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Editor’s Preface to the Spring Edition

As we enter the College of William and Mary’s third year hosting the Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics, we have a great deal to consider as we move forward. This past year we were fortunate to see a marked increase in both the number and quality of the submissions we received. In addition, the diversity of the issues addressed in these papers, and the expanding number of institutions from which they were produced is something to be excited about. We look forward to see what next year holds for the Journal as it aims to reach out to more undergraduates across the country.

As always, there are many people we wish to recognize. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee for their endless support and tireless dedication.

Additionally, we would like to recognize all of the student Editorial Board members, our peers who joined us every week with insight and enthusiasm. Likewise, we would like to acknowledge our faculty Advisory Board members, whose expertise and assistance ensure the Journal’s quality and prevalence in the world of political science publications.

We would also like to extend our appreciation to members of the faculty of the Government Department and staff of Information Technology at the College of William and Mary.

Finally, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to our two Faculty Advisors, Ron Rapoport and Chris Nemacheck, who have enabled us to produce a publication we are all proud to be apart of. Without their unyielding support, the Journal would not be where it is today.

We hope you enjoy and share the Spring/Summer 2012 edition of the Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics.

Best,

The Editors
Submission of Manuscripts

The Journal welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. We strive to publish manuscripts of the highest quality in all areas of political science. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their manuscripts before they are accepted for publication.

Submissions deadlines are October 31 for the Fall issue and March 31 for the Spring issue. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis, so earlier submission is encouraged.

To submit your work, please email it (as a Word document) to psajournal@wm.edu. Please include your name, university, and contact details (mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number). If possible, please also include a short comment about how you heard about the Journal.

Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (roughly 150 words), and citations and references should follow the APSA Style Manual for Political Science. The maximum page length for submitted manuscripts is 35 double-spaced pages.

The Journal is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board who are undergraduate Pi Sigma Alpha members at The College of William and Mary. There is also an Advisory Board consisting of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council.

If you have any questions, please email the Journal’s editors at psajournal@wm.edu or Dr. Chris Nemacheck at clnema@wm.edu.
An Argument for Nietzschean Democracy: In Response to Allan Bloom

Stephen Wade Cupcheck, The College of William and Mary

The late Allan Bloom argues in The Closing of the American Mind that cultural relativism in academia is threatening our civilization. Specifically, he pegs 19th Century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as a primary culprit, arguing that Nietzsche’s pessimism and skepticism has brought on cultural apathy and is eroding democracy. True, one aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy is his destructive critique of our supposed great moral truths. Yet it is important to remember that Nietzsche also offers his readers a way forward from nihilism. While Bloom seems to accuse him on both seemingly contradictory grounds, Nietzsche’s insights demand that we be neither dogmatists nor pluralists. Rather, I argue that in his development of the overman, Nietzsche lays the foundation for an agonistic approach to democracy and political discourse, similar to that discussed by Chantal Mouffe in On the Political.¹

Introduction

Allan Bloom, in his call for a re-examination of higher education in The Closing of the American Mind, challenges the prevailing modern sentiment he calls “relativism.” He traces American relativism, which he believes is poisoning both academia and American thought in general, back to the influence of Nietzsche. Whether or not he is to blame, Nietzsche’s ruthless skepticism makes him a target for Bloom in his polemical critique. Bloom attacks Nietzsche in three ways. First, he targets Nietzsche as the supposed source of the stultifying moral and cultural relativism which Bloom sees as fostering apathy among his students. Second, he insinuates that Nietzschean skepticism is a dangerous step toward accepting political extremism, including fascism. Third, he claims that a liberal rationalist approach is better suited to mitigate democratic conflict than Nietzschean perspectivism. In the following paper I intend to dispel each of Bloom’s arguments, from analysis of Nietzsche’s writing, and with reference to Leslie Paul Thiele’s Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, Alexander Nehamas’s Nietzsche: Life as Literature, and Chantal Mouffe’s On the Political. I hope to show that while Nietzsche’s skepticism is powerful, serious evaluation of his work must consider the ways in which Nietzsche means

¹ Special thanks to Professor John D. Baltes, who inspired my interest in political theory, and recommended that I submit to this journal.
to overcome the depths of this skepticism. Thus, despite Bloom’s conflation of relativism with fascism, Nietzsche’s relativism cannot affirm reactionary values. Moreover, I argue that Nietzsche’s perspectivism, far from undermining democracy, provides valuable insights for democratic government. Ultimately I aim to show that Bloom may be partially correct in attributing the apathy of the American student to an overdose of Nietzsche; however, far from being dismissed, I believe Nietzsche can offer a solution to Bloom’s problem.

In The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom is concerned that American college students lack intellectual depth due to the prevalence of what he calls “relativism” in mainstream American thought. “The point,” of modern education, Bloom laments, “is to propagandize acceptance of different ways, and indifference to their real content is as good as a means as any.” That is, Bloom believes that in an attempt to foster tolerance, educators have abandoned depth. Rather than understanding the real distinctions that exist between cultures, according to Bloom, “Practically all that young Americans have today is an insubstantial awareness that there are many cultures, accompanied by a saccharine moral drawn from that awareness: We should all get along” (Bloom 1987a, 35). Presumably out of this ignorance and apathy comes an inability, and perhaps an unwillingness to defend one’s own convictions. And, as Bloom explains, “There is an indifference to such things, for relativism has extinguished the real motive of education, the search for a good life” (Bloom 1987a, 34). Assuming that this is true; that American thought today is pervaded by a cultural indifference and ignorance born out of a misguided attempt at tolerance: is Nietzsche to blame?

Bloom certainly thinks so. He summarizes Nietzsche by proclaiming that “Nietzsche was a cultural relativist” (Bloom 1987a, 202). This idea of cultural relativism, for Bloom, emerges out of Nietzsche’s skepticism. After all, as Nietzsche says at the outset of book three of The Gay Science, “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown” (Nietzsche [1887] 1974, 167). God, the absolute moral authority and font of Truth, can no longer exist. Even still, the lingering shades of Truth remain, deprived of their divine fiat. Though we may cling to notions of justice or morality, serious examination proves that these ideas are nothing more than human constructs. Such concepts supposedly had “real” value, but the validity of these claims is no longer clear. Furthermore, as Nietzsche says in Twilight of the Idols of “The real world—we have done away with it: what world was left? The apparent one, perhaps?...But no! with the real world we have also done away with the apparent one!” (Nietzsche [1888] 2008, 20). Once we abandon the “real” world, the world of phenomena evaporates as well. We cannot be sure of our own perception, thus the perception of others is also inaccessible. Certainly then, one person’s valuation is exactly as
“real” or “true” as any other’s. Since nothing is shared between unique perspectives, no accessible common experience can be derived.

Bloom believes that this Nietzschean insight has crept into American thought. He asserts in “How Nietzsche Conquered America” that “Good and evil now for the first time appeared as ‘values,’ of which there have been a thousand and one, none rationally or objectively preferable to any other” (Bloom 1987b, 82). Because Nietzschean thought has eroded the conventional foundations of truth, the notions of “good” and “evil” have become watered-down, simply counted alongside myriad other values now possible. But while these values may not be “rationally or objectively” preferable to one another, Bloom does acknowledge Nietzsche’s stated preference. “Authentic values,” Bloom summarizes, “are those by which life can be lived, which can form a people that produces great deeds and thoughts[…] A value is only a value if it is life-preserving and life-enhancing” (Bloom 1987a, 201). That is, Bloom identifies the values which affirm and enrich life should be sought and adopted. At this point in Closing and “How Nietzsche Conquered America,” Bloom’s analysis and summary of Nietzsche seem on the mark. Far from a rebuttal, Bloom recounts that Nietzsche:

“did not say [God is dead] on a note of triumph, in the style of earlier atheism—the tyrant has been overthrown and man is now free. Rather he said it in the anguished tones of the most powerful and delicate piety deprived of its proper object[…] Honesty compels serious men, on examination of their consciences, to admit that the old faith is no longer compelling” (Bloom 1987a, 195-6).

Moreover, Bloom acknowledges Nietzsche’s call for individuals to create their own life-affirming truths. Apart from these initial points, however, I disagree with Bloom’s evaluation of Nietzsche.

A Nietzschean Refute of Fascism

In his discussion of Nietzsche, Bloom both insinuates a connection between Nietzscheanism and fascism, and further argues that Nietzschean perspectivism or “relativism” is incompatible with peace and democratic stability. I mean first to deal with the subtle association Bloom attempts to draw between Nietzsche and fascism. “The great revolutionary must destroy the past and open up the future for the free play of creativity,” Bloom says, again summarizing Nietzsche’s emphasis on the destruction of old gods. “Politics are revolutionary,” he continues, “but unlike the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution, the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution, the new
revolutions should be unprogrammatic. They are to be made by intellectually honest, committed, strong-willed, creative men. Nietzsche was not a fascist; but this project inspired fascist rhetoric” (Bloom 1987a, 202). Bloom’s implication, apparently, is that because Nietzsche does not provide a clear or adequate enough blueprint for self-overcoming and the revaluation of morals, he inadvertently clears the way for reactionary political regimes. Bloom reiterates this idea in “How Nietzsche Conquered America,” in which he compares the contemporary American political and cultural climate, purportedly rife with the spirit of Nietzsche, with that of the Weimar Republic:

“The pre-Hitler Weimar Republic also contained intelligent persons who were attracted, at least in the beginning, to fascism, for reasons very like those motivating the Left’s ideologues—that is, by reflections on autonomy and ‘value creation.’ Once one plunges into the abyss, there is no assurance whatsoever that equality, democracy, or socialism will be found on the other side” (Bloom 1987b, 92).

Here we find essentially the same accusation as that in Closing. Once Nietzsche clears away all of the old truths, Bloom argues, we could end up with anything—even Nazism.

The first apparent flaw in Bloom’s line of reasoning is contained in his summary that “once one plunges into the abyss, there is no assurance whatsoever that equality, democracy, or socialism will be found on the other side.” Bloom’s language suggests that he believes Nietzschean creativity requires full immersion into nothingness, that terrifying nihilist revelation nothing is true and anything is possible. He speaks of one who “plunges into the abyss,” which Nietzsche would recognize as a fatal move. In fact, such a leap might even be impossible anyway. Nietzsche implies as much, saying that “in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these. We cannot look around our own corner” (Nietzsche [1887] 1974, 336). And, as Nehamas points out, Nietzsche does not believe that anyone can confront the abyss without some kind of supports. “Even for the strongest,” he says, “there are still ropes, though they are ‘insubstantial’; even their dancing occurs ‘near,’ and not over, abysses. We have already seen that freedom does not consist in leaving rules and principles behind but in their appropriate internalization” (Nehamas 1985, 60-1). One does not, and cannot, plunge into the abyss.

For Nietzsche, there is always at least some thread, some willful act of forgetting, which allows the individual to overcome the depths of nihilism. “Man is a rope,” says Zarathustra, “tied between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous look-
An Argument for Nietzschean Democracy

ing-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping” (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 14). Nietzsche says that we become creative beings in our act of crossing the abyss. The nothingness of the abyss is the source of its great potential but also its great danger. “What is great in man,” Zarathustra continues, “is that he is a bridge and not an end” (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 15). The abyss itself does not produce creativity. Rather, creativity is the result of an attempt to overcome that nothingness. But we can only ever get near the abyss. We can only ever cross it by means of willfully forgetting that it is there at all. Like the tight-rope walker, we must forget our great height, but we must also remain steady on the rope, for a fall would mean death (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 19).

Our “rope” is made up of that forgetfulness, that willful ignorance. As Nehamas explains, “Both [Nietzsche’s] view that untruth is a condition of life and his metaphor of the eternal child imply that Nietzsche denies the possibility of a millennial elimination of illusion and falsification” (Nehamas 1985, 61). For the third step in Zarathustra’s metamorphosis is just as important to Nietzsche’s philosophy as are the first and second. As the camel is willing to bear anything, and the lion can overcome the old, hollow man-made idols, it is the yes-saying child who can create new values, because “the child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred ‘Yes’” (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 27). We must, out of necessity, forget the nothingness before us and say “yes” to life.

Indeed, Nietzsche does not wish to see whole societies plunged into nihilistic darkness, which is why he prescribes ideas for the development of individuals. Nietzsche sketches his thoughts on the self-overcoming, yes-saying individual, calling them “human beings who know how to be silent, lonely, resolute[…] with their own festivals, their own working days, and their own periods of mourning” (Nietzsche [1887] 1974, 228). This Nietzschean noble is isolated, and furthermore rejects conformity. But as the noble traverses the valueless void, he has his rope to walk on: shreds of pure self-reliance. Nietzsche further describes beings who are “incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long[…] Such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others; here alone genuine ‘love of one’s enemies’ is possible” (Nietzsche [1887] 1989, 39). The individual Nietzsche imagines is certainly powerful and self-assured, but is also magnanimous and regards worthy enemies as a mark of virtue. He contrasts his noble powerfully with the man of ressentiment, who is radically reactionary. “Slave morality,” as Nietzsche calls the ideology of ressentiment, “from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’[…] this need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of ressentiment” (Nietzsche [1887] 1989, 36-7). Slave morality feeds on its own insecurity: it is incapable of self-scrutiny—that would be too
painful. Instead it turns its hatred outward, always condemning the “other,” and the unfamiliar. The prejudice, the xenophobia, conformity, and reactionary hostility, which lashes out at the world from its own insecurity, is precisely the mindset which is most intoxicated by fascism. This is Nietzsche’s grave warning, and the reason he exalts the noble. The noble, because he is a creator of his own values, is immune to fascism’s demagogic appeals.

Thus Nietzsche insists that we must have something to cling to as we confront the abyss. The recognition of nothingness does not imply a blind gamble, as Bloom would suggest, out of which may arise fascism, or democracy, or any other such worldview. Instead it implies a measured approach, requiring a process of willful forgetting, self-reliance, and continual striving toward a goal. Nietzsche posits such a goal: life affirmation and the overman. These goals which Nietzsche requires of us serve as a powerful refutation of fascism. For Nietzsche, the man of ressentiment, the potential fascist, lacks the wherewithal, or the internal fortitude, to confront the abyss at all, let alone overcome it. On the other hand, the man who can confront the abyss is one so strong and noble that he does not need or desire petty political bromides or fascist rhetoric. What “is found on the other side,” (even though it is clear from Nietzsche’s language that man is “a bridge and not an end;” that man continually journeys over the abyss and does not reach the “other side”) is not random. The abyss is not a random value generator, but a grave test which weeds out all but the noble overman.

Moreover, if we consider Nietzschean perspectivism as an individual struggle, and not a cultural one, as Theile suggests in *Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul*, then it becomes clear that the political unity and conformity required for totalitarian regimes like fascism is necessarily ruled out. “All knowledge is experience, and all experience is individual,” Theile summarizes (Thiele 1990, 31). According to Theile, Nietzsche’s deep skepticism as demonstrated above, makes man inaccessible to man. This means that all evaluation is self-referential, and “the merit of any deed must be determined on a strictly individualistic basis” (Thiele 1990, 36). Nietzsche relegates shared morality to the lowly status of “herd instinct” (Nietzsche [1887] 1974, 174). There is nothing laudable or life-affirming about having one’s values prescribed and pre-ordained. Fascism, for Nietzsche, is a herd mentality insofar as it seeks to unite individuals in a commonness of purpose, commonness of belief, and by popular appeals to duty or nationalism. It offers an easy escape from life’s frightening emptiness by providing its adherents the illusory opportunity to become a part of something supposedly eternal, strong, and greater than themselves. But this is just a frantic retreat from and an embittered reaction to the threat of the eternal abyss posed by nihilism.
Perspectivism and Democracy

Bloom, however, makes a second string of arguments against Nietzschean perspectivism. He contends that because the Nietzschean view is adversarial, and implies that differences between groups which cannot be bridged by reason, such differences must instead be bridged by force. “Since values are not rational and not grounded in the natures of those subject to them,” Bloom explains, “they must be imposed. They must defeat imposing values. Rational persuasion cannot make them believed, so struggle is necessary” (Bloom 1987a, 201). Furthermore, to revisit Bloom’s charges of Fascism above, he attempts to unfavorably compare Nietzsche’s calls for a revolution in morality with the supposedly “rational, rootless cosmopolitanism of the revolutions of the Left” (Bloom 1987a, 202). This appears to be a distinct and contradictory accusation. Before, Nietzschean relativism was seen as the culprit behind the erosion of real comprehension and conviction in one’s cultural values. Now, however, Bloom implies that Nietzschean valuations are in danger of becoming too powerfully held, too willful, to allow for compromise and toleration. That is, Nietzsche is dangerous because he gives us values that cannot be united, bridged, or compromised by appeals to reason. “He saw what [perspectivism] means,” Bloom asserts: “war, great cruelty rather than great compassion” (Bloom 1987a, 202). However Bloom does not acknowledge the implications of this perspectivism on the individual level. He only treats perspectivism as an issue on the cultural battlefield. But, as demonstrated above, a society of Nietzschean individuals striving to become unique overmen would be in outright revolt against a fascist form of government. Bloom misses the point again when he says that “rational persuasion cannot make [values] believed, so struggle is necessary,” as if to imply that Nietzschean perspectivism would lead individuals or societies to attempt to subjugate one another and impose their values.

Certainly, there is violent language in Nietzsche. But here Nietzsche refers to violence done and discipline imposed upon the self. Because reason can no longer provide values, a struggle is indeed necessary. Bloom is exactly right in his analysis, but he mistakenly applies it to societies and not to individuals. The struggle of self-overcoming in Nietzsche is most evident in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in which Zarathustra is confronted with his own temptations and his plurality of drives, and must learn to love and subjugate them all. For this is what Nietzsche means by cruelty and struggle: cruelty to self, domination and discipline over the self. This emphasis on self-cruelty is evidenced by Zarathustra’s appraisal of priests, for, as Zarathustra says, “among them too there are heroes.” The ascetic priest, who tortures himself to become stronger, is exemplary of the rigorous taming and ordering of internal wills which the
overman must achieve. “They have called ‘God’ what was contrary to them and gave them pain; and verily, there was much of the heroic in their adoration. And they did not know how to love their god except by crucifying man” (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 91-2). The priests are not outwardly violent, but they know that they cannot take compassion on their own inferior base wills.

Nonetheless, it does appear that a society populated with Nietzschean, self-overcoming “relativists” would not be pluralistic or tolerant in the modern sense. If perspectivism makes individuals unable to compromise with one another, perhaps it is true that “rational, rootless cosmopolitanism” is a better foundation for liberal democracy than Nietzschean pessimism. That is not to say that a society composed of overmen would necessarily be violent. The virtues of the noble, as outlined in The Genealogy of Morality and referenced above, make adversarial friendship, or “love of one’s enemies” possible. Nietzsche here seems interested in intellectual jousts between his nobles, not physical bloodshed. However, the totally isolated, totally perspectival nature of the Nietzschean individual makes consensus impossible. Because perspectivism does away with common, rational foundations for thought, is it incompatible with democracy?

Part of this problem is addressed by Chantal Mouffe, in On the Political. Similar to Bloom, she argues that “Thanks to globalization and the universalization of liberal democracy, we can expect a cosmopolitan future bringing peace, prosperity and the implementation of human rights worldwide” (Mouffe 2008, 1). Compare this to the “rational, rootless cosmopolitanism of the left” which Bloom offers as the favorable alternative to the Nietzschean plague of “relativism.” Because everyone in society can agree to certain fundamental truths, or is accountable to reason, society can begin to move past political differences (which are only misunderstandings) and proceed to tolerant and mutually understanding democracy. Mouffe, making a strongly Nietzschean argument, disagrees. She instead argues “that the belief in the possibility of a universal rational consensus has put democratic thinking on the wrong track” (Mouffe 2008, 3). Her argument is that, by labeling prevailing views “reasonable” or “rational,” political systems are simply de-legitimatizing dissent rather than confronting it. This mindset refuses to recognize serious divergent opinion and thus only serves to radicalize those seen as “outside” the rational consensus. It is an error based on a misunderstanding of politics: that politics itself is just a misunderstanding and not a symptom of the struggle between legitimate and often irreconcilable differences. Mouffe attributes political values to “the ineradicability of the conflictual dimension in social life,” and Zarathustra would seem to agree. “Much that was good to one people was scorn and infamy to another,” Zarathustra proclaims. “Much I found called evil here, and decked out with purple honors there. Never did one neighbor understand
the other: ever was his soul amazed at the neighbor’s delusion and wickedness” (Nietzsche [1885] 1978, 58). These individuals Zarathustra describes are completely inaccessible to one another. They lack a substantive, common foundation, and therefore cannot be made to understand one another or come to a consensus. To find common ground would be asking them to debase their souls.

Therefore, when fundamental discrepancies with the established “rational” consensus arise, as both Mouffe and Nietzsche would agree they are bound to do, it is harmful to simply push them aside as “irrational.” Mouffe recounts the recent political situation in Austria, in which a fringe right-wing party was able to capitalize on its “outsider” status to win populist support. The presence of a supposed political consensus bounded by appeals to common reason, “created the ideal terrain for a talented demagogue like Jörg Haider who, when he took control in 1986 of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)—a party that was almost facing extinction—was able to transform it into a protest party against the ‘grand coalition’” (Mouffe 2008, 67). Haider was actually able to harness Nietzschean ressentiment out of the prevailing climate of liberal rationalism. This is precisely the type of climate which Bloom seems to believe should prevent these “misunderstandings.” As Mouffe explains, “Haider’s discursive strategy consisted in constructing a frontier between a ‘we’ of all the good Austrians, hard workers and defenders of national values and a ‘they’ composed of the parties in power, the trade unions, bureaucrats, foreigners, left-wing intellectuals and artists, who were all presented as impeding a real democratic debate” (Mouffe 2008, 67). Appeals to reason, common ground, and consensus shut the FPÖ out of the debate. Haider then turned his energy to ressentiment, attacking the establishment as un-democratic. As a result the FPÖ actually increased its electoral strength, gaining significant power within the Austrian government. Since then, however, as Mouffe relates, “participation in government has seriously weakened the position of the party” (Mouffe 2008, 67). The argument that it is apparently unreasonable is not enough to defeat political extremism. We must, in fact, contend with its dissent.

The lessons from the above example suggest a re-evaluation of the role of reason and consensus-building in democracy. Threats of extremist government, fascism included, are perhaps more dangerous when appeals to a common foundation, consensus, and universal reason are considered acceptable substitutes for debate. It is the closed universalism of liberal reason which threatens to breed political extremism, not the open perspectivism of Nietzschean thought. Mouffe concludes that we ought to pursue a democracy of true rivalry, not consensus building. She argues for “agonism” in the democratic discourse:
“envisaging a sort of ‘cultural consensus’ providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered as ‘legitimate enemies.’ [...] The democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight—even fiercely—but [...] their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, are accepted as legitimate perspectives” (Mouffe 2008, 52).

Nietzsche already provides us with essentially this solution. Looking no further than his description of the noble, we find Nietzsche proclaiming “How much reverence has a noble man for his enemies! —and such reverence is a bridge to love. For he desires his enemy for himself, as his mark of distinction” (Nietzsche [1887] 1989, 39). This is exactly the sort of agonism between legitimate adversaries which Mouffe imagines.

**Conclusion**

Where does this leave Bloom? We have seen that he is willing to accept Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and furthermore that he acknowledges Nietzsche’s standard of value: life affirmation. But here it would seem that we have arrived at a solution: contemporary American thought perhaps has only embraced the nihilism which Nietzsche has warned against. This would certainly explain, if one is to take Nietzsche’s word as Bloom has until this point, the apathy and indifference displayed by college students. Is this not symptomatic of some partial understanding of the horrifying Dionysian truth? But rather than seriously examining the solutions Nietzsche offered to the problems he himself uncovered, Bloom simply rejects Nietzsche as an inadequate foundation for liberal democracy. Worse, he imagines that Nietzschean skepticism permits, and could even foster, the rise of fascism. I have thus far presented arguments against these last two criticisms.

There remains a final problem for Bloom however: the premise of his book, the apathy of the modern American student. Rather than examining Nietzsche’s solutions to the Dionysian listlessness affecting his students, Bloom seems to out-Nietzsche Nietzsche and posit his own idea of a life-affirming value. Rather ironically seeking to create values where they have been wiped away, Bloom appears to believe that, as A.J. Mandt describes, “a cultural consensus can be created by instructing young people in ‘Western ideas and values’” (Mandt 1989, 19). Bloom quite literally wants to re-establish the old gods, myths, and legends. He hopes that the re-establishment of a common Western identity, based on the Western literary and cultural tradition, can aid students in “the search for a good life.” Bloom has seen the abyss, and contented himself to retreat to the comfort and reassurance of the previous universal
An Argument for Nietzschean Democracy

notions. Nietzsche is no doubt laughing. What happens when students scour the Bible, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas searching for a good life, and fail, as Nietzsche insists they inevitably will, to find it? What if there is no “good life”? What if life itself is not good? These are Nietzsche’s eternal doubts, and once accepted we cannot as Bloom suggests, return to a time before.

Bloom’s solution is inadequate. “Bloom’s position is actually a difficult one,” as Ann Clark Fehn points out. “He is too much of a modernist to deny Nietzsche’s insights” (Fehn 1989, 387). If he takes Nietzsche as seriously as he claims to, a simple retreat to the old dead gods will do little to help his students overcome their nihilism. He cannot simply dismiss Nietzsche’s insights based on a dimly threatening conflation with fascism. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that Bloom’s argument about the compatibility of universal rationalism versus perspectivism with democracy may have it backward. Without presenting a strong reason for dismissing Nietzsche, we are left to wonder why Bloom dismisses him anyway. While Nietzsche may not be perfect, a well-rounded discussion of Nietzsche’s thought would help Bloom’s students more seriously confront the threat of nihilism than any attempt to re-construct the vanquished idols. Moreover, as Nietzsche’s insights on nobility and the worthy adversary illustrate, perhaps it is just this Nietzschean sense of honorable rivalry which can restore passion and meaning to the prevailing discourse. Ironically, it appears that the solution for Bloom is not less Nietzsche in the American classroom, but more.

References


Liberalism and Republicanism in the Political Thought of James Madison

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Classical liberalism and classical republicanism have been identified by scholars as the two dominant political traditions that informed the founding of the United States. However, since Benjamin Constant’s distinction between the “liberty of the ancients” and the “liberty of the moderns,” these two traditions have been viewed in opposition to each other. The ambiguity inherent in an attempt to reconcile these two traditions was present in the debates at the founding of America. James Madison’s thought, expressed through his writings on factions, representation, and religious liberty, exhibits a republicanism wholly transformed via the interposition of his liberal convictions. While Madison dedicated himself to the establishment of a republic in the United States, his acceptance of liberal assumptions of human nature and embrace of liberalism’s distinction between private and public resulted in a belief in institutional checks as a method for securing virtue. It also resulted in an understanding of republican virtue as impartiality and the public good as a general framework of law and order necessary for the maintenance of individual liberty. This transformation of republicanism in the political thought of James Madison is indicative of the transformation of the idea of the classical republic into that of the liberal democracy.

The difficulty in understanding the intellectual history of the American revolutionary and founding period inheres in the contrast between the liberal and republican frameworks for the understanding of democratic society. Diverse authors’ characterization of these two traditions evinces the clear distinction between them (Kalyvas and Katzenelson 2006). Classical republicanism, with its roots in the ancients, held that man was a political or social animal who could develop his potential fully only in political society (Gibson 1993). On the other hand, moderns described a state of nature in which man was free, equal, independent, and motivated by a concern for self-preservation. They believed that government could be designed in such a way as to direct their liberated passions and interests (Gibson 1993). As Bobbio summarizes, “modern liberalism and ancient democracy have often been regarded as antithetical” (2005, 31).

In the revolutionary period, dominated by radical Whig ideology, the political language was more republican. America, moreover, displayed a republican character and “was seen as a young, vigorous, agrarian society, lacking in refinement, corruption, luxury and display” (Coniff 1975, 45). Individual liberty and the public good could coincide because Whig patriots emphasized
liberty as public or political liberty, which rested on the assumption that the people constituted a homogeneous body in which everyone was linked to everyone else (Wood 1969). For the Whigs, the best way to realize the public good was to give the people a maximum voice in the government (Wood 1969).

Conditions in the United States in the aftermath of the war for independence disturbed these conventional Whig, and republican, convictions. While the ideology of 1776 set the interests of the people against those of the rulers, differences that emerged in the period after the revolution (and the parties representing them) were among the people themselves. The problems that led to the adoption of the Constitution, including, “the confiscation of property, the paper money schemes, the tender laws, and the various devices suspending the ordinary means for the recovery of debts . . . were not the decrees of a tyrannical magistracy, but laws enacted by legislatures” (Wood 1969, 404).

Federalist thought and the Constitutional Convention amounted to a revolution in American political thought, evincing a rejection of the conventional political wisdom of the 18th century, which “taught that a pure republic of the sort which the framers envisaged would have to be constructed on the model of the direct democracies of classical antiquity” (Rahe 1992, 580). The political wisdom that was well known to the writers of that period showed them that what they were attempting to establish was an impossibility - a large republic (Conniff 1975). For the authors of The Federalist, however, the near-collapse of state governments was attributed to their resemblance to classical democracy (Rahe 1992). To solve the problem, federalists inaugurated a new form of republicanism that did not rely on virtue. This new political science was “a politics of ‘interest,’ not of ‘virtue’” and did not “depend upon a superhuman readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the common good” (Banning 1995, 6).

The crucial turning point was the notion that faction was an inevitable and enduring vice of republican government. Conniff argued that belief in the inevitability of faction “violates the canons of classical republican theory” (1975, 52). Madison’s trademark solution was, as Banning indicates, the “large republic [in which] partial interests would be counterbalanced by competing interests . . . and popular desires would be refined and rendered more consistent with the long term needs of the community” (1995, 7). Liberty was understood as personal liberty that needed protection even against the legislature, which the Whigs had traditionally viewed as the people’s guardian of their public liberty (Wood 1969).

James Madison worked in the midst of this transformation, and the ambiguity that attends the political discourse of his time inhered in the presence of both liberal and republican themes throughout the entire founding period, including Madison’s own political thought. While Madison, as a federalist and a nationalist at the Convention and as Publius, made the rights and liberty of
the individual his overriding concern (and, in so doing, overturned the theoretical foundations of classical republicanism), he never abandoned the language of virtue or an orientation towards the common good. Madison shared concerns typical of republicans and dedicated himself to the establishment of a republic in the United States, but his liberal convictions resulted in a belief in institutional checks as a method for securing virtue and an understanding of republican virtue as impartiality. Moreover, public good for Madison became a general framework of law and order necessary for the maintenance of liberal freedom. Liberalism and republicanism in Madison’s political thought can thus be seen as a composite in which the former provided the foundation that informed the latter. The result was his conception of a representative system of government, with institutional checks as the central feature. Before analyzing Madison’s thought, I will briefly discuss the concepts of classical liberalism and classical republicanism.

**Classical Republicanism and Classical Liberalism**

Classical republicanism’s major themes included a concern for virtue, the common good, widespread citizen participation in politics, and simplicity in contrast to luxury and opulence. In this context, politics was typically spoken of in terms of organic analogies such as the ‘body politic.’ Its most important facet was the priority it gave to the common good. As Wood says, “[The] common interest was not . . . simply the sum or consensus of particular interests,” but rather “distinct from the various private interests of groups and individuals” (1969, 58). Therefore, the role of politics was, above all, deliberative—with dialogue and discussion among the citizenry as critical features (Sunstein 1985).

This ideal fundamentally depended on citizen virtue, which was threatened by a growth in wealth and luxury, causing citizens to attend to their selfish interests rather than the common interest. “It was not the force of arms which made the ancient republics great or which ultimately destroyed them,” Wood argues; they were made strong by “frugality, industry, temperance, and simplicity” (1969, 53).

Another basic tenet of classical republicanism was the idea that a republic could only work in a small-scale society with homogenous interests and relative equality of wealth necessary for the formation of a common good. Only small states could “achieve equality, maintain uniformity of interests, [and] maintain virtue” (Conniff 1975, 39). “Because politics was conceived to be not the reconciling but the transcending of the different interests of society . . .” Wood suggests, “the republican state necessarily had to be small in territory and generally similar in interests” (1969, 58). A corollary was the rejection
of factions and parties, which were seen as indicative of corruption and moral decay.

In contrast to classical republicanism was the modern, liberal tradition that emphasized natural rights, individual liberty, society as composed of discrete individuals, and limited government. Whereas “the republican tradition stressed a patriotic concern for the ‘public good,’ liberalism insists that government protect the ‘private rights’ of individuals” (Epstein 1984, 60). Bobbio argues that “the philosophical presupposition of the liberal state . . . is to be found in the doctrine of natural rights . . . such as the right to life, liberty, security and happiness” (2005, 5). In the classical republican tradition, however, individuals were not seen as separate beings, but as assimilated in the community (Kalyvas and Katzenelson 2006, 468).

Early liberals conceived of society as a social contract in which individuals consent to give up some of their liberty to a common government for protection of the rest. In this conception of society, the individual comes first and precedes its establishment. The resulting state is an aggregation of individuals (Bobbio 2005). Whereas classical republicanism was a democratic tradition (its focus was the people as a whole), liberalism was an individualistic tradition. As Bobbio notes, “The existence at the present time of regimes referred to as ‘liberal-democratic’ suggests that liberalism and democracy are interdependent . . . [but] the relationship between the two is very complex and by no means one of continuity or identity” (2005, 1). Although in contemporary politics liberalism and democracy are seen as naturally compatible, early liberals were far less enthusiastic about democracy.

**Liberal and Republican Interpretations of Madison’s Thought**

Matthews (1995) understands Madison as a property obsessed, individualistic, liberal who adhered to an atomistic vision of society, but thought that institutions could mechanistically balance the social forces present in the state. The ultimate value in Madison’s politics was the protection of individuals in their property. Matthews contends that Madison was “neither a democrat or a civic humanist, [but rather put his faith in] government regulations and automatic social counter pressures” (1995, 22). Beneath the shifts in Madison’s political views, Matthews sees an underlying commitment to liberalism. He explains that Madison’s shifts in position from a strong national government as Publius to a supporter of a larger role for the citizenry did not contradict his liberal politics because, for Madison, power had to be adjusted to balance authority and liberty. “Since equilibrium, balance, and stability [were] the goals,” Matthews argues, Madison had to “shift his political weight from side to side . . . as changes in the sociopolitical environment [required]” (1995, 24).
Another interpretation of Madison attempts to place him in the tradition of modern pluralist democracy. Pluralist democracy’s connection to liberalism rests on the priority that both give to interests. Pluralists believe that there is no transcendent public good, but that the bargaining among numerous interests in the state results in something approximating a public good. Pluralism assumes a delegate conception of representation because “pluralists conceive of elected representatives as brokers for the interest groups that are dominant among their constituents and of the government as a neutral receptacle for public preferences” (Gibson 1993, 517). What they share with Madison was the notion that since society was composed of a great many interests, no one interest could ever dominate (Gibson 1993). Therefore, as Sunstein summarizes, “The common good consists of uninhibited bargaining among the various participants, so that numbers and intensities of preferences can be reflected in political outcomes” (1985, 32).

According to pluralists, Madison and the federalists intended America to be a commercial republic that would avoid the class struggle between rich and poor. “If [the federalists] thought it possible to improve on the ancients and to avoid class struggle,” Rahe argues, “it was because they believed that economic diversity characteristic of an extended republic and the social fragmentation . . .would undercut the fundamental antagonism between rich and poor” (1992, 597). Diamond’s (1959) interpretation is similar, emphasizing that, for Madison, the same passion or interest should be prevented in majorities. Further, the extended republic “depends upon an economic system that fosters mass production, a high division of labor, and specialized ‘industries’” (Gibson 1993, 503). Diamond believes that Madison’s scheme amounts to the replacement of the class struggle with that of interests; whereas the class struggle is one of domestic upheaval, the struggle of interests is compatible with social stability (1959).

Republican interpretations of Madison generally rely on his theory’s goal of improving the quality of representatives by making them more virtuous and deliberative. Wills (1981) focuses almost exclusively on the ability of the extended republic, with its large electoral districts, to refine public opinion and secure virtue. Wills denies the pluralist interpretation, asserting that Federalist “No. 10 is in no way meant to encourage competing interests, to give them a voice in the national councils” (1981, 229). According to Wills, Madison believed the system of representation relied on the general republican character of the American people. To secure virtue in government, he argues that Madison relied primarily on the filtration process of representation. He believed that process would keep faction out of the legislature altogether. The interplay of interests is tolerated only insofar as they are all blocked, so that the true interest of the people becomes salient (Wills 1981). Wills suggests, “the
effects [of faction] could be inhibited . . . in the national councils, [which] . . . would be done by purging narrow interest from the representatives . . . [and] purifying them of partiality” (1981, 229).

For Sunstein (1985), this process of representation allows the national legislature to be a deliberative body, implying that the public good is more than the product of compromise among different interests. He maintains that institutional procedures insulate representatives from constituents, allowing them to better deliberate on the public good. The representatives would have the virtue incident to classical republican citizens (Sunstein 1985). The task of Madison’s legislator, for Sunstein, “was very close to the task of the citizen in the traditional republican conception” (1985, 46). Madison’s goal was to allow legislators to deliberate on an approximation of an objective public good. In addition, Sunstein believes that Madison’s republicanism is consistent with a broad understanding of the public good, as it is “possible to believe in the Madisonian conception of the role of national representatives, but at the same time to accept redistribution of resources and selection of public preferences as legitimate governmental goals” (1985, 45).

Wills (1981) and Elkin (2006) also emphasize Madison’s republicanism, asserting that Madison’s thought relies in part on a social basis for virtue in the people. For Wills, formal institutions bereft of virtue do not suffice for the maintenance of a republic. Elkin concurs, saying, “Madison believed that the fully realized commercial republic . . . could not rest solely on institutional design” (2006, 38). Rather, the design requires that citizens have the virtue necessary to choose lawmakers that secure rights and the community’s interests (Elkin 2006). According to Wills, Madison’s theory demands at least some latent virtue among the people; “Unless men can transcend private gain for public good, a republic is impossible. An assertion that such virtue is beyond man dooms the enterprise from the outset” (1981, 186). Citizens’ judgments and actions are essential to the success of the republican enterprise (Elkin 2006). Wills (1981) further holds that the right of voting is an admission that a rudimentary virtue characterizes the people at large. Representation for Wills does not mean “electing a ‘stooge’ for oneself, but a person of disinterested virtue . . . The test for choice was simple: Was the candidate nonfactional?” (1981, 224). If people did not want virtue in their representatives, republicanism would fail (Wills 1981).

**Madison’s Liberal Republicanism**

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1 Elkin qualifies his assertion that Madison’s system demands a virtuous people, pointing to the low view Madison often took regarding the people and his lack of a method of fostering virtue among them. See page 65 of *Reconstructing the Commercial Republic*. 
The republican interpretations of Madison’s political thought are much closer to the mark; however, Madison was far from a traditional classical republican. His acceptance of modern, individualistic notions of society precluded a true republican conception of citizenship. Madison’s republican convictions can thus best be interpreted in the light of his deep and abiding commitment to individual liberty, private property, and the distinction between public and private. He derived his republican ideas mainly from the need to secure the prerequisites of individual liberty, rather than a belief in the sovereignty of the people as such. Therefore, although Madison adhered to a form of republicanism, it was totally transformed via the interposition of liberal assumptions of man and society. Madison’s republicanism, due to its essential liberalism, conceived of virtue as impartiality, and directed institutions toward the end of securing impartiality in government. Due to the constraints on the public sphere inherent in a classical liberal conception of society, Madison identified the public good with that framework of law and order that was so deficient prior to the adoption of the Constitution, but was necessary to furnish a context in which individual liberty could flourish. Elkin summarizes, “Madison agreed with some of the central tenets of . . . republican thought . . . and assimilated them to a liberal political theory” (2006, 21).

Madison’s notion of republicanism, at its foundation, rejected ancient republican ideas of political society and accepted modern, atomistic assumptions. Madison denied that the only threat of oppression in republican government came from monarchical tyranny. Carey argues, “[Madison] did not suffer from the delusion that republican governments, because of their popular foundations, were immune from the arbitrariness, injustice, and disorders that had plagued other forms of government” (1989, 5). He directs particular ire towards the small republic that was cherished by traditional republicans, believing that a small republic would not foster the formation of a common good, but that it would result in the formation of a majority will and a minority will. This can be shown in a passage from a letter to Thomas Jefferson written during the ratification debate:

Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of the majority, and operating within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights; but that they have all precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. Were this in reality the case, their reasoning would be conclusive. The interest of the majority would be that of the minority also; the decisions could only turn on mere opinion concerning the good of
the whole, of which the major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this voice could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed. We know however that no Society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 150).

In other words, it is not that the majority is right about the public good and the minority is incorrect, but that both interests are private interests, and, for Madison and republicans generally, the interest of the greater number does not necessarily coincide with the public good. But whereas classical republicans saw private interest in politics as a danger, for Madison private interest in politics was inevitable in a small society. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison again pointed to the error of direct democracy advocates in supposing that political equality would ensure equality of possession, opinion, and passion.

Madison held these views of direct democracy because he subscribed to a conception of human nature that was, at its core, a liberal, and individualist, vision. Man was by nature free, he differed from others in his physical and mental aspects and interests, and was concerned with the pursuit of his own interests (Riemer 1986). Madison articulated this view in his National Gazette essay, Property, in which he said that government is instituted to protect property of every sort and that the only just government is that which impartially secures to every man what belongs to him (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 515). Writing to Jefferson, he said that a distinction in property results from the protection that free government gives to unequal faculties (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 150). In addition, the protection of the exercise of reason causes diversity of opinion, so that the latent causes of faction are sown in human nature (Madison, The Federalist no. 10). Indeed, Madison regarded diversity of opinion, passion, talent, and interest as among the most important ramifications of freedom (Riemer 1986).

Madison adhered to Locke’s concept of a social contract, which created the problems for republican government that his theory tried to solve. In Locke’s social contract, upon entry into society, people kept many of the rights they had in the state of nature. Madison articulated Locke’s concept of the social contract in his Memorial and Remonstrance when he said, “all men are to be considered as entering into society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights” (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 31). The protection of the free exercise of natural rights in liberal society resulted in the diversity that caused faction. Therefore liberal society was characterized not by social unity, but by various, inherently conflicting interests among the people. For Madison, Coniff argues, “A society is not an organism with a single will to be discovered; rather,
it is an artificial combination of a number of groups. Since they do not share all interests, they can have no common will” (1975, 53). Madison emphasized this point strongly in The Federalist No. 10 when he articulated that the diversity of human faculties and the natural right to property is a permanent obstacle to uniform interests. As long as the free use of human faculties was protected, there could be no way to circumvent social differences (Zuckert 2003). There could be no traditional republican solution to this problem lying, as it did, within a liberal, property rights, framework.

In his republican philosophy, Madison attempted to design a political fabric that extended over an aggregation of groups and individuals who were often antagonistic towards one another. To put it differently, for Madison, the state was composed of a republican superstructure that sat atop a tumultuous, factional civil society. The central difficulty was that a republic allows the people to rule whether or not their will reflects justice and the common good. Thus democratic participation—essential to republics—allowed individuals and groups to impose their partial will on society through the government. Riemer contends, “freedom provided opportunities for men’s vices, particularly for factional damage to republican society” (1986, 35). The unequal faculties of man, combined with republican government, allowed for private interests to dominate the government—an outcome abhorrent to republicans. In sum, acceptance of the liberty of the individual created faction and republicanism allowed it to infringe on the rights of others.

Madison’s fundamental dilemma was to find a way to safely combine the virtue necessary for republican government with liberal freedom. As he asserted in Vices of the Political System of the United States: “In republican Government the majority however composed, ultimately give the law. Whenever therefore an apparent interest or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals” (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 76-77). Monarchic and Aristocratic elements were ruled out by the definition that Madison gave of republican government in The Federalist No. 39: that it is derived from the great body of the society, rather than from a class of it.

The central goal of Madison’s republicanism was to secure an impartial center of power that controls the people, controls itself, and secures the public good—understood as order—for the purpose of protecting the integrity of private rights and society’s private sphere. In a letter to George Washington, he stated the goal as “The great desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican Governments, seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different passions & interests in the state” (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 81). He intended to do this, as Kalyvas and Katznelson (2006) write, “without endangering popular sovereignty or eradicating the
plurality of interests . . . [incident to] free people in complex civil societies” (459).

In deriving a solution, Madison transformed concepts such as virtue and the public good from traditional republicanism into impartial sovereignty and the capacity for impartial representation. This was analogous to traditional republicanism’s insistence on the capacity of citizens to discard their private interests while in their public capacities. But now, in Madison’s republicanism, informed as it was by his commitment to liberalism, private interests expanded to comprehend everything included in the private sphere, so that only impartial representation could legitimately be comprehended within the public good. Indeed, “the very aim of elections is, precisely, the choosing of impartial adjudicators of the varying interests” (Wills 1981, 224). Then, once impartiality was secured, what was important for public officials was the capacity to deliberate on public good.

As stated above, individual liberty resulted in a constraint on the public sphere. Since more human endeavors were considered private, much less was comprehended under the public good, and impartial sovereignty could not take cognizance of anything properly in the private sphere. The ultimate example for Madison was religion, which lies outside the domain of the social pact (Munoz 2003). In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison states that no man’s right to the free exercise of religion is abridged, and that it is wholly exempt from the cognizance of civil society (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 30). Madison’s belief in liberalism as a constraint on the public sphere is at odds with Sunstein’s view of deliberative democracy. Although Sunstein is correct in noting that Madison wanted representatives to fulfill a deliberative role, he did not recognize that for Madison it was of central importance that the range of legitimate objects of national deliberation be limited. This limitation flowed from his liberal conviction that the individual’s liberty required a constrained public sphere.

Because Madison’s sovereign excluded from cognizance anything in the private sphere, this interpretation is consistent with Wills’ (1981) in the sense that factions, for Madison, should be totally excluded from gaining a voice in Congress. Where it differs from Wills and Elkin (2006), is that virtue in Madison’s republicanism need not be present in the people conceived of as a body (that is, in their common character and habits), but rather in a select few individuals among the people who are capable of deliberating on the public good. What Madison rejected was “a political system in which all active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision” (Dahl 1956, 137). What he accepted was a diversity of interests that would discourage majorities from forming until the public good could emerge to transcend parochial interests (Rakove 1988, The
Madison’s liberalism converges with republicanism in the republican fear of domination by a private will. But for Madison, private domination included domination by any interest or opinion properly belonging to the private sphere. Once again, for Madison, the model was religion:

What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny: in no instances have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the people (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 33).

Therefore traditional republican institutions like a civic religion were, “for Madison, horribly ill-conceived” (Kalyvas and Katznelson 2006, 472). Factional control of republican government was tantamount to a breach of the proper separation between the private and public spheres of liberalism.

The public good—now only of derivative importance—was a general framework of law and order necessary for the security of individuals in the free pursuit of their own interests. As Rahe writes, “The modern republic was to have a much narrower scope than the one assigned to government in antiquity and the Middle Ages” (1992, 615). When Madison speaks of the common good, he means not the deliberations of a small community, but rather a framework of order (Conniff 1975). America lacked this framework before the adoption of the Constitution due to the deficiency of virtue-as-impartiality among the state legislators—their undue attention to parochial, or private, interests. This deficiency was to be corrected by the more virtuous legislators who would occupy office in the federal government. It is no surprise that, commenting on that deliberative body known as the Senate, Madison said, “The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. . . . It will be of little avail to the people that laws are made by men of their own choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood” (Madison, The Federalist No. 62).

Madison’s ideal representative should approximate the classical republican citizen and act as a trustee who deliberates on the public good. The best support for this interpretation is found in The Federalist No. 10, in which Madison said that representation “refines and enlarges the public views by passing them through a chosen body of citizens.” He hoped they would transcend parochial interests in order to frame laws embodying the public good representing more than the aggregated preferences of the general population
In addition, Madison did not want representatives to be spokesmen for the interests in their districts. He clung to ideals of legislative responsibility that echo Edmund Burke (Rakove 1988, The Madisonian Moment 481).

**Madisonian Procedural Democracy**

Madison’s goal of an impartial sovereign was to be achieved through a process of checks that would filter partial views and interests, and, in so doing, secure virtuous men for public office. Riemer suggests that “insofar as a representative system enhances thoughtful deliberation, rational debate, and consideration of a broader range of interests, it may be said to purify and filter the passions of politics” (1986, 116). This concept of filtration can accurately describe not just the voters’ selection of their national representatives, but the entire structure established by the Constitution, from the citizens to the highest public officials.

The people at large, as a mere aggregation of individuals and groups, represented the most private domain in early liberalism’s private and public distinction. So Madison placed his strongest check—representation in an extended sphere and expanded electoral districts—on the people. The representatives that emerged from these electoral districts would ideally be independent of at least some of the private, factious interests of the constituents since “representatives chosen from large, heterogeneous districts are likely to be independent of any single interest” (Morgan 1974, 861). Otherwise, public power would be beholden to private interest (Elkin 2006).

The next step removed from the people were the state governments—bastions of parochial interests—over which a federal veto would have been placed if Madison had had his way in the Convention. Madison complained of the states, saying, “experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority” (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 99). That is, the more parochial, ‘private’ state authorities invaded the more general, public sphere of the general sovereign. The federal veto was thus intended to secure individuals against encroachments on their rights (Rakove 1999, Madison: Writings 149).

Members of the House of Representatives, extracted from the expanded electoral districts of the extended republic, were more virtuous. But the presidential veto and the division of Congress into a bicameral legislature imposed some checks on them, so that the more mature Senate could further dilute the more popular House. According to Madison, “[the people] may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body
of men than where concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required” (The Federalist No. 63). As Rakove indicates, it was “to the Senate that Madison looked for the recruitment of . . . broad-minded . . . legislators capable of discerning the true public good (1988, The Madisonian Moment 482). Madison imposed a check on both branches of the Congress as well by arming the presidency with the veto (The Federalist No. 51). The president and the Supreme Court were intended to be the most virtuous and impartial branches of the government. They represented, therefore, the ends of the filtration process, at which point the most virtue and impartiality had been extracted from the mass of society.

Madison’s checks can thus be explained in two ways: vertically (to secure virtue) and horizontally (to regulate the relations among officials). As vertical processes, Madison’s favored institutions and checks acted as continual filtration processes that purified the public views, rendering them more impartial the higher the office. The power exercised by officials who were closer to the people was more extensive and particular in nature. In this sense, although in The Federalist No. 51, Madison’s checks are described in such a way that they act horizontally (regulating the mutual relations among the branches), as processes for filtration, they can be understood vertically: as processes of refinement that extract virtue from a tumultuous and partial civil society. The refinement process continues as one ascends in office, so that lesser offices are less impartial and higher offices are more impartial. “The aim of every political constitution,” Madison argues in The Federalist No. 57, is to “obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.”

The role of these checks was to establish roadblocks such that the more factious and partial officials closer to the people could not invade the jurisdiction of those farther removed. This emphasis on Madison’s republican institutions as checks is another point of difference with Wills (1981) and Elkin (2006). When understood as a check on the more private, factious domain of the people at large, Madison’s system of representation attempts to ensure not that private citizens have the opportunity of consciously selecting virtue, but that only virtuous men come up for a vote. This was one of the arguments he made for larger electoral districts in The Federalist No. 10:

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive
and established characters.

For Madison, the crucial difference between large and small electoral districts was that the former induces the people, despite their lack of virtue, to raise the most virtuous men as candidates for office. It was thus the formal mechanism of checks established by the Constitution that encouraged the concentration of virtue in the governing body.

This point becomes conspicuous in Madison’s division of the Congress into the more numerous House and the less numerous Senate, as “In all very numerous assemblies . . . passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason” (The Federalist No. 55). The need for the senate, therefore, is “indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passion . . . a body which is to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous . . . hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration” (Madison, The Federalist No. 62). As stated above, not only the House, but also the Congress was needful of checks. In a representative republic “where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength . . . it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions” (The Federalist no. 48). The check on Congress was to be exercised by the even more virtuous character that Madison hoped would occupy the presidency.

The pattern that emerges in this analysis of Madison’s republican institutions is one of a hierarchy of virtue that corresponds to the public and private distinction of early liberalism. As ones goes from the people at large to high office, so one goes from less impartial to more impartial, less virtuous to more virtuous, and more private to more public. This is also related to Madison’s idea of limited government, as he articulated in The Federalist No. 45: “the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite.” That is, the public sphere was that in which small bodies like the Senate deliberated over the limited objects of the entire union, leaving the state legislatures to attend to the more numerous and parochial interests of the state. The more extensive the jurisdiction, the more general the nature of the power, and the farther removed from the direct election of the people, the more virtuous the officeholder. Madison’s checks served to prevent the people at large and institutions such as the state governments from infringing on the federal jurisdiction, and Congress from infringing on the executive branch. This was why The Federalist No. 51 discussed both checks and balances and the theory of factions: they had the same ultimate goal of
securing virtue. It was these institutions whereby Madison intended to secure in practice the safe enjoyment of individual liberty within the context of a government founded wholly on the people.

Conclusion

The classical republic did not feature a distinct separation between private and public spheres; it provided a role for the citizens acting together as a whole body. Citizens were expected to surrender themselves, as in Rousseau’s thought, to the ‘general will.’ But in Madison’s republic, the legislature constituted a very small part of the society, and this small part of the society became similar to the small republic itself, so that the small legislature (guardianship of public good) was strictly separated from the people at large (the private domain). To admit faction into government was, for Madison, to break down the private and public distinction sacred to early liberals. Characteristics of his thought that are typically Madisonian (checks and institutional safeguards), therefore, have their source in the transformation of his republicanism resulting from his liberal convictions.

The strands of authentic republicanism that persist in Madison’s political thought inhere not in an attenuated liberalism but rather in a rejection of pluralist democracy. This is because Madison, in favoring the exclusion of factions from the federal government, implicitly accepted a notion of the public good that results from deliberation and transcends the bargaining of interested parties. In support of this assertion one can cite Madison’s preference for smaller assemblies. Whereas a pluralist would favor large assemblies that could aggregate the desires of the constituents, resulting in bargaining and something resembling the public good, Madison, speaking of large assemblies, said, “. . . in all legislative assemblies the greater the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in fact direct their proceedings . . . the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic” (The Federalist No. 58). In this passage, Madison recognized that large assemblies would be less deliberative, and, due to his republicanism, favored more deliberative small assemblies.

One criticism that may be leveled against Madison’s republicanism is that it simultaneously presupposes the existence of public-spirited individuals in the people at large while rejecting the traditional republican notion that civil society must train individuals for virtue. Indeed, the emphasis on civic life at the local level in Alexis de Tocqueville’s political thought may be more consonant with liberal republicanism. Nevertheless, Madison’s vision does describe American political experience in its tendency for national politics to be the province of more elevated character types such as George Washington or the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. He most likely agreed with
Hamilton who said in The Federalist No. 17 that the issues of national policy would more likely attract the attention of ‘speculative men.’ The tendency to elect public officials from more prestigious backgrounds was, in Madison’s view, not a vice, but a virtue of the system.

“Madison’s political philosophy is a subtle synthesis of contractual and natural rights arguments about the origins and legitimate ends of government with republican conceptions of virtue” (Gibson 1993, 523). His ideal republic featured institutional devices designed to neutralize the ability of factious interests to dominate others, and had the power to pursue public good, now directed towards the protection of private rights and limited by liberal notions of human diversity and individuality. Lacking before 1787 was the virtue necessary to pursue public good and secure the order sufficient for the enjoyment of individual liberty, but after ratification of the Constitution, a more Madisonian government and a more impartial sovereign cured the American body politic of its ills under the Articles of Confederation.

References


“A Language in Retreat”: Assessing the Effectiveness of Welsh Assembly Government Policies on the Welsh Language

Nicholas Bell, The College of William and Mary

Over the past 50 years, the Welsh Office and later the National Assembly for Wales implemented policies aimed at stemming the decline in Welsh speakers. These efforts included promoting bilingual elementary and secondary education and providing grants for Welsh cultural and mentoring activities. However, Welsh language campaigners have focused on the threat of English in-migration to the community role of Welsh in certain areas. This paper explores whether these policies have been successful at preserving the Welsh language, particularly compared to the effect of English in-migration. A pooled cross section time-series regression analysis reveals that English in-migration has indeed had an overwhelmingly negative effect on the percentage of Welsh speakers, particularly in predominantly Welsh-speaking areas, while education and grant schemes have had an inconclusive impact. In order to more effectively preserve Welsh as a community language, the Welsh government must focus more intently on issues of migration.

The 1961 UK Census marked a significant turning point in the history of the Welsh language. Although in constant decline since the mid-1800s, the census results showed a remarkable ten percent reduction in the number of Welsh speakers\(^1\) compared to 1931, to just 26% of the population. Responding to what he saw as “a language in retreat,” prominent Welsh nationalist Saunders Lewis delivered a radio address on February 13, 1962 titled “Tynged yr Iaith (The Fate of the Language)” in which he declared the imminent death of the Welsh language unless an effective political body could be formed to protect it. Lamenting the decades of neglect that native Welsh speakers had suffered during the 20th century, Lewis said

The Government will not lift a finger to save a minority which is as politically ineffectual, as wretchedly helpless and as unable to defend itself as is the Welsh-speaking minority in Wales… the political tradition of the centuries and all present-day economic tendencies militate against the continued existence of Welsh… it will be nothing less than a revolution to restore the Welsh language in Wales.

The speech became a rallying cry for Welsh speakers and nationalists in Wales. Rooted in the tradition of “fervor and emotional intensity” that char-

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\(^1\) Census questions have traditionally considered both native speakers and learners together under the category of Welsh speakers.
acterized the 1859 and 1904 Welsh religious revivals, Lewis’ speech served as “the catalyst” for the formation of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (The Welsh Language Society), the establishment of the Welsh Office in 1964, and both formal and informal work to promote the language and protect the rights of its speakers (Jones 1994; Davies 2007). In addition to these efforts, since its establishment in 1999 the National Assembly for Wales has been a staunch supporter of the Welsh language, culminating in the Welsh Language Measure of 2010 that gave Welsh official language status in Wales.

However, despite the substantial progress that has been made towards slowing or reversing the decline of the Welsh language, concerns about the future of the language remain. Preliminary estimates suggest that the number of Welsh-speakers, both native and second-language, may be as high as one-quarter of people in Wales, but the declining density of native Welsh language speakers in traditionally Welsh-speaking areas means that Welsh may lose its status as a community language in the coming decades (Fishman 1991). Indeed, the Chief Executive of Cymuned, which champions policies to maintain Welsh as a community language, predicts that the 2011 UK Census will show a further decline in the number of predominantly Welsh-speaking communities even if the overall number of Welsh speakers in Wales increases (Jones 2011).

To help prevent the decline of the Welsh language, the Welsh Office and later the National Assembly for Wales instituted a number of policies to promote the learning and use of the language. The most prominent of these policies is the expansion of Welsh-medium education at the primary and secondary levels and grants from the Welsh Language Board (WLB) for community-level activities to promote Welsh. Today, local education authorities in Wales operate more than 500 Welsh-medium education schools,\(^2\) which serve 20.6% of primary school students and 16.5% of secondary school students. As well, in 2009 the WLB distributed grants totaling more than £2.9 million ($4.7 million) to support projects such as Welsh-language mentoring programs, theatrical productions in Welsh, and Welsh-language festivals and events.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether these policies have been successful in promoting the Welsh language where it is a minority language, and protecting it as a community language where it is strong. Using a pooled cross-section time series regression analysis, the effects of these policies in each of the 22 local authorities in Wales will be compared to the impact of migration from England. These migrants are assumed to be largely English speaking, and migrants from outside of England will not be considered because the make up less than 20% portion of the total migrant pool, are concentrated in urban, non-Welsh speaking areas, and data on these individuals is

\(^2\) Defined as schools in which all or most of the curriculum is taught through the medium of Welsh.
not available at the local authority level. My primary hypothesis is that while increasing enrollment in Welsh-medium education and increasing the amount of WLB language promotion grants will have a positive effect on the number of Welsh-speakers, in-migration from England will have an overwhelming and negative effect. Data for this study is derived from StatsWales, the Welsh Government statistics agency, and the WLB’s Annual Review documents.

In the first section of the paper, I examine the history of Welsh language policies in Wales, including recent concerns about the in-migration of English-speaking individuals from England. In the second section, I outline the methodology of this study, and in the third I provide the results of pooled cross-section time series regression analyses of Welsh language policies. I conclude with a discussion of the results, their implications, and possibilities for further study of this topic.

Background

Efforts to protect the Welsh language began well before Saunders Lewis’ famous radio address, but concerns over the in-migration of English-speakers from England first began to surface in the 1980s. This section will provide an overview of the history and recent scholarship on Welsh-medium education, WLB grants, and English in-migration into Wales.

Welsh-medium education

Prior to World War II, Welsh was virtually excluded from the education system since most policy-makers and Welsh-speaking parents believed that English-only education would open up greater economic opportunities to students (Baker and Jones 2000). In 1927, a report by Welsh Board of Education called *Y Gymraeg mewn Addysg a Bywyd* (Welsh in Education and Life) led several primary schools in Welsh-speaking areas to begin using the language as a teaching medium, and in 1939 the first fully bilingual primary school opened in Aberystwyth (Jones, 1998; Baker and Jones 2000). The first public Welsh-medium primary school followed in 1947, and by 1950 there were 12 Welsh-medium primary schools in Wales. The 1960s saw increasing numbers of pupils in Welsh-medium schools come from non-Welsh speaking families, as well as the opening of the first Welsh-medium secondary school in Flintshire. In 1988, the *Curriculum Cymraeg* (National Curriculum for Wales) was established, which required the teaching of Welsh as either a first or second language in all schools in Wales (Cox 2000). Today, all subjects can be taught in Welsh, there has been a huge expansion in the number of *Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin* (Welsh-language nursery schools), and the University of Wales sys-
A Language in Retreat

The system has begun adding lecturers to teach subjects in Welsh (Baker and Jones 2000).

According to a 2004 Welsh Language Board survey, 70.4% of Welsh-speakers aged 3-15 and 71.1% of those aged 16-29 first learned to speak Welsh in school, suggesting that within the last three decades the importance of education for the maintenance of the Welsh language has been significant. Baker and Jones (2000) identify four factors that have led to the growth of bilingual education in Wales:

- Pressure on Local Education Authorities by language activists and parents,
- Improved economic prospects for Welsh-language speakers,
- The strengthening of institutional support for bilingual education (such as original Welsh-language textbooks rather than translations from English), and
- The relative success of students in bilingual education programs compared to students taking Welsh only as a second language.

Baker also suggests that a cross-cutting lobby of language planners who seek the maintenance of the language, educationalists who focus on the cognitive and pedagogical benefits of bilingual education, and politicians who seek to develop a distinct Welsh identity has driven the growth of bilingual education. Jones (1998) argues that “the school has replaced the family to a large extent as the vehicle for language transmission,” particularly in areas with low numbers of Welsh-speaking families.

However, there is disagreement about the effectiveness of Welsh-language education as a maintenance policy. Fishman (1991) argues that education cannot guarantee language maintenance since schools do not offer the “repeated societal reinforcement” that drives community language use. He instead calls for a focus on community language transmission before implementing bilingual education. Cummins and Genesee (1985) are also skeptical of bilingual education, believing it to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for minority language preservation, since schooling does not turn a second language into a mother tongue without societal reinforcement. Jones (1998) concludes that the main problem facing revitalization of the Welsh language is the lack of available opportunities for Welsh-medium education students to use the language outside of the classroom, such as jobs that require daily use of Welsh.

Welsh Language Board Grants
The WLB was established by the Welsh Language Act of 1993 in order to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh language, advise on issues related to the Welsh language, oversee the preparation and implementation of Welsh language schemes,\(^3\) distribute grants to promote the use of Welsh, and maintain a strategic overview of Welsh-medium education ("Role of the Welsh Language Board"). It is a public body accountable to the National Assembly for Wales, which determines its annual budget. The WLB operates a grant scheme that can cover up to 70% of the costs of voluntary and private sector projects that will increase the use of the Welsh language. In the 2009-10 fiscal year, these grants made up more than half of the Board’s total expenditures and included funding for community language promotion groups (Mentrau Iaith), new Welsh-language nursery groups, the annual National Eisteddfod (festival of Welsh culture), and other programs with a focus on the Welsh language. The effect of WLB grants on language revitalization has not been previously studied in the scholarly literature, which makes the analysis in this paper particularly important given the large amount of WLB expenditures devoted to grants.

**English In-migration**

In the last three decades, the level of English migration into predominantly Welsh-speaking areas has become a widely discussed issue in the public and scholarly discourse. In the 1960s and 70s, small-scale industrialization in Wales led workers in rural areas to move to cities, and the empty dwellings they left behind were taken up as holiday homes by English migrants attracted by the natural beauty of Wales and low property prices (Day, et al. 2010). Geary (1994) estimates that between 1981 and 1990, more than 600,000 people from elsewhere in the UK chose to settle in Wales permanently, which caused an increase in home prices and forced low-skill workers to leave Wales for cheaper housing elsewhere in Britain. In the 1980s and early 1990s, concerns about the loss of Welsh identity as a result of English in-migration led to the formation of Meibion Glyndŵr (Sons of Glyndŵr), a violent Welsh nationalist group that set fire to more than 200 English-owned vacation homes in Wales, including Conservative MPs’ homes. Although in-migration from England has slowed, it remains a contentious issue.

Several ethnographic studies have been conducted on the impact of English migrants on Welsh identity. Cloke, et al. (1998) conducted a survey of 1000 households and interviewed 250 individuals to examine how English

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\(^3\) Welsh language schemes are documents produced by public and voluntary bodies in Wales which outline the organization’s policies on equitable provision of services to Welsh speakers. (Welsh Language Board)
migration has affected Welsh identity. They find that in many areas of *Y Fro Gymraeg*, or Welsh-speaking, Welsh-identified Wales, there has been a reformation of Welsh identity as being in opposition to the “other” of English migrants. In these areas, identity is closely related to the Welsh language and English migrants are often initially excluded from political and cultural interactions due to language issues. Day, et al. (2010) interviewed 260 English-born individuals (preponderantly over the age of 50) living in northwest Wales in order to assess the views of these individuals as a linguistic and ethnic minority within their communities. They find that 59% of migrants identified problems in moving to Wales, including 47% who said there was a negative attitude towards newcomers, 23% who experienced anti-English feelings, and 19% who felt there was a language barrier. They further find that many English migrants underestimated how different Wales would be, viewing it as “an extension of England under another name,” and that while many gave theoretical support to bilingualism, they saw learning Welsh as unnecessary. A minority of respondents expressed regret or shame at not being able to speak the language, while another minority was staunchly antagonistic towards the language. Finally, Coupland, et al. (2006) conducted a survey of 777 respondents throughout Wales to examine local differences in Welsh identities and found evidence to support the notion that the future of Welsh language development depends largely on the “good will” of non-Welsh speakers as much as high level use or competence.

**Methodology**

Here, I utilize a pooled cross-section time series regression analysis to examine the relative effect of various Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) policies on the promotion of the Welsh language. The dependent variable is the percentage change in the number of people aged 3 and over who say that they can speak Welsh in each of Wales’ twenty-two local authorities, measured each year from 2005 to 2009. I chose this time span due to the availability of data for each of the independent variables.

The first independent variable is the percentage change from the previous year in the number of students in grade 1 who are taught Welsh as a first language; this figure represents the prevalence of Welsh-medium education
within the local authority. The second independent variable is the number of migrants from England as a percentage of the total local authority population in that year. Although this data includes individuals who were born in Wales but later moved to England, it is the best available measure of English migration and is commonly used in similar studies. The third independent variable is the amount of WLB grants received the previous fiscal year in pounds sterling. A summary of the independent variables and their expected relationship to the change in the percentage of Welsh speakers is below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expected Sign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change in students in grade 1 taught Welsh as first language</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants from England as % of population</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in WLB grants in pounds (£)</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Results

I first analyzed the effects of the independent variables against the percentage change in Welsh speakers in all twenty-two local authorities; the results are presented in Table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.036998</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>-0.3795803***</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>-0.0000754</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.572305</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R-squared</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0635</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 99% level.

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5 This measure was selected instead of the percentage change in migration because all migration is expected to reduce the percentage of Welsh speakers, even if that migration is smaller relative to the previous year. In other words, whether the change from the previous year is negative or positive, the relationship with the dependent variable would be positive.

6 A Pearson’s correlation test did not reveal any collinearity concerns among the independent variables. The correlation coefficient between EDUC and MIGRANT was .0849; between EDUC and GRANT was .1242; and between MIGRANT and GRANT was -.0812.
able, and that for every unit increase in migration from England as a percentage of the population, there is an expected change of -.38% in the percentage of Welsh speakers in a local authority. Both the education and WLB grant variables are in the hypothesized, negative direction, but the variables did not reach statistical significance. The model explained only about 6% of the variation in the percentage of Welsh speakers.

In a second regression model, I tested the effects of the independent variables on the percentage change in Welsh speakers only in those local authorities where Welsh is spoken (native or second-language) by more than 40% of the population. These areas have been the focus of groups like Cymuned, which claim that English in-migration has been particularly harmful to the Welsh language where it is a community language. I present the results of this analysis below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Regression Results for Percentage Change in Welsh Speakers, predominantly Welsh-speaking areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* indicates significance at the 90% level.

Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Once again, in-migration from England is the only statistically significant factor explaining the variation among local authorities, and its effect was notably larger. For every unit increase in migration from England as a percentage of the population, there would be an expected decline of .62% in Welsh speakers in that local authority. In addition, the model explains more than 26% of the variation, suggesting that language advocates have correctly identified that in-migration is particularly powerful where Welsh is a community language. As with the previous regression, there are reasons to consider these findings with some caution. Only 20 observations were included in the regression, which

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7 An alternate regression model using interaction terms for each independent variable and the total percentage of Welsh speakers in the local authority was also tested, but the results did not indicate any statistically significant interaction effects. The results of this regression are presented in the Appendix.
may be too small to accurately reflect trends in predominantly Welsh-speaking local authorities.

I also tested the effects of the independent variables on the percentage change in Welsh speakers in only those local authorities where Welsh is spoken by less than 40% of the population. In these areas, the Welsh Government has particularly encouraged the use of Welsh-medium education as a means of increasing the number of Welsh speakers. The results are presented in Table 4, below.

| Table 4: Regression Results for Percentage Change in Welsh Speakers, non-Welsh speaking areas |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Education                       | -.1387335 (.141) |
| Migrant                         | -.2493442 (.210) |
| Grant                           | -.0000865 (.000) |
| Constant                        | .3729655 (.631)  |
| R-squared                       | 0.0390          |
| Observations                    | 90              |

Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.

When considering only those localities where less than 40% of the population speaks Welsh, none of the independent variables are statistically significant in explaining the effect of the Welsh language policies. Indeed, the independent variables explain only about 4% of the variation in the dependent variable, the lowest R-squared value of the analyses conducted here. Other factors may be at work in these local authorities that affect the percentage of Welsh speakers. It is worth noting, however, that once again only the migration variable is in the expected direction. This further calls into question the effectiveness of bilingual education policies and Welsh Language Board grants to revitalize the Welsh language.

Conclusion

Over the past 60 years, and particularly in the last two decades, Wales has been championed as an example of successful revitalization of a minority language. Both political and economic resources have been poured into developing a comprehensive bilingual education system and encouraging parents, particularly non-Welsh speaking parents, to send their children to a Welsh-medium primary or secondary school. Additionally, the Welsh Language Board has
dedicated much of its financial and administrative efforts toward projects that will build grassroots support for the Welsh language. At first glance, these policies appear to have been an enormous success; the overall percentage of Welsh speakers rose two percentage points in the 2001 UK Census. However, the data in this study tells a different story, and suggests that these policies are not able to counteract the demographic shifts caused by in-migration from England. The regression analyses presented in this study show that, in Wales as a whole and especially in predominantly Welsh-speaking areas, migrants from England have a statistically significant negative impact on the percentage of Welsh speakers in local authorities. In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that education policies or Welsh Language Board grants have promoted language revitalization.

Why, then, has the Welsh Assembly Government continued to promote these policies while doing little to address migration issues? There are several possible explanations. The first is that Welsh-medium education only recently reached a critical mass of the English-speaking population. Baker and Jones (2000) note that the 1990s was a decade of massive expansion for Welsh-medium education, including at the secondary and university levels. Past students from non-Welsh speaking families who attended Welsh-medium schools are now the parents of children entering these same schools. This would suggest that there is a certain percentage of mother-tongue English speakers interested in Welsh-medium education, beyond which no more parents can be convinced to send their children to a Welsh-medium school. There is anecdotal evidence to support an upper-limit on participation in Welsh-medium education, such as the 2004 Welsh Language Use Survey which showed that the percentage of Welsh speakers aged 3-15 who learned to speak Welsh in school was slightly lower than amongst those aged 16-29, even though both numbers were still more than 25 percentage points higher than then 30-44 age group. It is possible that the ability of Welsh-medium schools to attract new speakers has plateaued, and that a similar situation exists for WLB grants in which the number of new programs that can promote the language has peaked.

Another possibility is that bilingual education and WLB grants hold identity value beyond the actual maintenance of the Welsh language. Baker (2000) discusses the role of identity politics in the rise of bilingual education in Wales, and Cloke, et al. (1998) note the “otherization” of the English as a means of protecting Welsh identity. As policies that emphasize the connection between Welsh language and culture, bilingual education and WLB grants are in a prime position to be exploited in identity politics. In this case, even if these policies are not effective tools for language preservation, they still hold symbolic value; thus politicians are reluctant to revise or remove them.

A third possibility is that developing policies to address English in-mi-
migration is simply too difficult compared to promoting bilingual education and WLB grants. Until recently, not all matters within “devolved areas,” such as education, were under the purview of the National Assembly for Wales. If a particular policy option were not within the competency of the National Assembly, the body would have had to ask for legislative authority from UK Parliament, the membership of which is overwhelmingly English. Parliament may have been reluctant to allow a policy that hurts English migrants, such as restricting new housing developments to “local need” only for the first five years, making these measures virtually impossible to implement. Since Wales voted to expand legislative competency to all matters within the devolved areas on March 3, 2011, the influence of Parliament has been minimized, but its effect on migration policies remains to be seen. Either way, whatever policies Wales develops could potentially face legal challenges in the EU by restricting the free movement of workers, further derailing efforts to regulate in-migration.

Finally, it could be that Fishman’s (1991) theory of language revitalization is correct and bilingual education is not an effective way to prevent the decline of minority languages. Fishman argues that the key to language preservation is promoting community transmission of language through repeated, everyday use in social interactions. According to this theory, we would expect to see that in predominantly Welsh-speaking local authorities, the effect of in-migration from England would be greater since its impact on community social interactions would be more noticeable. Indeed, the results of the regression analysis do show that the impact of English migration is larger in Welsh-speaking Wales than in Wales as a whole. If Fishman is correct, then his theory would also help explain the inconclusive effects of bilingual education and WLB grants.

Regardless of the cause of the asymmetry between policy and outcomes with regard to Welsh language revitalization, the National Assembly must account for issues of in-migration if it hopes to preserve Welsh as a community language in Wales. Government efforts should focus on encouraging second-language learners to use Welsh in social and professional environments, promoting the transmission of Welsh from native-speaking parents to their children, and preventing native speakers from being forced out of Welsh-language communities. Future research on this topic could explore the implications and effectiveness of potential policy options in these areas, like subsidizing local homebuyers or promoting local businesses (such as creative industries) that utilize the Welsh language in order to stem the out-flow of native Welsh speakers. Further study could also account for migration within Wales, particularly the movement of Welsh-speaking individuals from rural areas to cities as the average worker becomes more highly skilled, as a causal factor in the reduc-
tion of Welsh speakers in rural areas. A more localized analysis beyond the local authority level may also be beneficial and is possible with the recent release of the 2011 UK Census results. Finally, future research should examine whether opportunities to use Welsh in employment or other aspects of daily life are available for graduates of Welsh-medium education, and if this plays a role in the maintenance of the Welsh language.

Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A: Regression Results with Interaction Terms, all local authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Welsh speakers in local authority (Welsh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*Welsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant*Welsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant*Welsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
** Indicates significance at the 99% level.

References


Secession: Factors of Violence, Irredentism, and the Future of South Sudan

Katelyn Alexandra Lawrenz, University of Richmond

This research analyzes the primary determinants of post-secession conflict between a rump and seceded state to predict whether or not South Sudan’s secession from Sudan will result in violence. I hypothesize that the possibility of post-secession violence increases if one or both states assert an irredentist claim over disputed territory. I employ selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995), prospect theory (Levy 1997), and the logic of Tir (2005) and Fearon (1995) to shape my hypothesis, as each framework describes facets of irredentism that can cause post-secession violence. Using Mill’s Methods of Experimental Inquiry, I examine previous secessions (Morocco/Western Sahara, India/Pakistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, South Africa/Namibia, and Yugoslavia/Macedonia) to determine what factor(s), if any, occur exclusively in violent cases. My results show that irredentism occurs in each violent secession case. Since South Sudan and Sudan also assert an irredentist claim over disputed territory, I argue both states may engage future violence.

Introduction

Why do some secessions result in violence between the rump and seceded state while other secessions occur peacefully? Can the international community identify factors that increase the possibility of violence post-secession? If so, can that knowledge prevent future bloodshed? Twenty new states have formed as a result of secession movements since 1990 alone; some cases have resulted in horrific conflict, whereas others have not (Spolaore 2008, 45). In July 2011, South Sudan became the newest sovereign state after its secession from Sudan; however, various political, social, and economic factors complicate the relations between both states. Will South Sudan and Sudan resolve each dispute diplomatically or resort to violence? Scholars must distinguish the factors that increase or decrease the possibility of conflict post-secession to answer this question accurately.

Despite extensive research, theorists cannot agree on which factor(s), if any, possess a causal-relationship with post-secession violence. Some theorists...
(Horowitz 1985, Etzioni 1992, Kumar 1997) assert that secession precipitates violence inevitably, regardless if warring ethnic factions separate completely. Conversely, other scholars (Kaufmann 1996 and 1998, Tullberg and Tullberg 1997, Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995) view secession as an opportunity to establish long-lasting peace between previously antagonistic groups, as ethnic homogeneity reduces the probability of violence. Today, other notable theorists (Sambanis 2000 and Tir 2005) weigh other factors, such as the secession process, the political climate, and disputed territory. Unfortunately, the lack of consensus causes the international community to face difficulty predicting, or perhaps preventing, hostilities between states after secession. Moreover, the inability to understand the primary determinants of post-secession conflict threatens peace between South Sudan and Sudan, as both states have yet to resolve several contentious issues.

I posit that post-secession violence between the rump and seceded state is more likely to occur if one or both states assert an irredentist claim over disputed territory. I conduct in-depth comparative analysis of five previous secessions (Morocco/Western Sahara, India/Pakistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, South Africa/Namibia, and Yugoslavia/Macedonia). Using the logic of Mill’s Methods of Experimental Inquiry, I discover one factor exists in each violent case (irredentist claim over disputed territory) that each peaceful secession case does not possess. Ultimately, I accept my hypothesis and subsequently analyze the lessons it offers for the situation in South Sudan and Sudan. As both states debate the rightful ownership of contested territory between them currently, my findings suggest South Sudan and Sudan will engage in violence.

**Literature Review**

The current secessionist literature fails to provide consensus as to which factors increase or decrease the probability of post-secession conflict between the rump and seceded state. As a result, the international community struggles to predict the post-secession political climate between Sudan and South Sudan. For organizational purposes, I divide the current literature into three “waves” to describe the major schools of secessionist thought: 1) secession *always* ends in violence because it fails to produce ethnically homogenous states; 2) secession is the best option to ensure peace because it separates rival ethnic factions; and, 3) other factors (such as the process of secession and territorial disputes) impact a secession’s outcome more than ethnic identity.

The primary first wave scholars (Horowitz 1985, Etzioni 1992, Kumar 1997) posit that the international community should discourage separatist movements, contending that few, if any, secessions have produced pure nation-states. First, all members of an ethnic group rarely reside in the exact
same area that can form its own state easily. The international community has facilitated population transfers after secessions to rectify this issue; unfortunately, as the India/Pakistan partition illustrates, population transfers can leave millions of people displaced, impoverished, or dead (Horowitz 1985, 589). Secondly, the previous antagonistic relationship between ethnic groups often does not disappear after secession, as an imaginary border between groups does not necessarily equate with peace (Horowitz 1985, 591). As a result, the authors contend that the international community should not consider secession as a policy to achieve long-term peace and stability between conflicting groups.

Conversely, second wave theorists (Kaufmann 1996 and 1998, Tullberg and Tullberg 1997, Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995) assert that secession provides a suitable international policy to end ethnic civil war and to prevent future hostilities. The authors emphasize the security dilemmas that ethnic heterogeneity often causes within a state (Kaufmann 1996, 138). Secession allows rival ethnic factions separate into homogenous, defensible enclaves; as a result, second wave theories posit that secession offers the only viable solution to eliminate ethnic tension (Kaufmann 1996, 150). The scholars also insist that separating ethnic factions promotes long-term peace and stability, as attempts to institute policies emphasizing unity (such as regional power-sharing or re-establishing identities) frequently fail to eliminate the security dilemma or end ethnic conflict (Kaufmann 1996 and 1998). Secession, however, may address the inherent reasons for violence and foster peaceful relations between both states in the future.

Scholars began to doubt the essentialist mindset of second wave theorists, and a new third wave of theorists entered the debate in the 1990s and 2000s (Sambanis 2000 and Tir 2005). Third wave theorists emphasize that other factors, such as the secession process or contested territory, influence post-secession violence more than ethnic affinities. Nicholas Sambanis argues that how a secession occurs represents the most statistically significant factor that leads to conflict, as “the more conciliatory the outcome of the war, the greater the possibility that peace will last” (Sambanis 2000, 480). Therefore, he believes that the international community can better predict the outcomes of secessions after examining how the state seceded.

Conversely, Jaroslav Tir states that territorial disputes may possess a causal-relationship with post-secession violence. The rump and/or seceded state may feel dissatisfied with how the secession divided the land between them: the seceded area may aspire to gain more territory of the rump state or the rump state may desire to reclaim a portion, or all, of its previously controlled territory (Tir 2005, 716). Land that holds historical and/or cultural significance to a state, whether it is an ancestral homeland, place of religious importance,
or populated by co-ethnics, can cause a state to assert an irredentist claim. However, unlike disputes regarding natural resources or other tangible land benefits that states could share or divide equally, leaders may face difficulty compromising over “indivisible” areas of ethnic and/or historic significance (Tir 2005). As a result, he argues that the possibility of post-secession violence increases.

As demonstrated, the current literature exemplifies how divided political scientists remain regarding the reasons for post-secession violence between a rump and seceded state. In light of South Sudan’s recent secession from Sudan, the lack of consensus amongst scholars causes the international community to struggle identifying, explaining, and predicting the factors that may lead South Sudan and Sudan to engage in violence.

**Theory and Hypothesis**

The logic of Tir (2005) and Fearon (1995), as well as the approaches of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) and prospect theory (Levy 1997), shapes the theoretical approach of my research and my hypothesis. Each framework highlights three unique factors of irredentist claims that I argue will increase the possibility of violence post-secession. Irredentas often present in indivisible terms, which can eliminate grounds for compromise between the rump and seceded state. These claims also influence the leaders of each state profoundly, as the constituents of each state may prefer to fight than relinquish valued territory. Finally, irredentas lower both states’ thresholds for violence, which makes each state more conflict prone. Together, these three facets of irredentist claims create an extremely unstable climate between the rump and seceded state that can escalate to violence post-secession.

In prior cases of violent secessions and partitions (e.g., Israel/Palestine and Armenia/Azerbaijan), leaders of one or both states have first asserted irredentist claims over a particular territory. The United Nations partitioned the British Mandate of Palestine in 1947 to create one majority Jewish state, one majority Arab state, and an internationally controlled area that would include Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Arab countries opposed the United Nation’s plan vehemently, claiming that a Jewish state would take away a substantial portion of historic Palestinian territory (Middle East Research and Information Project 2011). Conversely, the Jewish community stated that the area belonged to them before Palestinian control and they had a right to live freely in the historic Land of Israel. Since the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the competing irredentist claims have fueled a horrific conflict in the region that has escalated to several full-scale wars between many Arab countries and Israel (Horowitz 2010).
A similar situation occurred in the violent secession of Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding ownership of the Nagorno Karabakh region. Although the region sits inside Azerbaijan’s borders, the population has consisted largely of ethnic Armenians since the 11th century (Migdalovitz 2003, 1). Between 1805 and 1922, sovereign control over Karabakh alternated between the Armenians and Azeris as each country became independent and then re-conquered. Eventually, both countries fell under Soviet control in 1922 and Karabakh became a province of Azerbaijan (Migdalovitz 2003, 1-2). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries became independent and Karabakh remained a part of Azerbaijan. The Armenians, anxious to annex Karabakh on the grounds of an ethnic irredentist claim, launched a major military offensive against Azerbaijan in early 1992. The offensive precipitated the two-year Nagorno Karabakh War, which left thousands dead and displaced 1.4 million Armenians and Azeris. Armenia possessed a military advantage in Karabakh and areas of Azerbaijan proper, but the region remained a de jure part of Azerbaijan. Fighting in the region has continued throughout the 2000s, as both countries still dispute the territory’s status (Migdalovitz 2003, 3). Clearly, the pervasiveness of both countries’ irredentist claims has influenced the region profoundly.

Why does the assertion of an irredentist claim make a peaceful compromise between the rump and seceded state difficult to achieve? James Fearon posits that rational states have an incentive to compromise with each other and avoid war due to its exorbitant cost; yet, each state also has a range where it would rather enter war than compromise due to the issue’s importance (Fearon 1995). Tir (2005) and Horowitz (2010) later build on Fearon’s theory and address irredentist claims. Irredentas usually present in zero-sum terms, as the people within the irredentist state may feel a personal connection to the land shared by their co-ethnics (e.g., Armenians to Nagorno Karabakh) or a religious connection to the land (e.g., Israelites to the Holy Land). Therefore, leaders may not accept any settlement if it leaves co-ethnics in the “wrong” state or sacrifices an area deemed inherent to the state’s identity (Tir 2005, 718). States may view war as the only rational policy to solve the irredentist dispute. The Israeli/Palestinians’ and Armenian/Azeris’ numerous failed negotiation attempts illustrate this point.

If negotiations fail, leaders may resort to violence if they believe the citizenry would prefer militarized action to not acquiring the disputed land. The constituents’ influence on their leaders represents another facet of irredentist claims that increases the likelihood of violence post-secession. I presuppose that the leaders of each state strive to receive support from their constituents (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). The leader may feel pressured to (re)gain the territory forcefully if strong public support for the irredentist claim exists. As Tir explains, benefits-driven leaders will view potential territorial
acquisition as an opportunity to broaden their legitimacy and support amongst the population. If popular support exists, leaders will also encounter less difficulty convincing their constituents that militarized action may be the only policy option available (Tir 2005, 718-719). Consequently, the disputed territory’s significance to the public may precipitate the leader’s decision to use force.

The public’s influence shows clearly in the Israeli/Palestinian and Armenian/Azeri cases. Over 50 percent of Israelis believe that Palestinians wish to conquer Israel’s territory, and over 75 percent of Palestinians believe Israelis intend to annex the West Bank (Horowitz 2010). Unfortunately, the pervasive distrust influences the leaders’ decisions. For example, a significant majority of both Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state solution in theory; however, if a solution does not reinstate the 1967 boundaries, Palestinian support falls to only 33 percent (Horowitz 2010). The situation demonstrates how leaders may acquiesce to public demands if widespread support for the irredentist claim exists; yet, if the populace rejects the details of negotiations, leaders may engage in violence. Distrust between the Armenians and Azeris also influences each state’s leaders. The latest round of negotiations in May 2011 failed, and popular support for forcefully (re)conquering Nagorno Karabakh exists in both countries (Barry 2011).

The way each state orients risk is the final facet of irredentist claims that increases the possibility of conflict post-secession. Leaders will more likely resort to violence if their state operates in the domain of losses, and countries respond to potential gains and losses differently because they tend to “overvalue losses relative to comparable gain” (Levy 1997, 89). A state will fight harder to keep something it already possesses (domain of losses) than it will fight to gain something it does not already have (domain of gains). Operating in the domain of losses lowers the threshold a state may have for the use of force, whereas a state operating in the domain of gains may show greater caution entering a conflict (Levy 1997; Tir 2005, 724). When scholars apply risk orientation logic to territorial disputes following secession, on first glance, the likelihood of violence between the rump and seceded state actually decreases. The rump state may wish to regain either part of its territory controlled before secession occurred; therefore, the rump state will operate in the domain of losses. Conversely, the seceded state will operate in the domain of gains, as it may not want to risk losing any of its newly acquired territory or risk re-annexation if the both states engaged in a conflict (Tir 2005, 724). As a result, the seceded state’s reluctance to fight may increase the prospects for peaceful negotiation.

However, the logic does not account for one or both states asserting an irredentist claim over the territory in question. An irredentist claim assumes either: 1) prior ownership of the land or, 2) an inherent right to the land. There-
fore, the state declaring irredentist justification over territory operates in the domain of losses, as either criterion position the state to defend territory it controls (or should control) already. In any scenario with an irredentist claim, the rump state and the seceded state will operate in the domain of losses. If the rump state makes an irredentist claim against territory the seceded state possesses, the rump state will operate in the domain of losses because it believes the territory belongs to it and the seceded state will operate in the domain of losses because it will not want to relinquish the territory. The same risk orientation applies if the seceded state makes the claim against the rump state. Similarly, the rump and seceded state may assert an irredentist claim over the same region for different reasons; in this case, both states still operate in the domain of losses. Subsequently, the threshold of the use of force decreases for both states if one or both assert an irredentist claim.

The theoretical approach described above outlines why irredentist claims over disputed territory might increase the likelihood of post-secession violence. The zero-sum nature of irredentist claims makes compromise between each state more difficult to accomplish. Also, selectorate theory illustrates how leaders may resort to violence if their citizens would prefer to engage in war than relinquish the state’s irredentist claim. Finally, irredentist claims cause both the rump and seceded state to operate in the domain of losses, which increases the possibility violence will occur. As evidenced by the situations in Israel/Palestine and Armenia/Azerbaijan, irredentist claims have formed the foundation of two horrific conflicts. My theory builds the case that irredentist claims may be a significant factor in post-secession violence.

H1: Post-secession violence between the rump and seceded state is more likely to occur if one or both states assert an irredentist claim over disputed territory.

Research Design

My method is two-fold: 1) to use John Stuart Mill’s Methods of Experimental Inquiry to determine the causes of violence post-secession; and, 2) to apply the results of my research and predict South Sudan’s most likely outcome after it seceded in July 2011. John Stuart Mill developed methods that researchers use to determine actual causes among possible causes for observed phenomena. It is a qualitative mode of inquiry, but follows the logic of controlling for alternative explanations found in multivariate quantitative models in the social sciences (Chan and Lau 2011). Specifically, I will use Mill’s joint method of agreement and difference, which examines similar situations that have different outcomes to see if one factor is present in one case, but not the others. If there is one difference between otherwise similar cases (i.e. similar in terms of
alternative causal factors), then a causal relationship between that factor and the outcome experienced may exist.\(^2\) As with any research methodology, my application of Mill’s Methods has benefits and drawbacks. Qualitative analysis typically relies on a small sample size, as the depth of research required prevents a researcher from examining as many cases as a quantitative study would permit. A small sample size, however, allows me to elaborate in greater detail on the factors that led to secession, the secession process, and the factors that contributed to peace or violence after secession occurred in each case. A large, quantitative study may allow me to evaluate many cases, but numerical representations of personal connections (such as a leader’s irredentist claim over a particular territory) may distort the value or strength of the factors I will examine.

This methodology provides a starting point for examining causal relations. The politics of secession is multi-faceted and complex; therefore, the purpose of my research is not to predict with 100 percent certainty that the presence of one factor will inevitably lead to a violent breakup between states. Such generalizations would be logical fallacies and unhelpful to better understanding the nature and outcome of secessionist movements. Yet, my analysis of the cases I have selected can provide a valuable avenue for future research and foreign policy understanding. If one potential factor of violence is present in all cases of violent secessions and not in peaceful cases, the possibility that factor has a causal relation with violence exists.

Before I discuss my method for case selection, I must define three paramount terms in my hypothesis and subsequent analysis: irredentism, violence post-secession, and secession. I will define irredentism as a territorial claim based on the ethnic similarity or historical significance to a particular state (Kornprobst 2007, 459). I will define violence as an armed confrontation between two or more factions. In order to maintain flexibility in my analysis, I will not set an explicit threshold for how many casualties the factions must cause or stipulate that the rump and/or seceded state issue a declaration of war; however, the reasons for the conflict must result from the secession itself. Also, in accordance with scholars’ previous work on this subject (Tir 2005), I will define secession as “an internally motivated division of a country’s homeland (i.e. noncolonial) territory that results in the creation of at least one new independent (i.e. secessionist) state with full sovereign rights and legal recognition by the international community—and leaves behind the now territorially

\(^2\)Specifically, Mill’s definition of the joint method of agreement and difference is as follows: “If two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only one circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does not occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance: the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon” (Mill [1874] 2002, 283).
smaller rump state” (Tir 2005, 714). This limits my research to cases that have produced sovereign, or de jure, states.

I will use five cases to determine what factor, if any, exists exclusively in cases where violence occurred after secession. The cases I will examine in the subsequent section are: Morocco/Western Sahara, India/Pakistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, South Africa/Namibia, and Yugoslavia/Macedonia. Namibia and Macedonia seceded peacefully from South Africa and Yugoslavia, respectively. However, in Morocco/Western Sahara, India/Pakistan, and Ethiopia/Eritrea, violence occurred post-secession. In order to explain why similar events (secession) produced different outcomes (violence or peace) and use Mill’s Methods most effectively, I chose cases that possess similarities to the situation in South Sudan.

In my analysis, I will include three of the most notable cases of secession in Africa since decolonization: Morocco/Western Sahara, South Africa/Namibia, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. Few secession movements have occurred since decolonization and even fewer have been successful. The African Union (and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity) believed that dividing various ethnic groups into additional states would decrease the possibility of peace and democratic consolidation. However, cultural conflicts, the politicization of ethnicity, and political strife in countries throughout the continent has propelled certain groups to try and gain greater autonomy; for example: Somaliland, the Casamance region of Senegal, certain areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (such as Katanga), and the Cabinda region of Angola all experienced independence movements, albeit unsuccessful (BBC News 2011b). Therefore, I selected the few cases of successful secession movements in Africa to help analyze the case in South Sudan most effectively.

I have also included two cases outside Africa: India/Pakistan and Macedonia/Yugoslavia. Both cases have influenced secessionist literature significantly; therefore, it is prudent to include them in my analysis. After the British partitioned India and Pakistan in 1947, both countries have declared war against each other four different times and tensions continue to this day (Kumar 1997, 24). As one of the most devastating cases of secession, I believe the examination of India and Pakistan will undoubtedly help illuminate what factor(s) increase the likelihood of conflict. In contrast, Macedonia seceded peacefully from Yugoslavia in 1991 and it was the only state to escape the terrible violence that resulted in the Yugoslav Wars. Due to the unique nature of Macedonia’s secession, I will include it in my analysis.

Analysis

Case #1: Ethiopia and Eritrea
Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea grew substantially after the Ethiopia-Eritrean federation began on September 15, 1952. Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie began “a decade of constitutional and legal infringements that nullified the Eritrean Constitution” only three days after the federation’s inception (Iyob 1995, 88). Movements against Selassie’s reign gained strength throughout Eritrea quickly. In 1958, exiled Eritrean political leaders helped form the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which recruited heavily across the territory as it expressed its desire for a sovereign Eritrea and Pan-Eritrean nationalism (“Timeline: Eritrea.” 2011). On September 1, 1961, ELF members fired first shots on Ethiopian forces at a police post in southwest Eritrea (Iyob 1995; 104-105). Scholars consider the shots fired on this date as the beginning of the Ethiopian and Eritrean War.

Angered at the ELF’s unprovoked aggression, Emperor Selassie annexed Eritrea as a fourteenth province of Ethiopia on November 14, 1962 (Deng et al. 1996, 82). Eritreans mobilized quickly, and between 1963 and 1974, intense fighting between the ELF and Ethiopian forces spread throughout both states (Copson 1994, 34). On September 12, 1974, the Derg overthrew Selassie, and Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam assumed power (BBC News 2011). The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea continued under Mengistu, as he received substantial Soviet Union support in 1978. That year, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) also replaced the ELF as the major rebel force (Copson 1994, 36). The war continued unabated until the 1980s, but after the Soviet Union decreased its military support for Ethiopia in 1985, Mengistu’s subsequent military offensives in Eritrea failed to defeat the EPLF (Copson 1994; 36-37). Eventually, Mengistu fled the country to Zimbabwe on May 21, 1991, and his military forces in Eritrea crumbled. The EPLF retook the capital city of Asmara and drove all Ethiopian forces out of Eritrea (Department of State 2011a). Eritrea had won the war.

The United Nations supervised Eritrea’s independence referendum that took place April 23-25, 1993, and Eritreans voted in overwhelming numbers to secede formally from Ethiopia and become a sovereign state. Eritrea celebrated its independence on May 24, 1993 (Department of State 2011a). However, during the late 1990s, Eritrea and Ethiopia began to debate the exact border between each country. Both countries claimed the Badme region, which Ethiopia had governed since Eritrea seceded. Badme “[was] by all accounts nothing more than a barren piece of land with no known covetable resources” and “[offered] nothing of any particular value either above or below ground” (Jacquin-Berdal 2005, xxii; Van der Veen 2004, 181). However, disputes over the region would eventually spark the Ethiopian-Eritrean War.

Eritreans wanted a return to the colonial border that Italy drew in 1902. During this time, Italy controlled Eritrea (Italy colonized Eritrea in 1895) but
Ethiopia remained free. The Italians and Ethiopians signed the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 to demarcate the border between Ethiopia and Italy’s colony, and the agreement gave the Badme region to Eritrea. The Organization of African Unity (replaced by the African Union in 2002) also placed great emphasis on retaining the colonial borders of all African states to prevent waves of secession movements across the continent. Therefore, the Eritreans felt justified to express a historical irredentist claim over the Badme region (BBC News 2000).

Ethiopians also asserted both a historical and ethnic irredentist claim. When Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962, they argued, the Badme region fell under Ethiopian jurisdiction. Therefore, Eritrea had no historical “right” to Badme, since the region was within Ethiopian borders until Eritrea seceded (Jacquin-Berdal 2005, xiv). Ethiopia also had close ethnic ties to the region, as the majority of people in Badme identified as Ethiopian, not Eritrean (Bhalla 2002). Ethiopians saw Badme as a “significant” area “where Ethiopian nationalism was resurrected and celebrated.” Ethiopians believed that any inch of the Badme territory lost to Eritrea would undermine Ethiopia’s cultural and historic ties to the area (Gebrewold 2009, 199). As a matter of principle, the Ethiopians and Eritreans would go to war to claim the region as their own.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean War began in May 1998 after Eritrean troops fired upon Ethiopian police officers in the Badme region. Ethiopia’s leader, Zenawi, rallied public support for the war quickly, as “[Eritrea’s] secession was…a sore spot with the Ethiopian public.” Intense fighting continued along the border region as both sides tried to capture the Badme region (Van der Veen 2004; 181-182). By early 2000, Ethiopia had a military advantage in Badme, but the horrific destruction caused by the war left both sides more amenable to compromise. The international community estimates that each country suffered approximately 50,000 casualties during the two-year period (Van der Veen 2004, 182). Despite numerous international attempts to establish a ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the war continued until June 2000.

On December 12, 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Algiers Peace Agreement. The agreement established a ceasefire and allowed the United Nations to establish a Boundary Commission administered by The Hague to demarcate the final border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Border Commission’s final decision in 2002 supported Eritrea’s irredentist claim (Plaut 2005, 112). Border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Eritrea have continued after the war ended officially in 2000, and since 2006, the United Nations believed war would break out on two separate occasions (BBC News 2011a). Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain hostile; however, both countries have averted another full-scale conflict since 2000.
Western Sahara’s struggle for independence dates to the period of European colonization in Africa. During this time, Spain ruled Western Sahara, and both France and Spain assumed joint control over Morocco. After French decolonization, Morocco negotiated two agreements in 1956 and 1958 with Spain that gave Morocco control over the majority of Spanish-controlled areas. However, Spain refused to give up its claim to Western Sahara, and in 1973, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguit el Hamra and Rio de Oro (known as the Polisario Front) formed to resist continued Spanish rule (Department of State 2011b). In 1975, Spain acquiesced to international pressure, and the UN crafted a timetable for Spanish withdrawal and a referendum for Western Saharan independence. However, as negotiations took place at the UN, Morocco and neighboring Mauritania asserted that the Saharawi people had no right to self-determination, as the territory belonged to both Morocco and Mauritania (Copson 1994, 59-60). Soon after both countries made their competing irredentist claims to Western Sahara, a violent struggle for independence began.

Morocco argued that Western Sahara had been an integral part of various Moroccan dynasties since the 11th century. During this time, the Almoravid dynasty ruled Greater Morocco, which included present-day Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, areas of western Algeria, and areas of northern Mali. Before the Almoravid leader’s death in 1106, he unified Morocco and Western Sahara in regards to politics and the Islamic faith. Different dynasties and kingdoms evolved during the next several centuries; however, the unification of politics and religion between both Morocco and Western Sahara remained (Damis 1993a, 14-15). The vow of allegiance most tribes in Western Sahara gave to the Moroccan sultans made the territory part of Morocco’s siba lands. Due to this fundamental component of Islamic law, according to Moroccan leadership, there was no doubt that the Sahara has always been, and always would be, a part of Morocco (Damis 1993a, 15-16). Therefore, when the Spanish departed, Morocco would not let Western Sahara become a sovereign state without a fight.

In contrast, Mauritanian leaders asserted an ethnic irredentist claim over Western Sahara during a speech in July 1957. When Greater Morocco existed, the Moor nomadic tribes roamed Western Sahara and Mauritania, as well as in other parts of the dynasty. As a result, Mokhtar Ould Daddah argued that many people in Western Sahara and Mauritania shared a common culture (Arab-Berber-Islamic), as well as a common religion (Islam), language (Hassaniyya Arabic), economic practices (nomadism), and race (Arab-Berber). Many Mauritanian people trace their roots to Western Saharan tribes and vice versa (Damis 1993a, 30). Although Mauritania’s irredentist claim was primarily ethnic
in nature, it too saw Western Sahara as an important part of the state’s identity.

King Hassan of Morocco launched a demonstration (known as the “Green March”) in protest of UN and ICJ support for Western Saharan independence on November 6, 1975. Spain feared the protest might spark a war with Morocco; as a result, Spanish leaders agreed to meet with representatives from the Moroccan and Mauritanian governments. The three countries signed the Madrid Accords on November 14, 1975, which established a timetable for Spanish withdrawal and created an interim government for Western Sahara during this time. Morocco also gained the northern two-thirds of Western Sahara and Mauritania received the other southern third (Library of Congress 1988). In exchange, Spain was allowed to retain its shares in phosphate and fishing industries that Western Sahara owned.³

Sporadic fighting between the Polisario Front and Moroccan forces began before Spain left in 1976. After Spain’s departure, the Polisario Front immediately declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a government in exile. Moroccan troops proceeded to invade northern areas and met strong resistance from the Polisario Front (Department of State 2011b). Intense fighting between both sides continued for two years. Meanwhile, Mauritanian forces invaded in the south after Spain left, as well. However, in 1978, Mauritanian officials realized that continuing to fight the Polisario Front was too costly. Mauritania surrendered and abandoned its irredentist claim over Western Sahara in August 1979 (Library of Congress 1988).

When Mauritania surrendered, King Hassan of Morocco promptly annexed the southern areas of Western Sahara and Moroccan troops invaded the region. The conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco continued unabated until 1981. At that time, the Moroccans built the first section of a defensive sand wall (known as the Moroccan Wall) that prevented the Polisario Front from trying to retake any Moroccan-controlled northern areas in Western Sahara. By 1987, Morocco exercised de facto control of approximately 80 percent of Western Sahara (Department of State 2011b). Although the wall provided protection for Moroccan forces, it also left the war in a stalemate. Providing adequate coverage of the wall cost a substantial amount of money and left the Moroccan military strained, as well (Department of State 2011b).

In 1988, King Hassan stated that the war was unsustainable and he agreed to meet representatives from the Polisario Front to negotiate a ceasefire. Since

³Some historians claim that Western Sahara’s phosphate deposits were another factor in Morocco’s decision to annex the territory; however, Morocco’s irredentist claim predates the discovery of Western Sahara’s phosphate deposits (Damis 1983a 15-16). Also, Morocco already controlled over 16 billion tons of phosphate within its current borders, roughly eight times the size of Western Sahara’s reserves (Damis 1983b 174-175). As a result, Morocco’s irredentist claim to Western Sahara played a much more significant role in the decision to engage in conflict than the phosphate deposits ever did.
then, both sides have debated various proposals to establish a referendum for independence; however, disagreements regarding voting eligibility and the options for independence that voters could choose from have stalled negotiations indefinitely. As a result, the legal status of Western Sahara remains controversial to this day. Sporadic fighting between Moroccan security forces and the Polisario Front continues, but to a lesser extent than before the ceasefire in 1998 (Department of State 2011b).

**Case #3: India and Pakistan**

In 1947, Britain partitioned India (majority Hindu population) and Pakistan (majority Muslim population) based on religious demographics, as British leaders believed that religious affiliation would serve as a unifying force for Muslims and Hindus (Ganguly 2001, 72). The border left a substantial number of Hindus and Muslims in the “wrong” state, especially in the partitioned provinces of Bengal and Punjab. As a result, over ten million people migrated between the countries during the first few months after the partition; although estimates vary, the population exchange left as many as one million people dead and millions more displaced and homeless (Bates 2011). Tensions also erupted in the northern Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, which Britain allowed to choose whether it would accede to India or Pakistan or become independent. Pakistan assumed that Kashmir would choose to join it, as Kashmir had a Hindu ruler but predominately Muslim population. However, the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession agreement in late October 1947, which gave India control over Kashmir (BBC News 2002).

India and Pakistan had vested interests in Kashmir and both were willing to engage in violence because of it. Therefore, as soon as Indian troops entered Kashmir on October 27, 1947, the first Indo-Pakistani War began (BBC News 2002). Kashmir was strategically valuable, as its annexation would serve as a northern buffer zone between both countries (Ganguly 2001, 27). However, India and Pakistan desired to control Kashmir for more than strategic purposes. As Sam Ganguly explains:

“…the origins of [the] Indo-Pakistani conflict is Pakistan’s irredentist claim to Kashmir. As the putative homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent, Pakistan sought to incorporate the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir into its domain. Pakistani leaders forcefully stated that they sought Kashmir’s merger into Pakistan to ensure the latter’s ‘completeness.’ India, committed to a vision of civic nationalism, sought to thwart this goal to demonstrate that all communities, regardless of their religious orientation, could thrive
under India’s secular dispensation.” (Ganguly 2001, 5)

The Indo-Pakistan War of 1947 ended when both parties signed the UN ceasefire agreement on January 1, 1949. The agreement established a ceasefire line, known as the Line of Control (LOC), to distinguish the de facto Indian and Pakistani controlled areas of Kashmir. The agreement also stipulated that a Kashmiri referendum should occur. However, the referendum never happened and the Kashmiri constituent assembly ratified its official accession to India in 1954. Since that time, India “has regarded that part of the state which it controls as an integral part of the Indian union” (BBC News 2002).

Unfortunately, violence regarding Kashmir flared again in 1965. The Pakistani government still wanted to annex Kashmir and they had grown increasingly alarmed at India’s recent attempts to incorporate more of the area. As a result, the second Indo-Pakistan war began during August 1965 when Pakistani forces crossed the LOC into the Indian-controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir during a covert, offensive mission (BBC News 2002). The conflict only lasted three weeks; however, India and Pakistan lost 3,000 and 3,800 people, respectively. In January 1966, both countries signed another UN sponsored ceasefire agreement, but neither country resolved the Kashmir dispute (Ganguly 2009).

The third Indo-Pakistan War in 1971 did not concern Kashmir, rather the consequences of the civil war between West and East Pakistan. Starting in December 1970, tensions between East and West Pakistan rose due to the East’s desire for greater political autonomy. In response, West Pakistan attacked the eastern capital of Dhaka in March 1971. By May, over 9.8 million Easterners became refugees inside India or along the border, which strained India’s economy. India attempted to negotiate the refugees’ return to the East with the Pakistani government, but to no avail. In December 1971, India invaded Pakistan to help Bangladesh gain independence. The war only lasted thirteen days, but Pakistan and India suffered heavy losses: over 9,000 Pakistanis and 2,500 Indians died (Ganguly 2009). Both sides negotiated a ceasefire and East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, became an independent state on December 6, 1971 (BBC News 2002).

Conflict began in Kashmir again when armed resistance to India’s rule broke out during 1989. Two years prior, Muslim political parties asserted that the Indian government rigged its state legislative assembly elections against them. The fraudulent elections served as a catalyst for the formation of active militant groups, and by the 1990s, the insurgency had become a dominant force in Kashmir (BBC News 2002). Although India and Pakistan never officially declared war over the Kashmiri insurgency, the international community feared the standoff would precipitate a nuclear confrontation, as India and
Pakistan began to conduct major nuclear tests near the border between them in May 1998. After intense international pressure, both countries adopted the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, which emphasized that both countries must “intensify [the] efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir” (BBC News 2002). Unfortunately, India and Pakistan did not adhere to the Lahore Declaration for long.

On May 8, 1999, Pakistani forces entered Indian-controlled Kashmir in a mountainous area north of Kargil. The Pakistani leaders sought to internationalize the Kashmir issue again, as they believed that “global attention had been flagging for some time” (Global Security 2011). The Indian military dispatched forces to the area as soon as Pakistani forces invaded, and the Kargil Conflict began. The United States and the United Nations pressured both sides for a resolution immediately but the conflict continued until July 1999. At that time, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif caved to international demands and ordered the withdrawal of Pakistani forces (BBC News 2002). Within only a three-month period, over 500 soldiers died on both sides and over 50,000 people living along the LOC near Kargil became refugees. Pakistan’s plan had failed, as well: the Kargil area remained in Indian-controlled Kashmir territory (Global Security 2011).

Since the Kargil Conflict, India and Pakistan have not declared war against each other for a fifth time. However, both countries have yet to resolve the Kashmir issue and insurgents still operate within the region. Pakistan’s irredentist claim to Kashmir and India’s competing viewpoint were primary contributors to the Indo-Pakistan Wars of 1947 and 1965, the Kargil Conflict, and sparked the insurgency within Kashmir. Conversely, economic pressure and diplomatic tension precipitated the 1971 war. Different factors have correlated to violence between India and Pakistan after the partition; however, the competing irredentist claims over Kashmir have served as an underlying cause of the post-partition violence in four of the five major conflicts, and instability continues within the region.

Case #4: South Africa and Namibia

Following World War I, the League of Nations granted South Africa official administrative control of South West African (now known as Namibia). In 1945, representatives at the Yalta Conference concluded that the mandate territories would now become United Nations Trust Territories. Despite the ruling, South Africa continued to exercise de facto control over South West Africa. In October 1966, the UN decided to revoke South Africa’s mandate formally and place the territory under its protection. South Africa defied this ruling, as well, and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) formed to protest.
South Africa’s now illegal occupation (Department of State 2011c).

The Namibian War of Independence, also known as the South African Border War, began after the SWAPO attacked South African Defense Forces (SADF) on August 26, 1966. The war became entangled quickly with the Angolan Civil War. When Angola gained independence from Portugal in 1975, an immediate power struggle began between the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The conflict became a proxy war during the Cold War. The MPLA gained support from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the SWAPO; UNITA gained support from South Africa and the United States (United Nations 1990). As a result, the struggle for Namibian independence turned into a battle that involved many parties and had far-reaching consequences for all states in southern Africa.

While the South African Border War and Angolan Civil War progressed during the 1970s, the United Nations continued to pressure South Africa to withdraw all troops from Namibia and craft a timetable for independence. In 1977, the United States, France, West Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom formed the Western Contact Group to “to bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for Namibia.” The Security Council adopted the Contact Group’s proposal (Resolution 435), which would allow Namibia to hold elections under UN direction and establish a ceasefire between the SWAPO and the SADF (Department of State 2011c).

After its adoption, all the parties involved debated how the UN should implement Resolution 435. Since Namibia’s independence was still linked closely with the South African Border War and Angola’s civil war, the negotiations also included representatives from Angola, the Soviet Union, and Cuba (United Nations 1990). Following a decade of international debate, in December 1988, the states reached an agreement known as the New York Accords. This accord would implement Resolution 435 fully, end the wars in Angola, and leave Namibia an independent, sovereign state (Department of State 2011c).

In April 1989, the United Nations Transition Assistance Group helped South Africa and Namibia establish policies that would allow a smooth secession to occur. The transition lasted eleven months and took place peacefully with one exception. During the first month, a violent outbreak between the SWAPO’s military branch (the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, or PLAN) and South African troops occurred, which left 345 PLAN members dead. After the incident, however, the transition continued for the next ten months without conflict, and Namibia declared independence on March 21, 1990 (Department of State 2011c).

South Africa and Namibia continued to negotiate issues unresolved at the
time of secession until 1994. The most notable issue regarded which country would take the popular fishing port and tourist destination known as Walvis Bay, which is a coastal enclave that sits on Namibia’s western border. Due to its economic value and strategic location along the Atlantic Ocean, both countries now wanted to control the area. After negotiations took place at the United Nations, South Africa agreed to drop the case and allow Namibia full control over the port (Department of State 2011c). Since then, South Africa and Namibia have enjoyed pleasant relations between their respective governments and have not engaged in any violence post-secession.

Case #5: Yugoslavia and Macedonia

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) formed in 1943 under Marshall Tito. The SFRY consisted of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Macedonia; and two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Various ethnic groups lived within the SFRY states, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina where large numbers of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims resided together (Judah 2011). Until the 1980s, the different republics within the SFRY coexisted fairly peacefully; however, when Tito died in 1980, the people within the six states grew increasingly anxious about the future of the federation. During the next decade, a wave of nationalism swept across the federation’s republics. Slobodan Milosevic, a rising Serbian politician, took control of the SFRY in the late 1980s. He began to politicize the ethnic differences between the groups in each republic and “a spiral of competitive and mutually fearful nationalisms began to destroy the country” (Judah 2011).

The rise of nationalism, economic hardship, and frustration with Yugoslavia’s government all contributed to the break-up of the SFRY in the early 1990s. Milosevic’s ruling party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, began to disintegrate in 1990 and the individual republics, except Serbia and Montenegro, expressed a desire for greater autonomy and they created their own nationalist governments (Craven 1995, 202). Between 1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia all declared independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia seceded first in June 1991. Then, Macedonia held a referendum on September 8th, 1991. Over 95 percent of voters favored independence and Macedonia seceded officially from the SFRY on September 17th, 1991 (Craven 1995, 203).

The secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia sparked the Yugoslav Wars that began in 1991 and lasted until 1995. The conflict involved three separate but interconnected wars: the War in Slovenia, the Croatian War of Independence, and the Bosnian War. By the time Macedonia seceded, Slovenia and
Secession

Croatia were already entrenched in a war with Serbia and violence in Bosnia followed shortly after. In March 1992, Bosnia declared its independence, but fighting erupted immediately between its different ethnic groups (BBC News 2006). The Serbs within Bosnia wished to remain in Yugoslavia and help build a greater Serbia. Then, Bosnian Croats fought the primarily Muslim army in an attempt to join Croatia proper. Extremist groups from Belgrade also supported the ethnic cleansing of millions of people. In the end, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slovenia gained full international recognition as independent states; Serbia and Montenegro remained united as the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (BBC News 2006).

Macedonia was able to secede peacefully from the SFRY, despite the horrific violence that occurred in its neighboring states. The UN then sent peacekeepers to monitor any potential interethnic disputes between the Macedonians and the Albanian minority. Scholars still debate whether or not this action from the UN ultimately helped Macedonia escape the Yugoslav Wars (Ackermann 1999, 23). Regardless, the SFRY did not fight to keep Macedonia as a republic. The United Nations officially recognized Macedonia as a member state in April 1993 (Craven 1995; 204, 209). Since secession, Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) have continued to coexist without any major diplomatic or military conflicts.

Analysis: South Sudan and Sudan

Egypt and Britain asserted joint authority over Sudan through a condominium in 1899. Egypt controlled the North and Britain controlled the South. After World War II, British officials decided to reconnect the Northern and Southern areas into one country, and Britain gave control of Sudan to Northern leaders in Khartoum. In 1955, Southerners rioted against Northern rule in an effort to give the South greater autonomy. The protests marked the beginning of the First Sudanese Civil War, which lasted until 1972. The 1972 Addis-Abba accords attempted to end the violence permanently and give the South relative autonomy over its affairs (Department of State 2010). However, in 1979, Chevron discovered oil reserves in the Southern area of Bentiu. In order to access all of the Southern oil revenues, Sudanese President Jaafar al-Nimeri had to violate the accords since it granted the South limited financial autonomy. Southern military leaders rebelled again in 1983; unfortunately, the rebellion sparked the Second Sudanese Civil War (Department of State 2010).

The Second Sudanese Civil War was bloodier and filled with more political and social upheaval than the previous war. Over 2 million people died and millions more became displaced internally (BBC News 2008). The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the Second Sudanese Civil War and
created a timetable for Southern secession. The referendum, which would occur in 2011, would also include a separate secession vote for the people in the oil-rich Abyei region, as both the North and South claimed Abyei as its own (Zirulnick 2011). Despite the CPA’s accomplishment, the international community and many Sudanese citizens questioned whether or not the agreement would create lasting peace in the country.

The Southern Sudanese independence referendum took place from January 9-15, 2011. However, the separate referendum in Abyei did not occur because of a disagreement between the Northern and Southern governments regarding citizenship status (Bol and Stein 2011). Although the referendum itself took place relatively peacefully, conflict has continued after the South seceded officially on July 9, 2011. The United Nations estimates that post-referendum violence has caused over 260,000 Sudanese to become refugees and left over 1,800 people dead (Clarke 2011). The recent violence suggests the possibility of reigniting a decades-long war between Sudan and South Sudan, as several pressing issues exist between both countries.

Since South Sudan’s secession in July 2011, leaders of both states have not resolved the debate regarding oil revenue sharing. Oil revenue contributes to over 90 percent of the country’s total export revenues (Verjee 2010). Although the majority of oil reserves reside in South Sudan, little to no infrastructure exists in the South to refine and ship the oil. As a result, Khartoum and the SPLA agreed to split the oil revenues equally since the 2005 CPA. Post-secession, both governments are considering a deal that would allow the South to use the North’s infrastructure for a fee. Many scholars believe that revenue sharing negotiations are inevitable, as the separation between the oil resources and infrastructure “has created an environment of mutual dependence that will be the foundation of a new post-referendum oil deal” (United Press International 2011). However, as of March 2012, no oil deal yet exists.

Moreover, both Northern and Southern officials remain at an impasse regarding the proposed border between both countries. The most heavily contested region is Abyei, which sits in the middle of five Sudanese provinces: Southern Darfur, Kordofan, Unity, North Bahr al Ghazal, and Warap. Both governments believe Abyei is an integral part of their respective state’s identity. The North asserted a historical irredentist claim over the region, as the traditional border established by the British gave Abyei to the North (Johnson 2007, 1-9). Conversely, the South continues to argue that it has the strongest ethnic ties to the majority of people in Abyei (the Dinka Ngok), and thus should control the region. The competing irredentist claims have led both governments to increase forces in the region dramatically since March 2011, and violent clashes have occurred within the region (McDoom 2011). The Dinka Ngok and northern sympathizers (the Misseriya tribe) also disagree with their
respective government’s current handling of the situation, and leaders of both groups proclaimed that each faction would never make territorial concessions to the other, even if war resulted (Bol and Stein 2011). As of March 2012, negotiations regarding Abyei have continued to fail.

After completing my analysis on the five secession cases and detailing the potential factors of violence in Sudan and South Sudan, I can apply Mill’s Methods to test my hypothesis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor of Conflict</th>
<th>Namibia/South Africa</th>
<th>Macedonia/Yugoslavia</th>
<th>W. Sahara/Morocco</th>
<th>Ethiopia/Eritrea</th>
<th>India/Pakistan</th>
<th>Sudan/South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resource/Economic Dispute</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nearby Conflict with Implications for Either State</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced Population Transfers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irredentist Claim over Disputed Territory</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on my observations in the five secession case studies, I posit that post-secession violence between Sudan and South Sudan is more likely to occur because of each state’s irredentist claim over Abyei. The cases of Ethiopia/Eritrea, India/Pakistan, and Western Sahara/Morocco culminated in violence post-secession; the single common factor in each case was the presence of an irredentist claim over disputed territory. The two peaceful cases (Macedonia/Yugoslavia and Namibia/South Africa) did not have an irredentist dispute after secession. As a result, I accept my hypothesis that post-secession violence between the rump and seceded state is more likely to occur if one or both states assert an irredentist claim over disputed territory.

My final analysis for Sudan and South Sudan supports the theoretical approach to the nature of irredentas, as well. The indivisible nature of irredentist claims hinders the ability for the rump and seceded state to reach a compromise (Tir 2005, Fearon 1995). The current situation in Sudan and South Sudan highlights the zero-sum nature of many irredentas: each state claims Abyei and refuses to negotiate. The logic of selectorate theory also shows clearly as the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya leaders pressure their respective governments not to compromise or sacrifice the territorial integrity of their state, even if war results. Finally, I argue irredentas cause states to operate within the domain of losses, as an irredentist claim positions a state to defend territory it controls (or believes it should control) already (Levy 1997). In Sudan and South Sudan, each government assumes it controls Abyei and may resort to violence in
an effort to protect the territory the state “rightfully controls.” Therefore, the three facets of irredentist claims that threaten post-secession peace exist in the case of Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in the three violent secession cases I analyze.

Conclusion

Despite the vast political science literature that seeks to understand and predict violence between a rump and seceded state, little consensus exists amongst scholars regarding what factor(s), if any, possess a causal-relationship with conflict post-secession. South Sudan recently became the newest sovereign state following its secession from Sudan in July 2011; however, many in the international community debate whether or not both countries will engage in violence over significantly contested issues that currently taint the relationship between each state. Unfortunately, the lack of unanimity in the political science field makes anticipating or preempting violence between the rump and seceded state difficult. As a result, the comparative approach I take in this research addresses a notable gap in current secessionist literature.

Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of secession engenders significant questions and heated debates amid the international community and political scientists alike. After decades of research, scholars remain divided as to why some secessions end violently while others do not. Today, the future of South Sudan and Sudan remains unclear. After comparing five notable secession cases, I posit that the presence of an irredentist claim over disputed territory increases the likelihood of violence between the rump and seceded state. With greater understanding of secession politics, the international community may be able to address concerns before violence potentially flares between a rump and seceded state. In regards to South Sudan and Sudan, this proactive approach may stop massive conflict from reigniting between both states.

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Divide and Conquer: A Lesson in Navigating the Political Obstacles of Cost Control from the Massachusetts State Legislature

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Rising health care costs at the state and national level make it vital for national policymakers to pay attention to the Massachusetts experience with cost control. In the implementation of Massachusetts’ health care reform, the state’s health care providers pose the largest political obstacle in controlling costs. Reforming the payment system conflicts with the profit that providers make within the current fee-for-service system. I found that what at first glance looks like an impossible political obstacle of organized well-resourced interests against government reform is more complex. Through examining the political actors, health providers and mass media of Massachusetts, I found that an exploitable division exists among these powerful provider groups which may provide an opportunity to push payment reform through the state legislature. Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is modeled after the Massachusetts law, the lessons learned in the state law’s implementation are indispensable.

The Massachusetts’ health care reform law of 2006 served as a model for President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. Massachusetts’ efforts in cost control in the aftermath of reform will serve as a precedent for cost containment at the national level; the Massachusetts experience will provide an opportunity to learn about the obstacles and solutions to a politically difficult endeavor. In April of 2011 at a Health Care Reform Forum, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announced the following: “just as we have shown the Nation how to expand coverage to everyone […] Massachusetts can and will be the ones to crack the code on cost containment. It won’t be easy, but it will be done” (Patrick 2011).

The Federal deficit and rising cost of healthcare make it vital to anticipate and plan for the major barriers that may obstruct cost control in national health care reform. Over the last decade, national premium rates have increased 130 percent on average (Patrick 2011). In Massachusetts, health care represents nearly 40 percent of the state budget (Patrick 2011). Even in states where there has been no attempt at insurance coverage expansion costs have also substantially risen; for example, Mississippi has not expanded coverage and still has experienced premium increases of 114 percent (Patrick 2011). Escalating state health care costs inevitably squeeze education, transportation and other community resources. Rising health care costs at the state and national level make it vital for national policymakers to pay attention to the Massachusetts experi-
ence with cost control. In the implementation of Massachusetts’ health care reform, the state’s health care providers posed the largest political obstacle in controlling costs since these reforms conflicted with the profit that providers make within the current fee-for-service system. However, an exploitable division exists within this powerful group, which may provide an opportunity to push payment reform through the state legislature. Since the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is modeled after the Massachusetts law, the lessons learned in the state law’s implementation are indispensible.

First, I will explain the provisions of the Massachusetts healthcare reform law of 2006, the 2008 cost containment legislation and discuss what cost control recommendations and proposed legislation exist today. In addition, I will explain accountable care organizations and global payment systems, which are the foundation of the state’s proposed payment reforms. Second, I will discuss why providers are the most difficult obstacles in containing costs. Third, I will argue that there is a division within the provider group that payment reform advocates can exploit, to provide an opportunity for successful cost control. Finally, I will explore how Massachusetts provides insight about providers as political obstacles in national healthcare reform; and furthermore, show how Massachusetts policymakers’ successes and failures in exploiting the division among providers present invaluable lessons for the implementation of national health care reform law.

**Massachusetts Health Care Reform Plan: The Mandate, Connector and Care Program**

On April 12, 2006, the Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law was passed by the state legislature and signed into law by Governor Mitt Romney. By July 1, 2007, the law required all adults and all small business owners to either purchase health insurance or face financial penalties. The law also created the “Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector” to provide individuals and small businesses with private, affordable coverage (Patrick 2011). For residents who are unable to afford private insurance on the Connector and who are not eligible for the Massachusetts’ Medicaid program called MassHealth, the law also created The Commonwealth Care Insurance program, which provides subsidies to purchase private insurance on the Connector. The law expands Masshealth coverage and increases the Medicaid reimbursement rate to providers (Meyer and Pervez 2006). Essentially, the law’s goal is to insure all residents through the individual mandate, expanded Medicaid, State children’s Health Insurance Program eligibility, and premium subsidies (Grady 2006).

The 2006 law also phased out the Uncompensated Care Pool that reimbursed hospitals for uncompensated care. The Health Safety Net Fund replaced
the Pool and is run by a new division in the state’s Medicaid office (Meyer and Pervez 2006). The funds from the Uncompensated Care Pool will be shifted over time into The Commonwealth Care program fund to help pay subsidies for those ineligible for MassHealth and unable to afford Connector insurance (Meyer and Pervez 2006). The law established a new fee schedule to standardize the reimbursements providers receive (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2007). The logic behind phasing out the Uncompensated Care Pool is based on the expectation that within a few years after the law’s passage most residents would have insurance due to the mandate (Meyer and Pervez 2006).

The Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector was created for employers with 50 or fewer employees; and, for individuals who do not receive insurance subsidized by employers with more than 50 employees. It is an independent and public clearinghouse for purchasing insurance. It was created to make private health insurance plans more accessible and affordable for these groups (Grady 2006). The state already had regulations for insurance companies in place before the law was passed, by which the Connector must abide. However, along with meeting all the requirements expected of insurance companies in the state, the Connector can also contract with selected providers which allows for negotiation for lower payment rates, and can also help to guide individuals to seek quality providers (Grady 2006). The Connector Board was created to approve plans offered by Massachusetts’ health insurers. The plans that became available in the spring of 2007 include a variety of coverage options (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2007). The Connector Board also established and manages a premium payment collection system for the Connector plans (Grady 2006).

The Commonwealth Care Insurance program is central to carrying out the individual mandate. The program provides government-funded subsidies to low-income residents to assure everyone can afford health insurance. The plans offered by the program do not have deductibles and are offered by the managed care organizations that are involved with the Medicaid program (Grady 2006). There are different levels of subsidies according to income. For example, individuals with incomes less than 150 percent of the federal poverty level, or an individual with an income of less $15,315, are not required to pay any premiums.

MassHealth is the state’s public coverage program that is funded through Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program. The law expands eligibility for MassHealth by increasing children’s eligibility from 200 percent of the federal poverty line to 300 percent of the federal poverty line. This new percentage is roughly an average income of $60,000 per year for a family of four (Grady 2006). By 2007, MassHealth enrollment had already increased by
53,000 residents (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2007).

The goal of the Massachusetts health care reform was not only to significantly expand coverage but also to control costs. Considering the United States has the most expensive health care in the world, it is no surprise that national and state governments have continuously wrestled with the politics of cost control (Gawande 2009). The Nixon administration declared healthcare cost control as a crisis in 1969 and today in 2011, no Congress has implemented breakthrough methods to trump the difficult politics of cost control (Marmor, Oberlander and White 2009). Why are the politics of cost control so difficult? Costs of medical care translate to medical care industry income; inevitably, controlling costs is controlling the medical professionals’ income (Marmor, Oberlander and White 2009). Cost control thus creates a clash with stakeholders who have resources, political influence, and a strong incentive to maintain a profitable and inevitably expensive healthcare system (Marmor, Oberlander and White 2009).

The basic financing of Massachusetts’ healthcare law is based on redistribution of funds and new revenue (Chandler 2011). Medicaid payments previously paid to safety net providers and Uncompensated Care Pool funds are part of that redistribution. Governor Patrick is relying on new funding from employers and General Fund Revenues (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2007). The rise in the amount of insurance premiums paid, because of the individual mandate, will provide new funds. The fines paid by those who do not follow the individual mandate also contribute to new funds. If an employer with more than ten employees does not offer a group health insurance plan for which they pay part of the premium, then the employer must pay a “fair share employer contribution” of up to $295 per employee per year (Grady 2006).

Expectedly, the law’s modest financing plans did not adequately address growing health care costs. With the law in place Massachusetts succeeded in having the nation’s highest percentage of covered residents: 98% of people and 99.8% of children have health insurance in Massachusetts. However, this success was offset by rising health care costs weighing down the Massachusetts budget (Patrick 2011). Massachusetts government health care costs, made up of MassHealth, Connector subsidized programs and state government employee health insurance, currently take up about 40 percent of the state budget (Patrick 2011). In 2009, an analysis by the Commonwealth Fund, a non-profit healthcare foundation, revealed that Massachusetts had the nation’s highest premium rates (Lazar 2009). A 2010 state report found that per capita health spending in Massachusetts’ was 15 percent above the national average (Goodnough and Sack 2011). As a result, the Massachusetts state legislature spent the next half-decade engulfed in the politics of cost control and continues the
struggle today.

Coverage Success and Cost Control Failure: A Call for Payment Reform

Since inception, the Massachusetts healthcare reform law has increasingly taken steps to limit the market leverage of medical industry professionals. After expanding coverage, the state embarked on payment reform with voluntary formations of accountable care organizations. Then as the market failed to naturally control costs, the government has incrementally put price setting and private sector regulations on the table. The incremental process is a careful attempt to dismantle the fee-for-service system that is the root problem that drives healthcare costs up. The hesitancy to strip power from stakeholders all at once is detected in how the Attorney General unyieldingly contends that the developments in payment reform are not government price settings but rather a “competitive market-based approach balanced with limited government intervention” (Gillick 2011).

In recognition of Massachusetts rising healthcare costs, Governor Deval Patrick stated, “We have an expensive system that doesn’t provide the best care for patients, and that has to change,” he urged now that universal coverage has been a success, “something must be done about costs” (Kowalczyk 2011b). In 2008, legislation passed to control health care costs in Massachusetts marked the start of what is often referred to as “Round 2” of the Massachusetts health reform law (Long 2010). The beginning of this cost control phase in 2008 created the Committee on the Status of Payment Reform Legislation within the Health Care Quality and Cost Council to recommend and outline a strategy for health care payment reform legislation (Shortell 2011). The Secretary of the Executive Office of the Massachusetts Health and Human Services Department, JudyAnn Bigby, sits on the Committee on the Status of Payment reform. This committee is also composed of eight other council members of different backgrounds such as a state auditor, a representative from Massachusetts Medicaid Policy Institute, an Attorney General designee, the inspector general and a representative from the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission. The Committee on the Status of Payment Reform also has advisory committee members; some interests represented within the advisory board include the Massachusetts Medical Society, AARP Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Hospital Association (Shortell 2011). The Committee was responsible for recommending a way to contain health care costs and explore difficult questions such as how much power state regulators should have over prices setting and how much leverage providers should have on the Committee (Kowalczyk 2010).

In 2009, the Committee recommended that, over the next five years, the
state should shift from a fee-for-service payment system to a global payment system. In addition, the committee also recommended establishing Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) (Steinbrook 2009). However, at this time, these recommendations were not enforceable and the board had no payment setting authority—rather, it appeared that the “market” would control prices (Steinbrook 2009).

The New Model: Global Payment Systems and Accountable Care Organizations

Global payment systems provide doctors and hospitals with a budget to treat their patients. Since they already have the funds, the idea is that the system gives providers incentive to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital (Bebinger 2011). ACOs under a global payment system are fundamentally different from the most common U.S. fee-for-service payment system where individual providers are paid for each service they give a patient. Fee-for-service is often critiqued for giving medical professionals an incentive to over-treat patients, and for failing to coordinate among the many different providers seeing the same patient, causing duplicated or conflicting services (Merlis 2010). ACOs work as an upside down business model; instead of increasing revenue by increasing services, providers have the incentive to work together to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital (Terry 2011). Such networks are integrated care systems in which primary care physicians, specialists and hospitals work together to manage the care of their patients (Merlis 2010). The concept of ACOs reflect and formalize that fact that doctors were already unofficially tied to a specific hospital and operated as an informal network. Their patients remained within that informal network for most of their health care, which increased coordination (Merlis 2010). Another fundamental idea of ACOs is that they allow providers to collaborate through a centralized organization to improve quality and efficiency. Kaiser Permanente health plans and Mayo Clinic are prime examples of such integrated networks; these systems own their hospitals and have physicians paid by salary. Concrete ways in which this networking can bring down costs are through established practice, guidelines or sharing patient information. The structures of ACOs can vary greatly; the Massachusetts legislature is currently working out guidelines for the state’s ACOs (Merlis 2010).

Similar to a capitation model in Health Management Organizations (HMOs), ACOs under a global payment system are paid a set sum as a network to care for a patient (The Washington Post Staff 2010). Critics of ACOs emphasize how they bring back the problems of HMOs of the 1980’s and 1990s—specifically the limits on people’s access to and choice of health care.
While HMOs and ACOs are similar in the way that they manage risk and build physician networks, supporters argue that the new system does not limit choice of doctors because an ACO patient does not have to stay in the network (Edmondson 2011). HMOs, on the other hand are accused of cutting costs by letting bureaucrats decide what health care is covered. This often pits doctors against the insurance companies (Meisel and Pines 2011). ACOs change the relationship between the insurer and provider; instead of the providers pushing for high reimbursement rates and the insurer pushing back, they work closely together. The idea in an ACO is that doctors work closely with patients and together decide the treatments that are necessary, creating an incentive for doctors to both improve the quality and reduce the costs (Meisel and Pines 2011). In ACOs, providers are in charge; medical services are determined by the provider as opposed to HMOs where standards are set by insurance companies. In an ACO, the insurance company works with the provider to decide the budget per patient and then allocates the payments that are controlled by the physician. ACOs can offer a range of payment models. A blend of fee for service and shared savings are possible in ACOs although the type that Governor Deval Patrick has proposed involves a global payment system—essentially a capitation model (Edmondson 2011). ACOs are local which also differs from the large HMO bureaucracies, with the intent that ACOs remain local and simple-able to directly manage care in small settings (Edmondson 2011).

Deputy Director for Policy and Analysis at the National Governors Association, Steve Lieberman, asserts that ACOs aim to keep health care costs down like HMOs, while at the same time avoiding “the structural features that give the HMO control over [patient] referral patterns,” which created the 1990s consumer backlash (Gold 2011).

Massachusetts’ Blue Cross Blue Shield began paying participating provider groups under an ACO model—their Alternative Quality Contract is a payment system in which providers receive fixed payments for patient care and rewards according to savings achieved and quality of care targets reached (Chernew et al. 2011). The future of ACOs in Massachusetts will look to Blue Cross for implementation logistics. In their system, a medical group agrees to a global budget for health care services they provide to the insurance company’s patients. The patient chooses their primary care physician who is then accountable for clinical and economic outcomes of the patient. Medical groups are evaluated based on their patients’ health outcomes; and, they receive bonuses based on the low level of utilization of emergency rooms, the control of chronic disease, screenings and patient satisfaction (Chernew et al. 2011). Supporters of ACOs cite the incentive providers have to keep patients satisfied as a major difference from HMOs.

The degree of distinction between ACOs and HMOs is significant. Those
who support ACOs think that the two systems differ greatly; on the other hand, those opposed to ACOs see no significant difference with HMOs. The lack of definitive guidelines for ACOs make it difficult to conclusively compare the system to HMOs. Since final guidelines have yet to be written, there is no comprehensive set of provisions that make or break an ACO at this point. A recent *Boston Globe* reported that the “politically powerful hospitals clearly hope to persuade lawmakers that price controls are not needed.” Even though Governor Patrick supported the Blue Cross’ experiment he stated that, “we still need a bill [to control costs] because we’ve got to have scale” (Goodnough and Sack 2011).

**From Recommendations to Legislation: Getting Serious about Cost Control**

The original recommendations did not establish government restraints on the budgets within which ACOs would operate; rather, the plan sought to control costs through global payments and ACOs, by making the cost and quality of healthcare public data and letting the market do its work (Gillick 2011). This method was based on the idea that transparency would allow hospitals, physicians and insurance companies to negotiate more effectively to bring down costs or in other words, improve market efficiency. Consumers could then truly make value-based purchasing decisions. However, the transparency approach did not make a substantial difference in cost because operating within a fixed budget without legitimate budgetary pressures left no incentive for behaviors to change (Gillick 2011). This conclusion was revealed in a report released by Massachusetts Attorney General, Martha Coakley who recently stated “market power […] was the driving force behind current health care costs” (DeLucas 2011).

The report found that there was wide variance in the way in which insurers made payments to providers. The state’s six major insurers negotiated substantially different reimbursement rates with their contracted providers. For example, the highest paid physician group received between 1.5 and 2.3 times the amount that the lowest paid physician group received from insurers (Gillick 2011). Similarly, the highest-priced hospitals received payments between 1.7 and 3 times the amount of the lowest-cost hospitals (Gillick 2011). The report notes that the variations did not reflect the “complexity or quality of care or even the severity of illness” but “the market clout of certain providers” (DeLucas 2011).

On February 17, 2011, three months after his reelection, Governor Patrick announced a payment reform legislation entitled, “An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Controlling Costs by Reforming Health Systems
Patrick’s proposed legislation would require that, by June 2015, all health care providers—doctors, hospitals and specialists—align themselves into ACOs operating under a global payment system in which the organizations will be paid a fixed amount per year for a patient’s care (a capitation payment). These requirements aim to lower costs, improve efficiency, effectiveness and quality of healthcare. The global payment systems that Patrick’s bill proposes seek to ease public fear that providers would have an incentive to withhold care from a patient in order to pocket unused funds at the end of the year by restricting providers from simply keeping leftover revenue (Ropes & Gray Attorney Advertising 2011). If leftover funds exist, providers would have to prove the patient got the care they required (Bebinger 2011). The bill also proposes to establish an independent board to oversee the transition to global payments as well as set the rules for the system. In addition, the board would also be responsible for creating guidelines for the ACOs (Bebinger 2011). The bill follows the 2009 recommendations except that it requires the change in the healthcare payment and delivery system, grants authority to the insurance commissioner to regulate accountable care organizations, and gives the attorney general power to review consolidation among providers (Kowalczyk 2011b).

In an address to the Massachusetts Association of Health Plans in November 2011, Attorney General Coakley discussed the problem of dysfunctional market power in the health industry, and outlined steps the government could take to make the accountable care organizations and global payment systems function more cost effectively (DeLucas 2011). First, she recommended that the government have the power to reject healthcare contracts that the state finds “excessive” (DeLucas 2011). Second, she recommended that if by 2015 the market does not fix unwarranted price variation, the legislature should reject health plan contracts with such variation. Lastly, she recommends that hospitals disclose prices of procedures and those hospitals with expensive costs undergo a “market impact review” (DeLucas 2011). Coakley’s speech came after The Payment Reform Commission’s new recommendations of price controls on medical providers. The recommendation passed the Commission 9-1 with only the president of the Massachusetts Hospital Association dissenting (Pecquet 2011).

As health costs continue to increase, the issue of payment reform tops the state legislature’s agenda. In late November of 2011, House Speaker Robert DeLeo stated that Massachusetts lawmakers’ main legislative focus must be health care payment reform (Quinn 2011). Speaker DeLeo plans to start a series of meetings with Health Care Financing Committee Chair Rep. Steven Walsh, D-Lynn. DeLeo urged that for the Massachusetts state legislature, health care payment reform will be “the most difficult, complex issue […].”
Plans & Providers: Who Cares the Most about Payment Reform and Why?

Through the mandate, Connector, Commonwealth Care Program and payment reform, Massachusetts’ new healthcare law affects different interests and creates distinct concerns for stakeholders in the state. In an analysis of Massachusetts health reform, senior fellow at the Urban Institute Sharon Long states that such a shift in systems will involve “hard choices, as cost containment, by necessity, must translate into less income for some providers and plans […]” (Long 2010). In the case of Massachusetts’ reform, the government’s goals are geared toward lessening the financial burden on state residents and employers, which inevitably means that alterations must occur on behalf of the doctors, hospitals, and insurance companies. The savings achieved in the processes of cost containment will represent some stakeholders’ lost profit. Representative Walsh, Chair of the Joint Committee on Healthcare Financing, explains how the state legislature is aware of and must work with the main stakeholders—doctors, hospitals and insurance companies—in the wake of Massachusetts health care reform (Walsh 2011).

Insurance companies will undoubtedly be affected by payment reform because they need to adjust their reimbursement methods and will be partnering closely with the new ACOs. However, it is crucial to make the distinction between the effects payment reform will have on insurance companies and those they will have on doctors and hospitals. Payment reform plans focus on altering the way in which doctors and hospitals are paid, recognizing that past attempts at insurance company based reforms did not make a significant difference. The Massachusetts state government has some of the strongest insurance premium rate review powers in the nation. In 2010, Governor Patrick’s administration denied almost nine out of ten premium rate increases (Pecquet 2011). Therefore, when the Patrick administration released payment reform focused on alterations to providers, insurance companies considered that this was the government’s acknowledgment that caps on insurance rates were not the answer to lowering healthcare costs (Pecquet 2011).

In addition, the aforementioned price variation study released by the Attorney General draws attention to the way in which providers set prices in Massachusetts, thus allowing insurance companies to divert government regulation onto doctors and hospitals. The blame for increased insurance premiums can be pinned on the varying prices set by doctors and hospitals. ACOs operating under global payment systems require providers to carefully manage the way in which their yearly budget per patient is used: this system ultimately shifts the burden of risk management from the insurance company to the providers. So what is the role of the insurance companies in an ACO dominated
health care system?

In exploring the stakeholders’ role in California ACOs, *Kaiser Health News* states that, “Insurers say they are essential to the success of an ACO because they track and collect the data on patients that allow systems to track patient care and report on the results” (Gold 2011). This statement suggests that insurance companies, while definitely a stakeholder in the new system, do not face the same magnitude of change or responsibility that providers face. This round of government healthcare reform in Massachusetts is an attempt to control costs through a different avenue than the state’s familiar strict insurance company regulations.

One of the main objectives of payment reform or “round two” of the Massachusetts health reform law is a shift away from the fee-for-service system toward a system based on incentives for efficient, high-quality care (Long2010). In a fee-for-service payment system, doctors are rewarded for the quantity of care rather than the quality of care (The Washington Post Staff 2011). When doctors are paid for each test or procedure there is less of an incentive to assure the patient’s condition is effectively and efficiently addressed.: they have no incentive to give a patient quality, cost-effective treatment. In describing the traditional payment system, Secretary of MA Health and Human Services JudyAnn Bigby states, “Fee for service is about how much revenue you can get for doing a certain thing or a certain number of things […]” (Kowlczyk 2010). A randomized controlled trial published in the journal, *Pediatrics*, unequivocally shows that physicians paid by the fee-for-service system will deliver more than the “right amount of care” (Phelps 1997, 254). This study suggests that the payment system affects the way in which patients are treated; and that, under “fee for service,” doctors are more likely to practice their profession in a way that creates more revenue.

Physicians are economic agents with “price setting power”(Phelps 1997, 254). The fee-for-service system not only gives incentive to over treat but also encourages higher costs of care. Insurance companies and government insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid pay doctors according to “customary” fees, which gauge the typical fee range in the area (Starr 1982). In the 1970s, the use of customary fees grew as a way for third parties to assess appropriateness of doctors’ charges. Doctors with no history of charges began raising their fees, as did the doctors in their surrounding area. This ultimately led to soaring medical prices and unprecedented inflation of medical fees (Star 1982). Massachusetts’s doctors in a fee-for-service system financially suffer from Massachusetts’ proposed payment reform. Patrick’s proposed legislation requiring ACOs and global payment systems strips physicians of their power to set prices based on customary fees. In addition, because doctors can no longer profit from giving more care, the incentives of the system change
radically. Since they gain no extra revenue from extra procedures, physicians have an incentive to increase quantity of tests and procedures. These changes directly challenge the current practice of medicine and the payment system.

Hospitals have similarly benefited in a fee-for-service payment system. The Massachusetts Hospital Association (MHA) responded to Attorney General Martha Coakley’s aforementioned health care cost report, reflecting the state governments recommendations for payment reform by stating that they “strongly disagree with the AG’s recommendation that government temporarily regulate prices for services” and that the private efforts underway to improve cost control by the hospitals should not be “stifled by prescribing government-controlled price regulation” (Massachusetts Hospital Association 2011). The MHA also stated that they are trying to improve efficiency and have improved—citing the association’s $3.1 billion reduction in costs in 2009 and 2010. However, it emphasizes that hospitals represent only 35% of the healthcare costs and they cannot be burdened with more cost control measures (Massachusetts Hospital Association 2011). Hospital costs, like the rising prices of doctors’ fees, have steadily increased in the past century (Blendon and Hyams 1992). In addition, the government faces a similar challenge with hospitals as that of physicians: once a financial precedent of financing is set, it is increasingly difficult to reverse or challenge. Between 1968 and 1981, annual hospital construction costs rose 203 percent partly reflecting the increased number of Americans insured under Medicaid and Medicare, which increased the need for hospital capacity. In addition, with the rise of medical technology, philanthropic and community financing could no longer fully pay for the new expensive equipment. This meant that financing had to be shifted over to internal reserves and external debt mostly from Wall Street; such a shift resulted in the institutional profit-making culture that exists in hospitals today as a way to assure future borrowing ability (Blendon and Hyams 1992). The incentives that came with these changes shape the behavior of hospital systems as a profit-driven institution competing in the market for patients and physicians by increasing capital expenditures (Blendon and Hyams 1992).

A Closer Look at Doctors’ and Hospitals’ Interests: A Division among Providers

Doctors and hospitals both express fear of major losses in the implementation of Massachusetts payment reform since it dismantles the fee-for-service system. However, there is a divide within the doctor and hospital stakeholder groups. Representative Walsh explains that for doctors, there are two groups: specialists and primary care doctors. In terms of earnings they are the “haves and have-nots” (Walsh 2011). Representative Walsh referred to a recent Mas-
sachusetts Medical Society Physician Workforce Study that analyzed physician’s opinions on healthcare reform and payment reform, specifically with global payment initiatives and accountable care organizations. The study found that 61.4 percent of primary care doctors said they were likely to participate in a global payment system while only 32.2 percent of specialists said they would participate in a global payment system (Massachusetts Medical Society 2011). In addition, the study also found that 71.9 percent of primary care physicians were likely to participate in voluntary accountable care organization compared to 50.2 percent of specialists. The study also reported that 80 percent of community health workers said they would participate in an accountable care organization (Massachusetts Medical Society 2011).

The breakdown of physician support for payment system reform makes sense considering that specialists, with mostly privately insured patients, benefit from the fee-for-service payment system while primary care doctors and community health workers have high rates of patients on Medicare and Medicaid. If a physician’s patients are mostly those able to afford private insurance or out of pocket specialist treatment then the profession is highly profitable. Medicare and other government-funded entities are having increasing difficulty affording reimbursements to providers. Providers with many patients insured by a government entity ultimately make less when reimbursements are cut or not paid. For these providers, fee-for-service is not beneficial and arguably unsustainable. This group of providers is in favor of payment reform to avoid entrapment in such reimbursement cycles that leave them struggling to financially survive.

An example of this stakeholder divide among physicians can be seen with the expressed opinions of Massachusetts physicians. As Representative Walsh points out, the opinions of specialists who have a great incentive to remain working in a fee-for-service payment system are often most prominently. The Boston Globe reported on the healthcare and payment reform concerns of Dr. Lynda Young, president of the Massachusetts Medical Society and a former specialist in pediatrics. She stated that, “a one-size payment model does not fit all physician practices” (Kowalczyk 2011e).

A similar divide exists in hospitals. Representative Walsh stated that the Boston teaching hospitals can demand higher rates within the fee-for-service system; therefore, they do not want payment reform. Walsh stated that the Boston teaching schools differ greatly on payment reform opinion from the “Holyokes”, referring to Holyoke Medical Center in Holyoke, Massachusetts. Walsh highlights the latter as having 77 percent of payments made by the government and therefore “cannot operate under the current system” (Walsh 2011). Hospitals with mostly privately insured patients and few charity patients can easily make up for lower government reimbursements whereas those hospitals
with more or many non-privately insured patients face financial trouble (Starr 1982). This reflects the effect of cost-based reimbursements on a hospital’s ability to meet expenses. Similar to physicians’ situation, a hospital’s financial stability depends on the ratio of charity patients to privately insured patients (Starr 1982). Walsh explained that despite the payment reform disagreement among hospitals in Massachusetts, the loudest voices are “the Partners of the world”, referring to Partners HealthCare, the largest provider in Massachusetts with many of its hospitals serving as teaching partners with Harvard Medical School (Walsh 2011).

The small non-“Partners” of Massachusetts want payment reform because ACOs and global payment systems provide a chance for these smaller hospitals to gain more business. ACOs under a budgeted system need to seek ways to provide quality care in a less expensive way. This aim can be achieved by primary care physicians referring patients to these less expensive, smaller hospitals. This practice is great for small hospitals and not so great for the larger institutions, which doctors may avoid to keep costs down. Therefore, there is a divide in hospitals’ support for payment reform. The dominant hospital voices with the most resources express a fear of losing patients. Dr. Mitchell Selinger, senior medical director for managed care operating under Blue Cross’ new system stated that his group is referring fewer patients to expensive Boston teaching hospitals (Kowalczyk 2011a). Blue Cross’s experiment with ACOs and a global payment system have shown that doctors operating within a budgeted fee have incentive to refer patients to less expensive hospitals. This action decreases the gap between the smallest and largest hospitals in the state: a trend from which the smaller hospitals largely benefit (Kowalczyk 2011a).

Ellen Zane, former Network President for Partners Community Healthcare Inc. and Chair of the Massachusetts Hospital Association, has been featured in The Boston Globe as the voice for hospitals in the midst of Massachusetts healthcare reform. The article titled “Hospitals Attack State Pay Proposal” in The Boston Globe is exemplifies how the interests of all hospitals become reduced to one dominant voice (Kowalczyk 2009). Describing stakeholders’ reaction to payment reform, the article states, “many hospital executives and doctors call it unrealistic, and say it could bankrupt some providers and compromise patient care if implemented too quickly and without major changes” (Kowalczyk 2009). The question here is who the “many hospital executives and doctors” are? The focus on figures such as Ellen Zane suggest the voice is predominantly that of, as Representative Walsh names them, “the Partners” out there. Despite the dominant voice of the well resources anti-payment reform providers, the division may provide an opportunity for payment reform to avoid total defeat.

The conflicting perceptions of payment reform as either a burden or a
benefit to different providers is illustrated in several media sources reporting on the legislation. While some local Massachusetts news sources, such as the Newburyport News, complain that, “there’s the frustrating tendency by lawmakers […] to pass legislation that increases the burden on providers”, others understand payment reform as beneficial to their local providers (Editorial 2012). The Washington Post notes Boston providers’ positive response to Massachusetts payment reform in stating that, “Massachusetts businesses have proved amenable to such payment changes —in many ways, they’re already moving in that direction without any direction from the government” (Kliff 2012). Both physicians and hospitals across the state vary in how they perceive the effects of payment reform.

Exploiting a Split Opposition: an Opportunity to Push Policy

Walsh’s explanation of the “have and have not” divisions within doctors and hospitals provokes an interesting question of representation within these divided groups that policymakers struggle with. The dominant voices that are heard on behalf of doctors and hospitals will inevitably be the “haves” with more power and resources. a. The hospitals that want payment reform have less money and therefore are less able to mobilize, vocalize and build lobby power. However, the fact that there is a divide in providers’ opinions of payment reform suggest room for Patrick’s global payment and ACO legislation to pass. What at first glance looks like an impossible political obstacle of organized, well-resourced interests against reform is actually more complex. The Massachusetts health care reform process was careful and incremental, starting with coverage expansion in 2006, to payment reform legislation in 2008 and finally to Patrick’s ACO and global payment system proposal in 2011. The phased-in process of controlling health care costs in Massachusetts reflects the opposing interest groups’ power in blocking policy. Representative Steven Walsh, speaking on behalf of the Joint Committee on Health Care Financing, said that moving slowly was absolutely crucial “to squeeze all the inequities out of the system.” He added that payment reform may even take 15 years (Goodnough and Sack 2011). Squeezing inequities out of a system inevitably requires taking something away from the “haves” and giving something to the “have nots” and Walsh recognizes how difficult taking away something from the well resources will be. Even though the slow, phased-in process of Massachusetts payment reform shows the legislature’s awareness of the difficult terrain ahead; while, the attempts to push payment reform at all show its awareness of a split opinion within the strong provider interest group and consequently a sensed opportunity to push policy. A divided opposition may provide an opportunity for the Massachusetts state legislature to successfully
implement payment reform.

*Cohesion as a Political Resource*

Large hospitals and doctors have different types of resources that are important for political influence; size, status and wealth all contribute to a group’s ability to mobilize a lobby or group interests (Kingdon 1995). Organized forces with such resources have substantial ability to impede proposed legislation. Cohesion is another resource aside from wealth, size and status that gives an organized group power to block or affect policy success. As Jon Kingdon describes it, “part of a group’s stock in trade in affecting all phases of policy making [...] is its ability to convince government officials that it speaks with one voice and truly represents the preferences of its members” (1995, 51). He goes on to argue that if a group experiences internal dissension, the effectiveness and power of that group is substantially diminished. The fact that the Massachusetts government cannot explicitly and truly define a comprehensive “hospital position” or “physician position” creates an important opportunity for payment reform to overcome interest group blocking attempts. When an interest appears able, through its resources and cohesion, to block a proposal, advocates of the proposal may simply give up in order to avoid total defeat and loss of future opportunities. However, the lack of interest group cohesion can affect the group’s political leverage and make the terrain seem easier to navigate for a policymaker (Kingdon 1995).

*Providers with the Highest Profit Assume the “Bad Guy” Role*

A cost containment proposal that targets providers is especially difficult because doctors and hospitals are difficult to portray as the “bad guys.” Providers are a piece of the community that contribute a good that can carry personal attachments and there is appreciative sentiment towards providers. Providers can also can play on public fear and argue that cuts or limits to physicians and hospitals will ultimately harm patients because people will have to be turned away. Politically, no one wants to be seen as hurting healthcare providers because it indirectly is hurting the patient. This reaction differs greatly from that to another health industry profession: insurance companies, which everyone loves to hate. Therefore, in the absence of insurance companies to pin blame on, the doctors and hospitals that the public associates most with a profit driven agenda will become the new “bad guys” (The Washington Post Staff 2010). The doctors and hospitals who want payment reform, the smaller and less resourced groups, are at an advantage in this respect because these “have nots” gain sympathy and are more likely to capture the national mood
than large, well resourced entities. The providers who oppose payment reform do so because they will lose profit whereas the supporters are on board with payment reform because they are struggling to financially stay alive.

The national mood has been shaped by increasing awareness of income gaps and is thus more likely to criticize fee-for-service for leaving small providers left to suffer. Indicators of such a mood in Massachusetts include the Occupy Wall Street movement’s strong presence in Boston which challenges market-based approaches and profit driven institutions. In addition, the widespread awareness of rising healthcare costs as a definite problem at the national and state level feeds into the state and national mood that is sympathetic to the “have nots”. Finally, perhaps the main reason the state’s mood could give leverage to payment reform support is the recession and its effects on the generation newly entering the workforce. Job loss and unemployment tilt the scale in favor of helping financially struggling providers rather than those worried about losing the profitable fee-for-service system.

Some Support is Greater than no Support

Conflict among interest groups causes political leaders to perceive their environment as a balance between those for and against a policy even if one side is substantially more powerful (Kingdon 1995). This political phenomenon was clearly seen at the height of global warming debates. Those opposing climate change’s existence were miniscule in number; however, the meager existence of support for that argument allowed a false portrayal of the debate as even. Even if policymakers perceive the opposition side of the division as stronger, it does not mean the proposal will not be sincerely considered. On the other hand, it does reveal the obstacles and potential price policymakers may face if they do push such a proposal, which is why Governor Patrick approached payment reform so incrementally. Since provider support for payment reform does exist, the proposal has potential to be enacted (Kingdon 1995).

People in and around government calculate where support and opposition lie by communication in the community. It is often assumed that if one side is louder the balance tilts to that side. However, there is a caveat: calculating this balance also takes into account which side has superior political resources to communicate its interests. By recognizing that the supporters of payment reform have less size and wealth, their stance may be magnified or inflated to make up for the known lack of resources. Even if it is less vocalized, the fact that there is support for payment reform among providers is enough to avoid immediate payment reform blockage.

Former President Carter’s cost containment policy is often cited as legislation with no constituency or a cause with no supporters. His failure to com-
municate who actually benefited from the proposal led to the plan’s demise. This is not true in Governor Patrick’s current attempts: he cites his supporting constituency in the media and works to make the existing support recognized. In a *Boston Globe* report this year, Patrick explained that “the state needed to help struggling hospitals” (Goodnough and Sack 2011). The ability to concretely refer to an organized support group is crucial even if that group is less resourced. Having resources does not always guarantee an interest group’s success in setting agendas or blocking agendas and similarly, not having resources does not mean the interest group is automatically powerless (Kingdon 1995). The mere ability of the administration to call out an organized constituency that benefits from the legislation helps to level the playing field for the provider’s “haves” and “have nots”.

**Conclusion: Applying Massachusetts Health Care Reform Lessons to the National Level**

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, President Obama’s 2010 national health care reform legislation, is modeled after the Massachusetts’ health care reform legislation of 2006. The laws’ parallels include the individual mandate, expansion of public programs, creation of health insurance exchanges and subsidies for moderate to lower income residents (Long 2010). The similarities of the laws create an opportunity for the national health care reform efforts to learn from the Massachusetts experience. As indicated previously, the politics of cost control in health reform are a historical and prevailing challenge in the nation’s political arena. The most valuable lesson the national level can take from Massachusetts is in cost control and payment reform efforts. Whether Massachusetts succeeds or fails in cost control will shape the politics at the national level, both the opponents and advocates will rely on the Bay State’s outcome to argue for or against efforts to control costs in the aftermath of the ACA.

Even though Patrick’s administration has not fully implemented payment reform, the efforts since the passage of health care reform already provide important lessons for the national level. The first lesson has actually already been learned and implemented by supporters at the national level: the lesson of coverage first, cost control later. Expanded health care coverage is politically easier to push than payment system reform and if coverage is successfully expanded, the next inevitable step is figuring out a way to afford it.

Once coverage is expanded, taking that coverage away is difficult which almost automatically creates the next piece of payment reform legislation. Patrick’s 2006 legislation included limited financing provisions and purposefully avoided heavy cost control language: universal coverage and radically
reforming the payment system is too politically difficult to pass in one bill. It is evident that Patrick’s incremental approach worked --payment reform has not been shut out of the Massachusetts political conversation yet. In fact, it is at the top of the agenda and carries a sense of urgency. President Obama’s legislation does contain language about ACO formation; however, there is an absence of in-depth provisions. About one year after the ACA passed, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services revealed a 429-page plan that proposes more specific structure and functioning of ACOs following healthcare reform (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2011). Payment reform legislation and cost control is so politically difficult because the strong organized groups of providers who benefit from the fee-for-service payment system have an incentive to block payment reform legislation. The national effort has already learned from the Massachusetts example that incremental payment reform will help overcome this obstacle.

Recognition of how politically difficult interest group opposition makes payment reform led the national cost control efforts to be incremental and cautious so far. With such awareness of the political obstacle of powerful providers, the next step is then what to do about that opposition. This is where the divisions in providers can be exploited. As Massachusetts incrementally goes about payment reform, the divisions within powerful interest groups may further surface providing an opportunity for payment reform legislation to be successfully implemented. The national efforts must learn to exploit this division.

The reasons the division in provider stances can be exploited mirror those seen in Massachusetts. At the national level, cohesion of an interest group is still a political resource and the absence of cohesion impedes the group’s ability to mobilize. Lack of cohesion among providers may be greater than at the state level since there is a larger group that must coordinate to become cohesive. This disunity provides an opportunity for national payment reform to advance if policymakers recognize and take advantage of the division. The national mood, like that of Massachusetts, is critical of profit driven agendas. This criticism is reflected in nationwide occupy movements, national recognition of rising healthcare costs as a problem and the impact of the recession across states. Lastly, any support for health care reform by providers is a political tool that can be pinned against the opposition. Politics and media will cite the “have nots” providers as the groups that needs help and wants payment reform which creates a direct challenge against those in opposition.

Policy makers are keeping a close eye on Massachusetts to collect evidence to either advance or crush payment reform. If Massachusetts does pass and implement ACOs under a global payment system the nation will be intensely studying the aftermath. One misstep and the Massachusetts payment reform model could be lost to health care history books forever as another
failed attempt at controlling American healthcare costs. If the Massachusetts model is crushed by the politics of cost control then the model will be too risky for national politics to take on; therefore, national policymakers must learn from all of the obstacles Massachusetts encounters and the ways to navigate those obstacles. The obstacle of providers with incentives to oppose payment reform in Massachusetts presents a unique chance for the national level to assess how policymakers pushing payment reform legislation handle that obstacle. Exploitation of interest group divisions in light of payment reform is an invaluable part of the political strategy national policymakers cannot ignore whether Massachusetts fails or succeeds in its current health policy endeavors.

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**Colophon**

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Benjamin Bauer & Whitney Ogás  
Fall 2007-Spring 2008

John Nobrega & Kevin Rautenstrauch  
Fall 2008-Spring 2009

Katrina Neiley & Nicole Litvack  
Fall 2009-Spring 2010

Aaron Branch, Justin Benedictis-Kessner, Jessica Gallinaro & Emily Gottschalk-Marconi  
Fall 2010 - Spring 2011