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Editor’s Preface to the Fall 2012 Edition

The *Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics’* Fall 2012 semester at the College of William and Mary was characterized by increasing diversity, quality, and quantity of submissions from across the United States. The *Journal* continues to reach out to new universities for submissions with each issue, making the process more and more competitive each semester. It has been a privilege to read and analyze undergraduate research from all over the country this semester.

As always, there are many people we wish to recognize. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee for their endless support and tireless dedication.

Additionally, we would like to recognize all of the student Editorial Board members—our peers who joined us every week with insight and enthusiasm. Likewise, we would like to acknowledge our faculty Advisory Board members, whose expertise and assistance ensure the *Journal*’s quality and prevalence in the world of political science publications.

We would also like to extend our appreciation to members of the faculty of the Government Department and staff of Information Technology at the College of William and Mary.

Finally, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to our two Faculty Advisors, Dr. Ron Rapoport and Dr. Christine Nemacheck, who have enabled us to produce a publication we are all proud to be apart of. Without their unyielding support, the Journal would not be where it is today.

The experience of hosting the *Journal* has proved invaluable to the College of William and Mary and the Eta Rho Chapter of PSA in particular.

We hope you enjoy and share the Fall 2012 edition of the *Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics*.

Best,

The Editors
Submission of Manuscripts

The Journal welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. We strive to publish manuscripts of the highest quality in all areas of political science. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. Authors may be asked to revise their manuscripts before they are accepted for publication.

Submissions deadlines are October 31 for the Fall issue and March 31 for the Spring issue. Manuscripts are accepted on a rolling basis, so earlier submission is encouraged.

To submit your work, please email it (as a Word document) to psajournal@wm.edu. Please include your name, university, and contact details (mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number). If possible, please also include a short comment about how you heard about the Journal.

Submitted manuscripts must include a short abstract (roughly 150 words), and citations and references should follow the APSA Style Manual for Political Science. The maximum page length for submitted manuscripts is 35 double-spaced pages.

The Journal is a student-run enterprise with editors and an Editorial Board who are undergraduate Pi Sigma Alpha members at The College of William and Mary. There is also an Advisory Board consisting of political science faculty from across the nation, including members of the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council.

If you have any questions, please email the Journal’s editors at psajournal@wm.edu or Dr. Christine Nemacheck at clnema@wm.edu.
The Anxiety of Reproduction in Classical Greek Political Theory

Nick Allred, Swarthmore College

Texts from Classical Greece established and continue to shape the discipline of political theory and our understanding of the contours and ends of political life. This paper argues that those texts set out to police and legitimate social reproduction: the reproduction of human life (procreation), of money ("antediluvian forms" of capital), and of reality (the aesthetic). These three realms of reproduction were linked in the Greek imaginary, with similar tropes (Foucault’s "plethora" and "artifice") and similar containment strategies (the household and the state). The realm of the political is shaped by these productive forces brought to bear by love, labor, and language: forces that both sustain and threaten social organization. The mere observation of their political ambivalence is not enough; we must pay careful attention to the tactics by which they have been and remain managed by texts and states, beginning at the birth of political theory as a discipline.

The works of Plato and Aristotle are not just the first items in a series, but texts that founded a field of inquiry. In them we can see the disciplines of philosophy, political science, and political theory taking shape as such, and trace the extent to which the three remained bound up with one another and with related, also-nascent concepts like sexuality, commerce, and aesthetics. Classical Greek thought, from Sophocles’ Oedipus cycle through Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, was formed out of anxieties related to reproduction: the reproduction of people through sexual intercourse, the reproduction of money through capital, and the reproduction of reality through representation. These three reproductions are the keys to the survival of the social body, and political theory emerges to manage their use and yoke them to the household (oikos) and the state (polis).

Reproduction in both The Republic and The Politics is the underlying precondition of society. For Plato, “that one begets and the other bears children” is the principle and purpose of gender difference (Plato 1985, 145). Aristotle mentions reproduction at the very beginning of The Politics, establishing it as the foundation of nature:

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1 One might counter here that the Greek understanding of sexuality differed radically from our own, so much so that the use of the word is misleading. I am sympathetic to such objections, but cannot find a better single word in English to use. I will better define the elements of the field in question in Greek thought, but will retain the anachronism for the combination of questions of erotic pleasure and sexual reproduction – questions that may well have been quite distinct for the Greeks, but were by no means unrelated.

2 Likewise, the term “capital” is problematic here, as I will address later.
In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of choice, but because, in common with the other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 12).

Male-female relations here are not primarily romantic or erotic, but necessary and natural to the species. As Claude Lévi-Strauss has observed, society depends on them not only for genetic reinforcement but also for purposes of social binding; the combination of individuals is as important a function of marriage as generational reproduction. The former ensures synchronic cohesion, the latter diachronic continuity. Incest, even (or especially) when it bears children, is thus an offense against this procreative sexuality – reproduction bending back upon itself. We can see the significance of incest for the Greeks in myth and in tragedy. The horror it elicits was one of the most potent forces employed by Sophocles. When Jocasta tells Oedipus that his father’s “build… wasn’t far from yours” it is a moment of intense and palpable dramatic irony (Sophocles 1984, *Oedipus the King* 203). There is even a certain formal similarity to be found here between the content and the device, as Terry Eagleton observes: “Incest is a kind of irony, whereby a thing is monstrously compounded (sister/daughter, father/brother), both itself and something else” (Eagleton 2003, 162). Not only is Oedipus made monstrous, cast out from the city; his children are cursed as well. In *Antigone*, Antigone and the Chorus make frequent reference to her fate as the inevitable product of an incestuous union. The “tomb” must be her “bridal-bed”: the corrupted line must come to a close (Sophocles 1984, *Antigone* 105). As Marc Shell writes, “Antigone is the incestuous patricide’s daughter-sister and his only possible offspring or outcome” (Shell 1978, 101). The idea of fate pursuing a family through generations is a powerful symbolic expression of “corrupt” reproduction’s lasting consequences.

The hazard is not just personal: Oedipus’ crime brings the gods to curse all of Thebes with a plague. Indeed, incest as the *ne plus ultra* of perversion stands in for venality and corruption at the heart of the city (Oedipus’ Thebes or Sophocles’ Athens), private sin with public consequences. Crucially, it is the continuation of the incestuous line that brings insurrection to the gates of the polis (Polynieces) and incarnates the conflict within it between divine and civic law (*Antigone*). The curse of incest and the duty of siblinghood not only seal Antigone’s fate; the ruling house’s generational drama plunges all of Thebes into turmoil.
The fear of interference between the civic and the familial or libidinal seems to have left a deep impression on Greek political theory. In *The Republic*, Plato tries assiduously to keep family affairs away from affairs of state. While he is willing to use the sanctity of marriage to regulate copulation, Plato will not allow guardian-caste children to know their parents or vice versa (Plato 1985, 151). Aristotle is willing to cede family a larger role. He plans to harness the particularity of childrearing to the ends of the state by means of the household as a locus of political socialization, a solution he considers much more practical and effective than Plato’s (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 33-5). Aristotle’s approach demonstrates a powerful political containment strategy: the move to the *oikos*. Not only is sexuality yoked to the household, but the household is the vassal of the polis: “The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 14). This subordination is never a secure one, however, and problems of lineage are a serious destabilizing force – the lists of revolutions Aristotle recounts are full of disputes over adultery, legitimacy, and inheritance (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 125-6 and 141-2). Problems of progeny are not just causes of revolution; in *The Republic* Book VIII, rebellious sons serve as an extended metaphor for political upheaval and the progression of governments (Plato 1985). Generation is as fraught as it is vital for both the individual and the community.

Sexual pleasure is, in the marriage relation at least, a means to an end for Plato and Aristotle: a natural inducement to conception. However, it threatens to overstep its bounds and become an end in itself. We should distinguish between two types of what Foucault labels “immoderation” in sexual conduct: “plethora” and “artifice” (Foucault 1990, 56). The immoderation of plethora is the hypertrophy of the sexual; the immoderation of artifice is its unnatural use, the decoupling of sexuality from approved channels. We can draw examples from *The Nicomachean Ethics*: “pursuing the excess” in bodily pleasures is the very definition of the immoderation of plethora, while “paederasty” is an immoderation of artifice (Aristotle 2009, 129; 127). We should note that pedophilic relations between men and boys were nonetheless widespread; for some Greek men, erotic pleasure and romantic feeling may have been mapped onto these relationships, while marriage ensured reproduction and solidified social position. Similar figures of plethora and artifice reoccur with respect to other problems of reproduction: in the reproduction of capital, for example, there are the twin figures of greed (accumulation, plethora) and usury (money reproducing itself parthogenetically or incestuously, artifice).

We cannot analyze the anxiety of capital, however, without a discussion of history and terminology. How could such a thought even be conceivable in a culture that existed long before the development of capitalism in the strict sense? One must avoid the trap of generalizing to the entire pattern of ancient
Greek material relations phenomena that existed only in utero. However, an extreme historicism might miss the presence of some familiar institutions in Greek society at its peak. David Graeber writes, “By about 600 BC, just about every Greek city-state was producing its own coins as a mark of civic independence… coins were in common use in everyday transactions” (Graeber 2011, 186). Scott Meikle agrees that “by the fourth century BC, Athens had developed the production and circulation of commodities, or exchange values, to a significant degree,” albeit with the caveat that “the institutions and relations of exchange value were peripheral to ancient society, not central and dominating as they have become in modernity” (Meikle 1995, 5; 172). Athenians were familiar with mercantile capital from their extensive overseas trade, and as Aristotle notes in *The Politics*, Solon’s founding of modern Athens was in part ushered in by a debt rebellion (Aristotle 1996, *The Constitution of Athens* 211; Graeber 2011, 187 and en. 58). Usury existed in Athens even after Solon’s reforms, albeit “confined to petty operators of a kind that we would call loan-sharks” (Meikle 1995, 65). Marx calls merchant’s and usurer’s capital “the antediluvian forms of capital”; while in imagined origin stories like Adam Smith’s they follow industrial capital, they are historically prior (Marx 1981, 728). Wage labor was a minor, though recognized, model of economic participation; to the extent that there was labor-power for sale on the open market, it was generally in the form of slaves. The institutions that make up modern capitalism – currency circulation, borrowing and lending at interest, and the purchase of labor-power – existed in Plato’s and Aristotle’s Athens, albeit in limited and precursory forms. We should remember that capitalism describes a system where the commodity form and the self-valorization of value are predominant; that system’s elements predate it and coexist with ancient formations much like early mammals scuttling around at the feet of the dinosaurs.

Furthermore, it would be a mistake to assume that a small role in material relations precludes a larger one in imaginary relations or ideology. Parent-child incest was (presumably) uncommon; nonetheless, it played a role in Greek thought as a monstrous sum of all perversions, as we have seen already with Oedipus. We might say that just as the specter of communism would later haunt industrial Europe, the specter of capitalism already haunted the Greeks.

Value in the abstract, externalized in and developed dialectically through money, is recognized by both Plato and Aristotle as the linchpin of socially organized production and consumption. In Plato’s thought experiment in Book II, Socrates proposes and Glaucon accepts that in the development of a city “there will be a market place and money as a medium of exchange” (Plato 1985, 67). Aristotle recognizes the role of money as the measure and material

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3For evidence of wage-work’s existence in classical Greece and its conceptualization as the rent of labor-power, see Plato 1985, 67.
index of value: “Money, then, acting as a measure, makes goods commensurate and equates them; for neither would there have been association if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality if there were not commensurability” (Aristotle 2009, 90). But as much as both Plato and Aristotle naturalize money as a consequence or enabling condition of commerce, both come across as deeply uneasy with value even as they recognize its necessity. Aristotle seems in one particular passage to seek out the point at which value’s appearance in exchange-value becomes “unnatural”:

He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper use, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a natural part of getting wealth (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 22).

The uneven distribution of resources is natural here, and commerce “arises at first from what is natural.” The moral problem of the commodity for Aristotle is exchange-value; he cannot fully accept that the products of human labor might be directly stacked up against each other and traded. Marx, a great admirer of Aristotle, suggests an answer: the condition of commodities’ commensurability is human labor conceived in the abstract, and this demands that different human labors be considered qualitatively equivalent, differing only in quantity. “Greek society was founded on the labor of slaves,” Marx writes, “hence had as its natural basis the inequality of men and of their labor-powers” (Marx 1976, 152). Aristotle encountered a seemingly intractable dilemma: how could the products of human labor be exchanged without admitting that, as commodities, they bore an exchange-value alongside their use-values? The fragile solution was the displacement of the opposition within the commodity-structure itself onto the opposition between money and commodities. Exchange-value is aligned with the universal equivalent, money, and the products of labor purged of the rift within the commodity form. “Coin is the unit of exchange and the limit of it,” writes Aristotle (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 23). An inherent feature of the commodity has been redirected into a use-value of money.

There are definite pressures on this ideological mapping. It demands that money never behave as an end in itself; its accumulation is an ethical problem exactly parallel to that of a shoe used for barter. For Aristotle, unlimited accumulation appears as a drive without a finally attainable purpose (telos). “In
this art of wealth-getting there is no limit of the end,” he warns, “which is riches of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth” (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 23). Accumulation or greed, the immoderation of plethora, is threatening precisely because it aims at infinite reproduction; while “the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited,” when money is accumulated for its own sake there can never be enough (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 21). Such unboundedness is profoundly unsettling to Aristotle, whose ethical thought so often prescribes moderation; when a vice is unlimited, the middle course is hard to find.

Plato’s Republic is occasionally called a proto-communist utopia, but a close reading makes evident that its concern is far from Marx’s: alienation and exploitation are not the complaints here, but rather exchange-value and avarice. Marx himself sees Plato as “merely an Athenian idealization of the Egyptian caste system,” a romanticized division of labor that attempts to exercise exchange-value through total state power and absolute fixity of social roles (Marx 1976, 489). Fredric Jameson summarizes Plato’s position thus: “that the root of all evil is to be found in gold or money, and that it is greed (as a psychological evil) which needs to be somehow repressed by properly utopian laws and arrangements in order to arrive at some better and more humane form of life” (Jameson 2004, 36). The best moments for the demonstration of Plato’s attitudes about money come from the “noble lie” that underpins the caste system of his ideal state: the parable of the metal souls (Plato 1985, 112). Its premise is as follows: “God differentiated those qualified to rule by mixing in gold at their birth. Hence they are most to be honored. The auxiliaries he compounded with silver, and the craftsmen and farmers with iron and brass. So endowed, each will usually beget his own kind” (Plato 1985, 113). At first blush this would appear a naturalization of the money-commodities by grounding the caste-based social order in the media of exchange, a play of species and specie. However, a closer analysis reveals the total absence of currency or even its possibility. There is no commerce in soul-metal. It is irremovable, unquantifiable, and incommensurable. This account naturalizes the valuation of the money-commodity only by exorcising the essence of the money-form entirely.

The removal of exchange-value, however, is not the only purpose at which Plato aims. The real end of the parable comes shortly thereafter:

Gold and silver, we shall tell them, they have already in their souls in divine measure from the gods. They have no need of human metals nor is it meet that they should profane the divine gift by exposing it to the contamination that comes with coveting mortal currencies. Many are the evil deeds committed for the sake of the coin loved by
The Anxiety of Reproduction in Classical Greek Political Theory

Acquisitiveness is purged from the guardians and so removed as a source of “faction” and instability (Plato 1985, 156). Currency can govern the “base” (in both the moralist and Marxist senses), but the seat of political power will remain immune from the endless rapacity that it brings. It is money’s infinitely pliable property of exchange-value and the “coveting of mortal currencies” that, as for Aristotle, are sources of anxiety for Plato, and with one brilliant “noble lie” he kills two birds with one stone.

The immoderation of plethora with regard to economic reproduction is, I hope, plainly enough a concern for both Plato and Aristotle. The immoderation of artifice in usury (money’s asexual reproduction by itself) is a more challenging case. The lending of money at interest was extremely uncommon in classical Greece, and for the most part is absent from the Republic. One generation after Plato, however, Aristotle’s writings betray a dread of usury akin to that of incest in Sophocles. It is marginalized, but as a monstrosity; Aristotle describes it in The Politics as contrary to nature, the ultimate form of the creation of value from value alone:

There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former is necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring of money resembles the parent. That is why of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 25).

The interest/incest analogy is crucial to understanding the fear of capital in Aristotle – for the same reasons that parent/child intercourse is a key figure in the Greek tragic imagination, usury is a monstrous prospect even if its incidence is rare. It likewise represents an infinite repetition, a reproduction that bends back on itself. It is an immoderation of artifice in that it uses money in an “unnatural” way. In Marx’s terms, this is the naked and unmediated M – M': sheer financial self-reproduction (Meikle 1995, 63; Marx 1981, ch. 42). Again, it is the limitlessness that Aristotle finds most unsettling: this circuit
Nick Allred

does not seek homeostatis or a happy medium but rather endless acquisition, and without mediation through the commodity, its sheer irrationality is foregrounded.

The strategy for managing this prospect is again a political one resting on an opposition like that between public and private: that of citizenship and exclusion. In *The Ethics*, Aristotle classes usurers “with those who ply sordid trades, pimps and all such people” (Aristotle 2009, 64). Meikle explains: “Asmetics [resident noncitizens], and often ex-slaves, they were marginal in a society based on citizenship. Citizens did not involve themselves in professional credit, and the clientele of ‘bankers’ were people to whom citizen-credit [interest-free loans from friends] was not available, such as visiting traders, shipowners, and sightseers” (Meikle 1995, 65). The question of citizenship is one of the most potent ones in Greek and indeed much subsequent political theory; it is perhaps the most expedient and loaded way to determine what is ideologically “inside” and “outside,” who participates in the public sphere and who is relegated to the sidelines. Aristotle deals with the incestuous perversion of usury just as Thebes dealt with Oedipus: exile from, if not the city’s physical limits, all save a negative, spectral participation in citizenship - the good life and the *polis*.

The third great realm of anxiety for Aristotle and Plato, aesthetics, is the most difficult to address. The reproduction of reality in art is the most purely formal, abstract, and metaphysical sort I cover here, and has tended to lie on the periphery of political theory in the intervening millennia of its development as a field. Nonetheless, the aesthetic is as old as the sexual and the commercial, and some argue that it is as important to human collective existence. As Freud writes in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, “Beauty has no obvious use; nor is there any clear cultural necessity for it. Yet civilization could not do without it” (Freud 1962, 29). Aesthetic production (taken broadly to include painting, sculpture, drama, fiction, poetry, and music) threatens individual and state virtue with its potential for enchantment and falsehood (perhaps a recurrence of the twin figures of plethora and artifice), but can and must be harnessed to state ends, chiefly the reproduction of citizenship through education.

Aristotle largely inaugurates the political theory tradition of ceding independence to aesthetic considerations; he saves them for the *Poetics* instead of integrating them into *The Politics* or *The Ethics*. Nonetheless, the latter texts do betray certain elements of his theory. It is, as Susan Sontag observes of practically all Greek (including Platonic) and subsequent Western aesthetic thought, mimetic: art in all its forms is taken to be a representation or repro-
duction of reality (Sontag 1961). This is true of the visual arts above all: “The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at mere representations is not far removed from the same feeling about realities; for example, if any one delights in the sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily follows that the sight of the original will be pleasant to him” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 201-2). The mimetic model is extended even to music, wherein “rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 201). Artistic expression, in all its forms, is decisively tied to the representation of reality.

Representation entails certain dangers, in which we can trace, if tenuously, Foucault’s parallel lines of plethora and artifice: enchantment and falsehood. The danger that a viewer might be so captivated by an image that reality pales in comparison is handled by recourse to the mimetic paradigm and sheer sophistic denial. In the passage about the statue above, it is axiomatic that any aesthetic pleasure in the representation is simply a derivative appreciation of the real model. It does not even enter Aristotle’s theory as a variety of sin for the viewer to prefer the representation to the original, the imaginary to the real: it is simply inconceivable. The only possible pleasure derived from representation itself is described in *The Ethics* as “amusement,” and we are told that it cannot be a source of “happiness,” which in the Aristotelian constellation is the *sumnum bonum* (Aristotle 2009, 193). The idea of a seductive, non-derivative aesthetic pleasure, a pleasure in representation as representation – “artifice” in the very strongest sense – is for the most part rationalized away.

Plato deals with such seduction much more explicitly. It is the nub of his complaint about free indirect discourse and his explanation for the prisoners’ attitudes in the cave analogy (Plato 1985, 90-5, 209-10). He claims that “every man loathes the thought that he might be taken captive by a lie which would prevent him from distinguishing between reality and unreality,” but holds that mimetic art is capable of taking prisoners against their will or interests (Plato 1985, 79). Enchantment is the model here; Plato uses “witchery” as a term for when people’s “opinions are stolen from them” (Plato 1985, 111). Even more so than in *The Politics* or *The Ethics*, the spell of art in *The Republic* is suspect; it is not just frivolous and derivative, but threatens the sovereignty of reason and will.

Plato and Aristotle are both concerned about questions of right and wrong in representation. Despite his unwillingness to recognize a nonderivative aesthetic pleasure, Aristotle acknowledges and attempts to contain the possibility of bad moral example. “Indeed,” he writes, “there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive away than indecency of speech; for the

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4We must note that art here is different from the sense used on page 105 of *The Ethics*, which has to do with craftsmanship (*techne*). Ross clarifies his translation as “technical expertise” in the endnote to 1140a on page 238.
light utterance of shameful words leads soon to shameful actions” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 193). He explicitly extends the concern to fiction: “Since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches from the stage which are indecent” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 194). The most susceptible to bad example are the young, and what theater is not banned outright should be age-restricted: “The legislator should not allow youth to be spectators of iambi or of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences of such representations” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 194). Two dynamics bear mention here. First, art is linked to intoxication – only those old enough to drink “strong wine” should be admitted to the theater. Second, education is the inoculation against “the evil influences of such representations.” Education, for Aristotle, is based on vocational mimesis: “The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for all such things are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest” (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 193). For all their destructive potential, fiction and representation are also at the core of education, which immunizes youth against harmful examples and enables the passage from family to economy. Apart from the didactic, fiction also serves a purgative purpose; as Sontag writes, “Lie or no, art has a certain value according to Aristotle because it is a form of therapy” (Sontag 1961, 4). This is the theory of *catharsis* more fully fleshed out in the *Poetics*, but mentioned in passing in *The Politics* in reference to music (Aristotle 1996, *The Politics* 205). In both inoculation and purgation, representation, usually an intoxicating or harmful drug, acts to preserve the health of the individual and the state.

For Plato, right and wrong are often nearly indistinguishable in their epistemological and ethical senses. In stories about models of conduct, at least, the two coincide. He claims that poets are lying “whenever they tell a tale that plays false with the true nature of gods and heroes. Then they are like painters whose portraits bear no resemblance to their models” (Plato 1985, 74). The exile of such poets is necessary to avoid providing bad examples, particularly for the young: “We surely don’t want the children to adopt opinions and beliefs that might be largely contrary to the kinds of values we deem desirable for them to have when they become adults” (Plato 1985, 73). Only the combination of representational fidelity and ideal role models uses mimesis to the right ends (the ends of the state), and so the “city will admit no poetry except hymns

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5One might recall the analogy of the Dionysian tendency to intoxication in Nietzsche’s *Birth of Tragedy*; in his account, the Dionysian is an integral component of high Greek tragedy and is driven out by the advent of Socratic philosophy. (Nietzsche 1967).
to the gods and fair words about good men” (Plato 1985, 297). However, there is an important exception to the equation of the ethical with the true: the “noble lie.” As discussed above, Plato uses this term for the parable of metal souls; he returns to it in his discussion of marriage:

The rulers will probably have to resort to frequent doses of lies and mystifications for the benefit of their subjects. You will recall that we said these kinds of lies could be advantageous if used after the manner of medicinal remedies. And we were right. And the right use of this sort of medicine will very often be imperative in matters of marriage and the begetting of children (Plato 1985, 150).

This trope of the “medicinal lie” recalls Aristotle’s public use of fiction for inoculation (education) or purgation (tragic catharsis). Here, however, it comes to the rescue of legitimate social reproduction through marriage in a breathtakingly compact crucible of Platonic concerns. The encounter is not coincidental. The domestication of fiction in the “noble” or “medicinal lie” is deployed at those key moments where gold and silver (the metal souls) and sexual intercourse (marriage) are harnessed to the state; the three problematics of sexual, commercial, and fictional reproduction are inextricably linked.

Aristotle’s notorious misogyny is another case of this three-part analogy’s operation. The reduction of women to second-class status is a way of containing their vital role in reproduction (a role that is privileged epistemically – one of the great male horrors with regards to generation is uncertainty about fatherhood) and their potential to thus disrupt patriarchy. After all, “the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth” (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 192). This makes particularly interesting the linking of women to avarice in The Politics: “in such a state [Sparta] wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizens fall under the dominion of their wives” (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 50). The connection between women and materialism is a familiar one in misogynist ideology, but we should step back and take a look at the function it serves here: it condenses the anxieties of monetary accumulation and sexuality and then displaces these dreads metonymically onto women, the bearers of children. Little clearer evidence could be adduced for the basic parallelism of sexuality and commerce in the Greek imagination. Words like synousiai (relation) and tokos (offspring, interest) could be used in both contexts (Foucault 1990, 179). Furthermore, this homology is a decisive foundation of Aristotelian thought about fiction and imagery, which relies on the same notion of the natural and limited versus the excessive, the deviant,
and the unbounded. As Marc Shell writes, “The esthetic theory of mimesis and of the homoion is informed by theories of economic and biological production (poiesis)... [and] the crucial distinction between nature and convention, or between good and bad production” (Shell 1978, 91). Mimesis is likewise described in Plato by analogy to sexual reproduction: “Imitation is a defective art. It mates with what is also defective, and so it produces defective offspring as well” (Plato 1985, 294). These processes – sexual reproduction, economic reproduction, and aesthetic reproduction – are described by analogy to one another, and all with the same dread of “immoderations,” of hypertrophy or corruption. The task of an emergent political theory is to check these immoderations and tether reproduction to the thriving and preservation of the state.

The first process in that harnessing is the oikos, or household. The domestication of sexual reproduction into the marriage relation is of paramount importance; even without families among the guardians, Plato preserves the sanctity of marriage. But the movement further from marriage to household is accomplished in Aristotle. The family is the quantum level, the building-block of the political community: it is “the association established by nature for the supply of men’s everyday wants” (Aristotle 1996, The Politics 12). It is indeed the cornerstone of material as well as political existence; it is from oikos that we derive the word economics, and household management was an art of production and allocation of resources. The household was also the site of education, or the use of fiction (mimetic production) for the cultivation of virtue and citizenship. Finally, by means of analogy, we move from the household to the state. The two are likened throughout Greek thought, from Antigone all the way to the Nicomachean Ethics (Sophocles 1984, Antigone 94; Aristotle 2009, 201). The conduct of self and household in the private sphere is seen as the model or preparation for political participation; as Foucault writes, “In classical Greek thought, the ‘ascetics’ that enabled one to make oneself into an ethical subject was an integral part – down to its very form – of the practice of a virtuous life, which was also the life of a ‘free’ man in the full, positive and political sense of the word” (Foucault 1990, 77). Financial reproduction was brought into the service of authorities eternal and temporal, often at once; coins were stamped with images of cities’ patron gods, and as Graeber writes, “the Athenian gold reserves... were used to plate the monumental statue of Athena in the Parthenon” (Graeber 2001, 102). Private avarice could be the polis’ downfall, but public wealth its apotheosis. Finally, through education mimetic reproduction could be turned towards the proper training of citizens and thus the perpetuation of the state. This is the final stage in the harnessing of reproduction: the establishment of a political sphere wherein the state can make use of the sexual (marriage), the economic (commerce and production), and the representational (educational stories) and yet remain prior to and
dominant over them. The political is enabled by forces of reproduction and
tames them to its own end – the eternal, faithful self-replication of the state
above the level of individual birth and death, material relations, and cultural or
aesthetic production. This is the project that political theory emerges in order
to accomplish, and thus is the discourse that it establishes in classical Greek
thought: the perpetuation of the polis.

In an important sense, the concerns of the Greeks are not alien to us.
They are tied up with capacities that can genuinely be called universally hu-
man: love, labor, and language. But to call these capacities definitive of human
nature is not to render them ahistorical. Rather, it is to constitute humanity as
essentially historical. Hence, political theory becomes a form of relation to
history: the management and deployment of social reproduction, the orienta-
tion of society to its continuity in time. Its legacy shapes both our collective
life and our historical consciousness today, and hence investigating it is not
simply a matter of antiquarian interest. In a time when questions of population
and sexuality, labor and capital, aesthetic production, and the future of the state
are both familiar in their concerns and unprecedented in their urgency, it is a
task of genuine political importance.

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The Decline of European Neutrality: A Neoliberal Perspective

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The purposes of this research project are to discuss the theoretical origins of political and military neutrality of Sweden, Finland, and Austria and to examine the rationale behind the diminishment of their commitment to neutrality as members of the European Union in the post-Cold War environment. In this comparative study of the security policies of Sweden, Finland, and Austria, I argue that neo-realism offers the best explanation to why each country initially adopted neutrality, but neo-liberalism and neo-functionalism provide a theoretical framework as to why each redefined and modified neutrality as its security policy attaching less value to it. I argue against state-level constructivist theories of neutrality by analyzing the behavior of the political elite in each country in order to demonstrate how all three states have uniformly and rationally redefined neutrality as a means of maximizing key economic interests in the growing global economy. I find that neutrality has been retained for its worth as a source of international prestige and as a useful tool to mobilize the electorate in domestic elections. I conclude that the need to remain economically viable in the global economy has usurped the importance of security and compelled Sweden, Finland, and Austria to sacrifice their neutrality, and the sovereignty it signifies, in favor of sustained growth. In doing so, I hope to highlight the importance of EU security integration and its implications for the NATO alliance and the future of European defense.

Neutrality has long been regarded as an unconventional basis for a foreign policy and often has been overlooked by theorists, due in part to its fluid definition. Neutrality has evolved differently in the states that claim to adhere to the principle and the changing conditions of the international system. Traditionally, as defined at the Hague Convention of 1907, neutrality refers to non-participation in foreign conflicts which includes the refusal of providing any military assistance and the use of the neutral’s territory to transport troops. Most essential to the character of a professed neutral, however, is the rejection of any form of military alliance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent reconfiguration in the world order and the commencement of integration into the European Union, “euro-neutrality” has become the subject of much speculation. Will neutrality continue to effectively describe the foreign policy of its adherents? In other words, will neutrality survive both the systemic changes and, more pertinently, integration into the EU’s security architecture and economic union? Torn at by both these realist and liberal considerations, it is my belief that neutrality is in the process of dissolving as a substantive foreign policy and is now used as a loosely defined icon formu-
lated to resemble national continuity and imbue upon national politicians the normative political legitimacy the policy has granted them in the past. Therefore, despite public support for neutrality and the presence of significant euroskepticism (attitudes critical of the EU and supportive of national sovereignty) in each state, the political elite in Sweden, Austria, and Finland have advanced in the direction of security and economic integration to varying degrees since 1991 in the hopes that the EU will help the small countries remain economically competitive in the vast global market while simultaneously retaining the international prestige associated with neutrality.

In this comparative case study, I seek to explain why states have adopted neutrality, why states choose to redefine it, and how neutrality cannot be compatible with the emerging EU security structure as envisaged in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Three of the five European neutral states fit within the framework I wish to establish: Sweden, Finland and Austria. All three are in the process of integrating into the EU, enforce armed neutrality, and have realist foundations for adopting neutrality. I exclude Ireland because it enforces an unarmed neutrality that is not founded on security concerns or geopolitics, but rather on an ideological protest against the UK (Neal 2006). Switzerland’s neutrality, though founded upon realist principles, remains outside of the EU, making it more resilient to integrationist forces that would otherwise impact its neutrality policy as they do in the other three cases thus making this Alpine neutral unsuitable as well. The case of Maltese neutrality may potentially fit within my analysis and serve as an area for future research in comparative case studies of neutrality, but the literature on the small island’s security policy is quite scant in relation to the other neutrals. For this reason and for the sake of expediency, I omit Malta from my analysis.

In order to demonstrate the evolution of neutrality, I will first discuss the neorealist factors that led to the adoption of neutrality in each state and how systems theory fails to explain wholly both why neutrality remains intact in an era bereft of traditional security concerns and why the neutrals have chosen to redefine their policies. I then propose that neutrality’s evolution can best be explained through a combination of neoliberal and neofunctional theory in that complex interdependence and the need to remain competitive in the global market has compelled the three neutrals to redefine their policies in a very fluid manner that permit heightened degrees of cooperation in the security architecture of the EU, including a close relationship with NATO despite repeated rejection of explicitly entering the alliance. I then shift my analysis to address constructivist arguments that often pertain to the role of national identity and cosmopolitan idealism in the maintenance of neutrality. Though these factors have succeeded in playing a larger role in the least integrated EU neutral (Sweden), it is still found that in all three countries (to varying extents) the elite
engage in pursuing policies that tend to favor integration and the abandonment of neutrality principles, positions that are at odds with public concerns of retaining national sovereignty, a realist concept often linked closely to neutrality. National identity and state-level analyses of neutrality are thus found to be unsuitable in understanding the changing nature of neutrality.

Since the three cases I examine in this paper represent a clear choice on the part of their respective governments to actively institute a policy of neutrality, for the sake of brevity and clarity, I do not include an exploration of negative cases where neutrality policies are neither formulated nor redefined given the same environmental conditions. Since my analysis doesn’t account for these negative case studies to test my thesis against, I present this paper to be a plausibility probe as described by George and Bennett (2005) wherein I may explore the existing literature on neutrality and demonstrate the strong potential the veracity of my arguments hold in the absence of variance in the dependent variable (the nation-state). That said, I believe that there are several good negative case studies I can use to support my thesis such as Norway and Denmark that can later be incorporated into this study at a later time.

In my analysis, I employ two theories to explore neutrality’s evolution over the past two centuries, neorealism and neoliberalism. Often cited as being diametrically opposed to one another in content, the two theories are considered entirely incompatible when determining the behavior of states. Since both neorealism and neoliberalism hold fundamentally different views on world politics (cynicism in the former case and idealism in the latter) one Weltanschauung cannot be exchanged for another so easily. It is generally assumed that only one international system exists and only one set of rules and assumptions can explain its behavior from the beginning of recorded history to the present-day. I reject the ideological rigidity of this type of assertion, as neither theory can hope to explain the entire span of human history. Rather, I vouch for the more practical mode of constructing theory suggested by Sil and Katzenstein (2010) in their definition of analytical eclecticism which permits a type of sharing between traditionally opposing theories. Analytical eclecticism provides us greater flexibility when adapting and applying theory to practice and takes into account that, alone, neither theory can indefinitely describe the international system. Rather, as I will demonstrate with sufficient evidence, the applicability and relevance of neorealism and neoliberalism very much depend on specific historical contexts which ultimately guide the behavior of each state.
Neorealism\(^1\) and the Foundations of Neutrality

Before discussing the deterioration of neutrality in the present day, it is important to understand the conditions that allowed such a policy to be both viable and desirable. Of the three states, only Sweden has a history of neutrality preceding the Cold War. It is a policy that has never been enshrined into either its constitution or common law, yet Swedish neutrality has been practiced for nearly 200 years. It was born from the triumph of Napoleon’s strategy of mass conscription which created an environment in Europe where small states could no longer contend with the Great Powers militarily (Hopper 1945). Neutrality was thus formulated as a comprehensive policy at the Congress of Vienna in order to curb the power appetites of the larger states and to prevent any upset of power. Swedish neutrality, therefore, was both a product and a tool of the balance of power in a multi-polar system. The two world wars saw the evaporation of neutrality among most of the original adherents, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, leaving only Sweden and Switzerland. The post-war bipolar world order did not pose a threat to Swedish neutrality; on the contrary, the change served to reinforce it. Sweden’s geopolitical position next to newly neutralized Finland provided for “the Nordic Balance” (Jakobson 1998), that is it served as a dividing bloc that could temper the power drives of the West, as Finland functioned towards the USSR. It is during the Cold War that Swedish neutrality takes on a high-minded moral character of being an agent of peace, providing Sweden with both prestige and a world stage to criticize all it saw as belligerents, the most poignant example being Prime Minister Olof Palme’s sharp criticisms against the US invasion of Vietnam (Ferreira-Pereira 2005). With neutrality keeping Swedish troops out of two world wars and its new, cosmopolitan and idealist identification, the policy of neutrality became very popular among the Swedish public. The electorate thus reinforced the policy by keeping the Social Democrats in power (Möller and Bjereld 2010). However, as I will argue later, realist considerations and the rigid bipolar order largely determined the behavior of Sweden, which, despite its neutrality, had formed, in secret, military contingency plans with US authorities on the occasion of a Soviet invasion. This brings forth interesting questions regarding neutrality’s ultimate utility and Sweden’s alleged traditional commitment to the principle in the context of neutrality’s redefinition, as I will demonstrate later.

\(^1\)When I discuss neorealist theory, I’m using the framework established by Waltz (2010) wherein the behavior of states is dictated by the distribution of power within the structure of the international system. This is to say, too, that security interests are by far the most salient and influential when formulating and implementing policy. The theory is essentially a modification of Hans Morganthau’s realism (1967) which advances that the pursuit of power itself is the driving influence of a state’s behavior.
The Decline of European Neutrality

In contrast with Sweden, the neutrality policies of both Finland and Austria do not have such a long historic tradition, both having the policy imposed on them due to the post-war restructuring of the international order and weaker military deterrence, a model defined by Josef Binter as “positive-negative” neutrality (1989). Upon its independence in 1919, Finland practiced a form of informal neutrality as to avoid antagonizing the USSR. However, the anticommunist rhetoric and behavior of Finnish elites served to undermine the policy and by the 1930s Finland tried to abandon it by forging a Nordic alliance structure. However, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, all neutral states at the time, did not want to be drawn into a conflict that would most likely originate from a Finno-Soviet dispute (Neuhold 1982). Even in this earlier instance, Finland clearly distinguished itself as different from other neutral states in its willingness to abandon neutrality when faced with realist pressures. Truly, the Winter War between Finland and the USSR revealed to many Finns that neutrality was not reliable in preventing war and that neutrality should not turn into a dogmatic creed as it had in Sweden. After World War II and the subsequent emergence of the Western and Communist blocs, Finland’s neutrality was solidified due in part to its adverse geopolitical position between the two. As mentioned above, with Sweden, Finland formed “the Nordic Balance”, wherein it took on the role of a mediator, in particular with the USSR. Indeed, Finland learned from the Winter War that neutrality could only be viable when relations with the Soviet Union were positive. Thus, despite its western socio-political orientation, Finland entered into friendly relations with the Soviet Union under both the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (YYA). As a consequence, Finland embraced a form of “active neutrality” known as the “Paasikivi–Kekkonen Line” (named after two Finnish presidents) that sought positive bilateral relations with the USSR through avoiding criticism of its communist neighbor and strong trading relations. This is in stark contrast with Austria and Sweden’s interpretations of “active neutrality” which insisted on equal criticism and greater internationalism. Throughout the Cold War, Finland was criticized by the Western bloc as being overly cozy with the USSR, the term “Finlandization” being used to describe the fear held by the US that other Nordic NATO members would drop out of the alliance in favor of a Finnish-style arrangement with the USSR (Dutton 2006). Even after the Cold War, perceptions that Finnish sovereignty (and the neutrality that maintained it) rested on the back of a happy Russia is a notion that has had a hard time dying in the minds of Finnish politicians, one particularly key in the 2007 debate on joining NATO that I will discuss later in the context of redefining neutrality in the new world order.

The case of Austrian neutrality differs from Swedish and Finnish neutrality in its lack of historical precedence before the Cold War. Prior to this, Aus-
Austria had traditionally enjoyed status as one of Europe’s great powers, embodied either in the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Nazi Germany. Its defeat in WWII brought with it the imposition of neutrality on Austria by the occupying powers. Its geopolitical position between the Soviet Union and the West helped induce neutrality, a policy the Soviet Union insisted on as a precondition before they withdrew troops from Austria. The neutralization of Austria was a positive development for Soviet security, as it diminished the possibility of a greater NATO presence in Eastern Europe, thereby reducing the rigidity of the alliance structure of the bipolar order. Neutrality, like the Finnish case, was a tool employed by the greater powers (in particular the USSR) to mitigate sources of tension between the two blocs. However, in response, Austria (like Sweden) adopted a policy of “active neutrality” that openly sought to reduce tensions through conflict mediation, arms reduction inspection, and indiscriminate criticism of the superpowers. Thus Austria, like the other neutrals, managed to play its relative weakness off as an ideational force that brought with it international prestige. In a key area differing from Finland or Sweden, however, Austria has written into its constitution a status of permanent neutrality similar to Switzerland, a position that poses some problems for Austrian politicians in their current efforts to redefine such a constraining policy in their efforts to integrate Austria into the EU.

In discussing the roots of neutrality, I have found that neutrality is a policy developed in response to the power politics of Europe as an alternative means of safeguarding a state’s sovereignty in the international system. This is not to say neutrals are not subject to the pressures of larger states, for neutrality can only be practiced when it is recognized and respected by greater powers. In essence, neutrality is a state-centric policy born from traditional understandings of international behavior in that it makes the assumption that the ability to initiate and sustain war is the monopoly of a state. However, the swift dissolution of the USSR brought with it structural changes to the international system that had no precedence in international relations. The sudden reality of a sole superpower brought into question whether joining the NATO alliance would be conducive to help deal with new European security threats or simply aggravate Russia and provide few benefits in the long term. Likewise, would integration into the EU better serve these security matters or would it undermine the sovereignty of the neutrals? Compounding this neutrality identity crisis is the growing presence of violent non-state actors (e.g., terrorists, pirates) and the frequency of civil wars that ultimately undermine national interests and humanitarian goals in such unstable regions. It is questionable whether such a policy, wrought in the forges of European power politics in the 19th and 20th centuries, can effectively address these increasingly prevalent security issues effectively. Hopes that neutrality would spare its adherents from such
unconventional security threats have proved to be delusional; for instance, the Austrian authorities foiled a terrorist plot in 2005 and Sweden suffered an unsuccessful suicide terrorist attack in 2010. The changing nature of both system and conflict has thus prompted neutrals to redefine their policies in order to conform to EU integration while simultaneously appeasing their citizens who greatly value neutrality as a vital characteristic of national identity. In the post-Cold War era, all three have done this by applying a narrow definition of “military non-alignment” to their neutrality policies, essentially allowing any type of aid or peacekeeping mission that falls short of combat operations. This has allowed the political elite to maintain an illusory vision of neutrality to satiate the public while simultaneously allowing the flexibility to partake in the EU security architecture.

**The Limits of Neorealism: Neutrality Lives On**

The unexpected and sudden collapse of the Soviet Union was a shock to the international system. The dissolution of one of the major poles demanded an immediate revaluation of the security policy of all countries, the euro-neutrals, to differing degrees, not exempt. Perhaps the most notable change was felt in Sweden, where, in 1992, Carl Bildt’s Moderate-led government announced the “1992 Formula”, which redefined Swedish neutrality to read “non-participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for our country to be neutral in the event of war in our vicinity”\(^2\). By this wording, neutrality could be invoked in the instance of an immediate war between its neighbors, but the ambiguity of “with the aim of” (a phrase that was the subject of major debate in the *Riksdag*) allowed the country to make no guarantees on what course of action it would take in the event. It has been argued that uncertainty and geopolitical factors played an important role in shaping this flexible definition, as Russian troops remained stationed in the newly independent Baltic States, but it should be noted that these were of secondary concerns to Bildt. The structural change of the international system merely provided the political opportunity to redefine Swedish neutrality to gain more flexibility in pursuing its international interests, prepare the country for eventual integration into the EU, and allow Sweden to take a larger role in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid, in particular during the Bosnian conflict. The Social Democrat’s (SÅP) return to power in 1994 coincided with the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic States. This development removed the most salient potential source of conflict in Sweden’s vicinity, thus rendering the security implications of the 1992 formulation somewhat outmoded. Despite this, the SÅP retained Bildt’s redefinition of neutrality not out of a fear of Russia, but

\(^2\)See Möller and Bjereld (2010) for the English text.
for its original purpose of conforming Sweden to EU security standards.

Finnish and Austrian changes to neutrality policy following the immediate collapse of the USSR were far less reactionary, in part due to the nature of their respective neutrality policies. Finland’s geographical proximity to Russia (a crippled giant, but a giant nonetheless) and heavy Russian military presence in the Baltic States prompted Helsinki to let the dust settle before any drastic policy changes were explicitly made (Schmidt 1992). When debating EU membership, security was used as a rationale for both the traditional maintenance of neutrality and the reorientation of Finland towards the western sphere of influence. Consequently, each side accused the other of undermining Finnish security. Though consensus between the parties ultimately coalesced into an overwhelmingly pro-EU force, it is vital to understand that security interests are harder to define during a period of uncertainty and that we shouldn’t overemphasize its role in Finland’s decision to join the EU. Though powerful politicians, like President Mauno Koivisto, may have seen the EU as a source of security and supported membership on that basis, for the most part security issues were of secondary consideration to many of the Finnish political elite who sought to fix the dismal state of the economy, as will be discussed in the next section. Finland’s eventual ascension into the EU in 1995 economically aligned the country with the west, serving as a future catalyst to neutrality policy change.

In Austria, constitutional neutrality prevented the type of swift reaction that occurred in Sweden, despite the immediate security concerns cropping up near its border and the mass flow of Bosnians in 1993. To most Austrians, neutrality was, in essence, still a viable security policy. In fact, neutrality’s popularity reached its pinnacle among the public during this conflict, thus forcing the ruling ÖVP (liberal conservatives) and SPÖ (social democrats) to tread carefully in their future evaluations of the policy, a process that had begun before the fall of the Soviet Union for reasons vastly different from security interests: ascension into the (then) EC (Luif 2001).

It is curious to note in all three cases that though neorealist factors contributed greatly to the adoption of neutrality policies, they did little to induce a departure from the principle. As Jan Eliasson notes, “If during the Cold War, we managed to cope with the nuclear threat by remaining outside a military alliance, why seek nuclear guarantees when the Cold War is over? It’s paradoxical.” It is thus important to note that we cannot explain changes to neutrality policy through solely realist interpretations, but rather in the context of EU integration. Indeed, the extinction of the antagonistic environment of the Cold War facilitated a profound shift in state priorities in Europe in that security, a principle considered vital by neo-realists, has become of increasingly

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3See Ferreira-Pereira (2005) for full quotation.
of secondary importance to neutrals. Joenniemi (1988) even supported this view on the twilight of the Soviet Union’s fall, writing, “Rather than survival, they [neutrals] seem to be concerned about other types of problems, such as their technological competitiveness and economic performance in an increasingly integrated world economy.” The new world order that replaced the bipolar order thus greatly changed the vital interests of neutral states. It is therefore better to discuss neutrality’s redefinition in the context of neoliberal theory, that, through institution building (the EU, in this case), low politics such as economic growth and interdependence will ultimately become more salient than security and thus, via neofunctionalist spillover, shape the behavior of the state. This is not to say that realist considerations should be disregarded, for the absence of such pressures have helped render neutrality to be something of an artifact, an outdated foreign policy detrimental to the integrationist efforts of the state. However, the reasons behind reforming neutrality can be best described as efforts to pave the way for strengthening the EU and enjoying the economic and, to a lesser extent, security benefits accompanying it.

**Neoliberalism**: The Role of the Economy and Institution in Neutrality’s Redefinition

It has long been debated among states to what degree a neutral’s economic ties with an aligned country constitute as a *de facto* alliance between the two. For instance, the decision on the part of the German high command to sink neutral US merchant ships *en route* to Great Britain during WWI was based partly on disproportionate trading figures and a founded belief that the alleged neutral was supplying a wartime belligerent with weapons. But it was not only weapons the US was shipping across the Atlantic in excess: food, medicine, and raw materials could likewise be interpreted as providing a form of military assistance under articles six through ten of the Hague Convention. It is thus quite understandable that the ambiguity of these clauses has been a source of contention between neutral states and great powers. During the Cold War, accusations were leveled by the USSR that Sweden and Austria were violating their neutrality by seeking economic integration within the western bloc. Likewise, the US was a vocal critic of Finland’s close economic relationship

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4When discussing Neoliberalism, I rely on Keohane and Nye’s (1977) conception of “complex interdependence”, that is the web of economic and institutional relations established between states will ultimately serve to change their vital interests. Instead of hard politics like military or security issues, soft politics like economic growth will become the norm for international behavior. This is because states are deterred from militarily attacking the economic interests they may have with the other country. Instead, it is a greater incentive to focus on mutually beneficial economic relations. Institutions created to protect economic interests will also empower international law to moderate the behavior of the state actors.
with the USSR (established by the YYV Treaty) and, in many ways, considered the Nordic nation as overly subservient to its massive neighbor. To understand neutrality’s change after the Cold War, it is important to look at earlier attempts made by the neutrals to strengthen economic ties and cooperation between themselves and their neighbors.

In the case of the European neutrals, the first step towards market integration came with the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a trade bloc consisting of both neutral (Sweden, Austria, Finland) and aligned states, in 1961. It functioned as an alternative to the European Economic Community (the ECC, later EC, now EU) that permitted members to establish their own tariffs with non-members. Though EFTA proved to be beneficial to their economies, most of its members wanted to join in the ECC in order to secure greater access to the dynamic French and West German markets. Both Austria and Sweden (but not Finland) sought membership in 1963 but were discouraged by President de Gaulle’s decision to veto Great Britain’s application. Though Sweden withdrew its application shortly afterward, Austria continued to press for some form of association with the ECC. This is in part due to the ruling ÖVP’s position that neutrality constituted only military obligations, but this “military neutrality” was briefly lived when, in 1968, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia made security concerns far more salient. This period of heightened tensions succeeded in cowing the ÖVP to abandon market liberalization and maintain the status quo of quasi-autarchy and protected markets (much to the SPÖ’s delight). The USSR was not pleased with Austria’s decision to seek membership with an institutional union with West Germany, as one of neutrality’s main functions was to ensure guarantees against a renewal of Anschluss. The Soviets thus saw economic integration with a strong political dimension as incompatible with neutrality, compelling Austria to amend its interpretation (Luif 2001). But what of EFTA? Suffice it to say that the USSR was not ecstatic about the trade association, but its framework was seen as less threatening than the ECC since it excluded the FGR, had a membership of less committed NATO allies (Norway, Denmark) and neutrals (Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland), and had no past history of trying to form a European Army. For these reasons, it was seen as compatible with neutrality by the USSR, thus permitting all the European neutrals the flexibility needed to begin a process of limited integration. Furthermore, this attitude and the absence of an implicit security component contributed to tacit Soviet consent of the 1972 free trade agreement established between EFTA and the ECC to further economic cooperation. This was particularly important to Finland, as it could use its ties of EFTA to prop up the credibility of its neutrality by offering trading privileges with the western bloc once solely reserved for the USSR in the YYV (Moisio 2008).
The Decline of European Neutrality

It is important to note that even at the height of Cold War tensions, there existed an underlying desire shared by western European countries to liberalize and institutionalize economic cooperation so to further bolster market competitiveness and sustain high levels of growth. However, it is equally important to keep in mind that the economies of countries during the Cold War were still quite sheltered, a trend fortified by the return of Social Democrats to power throughout Europe in the late-1960s. Adhering closely to a Keynesian economic model, Austria, Finland, and Sweden were similar in their desire to reach full unemployment, provide an extensive range of social welfare policies, and maintain a somewhat self-reliant image conducive to conveying their neutrality. The economic objectives of Social Democrats were thus complementary to the propagation and maintenance of neutrality and further reinforced its utility as a vital component of national security within both the spheres of national defense and economic stability. Economic integration prior to EU ascension in the context of the three neutrals should therefore be interpreted as both cautious and limited in its scope and nature, thus little spill-over can hardly be detected.

This relative economic independence was challenged in each country to varying extents during the latter half of the 1980s due in part to both the unsustainability of the Keynesian model in the face of globalization and the growing importance of transnational capital, since state-shielded industries found it increasingly difficult to compete in the global market. In Austria and Sweden in particular, the 1980s were characterized by prolonged recession and low rates of economic growth. Of these two neutrals, Sweden was perhaps more resistant to reforming the structure of its welfare state to conform to the neoliberal economic model espoused by the EU. Dominated by the SÅP for nearly the entirety of the Cold War, there was considerable reluctance from the government to abandon its popular positions towards welfare and neutrality by seeking EU membership. Instead of silently preparing for EU membership as was the case in Austria, the SÅP opted to go a “third way” between the Keynesian and neo-liberal models, but it did little to inspire the confidence of its native transnational corporations (TNCs) who continued to pour FDI into the EC at the expense of the national economy. By 1990, the SÅP realized that membership in the EC could address this distressing development and attract more capital to the ailing Swedish economy and applied for membership. The fall of the Soviet Union, the following global recession, and the victory of the more vocally pro-EU Moderate Party (MS) in the 1991 elections greatly facilitated preparations to pursue membership. Among the areas needing reform was Sweden’s neutrality policy, which the SÅP had alleged as early as 1989 to be incompatible with the EC. As noted earlier, redefinitions to Swedish neutrality had a security rationale, but the underlying long-term goal was compatibility
with the EU so to reap the economic gains of membership. Sweden’s narrow definition of “neutrality in an event within its vicinity” provided the possibility of a close economic and political union with the rest of Western Europe and thereby attain the means to economic recovery (Bieler 2000).

Austria’s neo-corporatist Keynesian economy that had long functioned well for the “grand coalition” of the two major parties (ÖVP and SPÖ) came under great duress with the intensification of EC integration and global competition. Since few TNCs developed in Austria, this case differs slightly from Sweden. Instead, pressures to apply to the EC originated with a well-organized national industrial elite, the Federation of Austrian Industrialists (VÖI), who desperately wanted to participate in the growing dynamism of the European market. The pro-business ÖVP was the first to consent in 1988 and the more reluctant SPÖ followed suit in July 1989 when it at last applied to the EC. It is important to note that this occurred before the fall of the Berlin Wall, thus prompting the Soviet Union to condemn what it perceived as a violation of Austrian neutrality despite the latter’s insistence that the emerging EC would respect the institution of permanent neutrality. However, as will be discussed later, this fantasy hardly manifested in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty’s establishment of the CSFP.

Finland differs from the other neutrals in its decision to apply to the EU, as security issues were far more salient in the 1980s and such a move would appear antagonistic only towards the USSR. Sweden’s unexpected application to the EU in 1990, however, prompted Finnish politicians to reconsider its stance towards membership and its compatibility with neutrality. In 1991, Finland felt the initial sting of global recession that was fiercely exacerbated by the collapse of its principle trading partner (the USSR accounted for 15% of Finnish exports), an overheating of production, and a severe banking crisis. As a result, Finland endured a ghastly 20% unemployment and its GDP dropped by 13% (Lee 1996). Such harsh economic realities prompted the EU debate within parliament to become increasingly tied to economic issues. Despite a fierce clash of interests between the pro-EU industrial/commerce sectors and anti-EU agricultural interests, there was surprisingly little open opposition to EU membership from any party, a curious trait in Finnish politics.

According to neoliberal theory, the building of institutions (such as the EU) can induce economic cooperation and establish a form of complex interdependence between member states. Since states sacrifice a degree of sovereignty in order to tame the anarchic system in which they exist, there must be a visible and continual shift towards cooperation as a co-requisite to integration within the created institution. According to neofunctionalist interpretations, integration in the economic sphere will lead to a sort of spillover effect of cooperation into other policy areas, most importantly security issues, among
member states (Fligstein and Stone 2001). In each of the three cases presented, crippled economies and declining prosperity factored heavily into the decision to join the EU thus initiating deeper economic integration with the rest of Europe. When analyzing neutrality’s redefinition in Sweden, Finland, and Austria, we must see it in the light of the spillover ascribed by neofunctionalism, that the need to conform to the EU security structure as laid out in the CFSP and cooperate with NATO (the foundation and principle mechanism of EU security) has pressured each country to amend its neutrality policy.

**Sacrificing Security Sovereignty: Integration’s Impact on Neutrality**

Joining the EU in 1995 brought major changes in the neutrality policies of Austria and Finland, while Sweden retained the Bildt 1992 formulation, which was sufficiently ambiguous in its character and application to conform to EU security norms. Recent revelations from the 2010 WikiLeaks of the US State Department suggest that that Sweden has reverted back to its Cold War definition of neutrality as “non-participation in military alliances during peacetime and neutrality during wartime”⁵, but such a notion is difficult to believe for two reasons. Firstly, according to the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Swedish military spending has decreased from 2.5% of its GDP during the Cold War to only 1.2%, discrediting the deterrent effect armed neutrality is supposed to have.⁶ Secondly, Swedish troops participated in Petersberg missions in NATO-led contingencies during the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In regards to Austria, membership into the union emboldened the government to resist Russia’s pressure to affirm their neutrality and induce constitutional amendments to neutrality that permitted Austria to take part in collective diplomatic sanctions. In 1998 the neutrality article was refined once again to allow all EU related peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as well as those duties of the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP). These two amendments effectively permitted Austria to perform its security duties to the EU under the Amsterdam Treaty. It is clear through these measures that Austria has strictly defined its neutrality as “military non-alignment,” as it seems to have aligned with the EU in every other possible way. As noted earlier, the lack of normative imperative among the public and constitutional mandate provided Finland with more flexibility. EU membership allowed the government to actively denounce old interpretations of neutrality, the earliest example being President Martti Ahtisaari’s declaration in 1997 (Ferreira-Pereira 2006). Finland has since become even more vociferous in its redefinitions of neutrality, the

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⁵ Due to the founder’s decision to shut down WikiLeaks temporarily, data may not be attainable.

Foreign Minister, Alexander Stubb in 2007, even going as far as saying to his Russian counterpart that: “We have been politically aligned with the EU as of January 1st, 1995, and we work in close military cooperation with NATO, among others… Finland’s foreign policy doctrine is clearly defined in the government’s policy programme, and neutrality is not a part of it.” However, we must take into consideration that this newer notion of military non-alignment successfully replaced traditional neutrality as a source of conflict mitigation between the EU and Moscow, thereby retaining some sense of continuity in terms of Finland’s relationship with Russia, yet altering greatly its capacity to be an active member in the EU security structure, despite the latter’s close relationship with NATO.

Even after the end of the Cold War, NATO’s attractiveness to the neutrals has always been very limited. The immediate post-USSR environment led conservative politicians in Sweden to consider membership as a requisite to joining the EU, but it never had a substantial base of support in either parliament or the public. Likewise, conservatives in Austria also considered membership, but lacked overarching support to effectively pursue such a policy. The NATO debate in Finland, however, has always been more substantial than the other two neutrals as Finland’s “military non-alignment” exists side-by-side with its policy of reserving the right to enter into a military alliance when it deems vital to its interests. Therefore, NATO membership has been proposed by several Finnish foreign ministers, most recently by Jyrki Haakeamies in 2007. Despite this, the idea of joining the treaty organization still lacks both public and parliamentary support, many Finns worrying that such a move may unnecessarily antagonize Russia. It is thus important to note in the Finnish case that a great motivation to retain an ambiguous version of neutrality out of realist, power political concerns. However, the spillover of integrationist measures that support the EU has helped reinforce this ambiguity by creating an unconventional security relationship. The most prominent is the PfP, a peacekeeping/peace-making international organization affiliated with NATO that is active in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and many other initiatives. In Finland, supporters of NATO point to the fact that “military non-alignment” is compromised to a degree in that the country is clearly associating itself with a particular military bloc. This is also true in Sweden and Austria, where PfP is quite popular due to its humanitarian aspirations and a non-threatening means of demonstrating neutral commitment to EU security. Each nation regularly sends peacekeeping forces through NATO channels, so it is interesting how such a close partnership can exist between a militarily unaligned state and an alliance structure. PfP further emphasizes the fact that neutrality in the contemporary sense simply equates to non-participation in combat scenarios, and even this could evolve if the EU was directly threatened.
The security structure of the EU is strongly tied to NATO, which, under the Berlin-plus Agreement, shares the same institutions and mechanisms in a time of war or crisis. In the case that NATO declines to act, the EU may utilize these assets to achieve its ends. Though the neutrals have largely been exempt from having to contribute militarily to the EU in the Amsterdam and Lisbon treaties, they have been prompted to contribute in other ways to the security objectives defined in the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and its European Security Strategy (ESS). Both seek to deal with the changing nature of conflict, focusing its efforts to combat terrorism and pirates, prevent environmental disaster, civil war escalation and nuclear proliferation (Ferreira-Pereira 2006). Along with the Lisbon Treaty’s guarantees in promoting cooperation in these matters (the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense), the EU established the battle group, a division of 1500-2000 troops that primarily perform Petersberg tasks currently. Some observers speculate that duties most likely will evolve as the EU continues to develop the ESS to include a more diverse range of missions (perhaps even military roles) in the near future (Wessels and Bopp 2008). Sweden and Finland are both major contributors to the Nordic Battle Group that stood by ready to be mobilized during its 2011 rotation. Austria contributes to the German-Czech Group, but it is not yet a functioning unit. With this open commitment to EU security, questions arise whether the neutrals would actually abstain from aiding their fellow members militarily. Flexibility exists in the Finnish and Swedish cases, but Austria’s continued constitutional neutrality serves as a major barrier to practical defense operations. There is serious skepticism as to the utility of this layer of EU security because NATO’s chances of declining to act in the event of a major European crisis is unlikely, so the EU security structure may not need to be mobilized. In short, the neutrals can ride on NATO tanks while maintaining their non-alignment image for their respective reasons (identity, geopolitics). However, no matter who acts, the EU will press neutrals to contribute to the effort in some form.

**Getting Lost in the Details: The Shortcomings of Constructivism**

It would be remiss to neglect perhaps the most prevalent theoretical interpretations of neutrality’s alleged survival espoused by constructivist literature. The fundamental tenants of these approaches differ radically from realism and liberalism in that they reject the notion that states behave in a uniform manner in a falsely assumed anarchic international system. Security and economy are often insufficient means of interpreting a state’s behavior, since states; in essence, define their own interests in accordance with not just these two cornerstones of power but also in terms of national identity within the context of the
international community. This identity is shaped by both cultural values and social forces (i.e. competing interests organized within the state such as trade unions and activist groups) of the collective nation, making democracies particularly sensitive to its impact. As such, states cannot be deemed as rational actors and consequently behave in ways that often contradict their economic or security interests, however these may be defined.

When discussing the evolution of neutrality, it is important to address these normative aspects that underlie and reinforce neutrality within a society. Constructivists have argued that neutrality has become institutionalized within a state due to a positive feedback mechanism from the public (Möller and Bjereld 2010). This is not to say that neutrality, per se, is the object of the resultant expression of national identity. This is especially true in the Finnish case where neutrality is founded upon a stern pragmatism, but its connotations of self-reliance and national sovereignty still appeal to a healthy segment of the public. Though 45% of Finns agree that neutrality’s meaning has changed and that a redefinition was necessary (in contrast with 33% against)\(^7\), it belies the fact that neutrality as a principle is never rejected. For instance, when it was leaked that Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen had supported the US in its 2003 Iraq invasion, the public outcry against the government ended in the PM’s resignation. It suffices to say that the Finnish people put a value on neutrality, but their government has hardly conformed to these ideational sympathies. One needs only to think back to Foreign Minister Stubb’s words. Joining the EU effectively stripped Finland of its identity as an independent, self-reliant state and aligned it permanently within the “family of western countries,” thus mythic notions of total sovereignty have been abandoned by the government unequivocally. Despite substantial public apprehension about the EU (the 1995 referendum passed with only a 56% approval)\(^8\), Finland had no euro-skeptical parties. Elite consensus has largely shaped Finnish foreign policy since the nation’s inception, insulating its formulation from the general public so to ensure its vital goals of security and economic growth. Finland’s multi-party parliamentary system, its emphasis on consensus, and a deeply embedded elite political culture thus impeded the formation of a major euroskeptical party during the 1993 EU debates (Raunio 2005). To spare any one party the scorn of their anti-EU bases of support, the referendum (the first of its kind since 1930) was placed to the voters so to diffuse responsibility and legitimize the government’s future efforts to deepen the economic union. Social forces within the country could do little but try to mobilize a majority to oppose the item, but in the end, industrial and commerce interests won the day. Truly the referendum sounded the death knell for the Finnish neutral identity

\(^7\)See Möller and Bjereld (2010) for polling data.
\(^8\)See the European Election Database for polling data.
and its rebirth as a true member of the western world (Moisio 2008).

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the populist True Finns (PS) has emerged to challenge this elite style of consensus force in the 2011 elections, but its choice to remain outside the government in protest against its Pro-EU peers has limited the PS’s direct influence in policy-making. The PS has thus yet to make a lasting impression on Finnish political practices, and it is questionable whether a lone wolf in the Eduskunta can ever achieve its goals in a system structured around compromise.

In Austria, constructivists seemingly find an ideal case study, as neutrality has played a role in the formation of both Austrian national and international identity. After being absorbed into “Greater Germany” during WWII, the reborn republic was tasked with establishing a new Austrian national identity in the post-war era. This goal was vital to both the state’s legitimacy and integrity, for many Austrians in 1946 still considered themselves to be German. Though initially perceived as a national humiliation by the public, neutrality permitted Austria to remain aloof from the great ideological divide separating Europe and acquire a significant moral standing in the world community. This impartial status brought Vienna great prestige in international affairs, attracting many international organizations and UN agencies to Austria (Gärtner 2001). It is thus not surprising that the emerging Austrian national identity would incorporate neutrality as an important component. According to constructivists, this widespread support for neutrality is reinforced through the ballot box and accounts for its survival in the present day. This interpretation, however, ignores several important factors, among the most significant being Austrian political culture. Like Finland, Austria follows a consensual model of governance on a multi-party basis, but for the most part, the “grand coalition” between the two largest parties, the ÖVP and the SPÖ, has largely remained constant for the past sixty years. Majority rule is uncommon, especially with the growth of political opposition to the two party model in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As discussed earlier, both the ÖVP and SPÖ supported admission into the EU as a solution to Austria’s economic problems. Anti-EU opposition from the far-right Freedom Party and the Green Party could not be mobilized due in part to their conflicting ideological interests and minimal representation within parliament. A Pro-EU message carried the day when the referendum passed with an impressive 66% approval to join, despite 61% (Luif 2001) support for maintain traditional neutrality. Since the referendum, Austrians have grown increasingly critical of the political alliance as many perceive that the government is subverting Austria’s constitutional neutrality through its constant efforts to conform to Brussels’ security and economic standards. Despite undeniable economic growth, the Austrian public has become increasingly euroskeptical, ranking fifth in its overall dissatisfaction, just above Sweden.
The Austrian government’s ratification of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (the latest amendment to the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties that aims to further centralize the EU), for instance, was met with relative indignation, as many citizens had pressed for a referendum akin to Ireland’s. Moreover, the policy remains politicized by the Social Democrats and the ÖVP who regularly condemn the other of abandoning neutrality, when, in reality, both parties have been supportive of security integration into the EU. Neutrality functions as a tool in Austrian domestic power politics and is invoked in non-threatening situations (e.g. blocking transport of French soldiers for training in Slovakia) or when the constitution prevents action (e.g. the 1999 Kosovo conflict) so to garner public support.

Perhaps the most compelling case for constructivists exists in Sweden. Two hundred years of domestic peace have fortified large normative barriers that prevent an explicit departure from neutrality. This national preference for neutrality has come to define Sweden’s international identity in such a profound way that Swedish neutrality has become a part of conventional international law. It is thus telling that, despite elite capital and the alignment of pro-EU TNCs, the major political parties (SÅP, MS), and the leading labor unions, there was considerable resistance against abandoning traditional neutrality among the public during the EU referendum. It is important to keep in mind, though, that opposition to the EU among the public was not based primarily on abstracts such as neutrality, but a concern that the EU would undermine the Swedish welfare state. Still, the ideological significance of neutrality as a symbol of Sweden’s independence from Europe played an important role in the “no” campaign. With 83% of eligible voters participating, the referendum was only narrowly accepted by a 52% majority. Though in this instance the elite managed to achieve its goals and succeeded in securing legitimacy for ascension, the Swedish public has been more successful in its defiance of elite interests than Austria and Finland. This reality manifests most powerfully in the 2003 referendum on entering the European Monetary Union (EMU) where the pro-EU alliance once more mobilized to convince the public of the necessity to deepening the process of economic integration by joining the single currency. Growing euro-skepticism among the Swedish public cut across class and party boundaries resulted with a resounding rejection of the initiative with 40% saying ‘Yes’; and 56% ‘No’ (New York Times 2003). Anders Wildfält perhaps describes the implications of these results best in his work (2004): “Indeed, the fact that the ‘No’ side could win, despite inferior financial resources and against the major parties and interest organisations, could be seen as evidence that ordinary citizens in Sweden are not without influence.” Not only does this demonstrate the government’s sensitivity to public opinion, it also shows the public’s uncertainty of any form of alliance that may compro-
mise Swedish neutrality or sovereignty, two concepts that seem intertwined at times. Neutrality still retains a lot of political power due to its basic ideational draw to all segments of the voting public, making it strongly supported (and effectively politicized) by the Social Democrats. Despite the SÄP’s reluctant, though prominent role in EU integration, the party continues to unfurl the neutrality banner during each election cycle. It is thus important to the SÄP to ensure that changes to neutrality are limited and discreet, but still in accordance with the CFSP of the EU. The behavior of the SÄP is thus somewhat contradictory and should be understood as a conflict between facing economic and security realities while still placating the public with notions of traditional neutrality. Though Sweden is perhaps the most susceptible to ideational domestic pressures of the three cases, its political behavior in the international arena should be interpreted as rational and designed to maximize its economic and security interests.

In each case analyzed, constructivist arguments tend to focus on why neutrality is maintained rather than how neutrality has evolved. Voter attachment to neutrality in all three cases has had some impact on the behavior of the governing elite in that the neutrals have successfully watered down several collective security proposals in the EU (most prominently the Amsterdam Treaty’s CSFP obligations), but it is difficult to say that traditional neutrality has been safeguarded. Rather, it has been steadily eroded by the realist and neoliberal considerations the elite must address such as economic growth and structural changes in the international system. These issues take precedence over national identity. It is true that normative issues may hamper a democratic government’s abilities, but it hardly deter it from fulfilling its vital interests. The government simply changes its means to accomplish them.

**Conclusion: A Future for Neutrality?**

Although neorealism and neoliberalism are often seen as being opposed to one another in academia, I have demonstrated through a process of analytical eclecticism that the two need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, concepts such as neutrality cannot be understood without understanding the two theories and how specific historical contexts that saw one more substantially relevant than the other. Neutrality has existed for 200 years as a viable foreign policy for weaker, smaller states to defend their sovereignty from being consumed by the power politics of their more powerful neighbors. Their neutrality, however, was maintained through a cautious balance of power practiced by larger states in both multipolar and bipolar systems. Neorealism, systems theory and geopolitics thus offer an explanation of why Sweden, Austria, and Finland adopted neutrality policies but fail to answer why they have retained these policies in
an era bereft of major security concerns. Constructivists point to neutrality as an icon of national identity and public support, but politicians in all three cases have clearly worked against these normative qualities in order to integrate economically and politically within the EU. With its focus on low politics, integration and interdependence, neoliberalism and neofunctionalism provide a sufficient framework to understanding how Finland, Austria and Sweden have redefined neutrality to a very narrow definition of “military non-alignment”.

However, even in the, the neutrals’ affiliation with NATO and the fact that they are ultimately subject to its security structure raise questions about the worth of neutrality. The neutrals have negotiated hard in the EU to maintain some semblance of traditional neutrality to maintain credibility among voters, but the fact remains that, unless they opt-out (an unlikely and economically adverse choice) they are subject to supporting the EU and its security strategy. With European economies and institutions integrating and centralizing, the traditional model of neutrality as an autarkic preserve from the rest of the world is folly. Would it be possible for Sweden, Austria, and Finland to retreat in such a manner if the EU were invaded? Would they sit outside a security structure to foil terrorist activities, the relatively new face of global conflict and security issues? The evidence presented suggests that they would not. As a foreign policy, politicians have plucked neutrality of its substance to an extent that it can hardly be considered of the same vein as traditional or Cold War understandings, despite the public’s attachment to these antiquated ideals. Neutrality has been reduced to an identity with which politicians have to struggle (Austria and Sweden) and a tool to calm the Russian bear (Finland). It is paradoxical to adhere to “military non-alliance” while associating closely with partner organizations to NATO and working within its security architecture, as the Finnish foreign minister so deftly pointed out to his Russian counterpart. As Europe continues to integrate, pressures to conform to the developing ESS may induce more new evaluations and redefinitions of neutrality. Neutrality may survive as a vestige of national identity, but for all practical purposes, neutrality has significantly diminished as a substantive description of the foreign policies of these (more aptly named) post-neutral European states.

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Gubernatorial Influence in Federal Policy Implementation: Evidence from the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Program

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The literature on federal policy implementation in the United States generally finds that governors exercise little influence in the implementation process. Evidence challenging this literature is found in the implementation of the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Program (PCIP), which delegated the responsibility of establishing temporary, high-risk insurance pools to the 50 states under the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA). Using OLS regression, this study seeks to explain why some states implemented the high-risk pools more successfully than others in terms of pool enrollment. The author hypothesizes that PCIP enrollment will be lower in states led by governors politically opposed to ACA. The data used in this study is primarily provided by the National Council of State Legislatures. The results show that primacy, or whether the state or national government operates the high-risk insurance pool within the state, is the principal determinant of success in PCIP implementation. Enrollment is significantly lower in states with national primacy. Follow-up analysis shows that governors politically opposed to ACA were significantly more likely to choose national primacy in PCIP for their states. The author concludes that governors, while not directly affecting enrollment, affect the success of PCIP implementation by deciding primacy.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) signed into law by President Barack Obama in March 2010 established the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Program (PCIP). This program creates temporary, federally-funded health insurance pools for high-risk individuals previously denied coverage by private insurance companies. PCIP entails the operation of 51 insurance pools (one in each state and the District of Columbia) until 2014, when insurance companies will be prohibited from denying coverage to individuals based on pre-existing health conditions. Despite initial fears that PCIP resources would quickly be overwhelmed by high demand (Pollack 2010), current enrollment numbers in the pools constitute only a fraction of enrollment capacity. However, PCIP enrollment varies substantially across states. In some states, PCIP has been much more successful in adding the uninsured to its rolls than in others. What explains the variation in state PCIP enrollment?

This study examines the power of a governor and whether his or her support affects the implementation process in terms of PCIP enrollment. While the academic literature concludes that governors hold little power enforcing federal policy (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Miller 1987), evidence suggests that, in the case of PCIP, governors
indeed are influential in the implementation process. First, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) contacted governors in the initial stages of PCIP implementation asking that they decide whether the state or DHHS would operate the state’s high-risk insurance pool. Therefore, governors had some power to determine state primacy in PCIP implementation. Whether or not a state agency has primacy may affect the success of the program. Second, media reports observed that most states rejecting primacy in PCIP were led by Republican governors (e.g. Hilzenrath 2010), suggesting that these governors were not interested in implementing a federal policy at odds with their party’s platform. Third, PCIP is in many cases operated by state bureaucrats who are largely accountable to the governor (Elling 1992; Miller and Wright 2009).

My argument proceeds as follows: First, I discuss theories of federalism and state policy implementation, placing PCIP in the context of these literatures. I hypothesize that PCIP enrollment increases as political support for the ACA by a state’s governor increases. If a governor supports the ACA, he or she will strive to ensure better implementation of PCIP at the state level. With better implementation, enrollment numbers in PCIP will increase. Next, I empirically test my hypothesis using OLS regression. Finally, I discuss the results, which suggest that governors’ political calculations in deciding whether to direct their states to operate the insurance pools or to leave their operation to the federal government, affects the success of the pools’ implementation. This study contributes to our understanding of how state governments interact with the federal government to implement national policy, and the extent to which state governments can exert influence over federal policy. In turn, the findings may have greater implications for American policymakers in deciding who will implement policy and how policy will be implemented in the future.

Literature Review

The literature on federal policy implementation suggests that governors exert little influence over the implementation process. The dominant theories of federalism (cooperative and coercive federalism) treat states as unitary governments acting in solidarity with one another (Cho and Wright 2001; Kincaid 1990; Zimmerman 2005). This notion does not account for the fact that state-level political actors (within states and across them) do not share the exact same policy goals. The literature also suggests that state legislatures and bureaucracies exercise more influence over the policy implementation process in states than do governors, though the work is far from conclusive (Barrilleaux 1999; Elling 2004; Gerber, Maestas, and Domestrius 2002; Miller and Wright 2009). The examination here sheds much needed light on governors’ roles in implementing federal policy.
Scholars have formulated two primary competing theories seeking to explain relations between national and state governments in the United States. Bulman-Pozen and Gerken (2009) describe the federalism literature as split between views of federalism as “cooperative” and “uncooperative.” Under cooperative federalism states act as subordinates to the national government, carrying out federal policy as allies. This strategy largely rests on federal provision of grants-in-aid to state government to incentivize, rather than coerce, state governments to enforce federal policy (Cho and Wright 2001). States preserve a semblance of autonomy in having greater flexibility to create policy specific to local conditions, as in the case of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) (McGrath 2009). Kincaid (1990) identifies cooperative federalism as the dominant form of federalism in the Postwar era, when a rising need to address national issues like racism and pollution spurred the federal government to take a more active role in setting priorities for states.

Alternatively under uncooperative federalism, states rival the national government, challenging federal policy. This often occurs when state authority is preempted by the national government with minimal allowance being made for state actors to shape the policy they are charged with implementing, such as in the case of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) (Shelly 2008). This theory of intergovernmental relations has gained steam since the 1970s, when Congress began to set stricter national standards in regulation and precluded states’ ability to influence implementation (Kincaid 1990). In fact, Zimmerman (2005) finds that more than two-thirds of this coercive legislation was approved by the federal government after 1965. States subsequently resisted implementation due to their strong resentment of top-down federal mandates (Conlan and Beam 2002).

Although different pieces of legislation support both cooperative and uncooperative federalism, neither of these theories fully captures the complexity of the federal policy implementation process. First, in both cooperative and uncooperative federalism, the state is a single entity subject to the demands of the federal government. These theories make no consideration of the competing goals and motivations of state-level political actors and bureaucrats, choosing instead to treat these diverse state actors as one entity.

Second, in many cases, federal policy includes elements of both cooperative and uncooperative federalism. PCIP is one of these cases. PCIP follows the model of partial preemption, a nuanced legislative mechanism (Woods 2008). In cases of partial preemption, states are allowed to decide the manner in which to enforce a regulation or policy on the condition that it meets minimum federal standards. Similarly under ACA, states have some choice in the manner in which they implement PCIP. A federally-approved high-risk insurance pool must be instituted in all states, but states may opt to administer the
program themselves or allow federal agencies to operate the insurance pools. States that operate their own high-risk insurance pools have “primacy” in the policy implementation process.

A third theory of federalism explains the forces at work in PCIP and rectifies the shortcomings of the two aforementioned theories. Conlan (2006) describes “opportunistic federalism,” in which state-level actors pursue their short-term political interests in enforcing federal policy regardless of the broader implications of their actions. In other words, politicians at the subnational level are likely to allow federal policy to preempt state policy if it aligns with their policy goals and preferences, even if it means ceding state sovereignty or rewriting the rules of federal-state relations.

PCIP provides an opportunity to test this third theory of opportunistic federalism. Whereas some states have welcomed the opportunity to operate their own pools, others have rejected the responsibility and allowed the federal Department of Health and Human Services to administer the pools within their domain. The states’ option to choose who operates PCIP allows for an examination of how closely their choices align with the policy goals expressed by state-level political actors.

Following the theory of opportunistic federalism, I propose that the policy goals of the governor carry the most weight in the implementation process. In the past, political scientists have discounted the influence of governors in the policymaking and implementation process, opting instead to emphasize the influence of the state legislature (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003; Miller 1987). The adoption of this norm may be a result of Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s (1993) finding that governors are essentially inconsequential in the policymaking process. Other scholars posit that governors have influence equal to that of other state institutions, if not more, depending on the individual governors’ formal institutional powers (Elling 1992; Hebert 2000). Furthermore, the greater the public support enjoyed by the governor, the greater the influence he or she wields over bureaucratic decision-making (Dometrius 2002). Thus, some scholarly work indicates that under certain conditions governors wield significant influence in the state policy implementation process, and that this influence carries over when a state bureaucracy must implement federal policy. Examining PCIP implementation, as I do here, provides an opportunity to analyze governors’ influence in the federal policy implementation process.

While I hypothesize that governors exert significant influence over federal policy implementation, the effect of other state institutions must be taken into account. Legislatures may exercise ex post and ex ante reviews of state agencies, such as modification of agency programs, confirmation of agency heads, and conducts investigations and hearings, to exert oversight control (Elling 2004; Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius 2002). When legislatures regu-
larly conduct reviews, state agency heads perceive the state legislature to have great power over the bureaucracy; however, such a review can be checked by gubernatorial intervention (Elling 1992). Taking the wide array of legislative oversight options into account, models developed by Elling as well as Brudney and Hebert (1987) are unable to explain more than 5% of the variance of sources of external influence over a state agency. This result contrasts with their explanations of variance in gubernatorial influence at 14% and 20% respectively. These findings evince a disagreement in the literature regarding the effects of governors and legislatures and indicate that while legislatures have many means of exercising agency oversight, no single, common oversight mechanism can cause a significant alteration in an agency’s course of action. Nonetheless, Elling finds that when legislatures are more professionalized and in session for longer periods of time, they exercise greater influence over state agencies (1992).

The legislature, then, is perceived to have somewhat limited influence over the bureaucracy and thus the policy implementation process. What about the bureaucracy itself, the body of actors which implements the policy first-hand? Some scholars believe the state agency, when it is directly responsible for policy implementation, has more direct influence over the outcome of the policy implementation process than any other single actor (Elling 2004; Potoski and Woods 2000). State agency heads in particular play an important role in policy implementation (Barrilleaux 1999). The bureaucracy, however, does not act independently of other political institutions. Miller and Wright (2009) find that state agency heads believe the governor, state legislature, state courts, clientele groups and professional organizations have some measure of influence over the bureaucracy. Of these, agency heads perceive first the governor, then the state legislature to be most influential.

In sum, I contend that the literature understates the role of governors in policy implementation, while finding less than conclusive evidence that either the legislature or the state agencies themselves drastically affect the outcome of the policy implementation process. Based on opportunistic federalism theory, I believe that the policy goals of state-level actors are significant in the federal policy implementation process and of the state-level actors, the policy goals of the governor weigh most heavily. Consequently, I expect (a) that governors are most significant in determining how a state implements PCIP, and (b) that their decisions are based on their personal policy preferences rather than larger questions of institutional authority. My analysis will also shed light on the effects of gubernatorial power on overall effectiveness of the policy’s implementation, as evidenced by program enrollment.
Hypothesis

I hypothesize that PCIP enrollment is greater in states where gubernatorial support of ACA is greater. Because of the federalized nature of the healthcare reform law, state-level political actors have a stake in the healthcare law’s outcome. States have a vested interest in implementing ACA and may play a major role in determining the extent to which healthcare reform efforts are successful (Weil and Scheppach 2010). Governors, as principal political actors in their states, can exert significant influence over state efforts to implement federal healthcare reform. Those governors who support ACA would benefit politically from its success, while those who oppose the law would benefit from its failure. Thus, I anticipate that a governor’s support would aid the policy’s implementation, while his or her opposition to the same policy would hinder its implementation. This study investigates the extent of gubernatorial power in determining whether a policy is successfully or unsuccessfully implemented.

Data and Methods

In order to determine the causes of variation in state PCIP enrollment numbers, this study primarily utilizes data published by the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL 2011). The dependent variable in this study is state per capita PCIP enrollment. State PCIP enrollment figures were collected by NCSL in February 2011 and April 2011. Enrollment is divided by state population (in thousands) according to the 2010 U.S. Census in order to control for discrepancies between densely and sparsely populated states. For example, an enrollment number of 61 in Alabama in February 2011 is divided by a state population of 4779.736 thousand residents, producing a value of 0.01904. Population-adjusted state PCIP enrollment ranges from 0.0105 in Maine to 0.2512 in Pennsylvania. Appendix 1 provides a full list of enrollment figures.

The key independent variable in this study is gubernatorial support or opposition to the Affordable Care Act. The party of the governor serves as a proxy for political support in this instance. A dummy variable is constructed, \(^1\) The original intent of this project was to construct an index variable incorporating both the governor’s party and the governor’s stated support for or opposition to ACA. Press statements and media reports about governors’ stances on healthcare reform were collected, with opposed governors assigned a “1” and supportive or indifferent governors receiving a “0.” However, during the collection of these reports it quickly became apparent that the correlation between party and support for the bill would be too high to produce a meaningful difference in results. To my knowledge, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger (R-CA) was the only governor who broke party ranks in support of the Affordable Care Act. I chose to use the party proxy for the sake of parsimony.
assigning Republican governors a value of “1” and non-Republican governors a value of “0.” The election and appointment of several new governors in the midst of the PCIP implementation process were taken into account. February 2011 enrollment figures were paired with the governors in office at the time of the passage of ACA in March 2010. These governors either did not face reelection in the 2010 midterms or remained in office until January 2011, and thus were in office for the majority of the time between when PCIP enrollment was opened in August 2010 and when data were collected in February 2011. If a new governor won election or took office in 2010, he or she was paired with the second round of enrollment figures in April 2011, since that new governor would be responsible for any increase in enrollment in the period between February and April.

A second manner in which to examine gubernatorial influence is to examine whether a state holds primacy, the condition in which states take the lead in federal policy implementation, in PCIP. Governors held decisive power in determining primacy (HHS 2010). Primacy is represented through use of a dummy variable. States where PCIP is administered by the federal DHHS (“national primacy”) are coded “1.” States administering PCIP independently (“state primacy”) are coded “0.” Whether the national or state government has primacy in enforcing ACA may be an important factor in this analysis, as enrollment may vary depending whether a state agency or DHHS holds responsibility for the program’s implementation. NCSL data provided information for this dummy variable.

Support for or opposition to ACA among other state-level political actors must also be controlled for. Two actors are examined: the state legislature and the state insurance commissioner (or equivalent position). State legislatures may also play a role in influencing individuals’ decisions to enroll in PCIP or not. If the state legislature passes legislation or a resolution in one or both houses decrying ACA as unconstitutional, this creates further uncertainty and could drive down enrollment for the same reasons as above. State legislative opposition to ACA is measured by a dummy variable. States that have passed legislation or a resolution against the ACA are coded “1,” while states that have not passed such legislation or a resolution receive a value of “0.” Data for this variable was obtained from a separate NCSL report (Cauchi 2011).

The vigor with which state insurance commissioners attempt to register individuals for PCIP insurance may be a function of three interacting factors: (a) their personal level of political support for ACA, (b) the governor’s level of political support for ACA and (c) how accountable they are to the governor. As in the case of governors, the party of the insurance commissioner is used as a proxy to measure opposition to healthcare reform, with Republicans coded “1” and non-Republicans coded “0.” Accountability to the governor may override
an insurance commissioner’s personal feeling toward ACA in determining the enthusiasm with which he or she implements PCIP. A dummy variable differentiating between insurance commissioners that are appointed by the governor (“1”) and those that are popularly elected (“0”) measures accountability. But state insurance commissioner support is only relevant in states with primacy in PCIP implementation, and thus is only included in a follow-up model examining the variance in states with primacy. Data on insurance commissioners is collected from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC 2011).

This study also utilizes several control variables. One consideration in PCIP implementation on the federal level is the amount of federal funds allocated to each state. Though each state seems to have received federal funding proportional to the state population, it may be worthwhile to consider whether large states with more overall funding are better able to register individuals in high-risk pools than are small states with less funding. Using funding allocation as a control variable also eliminates the risk of overlooking states that may have received proportionally less funding than others. Federal allocations range from $8 million in North Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming to $761 million in California. NCSL (2011) data provided information for this variable as well.

Another factor likely important in determining whether an individual enrolls in PCIP is the financial cost of enrollment. Following microeconomic logic, individuals would become less likely to enroll as insurance premiums increase. The measure controlling for premium costs used here is the average premium for a 50-year-old enrollee in a state’s most popular PCIP insurance plan. Monthly average premiums in this category range from $240 in Utah to $1048 in Alaska. Data for this variable is obtained from the July 2011 GAO Report on PCIP implementation.2

I further control for state poverty rates. It seems a valid assumption that in states with a greater concentration of poverty, enrollment may be higher due to the existence of a larger number of individuals without access to standard health insurance. State poverty rates range from 7.8% in New Hampshire to 23.1% in Mississippi. The 2009 American Community Survey (Bishaw and Macartney 2011) supplied data on state poverty.

2A further consideration is the existence of high-risk insurance pools in states before the passage of ACA. Federal rules do not allow consumers to switch from standing state high-risk pools to PCIP pools. PCIP enrollment, then, may be lower in states with standing pools because individuals with pre-existing conditions in those states are more likely to have insurance and thus be ineligible for PCIP. Initial models accounted for this possibility both by dummy variable (“1” if state already had an existing pool, “0” if not) and by enrollment in the standing pool. Neither variable displayed significance in any model and both were excluded from the final model below.
Legal opposition to ACA among states is taken into account. Opposition is measured by dummy variable, with “1” representing a state that has filed a lawsuit against the federal government over ACA and “0” representing no lawsuit. In states that have filed lawsuits alleging ACA is unconstitutional, PCIP enrollment will be lower because of uncertainty surrounding the legality and sustainability of that insurance. The lawsuit indicates to consumers that the state does not support PCIP and is actively attempting to eliminate the program. Individuals assumedly would be hesitant to pay premiums for health insurance if they doubt that they will be able to draw upon that insurance when they need medical treatment. Information about the lawsuit and plaintiffs was collected from the Office of the Attorney General of Florida (2011).

As this study examines gubernatorial impact on PCIP enrollment, it must control for the institutional power that each governor possesses. To control for this, I use a variable that is represented by the Gubernatorial Powers Index (Beyle 2007). Governors receive a value between 0 and 5, with less powerful governors assigned lower values and more powerful governors assigned higher values. The range of these values extends from a 2.5 rating for the governor of Vermont to a 4.3 rating for the governor of Massachusetts. Governors with less institutional power in their state may be expected to exert less influence over PCIP implementation compared with governors possessing greater institutional power.

This study employs an OLS multivariate regression test of gubernatorial influence over PCIP implementation, using per capita PCIP enrollment as an interval-level dependent variable. This test examines factors leading enrollment to be greater in some states than others. This analysis excludes Vermont and Massachusetts, two states that have enacted healthcare reform laws in recent years that seem to have eliminated the need to establish PCIP in those states. Vermont had no PCIP enrollees at the time NCSL data was made available; Massachusetts had only one. The District of Columbia, which has its own federally operated high-risk pool under PCIP, is also excluded from the analysis due to the lack of corresponding state institutions. Two observations are reported from each of the remaining 48 states for a total (N=96), in February 2011 and April 2011.

Results

The empirical analysis provides mixed support for the hypothesis that the gov-

Concerns arose during the research process that enrollment in February would be
counted a second time with the addition of April enrollment numbers, thus skewing the results
even when data is clustered by states. However, models using only one month’s data (only
February and only April) showed the same variables were stable; variables significant in one
month remained so with the model including two months shown below.
Governor’s political support for the Affordable Care Act affects the success of PCIP implementation in his or her state. Table 1 displays the analysis of the influence of gubernatorial support on enrollment.\footnote{In later tests of my model, I included a dummy variable controlling for date of the enrollment data, with February 2011 receiving a value of “0” and April 2011 a “1.” While the coefficient for this dummy was positive and significant (indicating that enrollment increased between the months), none of the coefficients for the other variables changed significantly. Correlation between the two observation points is controlled through clustering by state.}

**Table 1: Determinants of PCIP Enrollment by State**

Multivariate Regression Model (N=96)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (Robust Std. Error)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.108 (.052)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Primacy</td>
<td>-.054*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing Condition Denial Ban</td>
<td>-.038* (.018)</td>
<td>-.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funding</td>
<td>-.00002 (.00004)</td>
<td>-.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Lawsuit</td>
<td>-.004 (.014)</td>
<td>-.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Governor</td>
<td>.002 (.010)</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Inst’l Power</td>
<td>-.007 (.013)</td>
<td>-.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>.001 (.002)</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premium</td>
<td>-.00004 (.00006)</td>
<td>-.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Op-</td>
<td>.016 (.015)</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p<0.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01 R-squared: 0.2649

Among these variables, only national primacy and standing pre-existing condition insurance denial bans are found to be significant, at the .01 and .1 levels respectively. Significantly lower enrollment is found in states with national primacy, or those in which federal DHHS administers PCIP. Holding all else constant, states with national primacy expect population-adjusted state PCIP
enrollment to be 0.054 lower than in states with primacy. Translating this figure to actual enrollment numbers, a state with a population of one million is likely to enroll 54 more individuals than a state with the same population with national primacy. For Rhode Island, a state with such a population, state primacy could account for nearly half of the program’s 115 enrollees as of April 2011. In a state with a population closer to 10 million, like Ohio, state primacy may account for as many as 540 enrollees, holding all else constant. This figure also represents just under half of the state’s April 2010 enrollment of 1145 individuals.

The existence of a standing ban on denial of private insurance for individuals with pre-existing health conditions within a state significantly lowers PCIP enrollment. A state with such a ban and a population of one million might expect up to 38 fewer PCIP enrollees, while a state with a population of ten million might expect 380 fewer enrollees. This model explained 26.49% of variance in enrollment numbers among all states included in the model. No other variable was found to be statistically significant in determining PCIP enrollment in any state. Though results of this study are largely not significant and more observations of enrollment are needed, the beta values provide clues to the relative influence of state political actors in affecting enrollment. Because of the variables’ lack of statistical significance, I examine the direction but not the absolute value of each beta. The Republican governors and legislative opposition variables show positive beta values, suggesting that, despite their opposition to ACA, they are unable to affect enrollment in PCIP. In contrast, the gubernatorial institutional powers variable shows negative beta values, the direction expected in a beta value if the governor were successful in discouraging enrollment.

Due to the primacy variable’s dominance in the initial results, further consideration was given to the determinants of state primacy through a look at correlation values. Appendix 2 displays the correlation values between all variables. Specifically, correlation between primacy and other variables included in the initial multivariate analysis were examined and can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2: Correlation of National Primacy with Other Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Correlation Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Primacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing Condition Denial</td>
<td>-0.2277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funding</td>
<td>-0.0211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Lawsuit</td>
<td>0.2212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Governor</td>
<td>0.4530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Inst. Power</td>
<td>-0.2635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.2723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premium</td>
<td>-0.2718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Opposition to ACA</td>
<td>0.1917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One variable that correlates with national primacy more than any other variable is the party of the governor at the time the state decided whether the state or federal government should have primacy in PCIP implementation. The correlation between national primacy and states with Republican governors was 0.4530, while nearly all other variables correlated positively or negatively with national primacy between .1917 and .2723. This high level of correlation between the party of the governor and national primacy may have produced an interaction effect in the initial test.

Due to this correlation, a multivariate regression was employed to separately examine states with primacy and states with national primacy. The results for states with state primacy are displayed in Table 3. For this model, all variables remained the same except for the addition of the variable examining insurance commissioner election. The insurance commissioner variable is added here and not elsewhere because the insurance commissioner is only expected to exert influence over PCIP implementation in states which have primacy. In this model only the pre-existing condition denial ban was found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, for a state with a population of one million and with primacy in PCIP, enrollment could be lower by 43 individuals in states with such a ban; for a state with a population of ten million and primacy, enrollment may have 430 fewer individuals. These variables explained 16.31\% of the variance in enrollment numbers among states with primacy. As in the initial model, beta values in this model hint at the amount of influence each state actor holds in terms of direction. Positive beta values again result for Republican governors and legislative opposition. Interestingly, gubernatorial institutional power surfaces as a positive value, the implication of which will be discussed below.
Table 3: Determinants of PCIP Enrollment among States with State Primacy

Multivariate Regression Model (N=54)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (Robust Std. Error)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.033 (.089)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-existing Condition Denial Ban</td>
<td>-.043** (.020)</td>
<td>-.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funding</td>
<td>-.00006 (.00007)</td>
<td>-.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Lawsuit</td>
<td>-.016 (.023)</td>
<td>-.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Governor</td>
<td>.007 (.013)</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Inst’l Power</td>
<td>.010 (.023)</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>.003 (.003)</td>
<td>.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premium</td>
<td>-.00005 (.00007)</td>
<td>-.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Opposition</td>
<td>.010 (.022)</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Insurance Commissioner</td>
<td>.004 (.089)</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p<0.1, ** = p<.05, *** = p<.01 R-squared: 0.1631

Table 4 displays results of the multivariate regression performed among states without primacy. Here the insurance commissioner variable is omitted, as is the pre-existing condition denial ban variable. State insurance commissioners are not expected to have influence over PCIP when the federal government has primacy in its implementation. No states that elected national primacy prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions. No variable is found to be statistically significant in this analysis, but they account for 30.96% of variation in enrollment. In this model, beta values act more in contrast to the previous two models. As in the previous two regressions, legislative opposition receives a positive value, suggesting that the legislature has little influence to affect its agenda over federal policy implementation. Both the governor’s party and institutional powers
result in a negative value. These findings, in combination with the previous two models, suggest that when a governor is politically opposed to ACA and is imbued with strong institutional power, he or she has a very strong influence on PCIP implementation, especially in comparison with other state political actors.

Table 4: Determinants of PCIP Enrollment among States with National Primacy
Multivariate Regression Model (N=42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients (Robust Std. Error)</th>
<th>Beta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.122 (.090)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Funding</td>
<td>.00005 (.00004)</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA Lawsuit</td>
<td>.012 (.011)</td>
<td>.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Governor</td>
<td>-.011 (.010)</td>
<td>-.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. Inst’l Power</td>
<td>-.024 (.017)</td>
<td>-.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)</td>
<td>-.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premium</td>
<td>.00002 (.00001)</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature Opposition</td>
<td>.017 (.010)</td>
<td>.337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01 R-squared: 0.3096

Due to the seeming importance of party to the decision of whether the state or federal government should have primacy, a cross-tab analysis was conducted between the two variables. Table 5 shows the results of this test. Fifteen of the 21 governors (or ~71%) in states with national primacy over PCIP were Republican. In contrast only seven of the 27 governors (or ~26%) in states with state primacy over PCIP were Republican. The results are significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the party of the governor, and by proxy his or her political support for ACA, is significant in determining whether a state has primacy in PCIP implementation. Appendix 3 features a categorization of states by governor’s party and primacy.
Table 5: State Primacy by Party of Governor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dem. or Ind. Governor</th>
<th>GOP Governor</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Primacy</td>
<td>20 (76.92%)</td>
<td>7 (31.82%)</td>
<td>27 (56.25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Primacy</td>
<td>6 (23.08%)</td>
<td>15 (68.18%)</td>
<td>21 (43.75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26 (100.00%)</td>
<td>22 (100.00%)</td>
<td>48 (100.00%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi Squared: 9.8515  
Correlation: 0.4530

Discussion

The hypothesis that PCIP enrollment is greater in states where gubernatorial political support for ACA is stronger is partially affirmed. Multivariate regression tests in all three models (those of all states, states with primacy, and states with national primacy) showed that the party of the governor is not statistically significant in determining enrollment. Thus, no evidence presented here can yield the conclusion that governors affect enrollment simply by their public support for or opposition to healthcare reform. The primary statistically significant variable determining enrollment in this study is instead primacy. States with primacy in PCIP implementation have higher enrollment numbers. States with national primacy, in which the federal DHHS operates high-risk insurance pools, have lower enrollment numbers. National primacy was shown to correlate highly with the presence of a Republican governor, and subsequent cross-tab analysis revealed statistical significance in states with Republican governors electing national primacy in PCIP implementation. Therefore, the conclusion can be reached that governors play an important role in the successful implementation of PCIP in that they can determine, or influence the process of determining, who has primacy.

Furthermore, beta analysis hints at the possibility that gubernatorial institutional power plays a much stronger role in determining PCIP enrollment than do the governor’s party or the legislature. Among states with primacy, highly correlated with governors supportive of ACA, institutional power has a positive effect on enrollment. In states with national primacy, institutional power has a negative effect. The ACA lawsuit does not move in the expected direction in each of the primacy models and the results are thus indeterminate about its effect on enrollment. Legislative opposition to a bill paradoxically seems to have a positive effect on enrollment in all three models. These results suggest that if an institutionally powerful governor opposes ACA in a state
with national primacy, enrollment will decline. On the other hand, the opposite effect occurs with an institutionally powerful, supportive governor in a state with primacy. At the same time, attorneys general and legislatures appear unable to affect PCIP enrollment in a negative manner if they oppose ACA.

This conclusion has important implications for federal-state relations in future cases of federal policy implementation. In the case of PCIP, when states and their corresponding agencies have primacy and take the lead in policy implementation effort, federal policy is more successfully implemented. State political actors, especially governors, play a role in determining the success of a federal policy by deciding whether their state has primacy. These actors, in support of a federal policy, may show their support in directing the state bureaucracy to implement the policy or voice their opposition in allowing the federal government to implement the policy in their state. These initial tests point towards governors having the greatest amount of influence of all state actors in cases of both state and national primacy.

In addition to providing answers, these findings raise further questions. This conclusion, though indicating that a governor plays a role in determining primacy and thus affects federal policy outcomes, does not decisively reveal the extent to which a governor has power over implementation in relation to other state political actors. However, through analysis of beta values, the results raise the possibility that the governor has a greater relative amount of influence over PCIP implementation in the two months observed than other state political actors. Future investigations should incorporate more observations into the dataset in order to support or dismiss the finding suggested by beta analysis. Finally, this study does not necessarily provide clues to the role of governors and other state political actors in other forms of federal policy implementation besides partial preemption, such as cooperative or conjoint federalism.

It remains to be seen what, if any, further role governors play in the implementation process. A refinement of this research may take the state agency more fully into account as a decisive actor in the implementation process. Do certain PCIP implementation strategies, such as program promotions and outreach campaigns, lead to higher enrollment? Future research should focus on defining more precisely the role of state political actors in the implementation of federal policy. Specifically in PCIP, motivations for individuals to enroll should also be examined. Do political messages about ACA relayed to consumers through politicians, mass media and peer groups affect personal opinion of the law to the extent that individuals may not be willing to enroll in PCIP? Does the uncertainty of the law’s constitutionality drive down enrollment? Though these questions lay beyond the scope of this analysis, the answers will contribute more broadly to an understanding of the how the state
government functions when required to implement federal policy

This study faces restrictions in methodology. Several variables used in this analysis do not perfectly capture the concepts they are established to measure. Governor’s party is used only as a proxy for ACA support. Though this measure adequately captures the governors’ stated opinions in favor of or against ACA, the reliance on a binary variable of “support” or “oppose” may not adequately reflect the degree to which governors support or oppose the law and take action according to their beliefs. Furthermore, the election or appointment of a state insurance commissioner does not fully explain their accountability to the governor nor embody the effectiveness of the agency enrolling individuals in PCIP. The analysis is further limited by a small N-size and may be improved with the addition of further enrollment data as measured by NCSL.

Conclusion

State implementation of the Pre-existing Condition Insurance Program (PCIP) provides evidence that governors play an influential role in the federal policy implementation process. PCIP, established under the Affordable Care Act, requires each state to maintain a temporary high-risk insurance pool for citizens unable to obtain health insurance on the private market because of pre-existing conditions. Each state has the option of operating a health pool itself or allowing the federal government to operate a pool within the state. Federal operation, or federal primacy, enrolled significantly fewer patients in the pools, and Republican governors, politically opposed to the ACA, were significantly more likely to choose federal primacy for their state. Consequently, I conclude that governors play a decisive role in the success or failure of PCIP by deciding, or contributing to the decision, whether the state or federal government has primacy.

References


## Appendix 1: Enrollment Figures, Population-Adjusted State PCIP

### Enrollment and Primacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Gubernatorial Influence in Federal Policy Implementation

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*State has primacy in PCIP implementation
^Case omitted from multivariate regression

Falls in upper quartile of April 2011 population-adjusted enrollment
### Appendix 2: Correlations Chart in February 2011 Observation

![Correlation Chart]

### Appendix 3: State Primacy by Governor’s Party

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*State had no previously standing high-risk insurance pool*
Telling the Truth: An Examination of the Publication and Presentation of Truth Commission Findings

Lindsay Harroff, Furman University

Truth commissions offer a powerful tool for transitional societies to account for crimes in the past as a means of moving towards a more promising future. However, the study of truth commissions is relatively new, and scholars still understand little about how they function and influence society. This study introduces a comprehensive database of truth commissions and uses both a cross-sectional analysis of truth commissions and a comparative case-study analysis to examine variations in how truth commission findings are presented to the public and how these variations influence public reaction and the extent to which the government implements the commission’s recommendations. Specifically, I examine the publication of a truth commission’s report and whether or not a government official formally endorses the report and publicly apologizes on behalf of the state. The findings of this study suggest that ensuring public access to the commission’s report and publicly acknowledging and accepting the commission’s findings can increase its positive impact. Furthermore, this study offers a new theoretical perspective to understand how truth commissions contribute to truth, justice, and reconciliation.

Hannah Arendt (1958) writes, “Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we would never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever” (237). For as long as humans have lived in groups, they have encountered conflict and had to develop means to recover from it in order to preserve the benefits of communal living. The wave of democratization that began in the 1970s, accelerated by the decline of the Cold War, gave rise to a new set of circumstances: the transition from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes to democratic ones. Truth commissions offer a powerful tool for transitional societies to deal with violent pasts with the hope of moving towards a more promising future.

Although truth commissions have gained considerable prominence in recent years, the study of truth commissions is relatively new and scholars still understand little about how they function and influence society. Questions of how truth commissions contribute to concepts of truth, justice, and reconciliation dominate the current literature. These studies are limited by a lack of comparable data on the universe of truth commission cases. Additionally, studies tend to focus on variations in the structure and mandate of the commission. Variations such as the nature of the mandate, funding, composition, naming names, application of amnesty, timing, and role of external actors are
often subjects of study (Brahm 2007; Hayner 1994). Many scholars recognize the importance of producing a publicly accessible report, but little attention has been paid to variations in how the commissions’ findings are presented to the public or the possible effects of these variations (Backer 2003; Borer 2006; Crocker 2000; Hayner 1994, 1996; Mazzei 2011; Rotberg 2000; Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 2000).

To address these gaps in the study of truth commissions, this paper presents a comprehensive and descriptive truth commission database with explicit criteria to define the universe of cases and variables concerned with the commissions’ presentation of findings to the public. Specifically, this study focuses on the publication of the commission’s report and whether or not the government endorses the findings and apologizes on behalf of the state for the abuses. First, I discuss some theoretical questions and suggest how this study contributes to the answers of these questions. After describing my analytical approach in greater detail, I review the observed variations across all identified truth commissions in the database presented here. Finally, I examine these variations, as well as public and government responses, through a comparative case study analysis of truth commissions and subsequent communicative acts in Chile, Haiti, and El Salvador.

**Points of Theoretical Contestation: Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation**

Over-arching theoretical questions about truth tend to overwhelm the literature on truth commissions. These issues include the capacity of truth commissions to provide truth, justice, and reconciliation. Examining the ways in which the public encounters the commission’s findings provides a new theoretical perspective for evaluating these questions.

A contentious issue in the literature is the extent to which truth commissions can discern and transmit the truth. Many scholars recognize that the public holds many and often contrary “truths,” and there cannot be one official truth (Alidu et al. 2009; Borer 2006; Crocker 2000; Hayner 2001; Rotberg 2000; Rushton 2006; Villa-Vicenio and Verwoerd 2000). Rushton (2006) and Rotberg (2000) warn against attempting to create a single truth, contending that continuing controversy and dialogue about the past is necessary for democracy. Hayner (2001), however, maintains that some facts are fundamental enough that broad acceptance of their truth is necessary for the purposes of reconciliation. The ways in which commissions present their findings and officials acknowledge and endorse these particular “truth(s)” revealed by the commissions demonstrate how government officials navigate multiple and contentious truths to both encourage the nation to accept a unified narrative of the past and create a space for public dialogue about it.
Many scholars question the extent to which truth commissions are compatible with ideals of justice. The concept of transitional justice emerged from legal scholars’ attempts to preserve principles of justice in times of political instability (Nobles 2010). Truth commissions contribute less to retributive principles than restorative. Restorative justice refers to meeting the needs of the victims and offenders to heal from the past by acknowledging the crimes of the past and establishing a means to overcome them and prevent them in the future.

Despite the linguistic association between concepts of truth and reconciliation, scholars also question the extent to which truth-telling contributes to reconciliation (Alidu et al. 2009; Borer 2006; Hayner 1994, 2001; Pankhurst 1999; Rotberg 2000; Rushton 2006). Although truth-telling can provide a cathartic effect for victims, scholars also identify potential re-traumatizing effects of truth-telling, equating it to opening an old wound (Hayner 1994, 2001; Rotberg 2000). Most of the literature supports the ability of truth commissions to contribute to reconciliation, but qualifies that truth-telling is only a part of the process (Borer 2006; Crocker 2000; Méndez 2006; Pankhurst 1999; Rushton 2006). The act of finding the truth must be supplemented with an official public acknowledgment of the past to contribute to reconciliation (Rushton 2006). Loudiy (2010) and Doxtader (2003) describe reconciliation as a rhetorical act. Loudiy (2010) characterizes reconciliation as a conversation about the past for the purpose of finding common-ground for a peaceful future. In this view, reconciliation is not something a truth commission can achieve, but an act in which it can encourage the public to participate. The acts and messages of public endorsements and apologies create symbolic grounds for reconciliation. Through the truth revealed in the report, commissions establish a common ground to engage the public in dialogue and promote forgiveness.

The Role of Publication, Endorsement, and Apology

Numerous scholars recognize the need for truth commissions to engage the public sphere to enhance the credibility of the commission, promote greater public sympathy and interaction, and provide a richer account of the past (Backer 2003; Borer 2006; Crocker 2000; Hayner 1994, 1996; Rotberg 2000; Rushton 2006; Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 2000). The truth revealed through the investigative works of the commissions can only influence society in so far as the results are made accessible to the public. Furthermore, the way in which facts are presented influence how the public interprets and responds to them. The publication of an official report, formal endorsement of the report, and a public apology for the abuses revealed by the report, invites the public to participate in the act of reconciliation by creating a conversation about the
past to make the transformation to a more peaceful future.

**Publication of the Report**

The publication of an official report and the extent to which it is made available to the public determines the public’s ability to access, evaluate, and respond to the facts discovered by the commission. Furthermore, the publication of a report gives credibility to the commission by making its work more transparent and granting an official status to its findings. Greater public access also increases pressure on the government to act in keeping with the commission’s recommendations. Finally, greater public awareness increases the recognition of past violence and the necessity to protect human rights and prevent reoccurrences. Thus, I theorize that in countries in which the public has greater access to the findings of truth commissions there is a greater positive impact than in those countries where public access is restricted.

**Official Endorsement**

On its own, an official report may not be enough to convince the public to accept the findings as truth. The publication of an official report is often required by the commission’s mandate, limiting the symbolic significance of the act. Furthermore, the report only offers a dispassionate review of the facts uncovered by the commission. Political officials can further increase the credibility and awareness of a truth commission’s findings by formally endorsing the report. Mazzei (2011) observes, “The success of the endeavor, of course, requires that varying factions acknowledge the validity of the commission’s findings” (436). The voluntary act of a public leader assuming accountability for a commission’s findings, and the message he or she presents, can compellingly convince a nation to accept a report’s findings about the past as the truth and reject contesting truths. Furthermore, this act gives the report a human voice, introducing the opportunity for human response and the discussion necessary for reconciliation. Theoretically, I suggest a truth commission will have a greater positive impact if a leading government official publicly acknowledges the findings.

**Public Apology**

The public distribution of a report that reveals extensive violence and atrocities also has the potential to incite further violence and retaliation. Because truth commissions are primarily investigatory bodies, they lack the ability to punish the perpetrators they identify. This can leave victims dissatisfied and
resentful about the impunity and lack of justice, while even the limited mea-
ures of accountability may provoke perpetrators to retaliate (Brahm 2007).
Public apologies can help counter-act these negative responses through gov-
ernment officials taking responsibility for the abuses, rebuilding public faith
in the state, and restoring dignity to victims. According to Nobles (2008),
“They [apologies] not only publicly ratify certain reinterpretations of history,
but they also morally judge, assign responsibility, and introduce expectations
about what acknowledgment of that history requires. Thus, although apologies
focus our attention on the past, they also have implications for the future” (2).
Through apology, a leader can direct the public’s response away from violence
and towards reconciliation.

A public apology is also a symbolic act that can contribute to national
unity. Dodds (2003) explains that when an individual represents a nation to
officially apologize, individuals are necessarily transformed into a collective.
By apologizing on behalf of the perpetrators, the individual challenges identi-
tarian logic that perpetuates divisions between victims and perpetrators.
Furthermore, the public apology recognizes that although the individual or current
government may not be directly responsible for the crimes, society as a whole
played a part. Finally, a public apology establishes a space for the public,
both victims and perpetrators, to participate in the dialogue of reconciliation
through a request for forgiveness. Therefore, I theorize that a truth commission
will have a greater positive impact if a government official publicly accepts
collective responsibility on behalf of the state and apologizes for the abuses.
Although the sincerity and comprehensiveness of the apology could further
influence the truth commission’s impact, this level of analysis is beyond the
scope of this study.

Research Design and Methodology

Identifying Truth Commissions

To identify the universe of cases of official truth commissions, I compared
the lists compiled by Dancy et al. (2010), Hayner (2001), the United States
Institute of Peace Truth Commission Digital Collection (2011) and the Justice
in Perspective project by The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconc-
ciliation (2007). Where these lists differed, I applied the following criteria for
inclusion:

• A truth commission was established as an independent entity to exist
for a temporary period of time.
• The commission was officially sanctioned by the state.

• The commission’s mandate includes powers to investigate a pattern of human rights abuses—such as torture, extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, and political imprisonment—committed by state actors and/or armed forces over an extended period of time, rather than surrounding a particular event.

• The commission actually began operating.

• The truth commission operated during a transitional period, within ten years of the abuses it was established to investigate.

After identifying the universe of cases, I eliminated all commissions still in operation, due to the inability to evaluate the commission’s impact in these cases. This process resulted in a list of 24 truth commission cases, spanning the years 1974 to 2009 (see Appendix 1).

Identifying Variation in the Presentation of Findings

Most, although not all, truth commissions conclude their investigations with an official written report, which becomes the officially recognized account of the events under investigation. Commission reports include details about the structure and mandate of the commission, the investigation process, the conclusions of the investigation, and recommendations for the government to prevent human rights abuses in the future. The methods by which these reports are produced, presented to and circulated amongst the public, and recognized by government officials vary widely between commissions and are the objects of analysis in this study. I examine these concepts using a variety of sources, including the commission’s official report (when available), the United States Institute of Peace Truth Commission Digital Collection, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation’s Justice in Perspective project, and official reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. I supplemented and verified the information provided by these sources with accounts in the news media, especially from the country where truth commission was located. News articles were especially helpful for providing information about whether a public endorsement or apology occurred.

First, I examine whether or not an official report was published, the form of publication, and how it was circulated amongst the public. Forms of publication include books, government documents, reproductions by the news media, and electronic documents available online. I also consider how accessible
the report was to the public. I classify the publication of the report into one of four categories: (1) no report was produced, (2) the report was kept confidential, (3) the report was published but still not easily available to the public, or (4) the report was published and widely distributed amongst the public.

Some political leaders issue official statements in response to truth commissions’ reports. I examine for each case whether or not a political leader publicly acknowledged the report and endorsed its findings. The sources listed above often indicated whether or not the government endorsed the commission’s findings. If this information was not reported, I searched news articles surrounding the time of the report’s completion for evidence of any public statements by the government regarding the findings.

Finally, I also consider whether or not a government official accepted collective responsibility for the abuses revealed in the report and offered a public apology to the victims and their families. For example, in an address to the Chilean public before making the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation’s findings publicly accessible, President Aylwin asked on behalf of the nation for forgiveness from the victims’ families.

Confounding Factors

Scholars have identified additional points of variation among truth commissions that require recognition. Variation exists in the length of time between the period under investigation and the establishment of the commission, the length of time the commission operates, the funding and resources given to the commissions, the identity of the commission’s sponsor, the practice of naming perpetrators identified in the investigations, and the application of amnesty (Brahm 2007; Dancy et al. 2010; Hayner 1994, 2001). Because these differences could influence the ability of the commission to impact society, I consider their possible effects when drawing any conclusions about the variables of interest in this study.

Assessing the Influence of Truth Commissions

Although scholars contend that truth commissions influence both individuals and societies, this study focuses on the societal impact. Individual-level analysis of the effects of the truth commission requires extensive surveys and focus groups over a period of time. Cross-national data to this extent is currently unavailable. Additionally, the societal impact best reflects the primary goals of truth commissions – to account for the past as a means of creating a culture of respect amongst society with regard for human rights and consolidated democratic institutions.
It is important to note that the societal impact of a commission, as examined here, is not necessarily synonymous with “success” as dictated by the terms of its mandate. Because the findings of the commission ideally are adopted as the official account of the truth, evaluating truth commissions in this manner becomes tautological. Instead, I examine the public reaction to the truth commission and the extent to which the government implements the commission’s recommendations. These measures include the generation of public discourse, levels of civil violence, implementation of institutional reforms to prevent future human rights abuses, and recommended reparations to victims and their relatives.

**Methodology**

This study uses a two-stage qualitative analysis. I first compare variations in the public presentation of truth commission findings and then examine the relationship between these variations and the truth commission’s impact, through a detailed case-study analysis of the truth commissions in Chile, Haiti, and El Salvador. I selected these cases for analysis because they display significant variation in both presentation of findings and social and political outcomes. Although I attempted to select cases that would control for many of the previously mentioned confounding factors, no possible sample of cases is identical in terms of structure and mandate. Ultimately, I decided that selecting cases that fully represented the range of variation in the variables of interest was most important to the analysis. To address this weakness, I describe multiple differences that could contribute to variations in social and political responses. I describe these responses in terms of the generation of public discourse, responses by other government officials, outbreaks of public violence, and the implementation of truth commission recommendations. The amount of information available for each of these dimensions varies across cases. However, I decided not to sacrifice detail, when available, for the sake of maintaining strict uniformity. Nevertheless, the claims to be drawn from this analysis are only as strong as those that can be supported by the minimum level of detail provided.

**Analysis of Variation in the Presentation of Findings**

The 24 truth commissions exhibit a range of approaches to reporting and publicizing commission findings. Table 1 summarizes the forms of publication and official responses to the findings of each truth commission. (See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description). On one end of the spectrum, the truth commissions in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Serbia and Montenegro failed to pro-
duce any official report. All of these commissions, however, were plagued by a lack of resources and political support and thus disbanded prematurely. Commissions in Algeria, Zimbabwe, and the first commission in Uganda each produced a report, but it was privately presented to the president and kept confidential from the public. Other commissions, such as those in Haiti, Nepal, and Uruguay, released their reports to the public but only provided limited accessibility. For example, Haiti’s report was published in French, but most Haitians can only read and write in Creole (USIP 2011). Nepal only made its report available to the public in response to pressure by various civil society groups, and the report is currently only available through the parliamentary secretariat and Nepal’s national library (USIP 2011). Most commissions made their reports widely available to the public by publishing them in print, online, and circulating the report in the media. Argentina’s truth commission published a condensed version of the official report, titled *Nunca Más: Informe de la Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparicion de Personas* (Never Again: The Report of the Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared), which sold over 500,000 copies and became a national best-seller. Forty thousand copies of the report sold in the first day, and it has been re-printed over thirty times, in multiple languages (Hayner 2001). Although Chad’s truth commission did not make its official report available to the public, it produced a two-hour documentary summarizing the report, and details were widely circulated in the media (Hayner 1994). Some commissions, such as the one in Peru, maintain an official website and provide access to the report. Sierra Leone adopted a particularly unique approach and produced a child-friendly version of the report to be distributed in grade schools (USIP 2011).

The official response to the commissions’ findings also varied considerably between the 24 commissions. In ten cases – the commissions in Argentina, Chile, Ghana, Guatemala, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Sierra Leone, and South Africa – the executive formally endorsed the commission’s findings. In eight of these ten cases, the official report was published and widely distributed amongst the public. In the remaining two cases the report was published, but with limited distribution. None of the commissions that failed to produce a report, or only published a confidential report, received a public endorsement of their findings. In some cases, such as Argentina and Chile, the executive’s endorsement of the report stood against public rejection by other branches of the government, society, or, most notably, the military.
Table 1. Presenting Truth Commission Findings

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Six of the ten public endorsements included an official apology. A government official accepted collective responsibility on behalf of the state for the abuses revealed by the commission’s findings and apologized to the victims. In most instances in which an apology was given, the head of state delivered a national address to its citizens, summarizing the truth commission’s
findings, accepting responsibility and apologizing for the crimes, and asking for forgiveness. Guatemala’s truth commission also elicited apologies from the leader of the former guerilla rebel group and U.S. President Bill Clinton, who apologized for the United States’ role in the civil war. These statements received massive public attention. Comparatively, the government of Ghana offered an official apology within the government’s white paper response to the commission’s report. The report was presented by the attorney-general at a news conference, and received significantly less public attention (Amnesty International 2007). Ghana’s truth commission specifically called for a formal presidential apology within its recommendations for reparations and rehabilitation (Migyikra 2008). In the cases where truth commissions did not receive an executive endorsement of their findings, an apology was not present. In cases such as Algeria, El Salvador, and Morocco, the head of state explicitly denied responsibility. In Morocco, the king formally endorsed the commission’s recommendations, yet refused to accept responsibility for the abuses detailed in the report. The abuses had occurred under his father’s rule, and he refused to criticize the regime. The variations in the responses to truth commission findings reflect the unique social and political circumstances of each truth commission and emphasize the difficulty of making broad comparisons across truth commissions. The following case studies of the truth commissions in Chile, Haiti, and El Salvador provide insight about how the publication of a truth commission report and the official responses after, can influence social and political responses to the truth commission.

**Case Studies**

**Engaging the Public in Chile**

On March 4, 1991 President Patricio Aylwin of Chile addressed the Chilean public and formally presented the findings of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, marking the culmination of the commission’s nine-month investigation into the human rights violations committed under the military regime of Augusto Pinochet. Aylwin officially acknowledged the commission’s primary finding that the state was responsible for widespread human rights abuses, accepted collective responsibility on behalf of the nation, and urged the public to also accept the commission’s findings.

Pinochet assumed power in Chile following a 1973 military coup d’etat that ousted President Salvador Allende. Immediately after the coup, the military seized control of all sectors of society and imprisoned or executed many political opponents, committing thousands of human rights violations. In 1974 Pinochet created the Directorate for National Intelligence (DINA), a secret
police force that systematically organized “disappearances” to exterminate political opposition. The military justified its actions as necessary measures in a subversive war against communist policies and enemies of the state (Zalaquett 1993).

Aylwin was elected President of Chile after Pinochet agreed to hold elections in 1989. Shortly after his inauguration, Aylwin established the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation, also known as the Rettig Commission, to investigate all human rights abuses resulting in death during Pinochet’s military rule from September 11, 1973 to March 11, 1990. The commission consisted of eight commissioners and 60 additional staff members.

Although significant portions of the population directly experienced the brutality of Pinochet’s regime, few people in Chile fully understood the extent of the abuses or the systematic nature of the military operation. Disparate perceptions of the past were a significant source of dispute and disagreement in society. Aylwin also faced legal constraints from an amnesty law passed by Pinochet in 1978 that exempted all politically-motivated crimes from 1973 to 1978 from prosecution; incidentally, the most violent period of Pinochet’s regime. The 1980 Constitution also allowed Pinochet to retain control over the Armed Forces and hold membership in the Senate (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation).

After nine months of investigations, the commission delivered its 1,800 page report to Aylwin on February 9, 1991. The report identified state agents as the primary parties responsible for the abuses and rejected the military’s claim that its acts were justified by a state of “internal war.” Aylwin studied the report for three weeks, before presenting it to the public on March 4, 1991. Although a limited number of copies of the official report were made publicly available, the newspaper La Nación published the report in full, and other newspapers published segments of it (Americas Watch 1992). Aylwin spoke to a highly charged political climate. Not only was the release of the report highly anticipated, but a retired army doctor who allegedly participated in torture sessions was assassinated, along with his wife, the day before Aylwin’s address. The assassination escalated the fear that revealing the extent of the atrocities would incite greater violence (Americas Watch 1992).

Aylwin began the address by emphasizing to the Chilean people that “we created the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation” to heal the “open wound in our national soul” through reconciliation “on the basis of truth and justice” (BBC 1991). He also praised the commissioners for their hard work and recognized them as “individuals of renowned prestige and moral authority in Chile,” building their credibility and, consequently, the report’s credibility. He then gave a human voice to the commission’s report, thoroughly reviewing its findings and recommendations.
After dispassionately summarizing the report, Aylwin offered his personal response to it. He formally endorsed the report and emphasized the importance of accepting its findings as the truth, stating, “The report that I am releasing today makes the truth clearer. This truth must be accepted by all considering the background of the report and the stature of its authors.” Continuing, he described how the truth laid the foundation for reconciliation and offered an official apology on behalf of the nation. “This is why I dare – as President of the Republic – to assume representation of the entire nation in begging forgiveness from the victims’ relatives” (BBC 1991).

He also addressed two common concerns for truth commissions – how a commission contributes to restorative justice and how the public responds to the impunity. In the speech, Aylwin described justice as the antithesis of revenge, telling the people that “a crime is not punished or repaired by committing a similar crime” (BBC 1991). He also explained how the truth can contribute to justice by restoring the dignity of victims who were falsely accused of crimes and identifying relatives to receive monetary reparations. He concluded with a list of actions the government was taking in response to the report to provide reparations and prevent future abuses. Aylwin’s list committed the government to “fulfill its duty in accordance with the moral principles guiding it, with no other purpose than accomplishing justice, reconciliation, and the homeland’s wellbeing,” and also a plea for the public to “accept this truth with integrity and responsibility” and to not allow “the pain, the horrors, and the just indignation push us to hate and promote violence” (BBC 1991). In addition to the few hundred people who gathered to listen to the speech in person, the speech was broadcast on national television and radio. One of Santiago’s daily newspapers, El Mercurio also reprinted the speech the following day (Americas Watch 1992). Considerable discussion about the remarks flowed through the media in the following weeks. Overall, the public response to the speech was positive (America’s Watch 1991).

The Air Force commander, General Fernando Matthei, and the Carabinero (Chile’s national police force) commander, General Rodolfo Strange, both publicly accepted the report’s findings. However, General Pinochet and Admiral Martínez Busch, the leaders of the Army and Navy, withheld any response for three weeks, before publicly rejecting the validity of the report. However, although Pinochet rejected the historical interpretation advanced by the report, he did not deny the specific crimes identified in the report.

The public discourse generated by Aylwin’s public acknowledgment of the report demonstrates a positive step towards reconciliation. However, the report also incited violent retaliations against those implicated by it. Most notably, Senator Jaime Guzmán, the legal adviser to Pinochet’s military junta, was assassinated a month after Aylwin’s address. The assassination inflamed
political divisions, with the political right blaming the left for the attack. Additionally, the government withheld distributing thousands of additional copies of the report (Americas Watch 1992). Nevertheless, there were also marked improvements in social violence. The violent legacy and widespread destitution left by Pinochet’s regime contributed to an increase in civil violence, common crimes, and terrorist movements at the time Aylwin took power. However, from 1991 to 1992, terrorist activities decreased 33 percent and armed robberies and criminal assaults decreased 36 percent (Americas Watch 1992).

Following the truth commission’s recommendation, Aylwin established the Corporation on Reparation and Reconciliation in January 1992. The corporation aimed to promote reparations and other aid to victims, assist in the search from remains of the disappeared, determine the circumstances of their deaths, organize and maintain the Rettig Commission’s files, resolve cases left open by the Rettig Commission, and make proposals to foster a culture that is respectful of human rights (Americas Watch 1992). The corporation was able to secure the equivalent of approximately 16 million U.S. dollars per year in monetary reparations to the victims’ relatives, as well as additional health and educational benefits (USIP 2011).

In his address, Aylwin asked the judiciary to not interpret the 1978 Amnesty Law as an obstacle to investigating the cases. Although the Supreme Court was at first defensive about accusations of impeding justice, it responded favorably and instructed lower courts to reopen cases forwarded by the commission (Americas Watch 1991). Since then, a number of high-profile cases have been brought to trial. The administration also passed a number of reforms to modernize the courts, increase their investigatory powers, and check abuses of power.

The Neglected Commission in Haiti

On February 5, 1996 the National Commission on Truth and Justice in Haiti presented its report to President Aristide, and the very next day Aristide stepped down to turn the office over to his elected successor President Préval. Over the next two years, only 75 copies of the report were produced. Préval’s justice minister, Pierre Max Antoine, claimed the cost of photocopying was too prohibitive. Not surprisingly, the report produced no visible impact (Human Rights Watch 1996).

After overthrowing Haiti’s President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a military coup in September 1991, General Raoul Cedras took power and led a violent campaign against Aristide’s supporters, killing more than 5,000 Haitians and committing numerous human rights violations (Quinn 2009). In 1994 U.S. troops helped put Aristide back in power. Based on the recommendations of
a community of Haitians in exile, he established the National Commission on Truth and Justice, also known as the CNVJ (its French acronym) by Presidential Decree less than six months after returning to office. The commission was comprised of seven members, three of whom were representatives of the international community due to the participation of the Organization of American States and the United Nations Permanent Mission to Haiti, with a mandate to investigate the human rights abuses that occurred between the September 1991 coup and Aristide’s return to power in September 1994 (Amnesty International 1999).

From the outset, the commission struggled from a lack of funding, resources, and political support, not least of which included the United States’ seizure and refusal to turn over materials from the Haitian military and the military government’s paramilitary arm, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (Human Rights Watch 1996). However, the commission still managed to conduct a thorough investigation, taking over 5,500 testimonies and identifying 8,667 victims (USIP 2011). Additionally, it included the names of all alleged perpetrators in its report, although its mandate precluded the ability to prosecute them (Human Rights Watch 1996). Ten months after its establishment, the commission presented its 1,200-page report Si M Pa Rele (“If I Don’t Cry Out...”) to Aristide. The commission was tied to a strict deadline, as its mandate required it to present the report directly to Aristide, who had to turn over office to his successor René Préval the next day. The report included a number of recommendations to the Haitian government, including recommendations for the creation of a Special Reparations Commission for identified victims, judicial reform, legal proceedings and sanctions against identified perpetrators, laws against sexual violence and rape, and the ratification of international human rights instruments (Amnesty International 1999).

Although Aristide created the commission, he observably distanced himself from it over the duration of its work and made no public remarks about its final report (Quinn 2009). His successor remained similarly detached. Although some of the recommendations were released to the public, Préval waited a year to make the report public, and did so largely due to international pressure by human rights advocates (Human Rights Watch 1996). Still, only 75 copies of the report were published, and the copies were printed in French, while most Haitians only speak Créole.

Quinn (2009) observes that even during its period of active work, the commission never succeeded in gaining popular support among Haitians. She attributes this weakness, in part, to the failure of the international organizations supporting the commission to fully inform and engage ordinary Haitians in the work of the commission (Quinn 2009, 269). The commission’s isolation from the Haitian public was further evident in the production of the
final report, which was written as a report for the government and never intended for consumption by ordinary Haitians (Quinn 2009). In addition to the report’s language, its conclusions primarily consisted of formal statistical analyses, rather than more easily comprehensible narratives and victim testimonies (Quinn 2009). Consequently, the report failed to generate any public discussion in the public or media. Quinn (2009) notes, “Lasting outcomes of the CNVJ are difficult to find. A collective memory that stems from the work of the Commission is conspicuously absent” (279).

The government also failed to implement most of the report’s recommendations, prosecute more than a few violators of human rights, or provide reparations to the victims and their families (Human Rights Watch 1996). Although many of the soldiers and paramilitaries of the Cédras regime were removed from power, they were never disarmed or faced any sort of punishment. Many have continued to engage in violence against the civilian government and police force (Human Rights Watch 1996). The Haitian government did follow through with the creation of the civilian police force. However, the Haitian National Police has struggled to maintain order and faces numerous allegations of ill-treatment and excessive force (Amnesty International 1998).

The most striking failure of the Haitian government has been its lack of commitment to prosecuting human rights violators or reforming the weak and corrupt judicial system (Human Rights Watch 1996). There are a few notable exceptions where the government brought a few human rights cases to trial. The results of these trials, however, were mixed. While the assassins of two well-known Aristide supporters and activists were convicted and given extended prison sentences, two men accused of assassinating Justice Minister Guy Malary were acquitted. Deficiencies in the justice system were cited as the primary cause (Amnesty International 1998). The trial of those responsible for the 1994 massacre against the citizens of the shanty town Raboteau received the most national and international attention, including praise and criticism. At the time of the trial in 2000, the Haitian government was commended for its preparation for the case, including the appointment of a special team of international lawyers to prosecute (Concannon 2001). Sixteen of the 22 defendants in custody were convicted, and the United Nations called the trial “a landmark in the fight against humanity” (Concannon 2005). However, the Supreme Court of Haiti overturned the convictions in 2005, causing an outcry of international condemnation (Amnesty International 2005; Concannon 2005). In addition to failing to provide aspects of restorative justice, the government’s lack of commitment to combat impunity angered many Haitians and contributed to continued outbreaks of vigilante violence by citizens (Human Rights Watch 1996).
Explicit Rejection in El Salvador

On March 18, 1993 President Cristiani of El Salvador addressed the Salvadoran people and formally rejected the report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, stating, “The Truth Commission report does not respond to the wishes of the majority of Salvadorans who seek to forgive and forget everything having to do with the very sorrowful past” (qtd. in Human Rights Watch 1993, 22). Only a few days later Defense Minister General Ponce claimed in a radio and television address that “the conclusions and proposals of the report distort the historic reality and make accusations that are devoid of basis and objectivity” and that the report was “unjust, incomplete, illegal, unethical, biased, and insolent” (quoted in Human Rights Watch 1993). The reactions of Cristiani and Ponce reflect the explicit rejection of the report by senior executive branch officials, the military high command, the Supreme Court, and members of the ruling political party (Human Rights Watch 1993).

Following decades of political repression and violence, increasingly radical leftist political movements began gaining popularity throughout the 1970s. Emerging from this trend, a group of leftist guerilla and political groups joined together and formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). A twelve-year civil war that took over 75,000 lives ensued between the FMLN and Salvadoran military forces, supported by the United States (Buergenthal 1994). The UN intervened and brokered a peace agreement in 1992 that included the establishment of The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. The commission was made up of three international commissioners and was given a mandate to investigate serious acts of violence that occurred after 1980 and to make recommendations to promote reconciliation. The commission had an additional twenty to thirty support staff, none of whom were Salvadoran, and received funding through a special UN fund (Buergenthal 1994). It operated for a span of eight months, collecting testimony from approximately two thousand victims and witnesses and reporting on over seven thousand cases of human rights abuses (Hayner 1991).

The commission presented its report From Madness to Hope on March 15, 1993. The report concluded that 95 percent of the abuses were committed by the government and armed forces and specifically named over forty senior members of the military, judiciary, and opposition as perpetrators. Although the report was widely distributed and well-received by the UN and human rights activists, government officials and armed forces rejected it outright. In addition to the statements by Cristiani and Ponce, all fifteen officials of the Supreme Court signed a statement denying the report’s charges against the Court and criticizing the commission for its lack of objectivity (Human Rights Watch 1993). In addition to the scathing statements mentioned above, many govern-
ment officials specifically attacked the commission’s thorough investigatory work, claiming the commission exceeded its mandate. Other officials claimed the commission’s recommendations violated the Salvadoran constitution and would destabilize the political system (Human Rights Watch 1993). Comparatively, the leader of the FMLN endorsed the report and agreed to abide by its recommendations.

After conducting a series of interviews in El Salvador in March 2003, Mazzei (2011) concluded that the civil war era discourse still dominated, including public admiration of the leaders of the right – even those specifically identified as orchestrators of the mass killings and death squads – and marginalization and vilification of the left (442). Mazzei (2011) writes:

Thus while the right referred to the left as insurgents, murderers, and radical, the left saw itself as maintaining the fight for reform through institutional means. Likewise, while the right saw itself as having ‘saved the country’ from a communist threat, the left referred to the right as defending only the interests of the elites (444).

Mazzei (2011) continued to observe this conflict-era discourse in the campaign rhetoric of the 2004 presidential election, 2006 Assembly elections, and 2009 presidential election. Mazzei (2011) suggests several reasons for the persistence of conflict-era discourse, including the reliance on foreign commissioners who remained detached from Salvadoran society and a lack of public hearings during the commission’s investigative work. She also emphasizes that there was no public airing of the report and its findings. Rather than prompting an apology as had occurred in Chile, “the findings offered another opportunity for the perpetrators to defend their actions and vilify their victims” (Mazzei 2011, 450).

Political violence, including death squad-style deaths, also continued in El Salvador. The violence was especially notable leading up to the 1994 elections. Almost exactly a year after the report’s release, the election year included a series of high-profile murders of senior FMLN commanders (Human Rights Watch 1994). Human Rights Watch (1994) reports, “The selection of victims, and the style of the murders, are reminiscent of the death squads that claimed thousands of victims during the height of the war. Heavily armed men in civilian dress still execute political opponents, leaving behind the initials of notorious death squads operating in the past, issue death threats in the name of these squads, and engage in ‘social cleansing’ killings” (4). The United Nations Observer Mission for El Salvador reported a 34 percent increase in complaints of arbitrary executions in 1993. There was also an increase in common crime throughout 1993 (Human Rights Watch 1994).
According to the commission’s UN-brokered mandate, its recommendations were legally binding; however, many of the commission’s recommendations were only partially implemented or not implemented at all. A recommendation to immediately prosecute the perpetrators named in the report was notably absent. The commission still expressed its belief that the guilty should be punished, yet the current justice system in El Salvador was incapable of administering justice and risked further fueling frustrations. The commission concluded that a reformed judicial system was a necessary precursor for investigating and prosecuting the crimes described in the report. Cristiani took advantage of the commission’s indirect declaration of the government’s duty to prosecute the offenders and passed a controversial and broad amnesty law within days of the report’s release (Human Rights Watch 1993). The law prohibited the prosecution of any of the perpetrators named in the report.

In response to the commission’s recommendation for the dismissal of culpable army officers and civil servants, 200 senior officials were removed from the army, including Ponce, but they all retired with full honors (USIP 2011). Although some judicial reforms were implemented, the Supreme Court refused to step down and investigations into political crimes remained wholly inadequate (Human Rights Watch 1994). Finally, the government did not implement any of the reparation measures suggested in the report (Hayner 1991).

Conclusion

This study examined variations in the representations of truth commission findings and how these variations influence the impact of the commission. A comparison across truth commissions reveals many differences in the publication of reports, the official endorsements of the findings, and apologies for the crimes. A more in-depth analysis of the truth commissions in Chile, Haiti, and El Salvador suggests that the presentation of truth commission findings can influence the commission’s ability to contribute to a publicly acknowledged truth of the past, principles of restorative justice, and reconciliation. Such findings present the ability to generate public discourse, reduce civil violence, and promote the implementation of reparations and reforms.

Out of the three commissions studied here, the commission in Chile generated the most public discussion and facilitated the strongest government commitment to institutional reforms. Although the report incited some acts of violence, the overall level of civil violence decreased in Chile. Aylwin’s address to the Chilean people attracted national and international attention to the commission’s findings, thus holding the government accountable to commitments of reform and reparations. Aylwin also constructed the commission’s findings as a source of unity through creating a common perception of the past.
The commission in El Salvador also received significant public attention. Like Chile’s commission, the official report was made widely available and attracted particular attention from the UN and United States. However, the government violently rejected the report and exhibited little commitment to its recommendations. The report became an additional source of division in society, with the government dismissal and the FMLN endorsement of it. In comparison with the other two, Haiti’s truth commission did not produce a widely accessible report, nor did the report receive any acknowledgment from the Haitian president. The commission is not well known, did not generate any meaningful public discourse, and did not result in any significant reforms.

The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are limited by other influential factors beyond the public presentation of the commission’s findings. Such factors include, structure, the mandate, and the political environment in which it operates. For example, Haiti’s truth commission struggled due to a lack of funding and resources, while El Salvador’s truth commission received significant funding from the UN. The detailed qualitative analysis employed in this study helps overcome some limitations by demonstrating how the public presentation of the commission’s findings can influence the impact. Future research that includes additional truth commissions and more defined measures of the commissions’ impact could further clarify this relationship.

The analysis suggests that truth commissions have a greater positive impact when the public can easily access the report and a government official endorses the reports while publicly apologizing on behalf of the state. These results also provide a new theoretical perspective through which to understand the relationship between truth commissions, truth, justice, and reconciliation. Although truth commissions cannot establish one objective truth, the facts revealed in the report can be used to construct a common perception of the past. The public presentation of truth commission findings can contribute to justice by identifying perpetrators, restoring the dignity of victims, and holding the government accountable to institutional reforms. Finally, instead of aiming to achieve reconciliation as an end product, truth commissions can invite the public to participate in reconciliatory dialogue by transforming discourse from narratives of justified violence to a new discourse of peace and reconciliation.

References


# Appendix 1. Truth Commission Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Access to Report</th>
<th>Official Endorsement of Findings</th>
<th>Public Apology</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Notable Advantages and Challenges</th>
<th>Public or Private Testimony</th>
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<th>Amnesty</th>
<th>Identity of Commission Sponsor</th>
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<td>1974</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
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<td>National Commission of Inquiry Into Disappearances</td>
<td>1982-1984</td>
<td>No Report</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8 commissioners, 6 additional staff</td>
<td>Very limited funding and political support; limited to disappearances, couldn't investigate torture and abuse</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons</td>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>Published: Broad Public Access</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13 commissioners and 60 additional staff</td>
<td>Could hire personnel and order cooperation of security forces, but no subpoena power</td>
<td>Private, but regular press briefings and public activities</td>
<td>Yes, included in report to president and leaked to press and published</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4 commissioners</td>
<td>Limited to violence in Matabaliland in 1980s</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Investigative Commission on the Situation of 'Disappeared' People and Its Causes</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Published but limited distribution and not well known</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9 commissioners and additional staff</td>
<td>Limited to investigating disappearances; military justified torture as necessary to fight an enemy</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights</td>
<td>1986-1995</td>
<td>Published but limited distribution; now available online</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4 commissioners</td>
<td>Lack of political will and sufficient funding, had to stop operating in 1987 because of financial problems, then resumed; Amnesty Commission</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Access to Report</td>
<td>Official Endorsement of Findings</td>
<td>Public Apology</td>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>Notable Advantages and Challenges</td>
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<td>Naming Names</td>
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<td>Identity of Commission Sponsor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Published, not easily accessible</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>4 commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Limited distribution of published official report, but duplicated in press</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 commission, 60 additional staff</td>
<td>Only investigated abuses that led to death</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partial (self- amnesty from former regime)</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by the Ex-President Habyé, His Accomplices and/or Accessories</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Report limited to government officials; film documentary available to public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12 members plus some additional staff</td>
<td>Included investigating human rights abuses, narcotics trafficking, and embezzlement of state funds; limited funding</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Yes, and photos</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Commission on the Truth for El Salvador</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Published; Broad Public Access, also available online</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No; Denied</td>
<td>2 international commissioners, plus 20 staff and 25 additional after</td>
<td>Recommendations were legally binding; funded by UN member states</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UN Peace Accord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Study Commission for the Assessment of the History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>Published; Easy Public Access</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>27 members</td>
<td>More research-based than investigatory</td>
<td>Some public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Parsons (3 geographically distinct commissions)</td>
<td>1994 - 1997</td>
<td>Published; Broad public access and available online</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>3 commissioners for each zone</td>
<td>Some public (stopped after received death threats)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>National Commission for Truth and Justice</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Published but not easily accessible by public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7 commissioners</td>
<td>Lacked sufficient resources and political will</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>1996 - 2002</td>
<td>Published; Broad public access and available online</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17 commissioners plus 300 staff</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Truth and Justice Commission</td>
<td>1996 - 1997</td>
<td>No Report</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7 members</td>
<td>Lacked sufficient resources and political will</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ministry of Government and Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Commission For Historical clarification</td>
<td>1997 - 1999</td>
<td>Published; Broad public access and available online</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3 commissioners</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Part of UN-brokered Peace Accord</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission</td>
<td>1999 - 2002</td>
<td>Never officially released, but unofficial version published by NGOs and easily available</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 commissioners</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President</td>
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## Appendix 1. Truth Commission Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Access to Report</th>
<th>Official Endorsement of Findings</th>
<th>Public Apology</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Notable Advantages and Challenges</th>
<th>Public or Private Testimony</th>
<th>Naming Names</th>
<th>Amnesty</th>
<th>Identity of Commission Sponsor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>Available on commission's website</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12 commissioners, 1 observer</td>
<td>Lack of ethnic diversity in commission; not seen as impartial;</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>2001-2003</td>
<td>No Report</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>15 commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>National Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Published but not easily available to public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9 commissioners, 70 staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Published; Broad public access and available online; also a child-friendly version</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7 commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Inquiry Commission in Charge of the Question of Disappearances</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Confidential</td>
<td>No; Denied</td>
<td>6 commissioners</td>
<td>Limited investigatory powers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>National Commission for Truth, Equity, and Reconciliation</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>Published; Broad public access and available on commission's website</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No; Denied</td>
<td>16 commissioners</td>
<td>Witnesses and victims not allowed to criticize former regime in testimonies</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
<td>2005-2009</td>
<td>Yes (but reserved)</td>
<td>Published</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>9 commissioners</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Colophon
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