the thirty articles in the sample (or 30% of articles). The difference in how many articles mention Abrams' identity as a Black woman in the national versus the local coverage is stark and supports the first hypothesis to a certain extent. However, as is discussed in the examination of the second hypothesis, the articles that mention Abrams' identities in both sources often do not focus on those identities, instead mentioning her identities as a supplemental fact or descriptor in articles that, in general, discuss her campaign and policy.

The data does not support the first part of the second hypothesis which states that national and local coverage will focus more on Abram's race and gender than on her policy positions. As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 demonstrate, both the NYT and the AJC focus on Abrams' policy positions, campaign, or the election in general. For the AJC, twenty eight out of thirty articles (or 90% of articles) focused on topics related to Abrams' campaign instead of her race and gender. The NYT had more articles focusing on Abrams identities but with nineteen out of thirty articles (or 61%) discussing topics directly related to Abrams' candidacy, it also fails to support the first part of the hypothesis.

However, the evidence does support the second part of the second hypothesis which predicts that the national coverage will focus more on Abrams' identities than the local coverage will. While both the NYT and AJC focused more on Abrams' campaign and positions than on her identities, the NYT still focused on the influence of Abrams' identities to a

Figure 2.1: Focus of NYT Abrams Mentions (%)



Figure 2.2: Focus of AJC Abrams Mentions (%)

| Table 2: Stereotypical Framing Results | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sources | Pet | Jezebel | Iron Maiden | Mammy | Superwoman | Angry Black Woman | No Stereotypical Framing | Total |
| New York Times | 0 (0%) | 0 (0%) | 0 (0%) | 0 (0%) | 4 (13%) | 1 (3%) | 25 (83%) | 30 |
| Atlanta Journal Constitution | 1 (3%) | 2 (6%) | 1 (3%) | 0 (0%) | 2 (6%) | 1 (3%) | 23 (77%) | 30 |
| Totals | 1 (1.7%) | 2 (3%) | 1 (1.7%) | 0 (0%) | 6 (10%) | 2 (3%) | 48 (80%) | 60 |

much greater extent than the AJC did. Out of the thirty-article sample, only three of the AJC's articles focused explicitly on Abram's race and gender (or 10% of the articles). On the other hand, twelve of the NYT's thirty articles (or 39% of articles) focused practically exclusively on Abrams' identities. While this is still a minority of the articles, the findings demonstrate how the national coverage of Abrams' campaign was more focused on the historical significance of her role, specifically her identity as the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor, than the local coverage.

Finally, the evidence does not support the third hypothesis which states that national coverage will explicitly discuss Abrams' race and gender while local coverage will implicitly allude to her identities using the stereotypes discussed in the literature review. As previously shown, NYT articles explicitly mentioned Abrams' identities at a much higher rate than AJC articles did. However, the coding used for the previous hypotheses does not account for the stereotypes and implicit bias described by the literature, meaning that all non-explicit mentions of Abrams' identities were not included in the analysis. Once the articles were read for stereotypes, based on the six stereotypes which are commonly associated with women in politics and Black women in politics, there was not a substantial difference between the use of stereotypes by the NYT and the AJC. As Table 2 shows, five out of the thirty (or 16.7%) NYT articles used stereotypical frames and seven out of the thirty (or 23.3%) AJC articles did. This difference is too small to be seen as a genuine difference in the national and local coverage as it demonstrates that while stereotypes were present in the coverage of Abrams' campaign, they were not often used.

However, even though less than a quarter of the sampled articles from both the NYT and AJC used stereotypical framing, the stereotypes used in reference to Abrams should be studied as well. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, the NYT articles predominantly used the Superwoman stereotype with one appearance of the Angry Black Woman stereotype. On the other hand, AJC articles used a broader variety of stereotypical frames. The AJC only used the Angry Black Woman stereotype once, but it also used the Pet stereotype and Iron Maiden



Figure 3.1: Stereotypical Framing of NYT Abrams Mentions (%)

- Pet
- Jezebel
- Iron Maiden
- Mammy
- Superwoman
- Angry Black Woman
- No Stereotypical Framing



Figure 3.2: Stereotypical Framing of AJC Abrams Mentions (%)

- Pet
- Jezebel
- Iron Maiden
- Mammy
- Superwoman
- Angry Black Woman
- No Stereotypical Framing

stereotype once each. The AJC also used the Superwoman stereotype to a greater extent like the NYT with the stereotype appearing twice in the sample. The other more commonly used stereotype by the AJC was the Jezebel stereotype which was used in titles such as the article from July 30th, 2017 which describes the primary campaign as "Beyoncé vs Taylor Swift: Georgia Edition," a title that alludes to Abrams' and her opponent's genders as well as their races and explicitly places Abrams, a Black woman, in opposition to Stacey Evans, her white opponent (Galloway 2017). Another example is the use of a sensational quote from one of the romance novels authored by Abrams under a pseudonym as the introduction to an article introducing her as a candidate (Redmon 2018). But these clear examples of stereotypical framing notwithstanding, the research shows that the use of stereotypes was uncommon in both local and national coverage of Stacey Abrams' candidacy.

This finding breaks with previous research which repeatedly found that stereotypes framing was common in the coverage of women and people of color in politics and especially with women of color. There are a variety of potential explanations for the low number of articles that used stereotypes. One could be that as many articles, especially NYT articles, focused explicitly on Abrams' race and gender, the use of coded language was unnecessary. Another potential explanation could be that journalists and their audiences are more aware of the subconscious biases that lead to stereotypes. A final potential explanation could be that American politics has become more diverse in recent years which could decrease the noteworthiness of Abrams' identities, but the prominence of articles that focus on her race and gender present an argument against this explanation. The only way to determine which of these, or other, explanations account for the lack of stereotypes when compared to previous research is by completing new research specifically examining the bases for the stereotypes that are used by the newspapers.

Overall, the research shows that while both the *New York Times* and the *Atlanta Journal Constitution* covered Abrams race and gender, the NYT focused on her identities to a much greater extent than the AJC did and almost every NYT article sampled mentioned the historical significance of Abrams' role as a Black woman regardless of the focus of the article. Neither newspaper used stereotypical framing commonly with under a quarter of both samples fitting within the typical stereotypical frames. The results of the hypotheses demonstrate that national news was much more oriented around the historical significance of Abrams' run than the local news which predominantly focused on her policy history and campaign.

## CONCLUSIONS

This research contributes to the literature by examining the differences between the local and national coverage of a woman of color's political campaign. The paper provides more research on the coverage of women of color in politics, a gap that

scholars have failed to substantially fill. The evidence shows that national coverage of Abrams' campaign largely consisted of articles discussing her role as the first Black woman to be a major party's nominee for governor in the United States and, even in articles discussing her policy positions and campaign strategy, her identities remained relevant within the articles. In contrast, local news overwhelmingly focused on Abrams' policy and campaign, only mentioning her identity in a handful of articles and focusing on it in even fewer. These findings provide a contrast to previous literature which found that both national and local coverage of women and people of color predominantly focuses on their identities and that this focus is primarily expressed through the use of stereotypes.

However, this research does face certain limitations, the largest being the coding of stereotypical framing within articles. As there is only one researcher for this paper, the coding was done by one white woman which could compromise the pure objectivity of the coding. Future works could combat this potential for subjectivity by having multiple researchers of diverse backgrounds code each article. The use of multiple coders would eliminate this limitation within the stereotype coding and would strengthen the coding of the foci of the articles.

In addition to multiple coders and an examination of the reasons behind the lack of stereotypical framing, other future avenues of research include examining how bias affected the coverage of both Stacey Abrams and her conservative opponent Brian Kemp. *The New York Times* predominantly covered Abrams and the coverage that Kemp received was generally negative as it focused on the potential conflicts of interest and voter suppression due to his role as Georgia Secretary of State during the election. On the other hand, much of the coverage Abrams received from the *Atlanta Journal Constitution* discussed her reliance on national donors with quotes from prominent state republicans condemning her decision to promote her campaign nationally. Both of these frames of coverage could influence voters' perspectives of the gubernatorial race and would provide an interesting field of study for future researchers. Building on this, another path for future research could examine the quantitative impacts of the use (or non-use) of stereotypes in the national and local coverage of the race on public opinion and, therefore, on the outcome of the election. ∎

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## APPENDIX

### *New York Times* Data Sources

NYT: Michelle Obama and Stacey Abrams, Models of Power for Black Women 12/29/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams Ends Fight for Georgia Governor With Harsh Words for Her Rival 11/16/18

NYT: Fighting for Stacey Abrams and Empowerment in Georgia 11/5/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams, Brian Kemp and Neo-Jim Crow in Georgia 11/7/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams and the Black Women Reshaping the Left 11/1/18

NYT: Trump, Offering No Evidence, Cites Stacey Abrams's 'Past' and Calls Her 'Unqualified' 11/1/2018

NYT: Stacey Abrams, a Daughter of the South, Asks Georgia to Change 10/26/18

NYT: Large-Scale Reforms' of Georgia Elections Sought in Federal Lawsuit 11/27/18

NYT: Do the Math. Moderate Democrats Will Not Win in 2020. 11/12/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams's Burning of Georgia Flag With Confederate Symbol Surfaces on Eve of Debate 10/22/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams and Brian Kemp Renew Attacks in Georgia Debate 10/23/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams Hopes Medicaid Expansion Can Be a Winning Issue in Rural Georgia 10/20/18

NYT: Democracy in Danger in Georgia 10/12/18

NYT: The Debt-Shaming of Stacey Abrams 08/27/19

NYT: Stacey Abrams Wins Georgia Democratic Primary for Governor, Making History 05/22/18

NYT: There Is More to Stacey Abrams Than Meets Partisan Eyes 08/19/18

NYT: After Winning in Georgia, Stacey Abrams Says She's 'Ready to Get to Work' 05/23/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams Didn't Play It Safe. Neither Do These Female Candidates. 05/29/18

NYT: Is Stacey Abrams Assembling a New Democratic Majority? 04/30/18

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NYT: In Georgia Governor's Race, a Defining Moment for a Southern State 07/28/19

NYT: Scouring for Stacey Abrams Votes, Georgia's Democrats Keep on Campaigning 11/9/18

NYT: Stacey Abrams and the Future of the Democratic Party 01/31/19

NYT: Stacey Abrams to Deliver State of the Union Response for Democrats 01/29/19

NYT: In Georgia, Democrats Go With a Voter-Turnout Strategy 05/23/19

NYT: Black, Female and Running for Governor: Can She Win in the South? 05/19/18

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NYT: Brian Kemp Resigns as Georgia Secretary of State, With Governor's Race Still Disputed 11/8/18

NYT: Georgia Governor's Race Still Unsettled After Claim of Victory by Brian Kemp 11/7/18

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AJC: DEMOCRATIC Meet Stacey Abrams. 10/14/18

AJC: ONLY IN THE AJC GOVERNOR'S RACE; Abrams brings stars; Kemp draws contrast. 10/05/18

AJC: GUBERNATORIAL RACE; Abrams campaign deputy resigns 10/19/17

AJC: ELECTION 2018; Biden to campaign with Abrams 09/23/18

AJC: AJC CONTINUING COVERAGE 2018 ELECTION; Governor's race could look a lot like '20 presidential contest. 07/29/18

AJC: AJC CONTINUING COVERAGE GOVERNOR'S RACE; Outside donations a blessing and a curse. 08/12/18

AJC: GOVERNOR'S RACE; Abrams' initiatives target early child care in Georgia. 11/20/17

AJC: LOCAL IN-DEPTH THE GUN DEBATE; In Georgia, Democrats find gun-curb courage. 03/24/18

AJC: Was Abrams misled on redistricting bill? 05/02/18

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AJC: AJC TOP LOCAL STORY DEMOCRATIC GUBERNATORIAL DEBATE; Democrats renew

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AJC: ELECTION 2018; Kemp hits Abrams on finances 08/09/18

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AJC: AJC DIGGING DEEPER GOVERNOR'S RACE; 'Black belt' is key to Abrams' strategy 09/30/18

AJC: AJC 2018 ELECTION GOVERNOR'S RACE; Kemp lead shrinks; Abrams to sue 11/12/18

AJC: VOTING RECOUNTS AND CHALLENGES; Abrams faces long odds to prolong campaign 11/08/18

AJC: AJC ELECTION COUNTDOWN GOVERNOR'S RACE; Abrams, Kemp get high-profile supporters 10/23/19

AJC: AJC CONTINUING COVERAGE GOVERNOR'S RACE; Abrams, Kemp allies trade shots on ethics 08/03/18

AJC: WHAT'S NEXT FOR STACEY ABRAMS?; Abrams shifting focus to federal lawsuit 11/18/18

AJC: INSIDE: 10 PAGES OF EXPANDED ELECTION COVERAGE; KEMP CLAIMS VICTORY; ABRAMS PRESSES ON 11/08/18

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AJC: 2018 ELECTIONS; Carter announces support for Abrams in governor's race. 08/15/18

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AJC: GOVERNOR"S RACE; Abrams' defiance delights fans, irks critics 11/17/18

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AJC: Stacey Abrams' vision, road map for Georgia. 10/14/18

AJC: AJC CONTINUING COVERAGE 2018 ELECTIONS; Black and female voting surges in first wave of absentee ballots 10/02/18

AJC: ONLY IN THE AJC GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN; Abrams' health plan has Medicaid, more 09/11/18

AJC: Beyoncé vs. Taylor Swift: Georgia edition 07/30/17