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## Table of Contents

Volume IX	Number II	Fall 2009
Ethnic Diversity and Overurbanization in the Middle East: (Originally) Benign Differences with (Hidden) Political Consequences		111
Jesse J. Atencio, <i>Washington University, St. Louis</i>		
Media Savvy Governors: An Analysis of How Governors Use their Web Sites to Court Journalists		132
John Dubeansky, <i>Northeastern Illinois University</i>		
Predicting the Legacy of President Barack Obama		156
Sarah Doucett, <i>Union College</i>		
From <i>Kulturkampf</i> to <i>Kampf der Kulturen</i> : Political Recognition and Representation of Islam in Germany in the Example of Islam Instruction in German Public Schools		180
Julia Norton, <i>Connecticut College</i>		

## **Editor's Preface to the Fall 2009 Edition**

We are pleased to present the Fall 2009 edition of *The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics*. This is the eleventh edition of the *Journal* sponsored by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, and the eighteenth edition since initial publication.

There are many people we wish to recognize. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee, particularly President James Campbell, Executive Director James Lenge, and Administrator Nancy McManus. The *Journal* would not be possible without these dedicated individuals. Additionally, we wish to acknowledge all of the faculty Advisory Board members, as well as Professor Jay Barth of Hendrix College for serving as a guest member of the Advisory Board for this issue. It is their continual dedication and efforts that make the *Journal* a reality. Finally, we express our gratitude for the unending guidance and enthusiasm of our Faculty Advisor, Zoe Oxley.

This Fall 2009 issue is our first as Editors of the *Journal*. We were consistently impressed with the quality of undergraduate political science research we received from students and look forward to the Spring 2010 issue.

Thank you.

The Editors

## **Submission of Manuscripts**

*The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics* welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. Our goal is to publish manuscripts of the highest quality. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. The maximum page length for submissions is 35 pages. Manuscripts should include an abstract of approximately 150 words. Citations and references should follow the American Political Science Association *Style Manual for Political Science*. Authors may be asked to revise their manuscript before it is accepted for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-mailed to [psajournal@union.edu](mailto:psajournal@union.edu). Please include name, university, and contact details (i.e., mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number).

## **Ethnic Diversity and Overurbanization in the Middle East: (Originally) Benign Differences with (Hidden) Political Consequences**

Jesse J. Atencio, Washington University, St. Louis

*Ethnic divisions and conflicts are discussed frequently in political discourse. One particularly controversial issue is the debate over whether ethnic diversity has negative effects on political society, and the findings on this issue seem to be somewhat contradictory. While some scholars claim that ethnic fragmentation predisposes states to higher levels of political conflict, less economic cooperation, and authoritarianism, others argue that there is little to no independent effect of ethnic diversity on the politico-economic climate. Much of the extant literature attempts to make sweeping generalizations about the causes of ethnic cooperation or conflict, but the influence of context is central to this article. More specifically, I suggest that the particular interaction of rapid urbanization and ethnic heterogeneity can create a harmful combination that can suppress political freedoms. Using Freedom House scores and part of Fearon's ethnic fractionalization measures, I find that, in the Middle East, ethnically heterogeneous states with high levels of urbanization are associated with dramatically lower levels of political freedom.*

Today, globalization and urbanization bring people together from across the world. While increasing contact among people can provide great intercultural experiences and learning opportunities, one must ask, "What are the consequences of this?" Huntington (1993) answered controversially that, in the modern world, intercultural amenability will not be the norm but rather major conflict will be organized around cultural lines—a "clash of civilizations." Other authors agree that culture is increasingly salient in an international context (Harrison and Huntington 2000). "Zooming in" even further to the national context, one sees distinct cultural subgroups that differ from each other by virtue of the fact that they enjoy their own distinct sets of norms, values, and attitudes (Diamond 1993). Societies that house these groups are often predisposed to weak national social solidarity and have the potential for intergroup hostilities. While globalization creates greater opportunities for contact among distinct cultural groups, urbanization is a potential impetus for increased social interaction among subcultures and ethnic groups in heterogeneous societies.

The Middle East, a region of many ethnically diverse states, is of great significance in this regard. The area continues to experience ongoing urbanization and increasing interethnic contact and—often—conflict. Will these states become flourishing cosmopolitan societies or will conflict (continue to) be organized along ethnic fractures? While the causes of ethnic conflict have been a choice research topic for political scientists, the particular role that urbanization plays, as “forced interethnic social acquaintance” among ethnic groups, has not been examined in detail. This article examines the effect of the interaction of ethnic heterogeneity and high rates of urbanization on political freedoms in the Middle East from 1980 to 2006. More specifically, I ask if urbanization in ethnically divided societies creates political benefits or ills.

In the next section I will provide a review of the extant literature concerning ethnic diversity, contact theory and overurbanization. Thereafter, I will lay out a general theory on particular conditions (i.e., ethnic heterogeneity and rapid urbanization) in which political freedoms are likely to be constrained and hypothesize about what I expect to find in my research. Subsequently, I will describe how I operationalize the concepts that are the focus of this research, and then discuss the results thereof. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the importance of my study and the implications for future studies on the political and economic ramifications of ethnic diversity.

### **Literature Review**

While there are many variations of theories on the consequences of ethnic diversity, I am foremost concerned with the roles of urbanization and ethnic heterogeneity. My theory and hypothesis are rooted in a few specific bodies of literature including contact theory, ethnic fragmentation and overurbanization. Here, I present a brief survey of the extant literature in order to be able to construct a theoretical apparatus about a particular context in which ethnic freedoms are more likely to be restricted.

#### *Ethnic Diversity and Contact/Conflict Theory*

The effect of ethnic divisions on political conflict and economic growth has been an increasingly popular issue of debate among social scientists. Since 1990, publications including the phrase “ethnic conflict” have skyrocketed dramatically (Gilley 2004). For

some scholars this is an obvious trend: interest in ethnic conflict has increased because the academy is realizing that civil wars occur frequently in—and can be extremely deadly in—ethnically divided societies. To these scholars, the world is full of a host of examples that lend credence to this claim (Horowitz 1985). Other scholars argue that the salience of ethnic conflict is due to the decreasing frequencies of international war. Gilley (2004) explains that civil wars organized along ethnic divisions have decreased, but not as fast as international wars. The argument follows that, contrary to popular belief, interethnic coexistence and cooperation is the norm rather than the exception. Nevertheless, many scholars still suggest that with ethnic heterogeneity comes the potential for conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Forbes 2004).

Underlying the arguments claiming that ethnic divisions and identities have a considerable bearing on political and economic phenomena are various understandings of the origins of ethnic identities and the nature of interethnic social interaction. While primordialists claim that ethnic identities are basically static and rigid biological concepts, constructivists define ethnic identities as social constructions which are subject to change over time as a result of shifting political conditions and events (Fearon and Laitin 2000; Horowitz 1977; Stavenhagen 1996; Young 1982). Despite this divide, many scholars from both sides concede that ethnic identities, whether social constructions or not, are important for understanding ethnic conflict (Collier, Honohan, and Moene 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Forbes 2004).

Generally, there have been two explanations for such interaction: contact theory and conflict. Contact theory explains that as interethnic contact increases, stereotypes are dispelled and ethnic discrimination, prejudice, and animosities decrease. As ethnic groups more frequently come into contact with each other and meet people from different cultural backgrounds and various walks of life they learn that their false preconceptions of the “Other” are in need of adjustment (Forbes 2004). Forbes (2004) argues that this claim is particularly weak because of counterexamples which illustrate that some of the most violent conflict has occurred in ethnically divided societies (e.g., Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Darfur). Under the contact theory framework, the argument goes, these states should not have experienced such ethnically-colored civil wars and bloodshed.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Of course, contact theory sets general conditions under which prejudices and

“Conflict theory”<sup>2</sup> attempts to explain these counterexamples (Forbes 2004; Hood and Morris 1998; Horowitz 1985). The theory suggests that as groups come into more contact with each other they will differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups culturally and linguistically. Thus, as Laitin (2007) states, culture acts as both a parameter and a variable in relation to ethnic fragmentation. That is to say, conflict theory suggests two mutually reinforcing processes: social differentiation actively defines cultural solidarity, and in turn, culture sets the social “rules” and norms for the ethnic group (Laitin 2007, 77). According to some scholars, ethnic groups give labels to their members and attach particular roles to them (expectations of typical behavior, attitudes, and attributes of the group) in a process that Omi and Winant (1994) termed “racialization” (Almond 1956; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Horowitz 1985). Furthermore, when a group defines its ethnic identity through cultural differentiation that group’s self-image is often characterized by features that are the extreme opposites of the features of the “Other [group]” (López 1996). These claims are quite compatible with conflict theory. When different ethnic groups come into contact with each other, identities are largely shaped through cultural differentiation, which creates conditions for interethnic animosities and conflict. Within certain social orders social differentiation and “racialization” can embed (or sometimes reinforce) hostile attitudes among the various ethnic groups.

#### *Political Implications of Ethnic Diversity*

The relationships between ethnic divisions and political phenomena are complex and the findings seem to be conflicting. There are a number of studies which have portrayed ethnic variety as a condition that is conducive to political conflict, a lack of interethnic cooperation, and violence (Horowitz 1971, 1985). Generally, these scholars argue that ethnic identities, under certain situations and in certain social orders, provide convenient vehicles for intergroup hostilities and civil conflict, suggesting that ethnic loyalties can be

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animosities decrease. Nevertheless, conflict theory would suggest that the fact that many of the counterexamples against contact theory are instances where extreme ethnic violence occurred in ethnically divided states is no coincidence, but rather a result of interethnic relations.

<sup>2</sup>This term is not a creation of scholars who accept that more ethnic group interaction results in conflict, but instead Forbes (2004) seems to have created it.

particularly—even dangerously—emotionally motivating for the members of ethnic groups. Other scholars do not necessarily argue that ethnic diversity has political benefits, but they do point out that diversity in particular is not important for predicting political violence, one way or the other (Fearon and Laitin 2003). In addition, there is yet another group of scholars who argue that ethnic diversity is empirically less likely to result in violent intergroup conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Lacina 2006).

The most pertinent area for this paper, within studies on ethnic diversity and its political ramifications, is the relationship between diversity and democracy.<sup>3</sup> Generally, scholars argue that ethnic heterogeneity has a negative relationship to democracy and/or democratization. A good example of a scholar who argues in favor of the negative effect of ethnic diversity on a state's political freedom is Horowitz (1971, 1985) who argues that ethnically fragmented societies are more prone to political conflict and incur more obstacles to democratization when the state power structure is one where an ethnic group can effectively maintain power over other ethnic groups. This is because ethnic groups tend to provide security for individuals within the ethnic group and create political capital for parties and political elites to capitalize on; or, as Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) put it, in states with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity political elites benefit from “outbidding” on ethnic loyalties—that is, taking extreme stances aligned with ethnic identities to gain more votes. Furthermore, there is the fear that democracy is not conducive to interethnic relations; this is the perceived danger of unleashing a “can of worms”—that is to say, unleashing coercion and/or violence—by providing democratic freedoms, which can be taken advantage of by demagogues who “outbid” on ethnic identities (Karatnycky 1999). Supporting these arguments is the tendency for political parties to be organized along ethnic lines in ethnically diverse states (Horowitz 1977; Wilkinson 2000). Political cooperation thus faces the problem of cutting across ethnic and party lines, and political conflict and loyalties are often themselves colored ethnically.

The general consensus within the group of scholars who argue that ethnic diversity enjoys a negative relationship with democracy is that the relationship is not simply linear. Instead, the claim is that the

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<sup>3</sup>Since democracies usually guarantee more civil liberties and political rights for individuals within a given society, this relationship is fundamentally connected with my hypothesis in this paper.

relationship of ethnic heterogeneity to political conflict and authoritarianism is a bell shaped curve where extreme ethnic homogeneity or extreme ethnic fractionalization usually support democracy and are associated with lower levels of political conflict. Meanwhile, in the middle of the heterogeneity scale, where there are large minority or small majority ethnic groups which can wield power more effectively over other groups, there tends to be lower levels of democracy and more frequent political conflict (Collier, Honohan and Moene 2001; Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2000/1). Notwithstanding the back-and-forth dialectic between scholars interested in the political importance of ethnic diversity, ethnic divisions have by and large been considered as impetuses for political conflict, violence, and authoritarianism, and rarely as positive effects on political systems (Reilly 2000/1).

### *Urbanization and Overurbanization*

In the past century the topic of urbanization has been a major focus of sociologists. Predictions for twenty-first century global urban growth are dramatic and show no sign of leveling off soon (Davis 1955; United Nations 1989, 2003).<sup>4</sup> While technological advances and economic growth have been evinced as byproducts of urbanization, the negative effects have also long been examined by social scientists (Bradshaw 1985; Kasarda and Crenshaw 1991; Teune 1988). These scholars have no trouble in listing the negative consequences of urbanization: surpluses in labor, unemployment, misemployment, poverty, overcrowding, crime, sanitation and health concerns. Some have called these symptoms collectively, effects of “overurbanization” (Davis and Golden 1954; Gugler 1982; Hoselitz 1955). Overurbanization, or what Hoselitz (1955) termed “parasitic” urbanization, generally occurs when levels of urbanization and rural-to-urban migration are not accompanied by the expected levels of economic development and material benefits. While some societies incur great economic benefits and societal advancements due to urbanization, others experience severe problems because of it.

Expectedly, urbanization, as many other social processes, has varying effects in different social and economic environments. The developing or underdeveloped world has been argued to be an

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<sup>4</sup>“World Population Projected to Reach 7 Billion in 2011.” CNN, 12 August 2009. Accessed: September 6, 2009 <<http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/08/12/world.population/index.html>>.

environment that is highly predisposed to experiencing greater negative effects from rapid urbanization (Davis and Golden 1954). Davis and Golden (1954, 16-18) cite Egypt as an example where rapid urbanization was still increasing due to rural impoverishment, despite the increasing pressures placed on urbanization. Huntington (1968) supports this, suggesting that rural stagnation often creates a push to urbanization and leads to political instability in the city. It seems that societies with more drastic economic problems are more prone to the negative effects of urbanization.

Those who migrate to urban areas often do so in order to secure a better quality of life, but as urbanization increases, so does competition over economic—and even political—goods. In developing countries, where the economic growth is relatively low in comparison to the economic and material stresses that can come with urbanization, urban areas can create particularly dire living conditions for citizens. In these conditions survival becomes even more difficult and citizens can unite under the auspices of certain social networks that extend beyond the primitive kin group to ethnic groups (Posner 1980). It appears that the developing world is much more vulnerable to negative consequences of rapid urbanization and, at least potentially, more susceptible to social tensions and conflict.

Up to now I have highlighted two perhaps seemingly independent trends. While the relationship between ethnic diversity and overurbanization (as determinants of political tensions) has not been examined in detail, my research suggests that the two are largely intertwined. I now turn to the theory section, where I lay out the nature of this relationship.

### **Theory**

Since ethnic diversity is frequently associated with political instability, intergroup violence, economic stagnation and a multitude of other ills, ethnically divided urbanizing societies should illustrate these pathologies to an even greater extent.<sup>5</sup> First, urbanization brings people into more contact with people of various cultural backgrounds. Increasing social interaction among ethnic groups (in more ethnically divided states) comes as a byproduct of urban growth. In addition, the “rural push” suggests that migration is

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<sup>5</sup>While the terms “urbanization” and “urban (population) growth” usually have different meanings, for the remainder of this paper I shall use them interchangeably to refer to the growth of the urban population.

largely due to impoverished rural areas and hope for better chances of survival in cities (Huntington 1968). Growing urban populations imply an increase in the number of political and economic actors who, in moving to the city, are focused on their own survival to some extent. The ethnic group can potentially provide individuals with various economic benefits and political mobilization. Secondly, as overurbanization occurs to greater extents in developing countries, economic and socio-political pressures placed on these societies can magnify the disposition to violent competition among groups and weaken social solidarity (Laitin 2007).

To the extent that these two trends, increasing interethnic contact and rapid urbanization,<sup>6</sup> are realities, there should be greater chances for political conflict, and indeed ethnic conflict, in order to secure one's own well-being. Therefore, more ethnically heterogeneous societies will likely be prone to more ethnic group solidarity (and less national social solidarity) and heightened interethnic tensions and hostilities. However, as Collier, Honohan and Moene (2001) claim, highly fractionalized nations with many small ethnic groups will have potential benefits from ethnic fragmentation; high levels of ethnic fragmentation might indeed provide a great source of motivation for interethnic political cooperation. On the other hand, in those states with a large minority, there will be greater potential for political conflict. In these particular conditions, where one ethnic group has the capacity to dominate another one, there will be both more potential for political abuse of other groups and greater incentive to do so.

Where ethnic politics become more competitive and hostile, there is a greater chance for conflict and this might affect the citizens' freedoms in three general ways:<sup>7</sup> first, the incumbent regime and officials might suspend freedoms if they perceive that granting the citizens more freedoms might turn out to be simply unleashing formerly restrained ethnic tensions and extremely dangerous for stability or public peace; second, and related to the first, is the possibility that the government might restrain freedoms as violent conflict ensues in an effort to impede further conflict; third, ethnic-

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<sup>6</sup>I assume, in this study, since the Middle East is largely made up of developing states, that more or less rapid rates of urban population growth would be highly correlated with what some scholars might agree constitutes "overurbanization."

<sup>7</sup>I do not presume that this is a comprehensive list of relationships, but only a list of the most salient and pertinent—to this study—ones.

based political parties might take advantage of any opportunities to suspend freedoms, both political and civil, when they are capable and when doing so benefits the group which they are members of.

Several states in the Middle East are urbanizing, undeveloped or underdeveloped, characterized by frequent political violence, and, to various degrees, ethnically divided. The region serves as a good test for my theory and hypotheses because there is adequate variance in the different levels of urbanization rates and ethnic fragmentation. As stated earlier, the extent to which contact between distinct ethnic groups serves as a cause for ethnic conflict is a hotly debated issue. I attempt to contribute to this debate by focusing specifically on the role of urbanization and increasing interethnic contact in relation to political freedom.

### Hypothesis

Despite the lack of variance in terms of “highly fractionalized” states<sup>8</sup> (see Figure A1 in Appendix), it appears that there was enough variance to explain differences between more homogeneous states and more heterogeneous ones (the left half of the parabola in Figure 1).<sup>9</sup> My hypothesis is: ethnically heterogeneous states with high levels of urban growth will have lower levels of freedom.<sup>10</sup>

A linear model should be fairly accurate here since there are no states that fall past the .8 level on the ethnic fractionalization measure. In my study, more ethnically heterogeneous states should be correlated with more conflict and there should not be the drop in conflict that Collier and his colleagues (2001) argue come with “extreme fractionalization” due to a lack of states which meet this criterion.<sup>11</sup> Urbanization leads to increased contact among ethnic

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<sup>8</sup>I ran my final regression with ethnic heterogeneity as a negative squared variable, but the linear model ultimately explained more variance. Perhaps if there were a number of countries in my sample that fell past the 0.9 fractionalization score, as Collier, Honohan and Moene (2001) argue is necessary for the positive effect of extreme ethnic fractionalization to be noticeable, I would have been able to test the theoretical model seen in Figure 1.


<sup>9</sup>In Figure 1 and A1 (see Appendix) I use Fearon’s ethnic fractionalization measure only and not the cultural diversity measure in order to remain true to Collier and his colleagues’ (2001) test of the positive effects of “extreme ethnic fractionalization.” My Ethnic Heterogeneity variable, however (and thus my hypothesis also), refers to my Ethnic Heterogeneity index, which is discussed in the data section.

<sup>10</sup>When referring to my own variables I will capitalize them.

<sup>11</sup>Collier and his colleagues (2001) argue that the most effective “cut-off” for

groups and political attitudes and orientations towards different cultural groups should change as a result. I predict that, in rapidly urbanizing societies with greater ethnic heterogeneity, there will be more potential and incentives for political conflict with and coercion over other ethnic groups, in addition to a more hostile political environment. As interethnic tensions are heightened, reinforced group cultural differentiation will occur and there will be greater incentive for ethnic groups to dominate or abuse other ethnic groups for a larger share of goods and more political rights that benefit one's own ethnic group, and freedoms might be constrained or suspended to maintain stability or public peace. Ethnically fragmented societies that have higher levels of urbanization should have lower levels of freedom.

**Figure 1:** Theoretical Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Frequency of Conflict (in Societies with High Levels of Urban Population Growth)



defining “extremely fractionalized” states is around 0.9. To see the ethnic fractionalization distribution of the states I used in my study refer to Figure A1 in the Appendix.

## Data and Measures

My variables are taken from various datasets. These datasets are *Freedom in the World*, the *Quality of Government Institute*, and the *World Bank's World Development Indicators* (Freedom House 2009; Quality of Government Institute 2008; World Bank Group 2009). I included 14 Middle East (and periphery) countries in my study. These were Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. With these I created a dataset that included *Freedom House* (2009) freedom scores, Fearon's Ethnic Fractionalization scores from the *Quality of Government Institute* (2008) dataset, and GDP, Population Density and Urban Growth Measures from the *World Bank's World Development Indicators* (2009).

My dependent variable, the political climate, is measured with *Freedom House* freedom scores. The degree to which a country guarantees political and civil liberties and is characterized by low levels of violence implies that there is a political environment that provides an arena for meaningful and peaceful political competition in which political actors play by the "rules of the game" and allow others to exercise the right of political participation and expression also. Using Political Freedom rather than some form of violence or war should prove to be a more sensitive variable since shifts in political freedoms are more common than occurrences of civil war and major episodes of political violence.

The *Freedom House* scores are expert analytical reports which assign scores to a country on two levels: political rights and civil liberties. In general, the scores measure the ability of citizens and organizations to participate meaningfully and compete for political power and the level of protection of citizens' civil liberties (e.g., freedom of expression, freedom of religion, etc). Ratings from lowest possible freedom (0) to highest possible freedom (4) are given for each of 25 questions concerning political rights and civil liberties. These raw sum scores are then collapsed into seven categories, ranging from the most freedom (1) to least freedom (7). In the interest of making my regressions and explanations more commonsensical, I switched the direction of the scales and created an index by combining the political rights and civil liberties score; this new Freedom index ranges from Less Freedom (2) to More Freedom (14).

My main independent variables are Ethnic Heterogeneity, Urban Population Growth, and an interaction between the two. For Ethnic Heterogeneity, I have extracted two of Fearon's (2003) four ethnic diversity variables and combined them to make an index. I created an index by combining Fearon's (2003) ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity. Ethnic fractionalization is the chance that any two randomly picked people in a state will be from different ethnic groups and cultural diversity is based on the similarity of linguistic structures between any two randomly chosen ethnic groups (Fearon 2003). Since both variables ranged theoretically from zero to one, my index ranges from ethnically homogeneous (0) to ethnically fractionalized (2).<sup>12</sup> The second independent variable of concern is the rate of Urban Growth. Urban Growth is a given year's percentage growth of urban population from the previous year. I have rescaled this variable so that it ranges from 0.59 to 1.282.

My control variables are Colonized Status, GDP Per Capita, Population Density and Urban Population Size. GDP Per Capita is measured in constant U.S. (2000) currency.<sup>13</sup> Colonized Status is a dummy variable, where I am concerned with whether a state was at some point colonized. Population Density is measured as the number of people per kilometer squared.<sup>14</sup> Urban Population is measured in millions of people.

## Results


The main focus of my research is the importance of ethnic diversity in relation to political climate. The bivariate relation of Ethnic Heterogeneity to Freedom (Figure 2) is not very strong. There does not appear to be any noticeable pattern or correlation between Ethnic Heterogeneity and Political Freedom. This perhaps dispels any claims about the intrinsically politically unstable nature of ethnic diversity.

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<sup>12</sup>My new index should be a valid combination because ethnic fractionalization and cultural diversity measure two important different, yet interrelated (the correlation coefficient for the two is 0.657), aspects of ethnic heterogeneity: the number of different ethnic groups and the cultural (or linguistic) proximity between different ethnic groups respectively.

<sup>13</sup>Fourteen GDP Per Capita values were missing and filled in with the country average (see Appendix).

<sup>14</sup>There were three Population Density values which were filled in by the country average (see Appendix).


**Figure 2:** Ethnic Heterogeneity and Political Freedom

The relationship between Urban Growth and Political Freedom was quite noticeable, however (Figure 3). Lower levels of Freedom are associated with higher levels of Urban Growth. When I examined the literature on urbanization, undeveloped countries were argued to experience the detrimental effects of urbanization to greater degrees (Davis and Golden 1954; Hoselitz 1955). Figure 3 seems to support this claim, revealing that, of the countries I included in my dataset, states with higher Urban Growth levels experienced less Political Freedom.

To test my model with my interaction, and due to my inability to conduct a time-series model, I ran a cross-sectional model on my data (see Table 1). The results presented here support my hypothesis that Ethnically Heterogeneous states with high levels of Urban Growth would be characterized by lower levels of Political Freedom. The interaction between Urban Growth and Ethnic Heterogeneity is negatively correlated with Political Freedom. More ethnically fragmented Middle Eastern states experiencing high rates of urbanization are associated with extremely lower levels of Freedom (-6 is half of my entire scale of Freedom!). What might seem odd about the results of my regression is that, in contrast to the negative relationship between Urban Growth and Freedom seen in Figure 3,

the relationship between Urban Growth and Freedom when my interaction is included is positive. While this might seem counterintuitive, it provides evidence for the other (implicit) side of my hypothesis. It suggests that more homogeneous countries with high levels of urban population growth experience *greater* political freedom. Similarly, Ethnic Heterogeneity is positively correlated with Political Freedoms, although not strongly and the relationship is not significant.

**Figure 3:** Urban Growth and Levels of Freedom



Three of my four control variables showed a significant relationship to Political Freedoms (Population Density was not significant). One of these controls, Colonized Status, was positively correlated with higher Political Freedoms. To my surprise, past colonies in the Middle East were more likely to experience greater Political Freedoms than those states who were not colonized. Perhaps the colonial powers were effective to a degree in establishing enduring liberal political traditions and institutions that were never totally abandoned.

**Table 1:** OLS Model Predicting Freedom in the Middle East (1980 to 2006)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> t	Betas
Ethnic Heterogeneity	.63 (.69)	.364	.126
Urban Growth (unit = 10 %)	6.07 (1.81)	.001	.578
Heterogeneity * Urban Growth	-6.00 (2.12)	.005	-.734
Colonized	1.05 (.26)	.000	.258
GDP per capita (constant USD 2000)	.00 (.00)	.000	.342
Population Density	.00 (.00)	.266	.065
Urban Population (Millions)	.06 (.01)	.000	.368
Constant	3.36 (.76)	.000	--

Estimations performed using Stata 7.0.

N=378, adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .0949

Missing variables reported in Appendix.

### Conclusion

My findings suggest that contact theory is not so simple. The observed relationship between ethnically divided societies with high rates of urbanization and political freedom highlights the notion that, under certain conditions, ethnicity can play a big role in the political sphere. More specifically, ethnic diversity in the Middle East seems to foster a political environment where, when there are high levels of urban population growth, political domination occurs more frequently. It is possible that in the Middle East, as I suggested earlier, both the potential and the incentives for politico-economic conflict and domination and suppression of political freedoms are high, and furthermore that distinct ethnic groups provide the basis for political mobilization.

Perhaps, as I explained in my theory section, when ethnically fragmented societies are exposed to overurbanization and face the

consequences of employment problems, health issues, and poverty, political actors then seek ways to maximize their utility and guarantee their survival in society in a somewhat Hobbesian fashion. Ethnic groups could provide the basis for political and social mobilization which, as they become more skilled at providing political and economic goods to their ethnic “constituents,” might in turn strengthen ethnic boundaries and heighten interethnic animosities. In developing countries these trends would likely be more powerful and create greater chances for ethnic groups to attempt to politically dominate other ethnic groups. Additionally, the more hostile the political environment and interethnic relationships are, the more incentives there are for public officials to suspend or constrain political freedoms if they perceive that there is a potential for political violence. If political violence actually occurs then there is even further incentive for restraining freedoms. This would explain why I found that ethnically homogeneous countries with higher urban growth levels experience greater political freedom; urbanization might contribute to national social solidarity in ethnically homogeneous societies, while it could provide more negative, divisive effects in ethnically divided states.

Of course, this is, at best, just educated conjecture. A more refined understanding of the intersection between ethnic diversity and urbanization would require a look at interethnic attitudes and a study of ethnic group psychology, in addition to extending this empirical analysis to other areas of the world with various economic, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds. What I would like to have included in this study but could not, due to a lack of sufficient available resources, is some measurement of economic inequalities. It could be that income disparities often overlap with ethnic divisions and explain much of the variance in my regressions. The relationships between income disparities, ethnic diversity and political climate would need to be studied further in order to better comment on the true relationship of ethnic heterogeneity and urbanization on the one hand and political freedom on the other.

What my research calls for is a more refined understanding of ethnic diversity and its relation to political conflict, and not simply the development of a new variant of contact theory, but an entirely novel and humble approach to understanding the nature of interethnic relationships and their political implications. The need for this approach is highlighted by my study’s assessment, which argues that ethnicity does not seem to have an independent effect on the

level of political freedoms of a given state, but when ethnically heterogeneous societies are confronted with high levels of urban growth ethnic identities can become more salient and heighten political tensions and conflict. My study suggests that social scientists, and political scientists in particular, need to focus on the role of ethnic diversity and its ramifications under specific conditions. Only when this is realized and put into action will social scientists begin to better understand the complex web of relationships which connects—both directly and indirectly—ethnic diversity to political and economic conflict.


### **Appendix**

The missing values for Table 1 were as follows: Bahrain, GDP per capita, 2006 (1); Kuwait, GDP per capita, 1990-1994 (5); Lebanon, GDP per capita, 1980-1987 (8); Kuwait, urban growth percentage, 1992-1995 (4); Kuwait, population density, 1992-1994 (3). In addition, one value was dropped because it was skewing the data: Kuwait, urban growth percentage, 1991, was -44.39 (1). In total I had 22 missing values which were all filled. I also replaced one extreme outlier with the country average (Kuwait, urban growth percentage, 1991).

I avoided creating an index out of all four of Fearon's (2003) variables. The two variables not included were "largest minority" and "plurality group," which are simply the proportions of the total population for the identified ethnic groups. These were not added because there was not enough variance in the degree or type of ethnic heterogeneity or ethnic fractionalization to make the size of the plurality group or the largest minority group crucial to my model (when using Collier and his colleagues' [2001] measures of ethnic fractionalization there were no ethnically fractionalized states with ethnic divisions of many small ethnic groups). Thus, as I expected, my Ethnic Heterogeneity index explained more variance than including all four of Fearon's (2003) measures. Figure A1 highlights Collier, Honohan and Moene's (2001) delineated area (between the two dotted lines) where the "dominance" coefficient was the highest. The lack of variance is illustrated in the lack of any countries that fall in the category in the third ("extreme ethnic fractionalization") section of the chart (Collier, Honohan and Moene 2001). For this same reason, squaring my heterogeneity index to see if there was a negative exponential relationship between Ethnic Heterogeneity and

Freedom explained less variance than that of the linear model used in my paper.

**Figure A1:** Fearon's Ethnic Fractionalization Distribution



Source: Quality of Government Institute Data

**Table A1:** OLS Model Predicting Freedom in the Middle East (1980 to 2006) (Without Interaction between Heterogeneity and Urban Growth)

Variable	Coefficient (Std. Err.)	P> t
Ethnic Heterogeneity	1.07 (.34)	.002
Urban Growth (unit=10%)	1.28 (.63)	.044
Colonized	.88 (.26)	.001
GDP per capita (constant USD 2000)	.00 (.00)	.008
Population Density	.00 (.00)	.061
Urban Population (Millions)	.06 (.01)	.000
Constant	5.03 (.49)	.000

Estimations performed using Stata 7.0.

N=378, adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .0778

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## **Media Savvy Governors: An Analysis of How Governors Use their Web Sites to Court Journalists**

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*New technologies are being used with increasing frequency in the political arena. However, scholars have largely overlooked how politicians are using newer technologies to solicit favorable media coverage. To close this gap, I performed a content analysis of gubernatorial Web sites in an effort to describe how (and the extent to which) governors use their sites to entice journalists. My data show that most governors are “media savvy” and make a concerted effort to engage journalists through their Web sites, relying heavily on both newer (e.g., RSS) and older (e.g., press releases) forms of communication. Further, my analysis explores which governors, in terms of their demographic characteristics, are more likely to court journalists online. My data show that median family income, the percentage of the vote they received in the last election, the size of the governor’s war chest, and years in office are correlated with the number of media-friendly features on the gubernatorial sites. Age, number of staff, gender, party affiliation, and region are largely irrelevant.*

It is important to understand how politicians communicate with the media because a healthy democracy requires a free and vibrant press. Before the Internet became prevalent, politicians relied heavily on journalists to transmit their messages to the public through television and newspapers. Aside from relying on personal relationships with the journalists who covered them, politicians attempted to influence journalists through press releases and speeches. Although politicians still rely on these old forms of communication, it is uncertain whether these old patterns remain intact given the advent of new technologies.

Given the seminal role that new technologies are playing in our modern society, it is imperative to examine how these technologies—especially the Internet—are shaping how political actors interact with another. It could be the case that politicians are

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utilizing the Internet to circumvent the media. By bringing their message directly to the public via the Internet, politicians may be able to avoid unwanted criticisms or avoid losing control of their messages when they are processed through the media's "filter." If politicians can avoid media scrutiny, the public may only be exposed to self-serving messages that further the office-holders' goal of reelection. If so, journalists may have difficulty serving as the watchdog of government thereby thwarting accountability and compromising the health of democracy. Given this potential risk, it is necessary to explore how new technologies are shaping the relationship between politicians and the media.

My study is one of the first scholarly attempts to explore how politicians use new technologies to court journalists. Specifically, I analyzed 50 gubernatorial Web sites to determine what information governors are making available to the press and what variables influence the extent to which governors rely on an online strategy when courting journalists. My analysis shows that every governor devotes a special section of their Web site to journalists, and they place a wide variety of "media-friendly" features on their sites, with a growing reliance on newer technological features such as Twitter, e-registries, and RSS (Really Simple Syndication). Taken together, these findings suggest that governors see the value in making online overtures to the press and believe that a wide variety of features will entice journalists to incorporate the online information in their news coverage. Furthermore, my data show that years in office, median family income, the percentage of the vote received by the governor in the last election, and the size of the governor's war chest are correlated with the number of media-friendly features on the gubernatorial sites, while age, number of staff, gender, party affiliation, and region are inconsequential.

## **Literature Review**

### *The Importance of Governors*

Governors are worthy of scholarly attention because they hold an especially important office. The governorship has become increasingly relevant due to the office's attraction of younger and more educated individuals (Sabato 1983), the electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents (Tompkins 1984), and the office's use as a stepping stone to the presidency, a trend illustrated by Presidents

Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush. Furthermore, scholars have observed that more power has been concentrated in the governor's office. Beginning in the 1950s, states began revising their statutes and constitutions so as to extend the formal powers of their governors. States, for example, bolstered gubernatorial power by adopting provisions that extended the governor's tenure in office, enhanced the governor's budgetary resources, and placed policy and planning offices in close proximity to the governor's office (Beyle 1987). In the mid-1990s, gubernatorial power was increased as a result of the "devolution revolution," whereby responsibilities once held by the federal government were shifted to the states (Van Horn 1996). Devolution—typically accomplished by the substitution of block grants for matching funds, greater administrative flexibility for the states, and less federal intergovernmental aid (Tannenwald 1998)—changed the institutional structures by which important public services were delivered, and, by doing so, allowed governors to play a more direct role in providing services to the public. Modern governors now play an important role in higher education (Grove 1984), have greater power over the budget process relative to state legislatures (Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003), and are even becoming more involved in international affairs (Kincaid 1984).

The preceding discussion identifies trends—largely structural in nature—that have enhanced gubernatorial power. However, executive power is also shaped by the personal skills and proclivities of the person who occupies the office. Ferguson and Barth (2002), for example, demonstrate that certain aspects of a governor's personality, including their power and achievement motives, help governors become more successful. Likewise, governors who desire more power have used relations with the federal government to bolster their political standing (Grady 1987). For instance, Kincaid (1984) shows that governors have been able to promote state interests by lobbying the federal government and traveling abroad to encourage foreign investment in their states. My study promises to enhance our understanding of the "personal" element of executive power. The willingness and ability of a governor to court journalists online informs our knowledge of a valuable political skill, which almost certainly has some bearing on the likelihood of the governor's ability to accomplish his or her policy objectives.

*The General Public's Usage of New Technologies*

Political scientists have recognized that technological advances could potentially change how politicians interact with the public. Scholars, relying on survey research data, have found that the public relies heavily on the Internet to glean information about governmental affairs. Upon polling 2,000 Americans in 2002, Larsen and Rainie (2002) estimated that 42 million Americans use government Web sites to research public policy issues. Furthermore, they found that approximately 23 million Americans contact public officials through email to express their concerns over public policy, while approximately 14 million people have used government Web sites to help them decide how to cast their votes. Similarly, citizens seem to be abandoning their reliance on traditional news outlets in favor of online news because they are dissatisfied with news transmitted by traditional media outlets such as newspapers and television (Tolbert and McNeal 2003). Those who gravitate toward online news tend to be politically engaged, as individuals with access to Web-based election news were more likely to vote in both the 1996 and 2000 elections than those who lacked Internet access. Taken together, the aforementioned studies suggest that the Internet not only plays a central role in the political lives of the general public, but it also has the potential to further the quality of democracy by encouraging an informed and engaged citizenry. Likewise, these results are of great significance to reelection-driven politicians, reinforcing the conclusion that the Internet is an important mode of political communication.

Not surprisingly, there appear to be generational differences in the way members of the public use newer technologies. In a study exploring how Web sites affect young adults, Lupia and Philpot (2005) found that the way a site is structured influences the level of engagement of younger individuals. Specifically, they found that “viewer’s perception of a site’s effectiveness and efficiency is critical” in determining the time younger individuals spend exploring political Web sites. In order for young adults to be influenced by politics, there had to be something “inside the net” that appealed to this younger audience. Thus, young adults had to be aware of the appeal, and the appeal had to contain information that captured their attention long enough such that the Web site’s form and content elevated their interest in politics and shaped their perceptions.

Although people are relying heavily on new technologies to

inform their political lives, they can also use new technologies as a means of “tuning out” politics altogether (Prior 2005, 587). With an increasing abundance of television channels and the opportunity for individuals to seek whatever information they desire online, people can isolate themselves from politics by pursuing their narrow interests or hobbies. Prior (2005) argues that political broadcasts on television, such as the evening news, used to give citizens basic political information that everyone shared; however, since technology has progressed, disinterested viewers have gained the ability to avoid such broadcasts because of the abundance of channels. Similarly, researchers have identified a “digital divide” where the less affluent are unable to purchase home computers and are therefore unable to realize the benefits of the new technologies. According to DiMaggio et al. (2001), the digital divide is attributable to many variables rather than just one’s socioeconomic status. Instead, it also turns on public connection availability, private subscription price, the services that are available, and the availability of the infrastructure that is necessary to deliver the Internet service.

In sum, research suggests that more and more citizens are gravitating toward the Internet as a source of political information and as a means of communicating with their elected representatives. And it appears that for some people, the Internet may be replacing traditional media outlets as their primary source of news. While the Internet is a potential vehicle for involving citizens in political affairs, it is unavailable to those on the other side of the digital divide and it has the potential to distract others from political affairs by providing them with an entertaining means of pursuing their hobbies and narrow interests.

#### *Politicians’ Usage of New Technologies to Communicate with Constituents*

Given the public’s heavy reliance on the Internet, it is not surprising that politicians are beginning to use the Internet in their arsenal of political tools. Politicians are using the Internet as a means of reaching out to voters, soliciting campaign contributions, and serving constituents once they assume office. Politicians clearly understand that the Internet is a valuable tool that can allow them to accomplish their objectives.

Politicians must maintain some type of a palpable relationship with their constituent base to win election and reelection. To this

end, politicians frequently employ a political consultant who is knowledgeable about utilizing the Internet for political purposes. Consultants now use information gleaned from the Internet—including information from online surveys, online credit card purchases, online voter registration data, and online demographic data—to make inferences about the mood and views of the electorate (Howard 2005). Consultants, for example, can determine that a “woman who is older than fifty-five, living in New York, registered as a Democrat, and spending a significant amount of her income on pharmaceuticals is very likely to think the government should offer universal health care” (Howard 2005, 157). Moreover, political candidates are paying companies that utilize data mining techniques such as “spyware” to better understand and target voters who have an online presence. Therefore, consultants clearly appreciate the importance of using new technologies to understand the public at-large and technologically engaged members of the public.

Although campaign consultants appreciate the importance of the Internet, it appears there is still a difference in how young and old politicians are availing themselves of the new technologies. Political candidates that managed longer careers in electoral politics were found less likely to campaign online than younger candidates (Herrnson, Stokes-Brown, and Hindman 2007). Hence, it appears that the digital divide separates younger and older politicians just like it separates younger and older members of the general public. Accordingly, it seems that those who come of age with newer technologies tend to attach greater value to them.

In his seminal work, *Home Style*, Richard Fenno (1978) found that, in an effort to build a bond of trust with constituents, House members convey to their constituents (1) that they are qualified to hold office, (2) that they identify with their constituents, and (3) that their presence in office is necessary to safeguard constituent interests from Washington insiders. Fenno’s work, which highlights the importance of constituent communications, has only become more relevant with the emergence of newer technologies. Members of Congress, for example, use their Web sites to advertise themselves as “attractive, approachable, and helpful public servants” (Owen, Davis, and Strickler 1999, 25). Likewise, House members use the World Wide Web to display their home styles and solicit case work (Adler, Gent, and Overmeyer 1998). Therefore, lawmakers apparently see the value in an online presence because, like more traditional forms of communication, it offers the potential to improve constituent

relations such that constituents might forgive a lawmaker for casting an unpopular vote.

In summary, although there may be a generational gap between young and old politicians in their use of the Internet, politicians generally realize they need to rely on newer technologies to achieve their political objectives. Many politicians, through their campaign consultants, take advantage of online data to better understand voters so they can win or retain their office. And, savvy House members rely on their Web sites to advertise themselves as trustworthy and helpful public servants.

#### *Politicians Using the Internet to Court Journalists*

Scholars have begun exploring how politicians use their Web sites to attract and build relationships with journalists. This area of inquiry is the most relevant to my study; however, the literature is fairly undeveloped and focuses exclusively on members of Congress rather than governors. Although members of Congress and governors operate in different institutional settings and under different institutional constraints, they probably share some of the same basic political objectives. Richard Fenno (1973) pointed out that House members have three central goals: reelection, influence in Congress, and making good public policy. Given that governorships have become more powerful and prestigious positions (Sabato 1983), the good public policy and reelection goals probably shape their behavior. If so, governors may interact with journalists online in a way that is similar to members of Congress.

Rather than using their Web sites to circumvent journalists, Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) demonstrated that members of Congress use their sites to attract and engage journalists. To do this, roughly three-fourths of the lawmakers devoted a special section of their Web sites to journalists (called an “online newsroom”) and filled this area with information that would help a journalist write a favorable story about the lawmaker. The most frequently posted items inside these online newsrooms—including press releases, the text of speeches, and op-ed pieces—were traditional tools that politicians have used to communicate with the press. Thus, members of Congress were using new technology to increase the impact of their traditional forms of communication. Although displayed less frequently than some of the older forms of communications, Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) noted that lawmakers were beginning to use

new technologies to convey information such as links to other Web sites, official pictures, and audio or video clips. More recently, Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007) examined which members of Congress, in terms of their demographic characteristics, were more likely to court the press with their Web sites. They found that the likelihood of a member of Congress using his or her Web site to court the media turns on the lawmaker's chamber, geographic region, age, gender, and race. Thus, a complex set of variables shapes the extent to which lawmakers pursue an online strategy when courting journalists. Although the reasons for these differences were beyond the scope of their data, Lipinski and his co-authors speculated that the differences were attributable to the lawmakers' goals—reelection, good public policy, and gaining power within Congress.

### **Expectations**

Since governors occupy the highest position of power in their respective states, I would expect them to understand the importance of the Internet and provide a wide variety of online features that would be beneficial to journalists. Governors are almost certainly goal oriented politicians, who seek reelection and the implementation of policies that they believe are beneficial. Therefore, I expect governors to court journalists because they need to generate favorable media coverage in order to accomplish their policy objectives and retain their office. Also, it seems that governors display more than just static ambition. That is, they are not simply content to remain in their current post, but wish to win election to a higher office (Codispoti 1987). In recent years, for example, it has been common for governors to run for the presidency thereby elevating their need for positive media coverage.

Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004), relying on data collected in 2002, found that members of Congress were using their Web sites to post press releases, speeches, op-ed pieces, and other devices that were traditionally used to communicate with journalists. However, during the seven year period since they collected their data, technological advances have occurred (e.g., the creation of Twitter) and our society has had more time to acclimate to newer technologies. Therefore, I anticipate that governors will be inclined to rely on a variety of “new” technological features such as Twitter and Facebook to reach out to journalists.

In the analysis that follows, I will examine whether governors' reliance on new technologies varies by their age, size of their war chest, number of staff, tenure in office, electoral security, gender, political party affiliation, and geographic region. I anticipate that the following continuous independent variables will be related to the extent to which governors court the media online. First, I expect the younger the governor, the more likely he or she will court journalists online as younger governors will probably be more familiar and comfortable with newer technologies than their older counterparts. Second, I anticipate that governors with larger war chests will be more likely to court journalists online because a large campaign fund may signal the strength of the governors' ambition to retain the office or seek a higher office—perhaps the presidency or a U.S. Senate seat. The more ambitious the governor, the more likely he or she will pursue activities that will further reelection or ascendancy to a higher office. Third, I expect that governors who serve in states with a higher median family income will be more likely to maintain Web sites with more media appeal because their constituents, and perhaps the journalists working in these areas, will have greater access to the Internet. Fourth, I anticipate that the larger the governor's staff, the more enticing the governor's site will be to journalists. This is likely because a greater number of staffers will provide the governor with more assistance in an effort to develop, monitor, and maintain the Web site. Fifth, I expect that governors who have had a lengthier tenure in office will maintain Web sites that are more attractive to journalists simply because they have had more time to devote to improving the quality of their Web sites. Finally, I expect that governors who have greater electoral security (measured by the percentage of the vote the governor received in the most recent electoral victory) will be more likely to have Web sites that are more enticing to journalists. Governors who enjoy greater electoral security, as evidenced by the extent of their victory, are probably more adept at soliciting favorable media coverage.

I anticipate that the following categorical independent variables will be related to the extent to which governors court the media on their Web sites. First, I anticipate that female governors will be more likely than their male counterparts to court journalists online because scholars have found that female politicians receive less national media exposure, even though they have moved into leadership positions (Larsen and Andrade 2005). Therefore, female governors may feel a more pressing need to use their Web sites as a means of

boosting the amount of media coverage that they receive. Second, given the growing importance of newer technologies in society and the desire of the political parties to be competitive, I suspect that there will be no difference between Republican and Democratic governors in terms of their willingness to rely on their Web sites to court journalists. Third, I anticipate that governors serving in the Sunbelt (AL, AR, AZ, CA, FL, GA, LA, NC, MS, NM, NV, OK, SC, TN, TX, and VA) will be more likely to court journalists online than governors serving in other regions of the country because, according to Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007), the population in the South (largely rural) tends to be dispersed such that there is “little convergence” between the state boundaries and the media markets. Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007, 80) also speculated that politicians from the South—a region with a large digital divide—might be more inclined to solicit media coverage online because “their constituents are more dependent upon traditional media.” Thus, southern politicians realize a greater benefit if they are successful in their efforts to entice journalists to provide them with favorable coverage.

### **Analysis**

#### *Descriptive Analysis of How Governors Use their Web Sites to Court Journalists*

To determine how governors use new technology to court journalists, I performed a content analysis of the official Web sites maintained by governors in January and February of 2009. To ensure that I included only “official” sites in my dataset, I relied exclusively on sites ending with a governmental designation such as “.gov,” “.us,” or “.state.” My analysis confirmed that all 50 governors maintained an official site rather than an unregulated private site that could be used as a vehicle for soliciting campaign contributions.

Following the approach used by Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004), I examined whether each site contained an “online newsroom” or link specifically intended to attract journalists who might be writing a story about the governor. Public relations firms believe that online newsrooms are the best way to attract journalists’ attention by organizing a large variety of information for them in one easily accessible place (Callison 2003). Thus, a Web site that provides helpful material in a concentrated and organized manner is

likely to assist journalists writing stories about various governors. To perform my content analysis, I identified these online newsrooms by virtue of their titles. The test was whether a journalist who visited the site would quickly be put on notice that a certain part of the site contains useful information intended for the press. This was the same standard that Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) used in their analysis of congressional Web sites. They found that congressional online newsrooms were assigned 49 different titles including “News,” “News room,” “In the News,” and “Press Center” that captured the attention of journalists. Employing their coding rule, I found that all 50 governors maintained an online newsroom under the banner of 22 different titles. It is therefore apparent that all 50 of the United States governors are making a concerted effort to court journalists online.

Next, I analyzed the content within these online newsrooms. Here, my objectives were to identify how many “media-friendly” features were present within each newsroom and to catalogue the presence or absence of any given feature. For this analysis, I only counted features that were located inside the online newsrooms or accessible to journalists from tabs that were visible from inside of the newsrooms. I did not record features located outside of the online newsroom because there was a high probability that the journalist would only encounter the information by coincidence.

Once inside each online newsroom, I counted the number of media-friendly features that the governor put on display. As Table 1 demonstrates, this number of features, or items, ranged from 3 to 18 per Web site. Very few governors maintained sites falling at the high or low ends of this range. At the high end, Governors Linda Lingle (HI) and Deval Patrick (MA) maintained the most elaborate newsrooms with 18 features, followed by Governors Chris Gregoire (WA) and John E. Baldacci (ME), whose newsrooms boasted 17 and 16 features. In contrast, Governors Jan Brewer (AZ) and Jack Markell (DE) had the fewest features in their newsrooms, with 3 and 5 items. The distribution’s mean, median, and mode, however, give us a much better sense of the extent to which governors, as a group, are inclined to court the press. Here, the distribution’s mean was 11.2; its median was 11; and its mode was 10 (with 13 different governors all having 10 features on their sites). Therefore, it seems that governors have invested quite a bit of effort attempting to generate favorable media coverage through their Web sites.

**Table 1:** Number of Media-Friendly Items Displayed in the Online Newsrooms of United States Governors

Number	Governor	State	# of Items
1	Linda Lingle	Hawaii	18
2	Deval Patrick	Massachusetts	18
3	Chris Gregoire	Washington	17
4	John E. Baldacci	Maine	16
5	Martin O'Malley	Maryland	15
6	John Hoeven	North Dakota	15
7	Charlie Crist	Florida	14
8	Mitch Daniels	Indiana	14
9	Jennifer M. Granholm	Michigan	14
10	Jim Gibbons	Nevada	14
11	Tim Kaine	Virginia	14
12	Dave Heineman	Nebraska	13
13	Jon S. Corzine	New Jersey	13
14	Donald L. Carcieri	Rhode Island	13
15	Rick Perry	Texas	13
16	Mike Beebe	Arkansas	12
17	Arnold Schwarzenegger	California	12
18	Bill Ritter	Colorado	12
19	Tim Pawlenty	Minnesota	12
20	Haley Barbour	Mississippi	12
21	Dave Freudenthal	Wyoming	12
22	Kathleen Sebelius	Kansas	11
23	Brian Schweitzer	Montana	11
24	David A. Paterson	New York	11
25	Mike Rounds	South Dakota	11
26	Joe Manchin III	West Virginia	11
27	Bob Riley	Alabama	10
28	M. Jodi Rell	Connecticut	10
29	C.L. "Butch"	Idaho	10

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	Otter		
30	Pat Quinn	Illinois	10
31	Bobby Jindal	Louisiana	10
32	Bev Perdue	North Carolina	10
33	Brad Henry	Oklahoma	10
34	Edward Rendell	G. Pennsylvania	10
35	Mark Sanford	South Carolina	10
36	Phil Bredesen	Tennessee	10
37	Jon M. Huntsman Jr.	Utah	10
38	Jim Douglas	Vermont	10
39	Jim Doyle	Wisconsin	10
40	Sonny Perdue	Georgia	9
41	Chet Culver	Iowa	9
42	Jay Nixon	Missouri	9
43	Bill Richardson	New Mexico	9
44	Ted Kulongoski	Oregon	9
45	Sarah Palin	Alaska	8
46	Ted Strickland	Ohio	8
47	Steve Beshear	Kentucky	7
48	John Lynch	N. Hampshire	7
49	Jack Markell	Delaware	5
50	Jan Brewer	Arizona	3

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To interpret what efforts are being made to court journalists, an analysis of Table 2 is appropriate. First, I needed to identify all the potential media-friendly features a governor might use to court the press. Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) identified different features that were found on congressional Web sites. Therefore, I used their codebook as a starting point; however, I found that the governors' Web sites contained many new features that Lipinski and Neddenriep did not identify. It is interesting to compare the technologies that they found in comparison to gubernatorial sites. I found that unlike the members of Congress Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) studied, governors were beginning to rely on newer technologies such as RSS and Twitter. Even so, Twitter was only available on one governor's

site, while RSS feeds were found on 18 of the Web sites, making it the most commonly employed new technology. Overall, the new technologies (picture gallery, links, audio, video, official picture, and RSS) seem to be becoming more popular and, perhaps in the coming years, will surpass more traditional features such as press releases, speeches, and position statements.

**Table 2:** Media-Friendly Features Found on Gubernatorial Web Sites by Frequency and Percentage

Feature	F	%
Biography	48	96
Press Releases	48	96
Picture Gallery	39	78
Executive Orders	38	76
Links to Other Web Sites	38	76
Speeches	36	72
Audio	27	54
E-registry (register for email updates)	26	52
Videos	26	52
Issue Positions	25	50
Managing the Budget	23	46
Official Picture	23	46
Contact Information for the Press	23	46
Really Simple Syndication (RSS)	20	40
Proclamations	18	36
Government Reports	16	32
Legislation Supported by Governor	13	26
Newsletter	11	22
Articles	9	18
Op-ed Pieces	9	18
Vision for the State	8	16
Accomplishments	7	14
Appearances	7	14
Official Statement	6	12
Letters to Colleagues	5	10
Calendar	4	8
Information about the State	4	8
Interview Transcripts	3	6
Grants	1	2
Twitter	1	2

Online Chats	0	0
Testimony from Hearings	0	0
Voting Record on Bills Presented for Signature or Veto	0	0

In sum, it appears that governors are using new technologies on their Web sites with much greater frequency than members of Congress. The prevalence of these new technologies suggests that governors are becoming more technologically sophisticated in their efforts to court journalists online. Given the emerging presence of Twitter and RSS applications, journalists now have instant access to the messages that the governors are seeking to communicate.

#### *Explaining the Variance in the Gubernatorial Web Sites*

The next step in my analysis was to explore whether there was a statistically meaningful relationship between my dependent variable (the number of features in the online newsrooms) and the independent variables. Since there were only 50 cases in my dataset, the opportunity to use advanced statistics was lost. Instead, I ran bivariate correlations on SPSS to find out if there was a correlation between the continuous independent variables and the number of media-friendly features found on the governors' Web sites. As Table 3 demonstrates, only two independent variables were statistically significant at the .05 level, including the governors' tenure (measured in years) and the median family income of the governor's state. The longer the governor served in office and the higher the median family income, the more media-friendly features on his or her Web site.

The median family income correlation may exist due to the probability of more constituents being technologically savvy. It is likely that more constituents will be connected online when their income levels are higher (Fox and Vitak 2008). Governors who serve in states with higher family income levels are more likely to sense that their constituents, and perhaps journalists, have the ability to afford computers and education to pursue their interests via the Internet. It may also be a function of wealthier states having the appropriate technological infrastructure to provide utility that enables Internet service to be provided. Conversely, the relationship between tenure and more features on the Web sites may exist due to the resources the governor has acquired over time. Governors who have had a longer tenure in office may have a better sense of what is

needed to win reelection, and they have had more time to establish complex Web sites to provide resources to the journalists who cover them.

**Table 3:** Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables of Interest and the Number of Items on Governors' Web Sites

Independent Variable	N	Pearson Correlation	Significance	Data Source
Age	50	-0.118	0.208	a
Campaign Money	50	0.215	0.067*	b
Median Income	50	0.267	0.030**	c
Staff	50	0.157	0.137	b
Tenure	50	0.305	0.016**	a
Vote	50	-0.199	0.083*	b

Notes: \* $p < .10$ , \*\* $p < .05$ , \*\*\* $p < .01$  (one-tailed). Age is the age of the governor in 2009. Campaign Money is the amount of money that the governor spent on his or her most recent campaign for office. Median Income is the median family income in the governor's state. Staff is the number of staffers who directly report to the governor. Tenure is the number of years that the governor has held the governorship, up to and including 2009. Vote is the percentage of the vote that the governor received in his or her most recent election. Sources of the Data: a = Internet Search Conducted by the Author; b = Book of States 2008; c = United States Census 2000.

Two other independent variables—the size of the governor's war chest and the percentage of the vote that the governor received in the last election—were statistically significant, but only when a very lenient test of statistical significance was used ( $p < .10$ ). First, my data showed that there is a positive correlation between the size of the governor's war chest and the number of media-friendly features that appear on the Web site. Although there is no literature that illuminates why this correlation is present, it could be the case that these governors have more resources at their disposal to develop their Web sites. Another possible explanation, perhaps a more likely one, is that the size of the governor's war chest reflects the governor's ambition to retain the office or seek a higher office. If the size of the governor's war chest measures the governor's ambition, it makes sense that more ambitious governors would take greater steps, including the creation of a more elaborate Web site, such that they

might realize their ambitions. Second, my data show that the percentage of the vote that the governor received in the last election is negatively correlated with the number of media-friendly features. This relationship may exist because governors who are more electorally dominant do not have a strong need to make overtures to the press to accomplish one of their central goals—reelection. These conclusions are, of course, speculative, which underscores the need for future research on this topic.

There was not a significant statistical relationship between the number of features and the other independent variables displayed in Table 3. Contrary to my expectation, age was not correlated with the number of features. Perhaps a correlation was absent because by now, even older governors appreciate the importance of utilizing the Internet. That is, newer technologies have become more prevalent, and their use in politics has been widely publicized (e.g., Obama's use of the Internet to raise funds during the last presidential campaign) to the extent that even politicians who came of age before the Internet's prevalence realize that they need to avail themselves of these newer technologies if they are to be successful. Contrary to my expectation, there was no correlation between the number of gubernatorial staffers and the number of media-friendly features on the Web sites. Perhaps even governors with a small staff have at least one person who possesses the technical expertise to develop and service the governor's Web site, thereby explaining the absence of a relationship between the number of features and staff size.

Next, I used cross-tabulations to analyze whether there was a statistically significant relationship between my categorical independent variables (gender, party affiliation, and geographic region) and the number of media-friendly features on the gubernatorial Web sites. To perform these analyses, I divided the number of media-friendly features into two categories: "More Likely to Court the Press" and "Less Likely to Court the Press." I placed a Web site in the former category when it contained between zero and eleven features, and I placed a Web site in the latter category when it contained over eleven features. I purposely selected 11 as the dividing point between the two categories because doing this folded my distribution at its median—eleven features. Although I would have preferred to divide my dependent variable into more than two categories, I was unable to do so because my dataset only contained 50 cases.

As Table 4 shows, I did not find a statistically significant

difference based on gender. Specifically, I found that 57 percent of men fell into the less likely to court the press category (0-11 features), with the remaining 42 percent of men falling into the more likely to court the press category (over 11 features). The women's Web sites were essentially the same. The  $p$  value located beneath Table 4 confirms that there is no statistically significant difference between male and female governors in terms of the number of features found on the gubernatorial Web sites that I examined.

**Table 4:** Number of Media-Friendly Features by Gender

	Male Governors	Female Governors	Total
Less Likely to Court the Press (0 – 11 Features)	24 (57.1%)	5 (62.5%)	29 (58.0%)
More Likely to Court the Press (12 – 18 Features)	18 (42.9%)	3 (37.5%)	21 (42.0%)
Total	42 (100%)	8 (100%)	50 (100%)

Note:  $X^2(1, N = 50) = 0.79, p = 0.549$  (one-tailed). The numbers not listed in parentheses are frequencies.

These results are different from those reported by Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007), who found women serving in Congress were more likely to court the press online than their male counterparts. They argue that their finding could be a function of the lawmaker's reelection goal. Unlike minority lawmakers who have access to the ethnic press, women in Congress must gain wider exposure by reaching both men and women, who unlike many ethnic minorities are geographically intermingled. One of the few ways that female lawmakers can reach such a diverse constituency is through wide exposure in the mainstream press. Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007) also argued that although women have gained congressional leadership positions in recent years, they may still be excluded from informal social events like pick-up basketball games and poker nights. As a consequence, women in Congress may need to generate additional media coverage if they are to draw attention to their issues and enhance their reputations at the bargaining table.

Although these arguments seem logical in the congressional setting, they apparently do not apply to the office of governor. Gender may be inconsequential because women who hold a governorship enjoy considerable influence. They cannot be ignored because they occupy, as an individual, the highest office in their state and often wield considerable constitutional powers such as the ability to exercise the veto. Therefore governors, unlike lawmakers who must form coalitions and work within a system of give-and-take, can act unilaterally to achieve their political goals. Another possible explanation is that my non-finding is attributable to the fact that only eight women held governorships at the time of my study, increasing the possibility that my results occurred by chance. Therefore, although my findings are informative, they should be accepted cautiously.

**Table 5:** Number of Media-Friendly Features by Political Party Affiliation

	Republican Governors	Democratic Governors	Total
Less Likely to Court the Press (0 – 11 Features)	11 (50.0%)	18 (64.3%)	29 (58.0%)
More Likely to Court the Press (12 – 18 Features)	11 (50.0%)	10 (35.7%)	21 (42.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>22 (100%)</b>	<b>28 (100%)</b>	<b>50 (100%)</b>

Note:  $\chi^2(1, N = 50) = 1.032, p = 0.233$  (one-tailed). The numbers not listed in parentheses are frequencies.

In their study of congressional Web sites, Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) hypothesized that Republican members of Congress would maintain a technological advantage over their Democratic counterparts because of Newt Gingrich's commitment to new technology in the mid-1990s. Like Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004), my data does not lend strong support for the assumption that the political parties differ in the extent to which they use new technologies to court journalists. Table 5 shows that Democratic governors were less inclined than their Republican counterparts to

court the media; however, this difference was not statistically significant. Specifically, my data show that half of the Republican governors relied heavily on the internet to court journalists, while the other half did not. Just over one-third of Democratic governors maintained a Web site with over 11 features, while roughly two-thirds fell into the less likely to court the press category. My non-finding seems to suggest that most skilled politicians, regardless of their political affiliation, appreciate the value of newer technologies in courting journalists. Put differently, my non-finding may simply be a function of the competitive nature of politics. If one party stands to gain a competitive advantage, the opposition party will follow suit.

**Table 6:** Number of Media-Friendly Features by Geographic Region

	Sunbelt States	Non-Sunbelt States	Total
Less Likely to Court the Press (0 – 11 Features)	7 (50.0%)	22 (61.1%)	29 (58.0%)
More Likely to Court the Press (12 – 18 Features)	7 (50.0%)	14 (38.9%)	21 (42.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>14 (100%)</b>	<b>36 (100%)</b>	<b>50 (100%)</b>

Note:  $X^2(1, N = 50) = 0.511, p = 0.344$  (one-tailed). Sunbelt states included AL, AR, AZ, CA, FL, GA, LA, NC, MS, NM, NV, OK, SC, TN, TX, and VA. All other states were coded as being outside the Sunbelt. The numbers not listed in parentheses are frequencies.

Finally, I analyzed whether there was a statistically significant difference between the geographic region in which the governor serves and the number of media-friendly features on the gubernatorial Web sites. To perform this analysis, I borrowed the coding scheme used by Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007), whereby they divided their cases by Sunbelt (AL, AR, AZ, CA, FL, GA, LA, NC, MS, NM, NV, OK, SC, TN, TX, and VA) and non-Sunbelt states (all other states). Contrary to my expectations, Table 6 shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the online strategies of the governors serving in different regions. It is

unclear why there is no statistically significant difference between the Sunbelt and non-Sunbelt states. Lipinski, Neddenriep, and Kedrowski (2007), finding the presence of such a relationship, speculated that the increased media friendliness of the southern lawmakers' Web sites might reflect a lack of convergence in the media markets or a larger digital divide—causing constituents to be more dependent upon the traditional media for their news coverage—such that lawmakers rely more on the press to communicate with their constituents. My findings may be different than those of Lipinski, Neddenriep and Kedrowski (2007) simply due to the extensive powers that governors wield. That is, governors command media coverage because they are solitary public officials who exercise a tremendous amount of power (Grady 1987; Kincaid 1984). This ability to generate media coverage can probably transcend narrow media markets and perhaps, to some extent, the digital divide.

### **Conclusion**

It is clear that governors, taken as a whole, devote substantial attention to courting journalists on their Web sites. All the governors in my study displayed at least some degree of “media savvy,” as each and every governor devoted a special section of his or her Web site (an online newsroom) to the needs of journalists. These online newsrooms, intentionally given titles that capture a journalist's attention, contained a wealth of centralized information and a wide range of media-friendly features that would allow a journalist to write a favorable story about the governor. Many of these online newsrooms were quite sophisticated and, on average, contained approximately eleven features that would be especially helpful to journalists. Older studies such as the ones conducted by Lipinski and Neddenriep (2004) show that older forms of communication such as press releases, speeches, and op-ed pieces dominated the sites of politicians. However, my study shows that newer technologies are beginning to appear with greater frequency inside these online newsrooms, including RSS and Twitter links or features. Therefore, it seems that the Web sites maintained by elected officials are likely to evolve, becoming much more sophisticated, as both politicians and their constituents become more aware of and comfortable with newer technologies.

Furthermore, my analysis revealed that the extent to which a

governor relies on his or her Web site to court journalists varies based on constituency-related factors (e.g., the median family income of the governor's state), political experience (e.g., tenure in office), and apparently the governor's political ambition (e.g., the size of the governor's war chest and the governor's margin of victory in the last election). Although my data do an admirable job exposing these relationships, it is unable to explain why these relationships exist. However, as my discussion suggests, these findings are probably a product of the governors' goal-oriented behavior—the desire to perpetuate themselves in their existing office, the desire to seek a higher office, and the desire to implement their policy agenda.

Although my research contributes to our knowledge, there is still much to learn about how politicians use technology to court the press. We know very little about how other state-level officials use their Web sites to court the press. It would be valuable to learn if and how lieutenant governors, comptrollers, and attorney generals pursue online coverage because they frequently seek higher office. As the status of office increases, perhaps the number of media-friendly features will also increase too. Additionally, researchers have yet to examine the question from the perspective of journalists. How do journalists really use politicians' Web sites and, if they do rely on these Web sites, what elements of a politician's site increase the likelihood that they will provide the politician with favorable coverage? Although there is still much for researchers to learn, one thing is certain: The Internet is changing how politics is conducted.

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## **Predicting the Legacy of President Barack Obama**

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*Ever since Barack Obama came onto the national political scene with his keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, supporters and opponents have had high expectations for his abilities to bring change to a country in desperate need of it. As Barack Obama has risen to the office of president as the first African American to do so, many individuals from political analysts to average voters are already questioning whether he will eventually be considered one of the greatest presidents in American history compared to the likes of Lincoln, Kennedy and Franklin Roosevelt. By conducting a personality test, scoring President Obama's public records for the power motive, this study attempts to make predictions about the outcome of the Obama administration. Using speeches, debates and press conferences, this study finds that President Obama has the tenth highest power motive score from Winter's (1987) power motive rankings. This result places Obama amongst many of the greatest presidents in American history according to historians' rankings. President Obama has a high probability for greatness but only upon the conclusion of his administration will there be answers in regards to his success.*

President Barack Obama came onto the political scene with a force in 2004, and ever since, his impact and potential legacy have been questioned and debated by everyone from the average voter to news and political analysts around the world. His almost unparalleled rise to power and unprecedented grassroots campaign are the topics of continued discussion, even following his successful election as the first African-American president of the United States. However, this type of rise to the nation's highest office is not without criticism. Many individuals question his abilities to handle the difficult situations the United States currently faces both domestically and internationally. There are still others that question his lack of experience on the world stage, even though he overcame Hillary Clinton and John McCain, two of the most experienced politicians in this country, to capture the presidency. While President Obama has many critics, his popularity, ability to break the mold of traditional politics, and his campaign based on change have given the general public high expectations and put intense pressure on the President to succeed. With these mounting pressures and the different problems the United States currently faces, many people expect Barack Obama

to be one of the greatest presidents in the history of the United States.

When Barack Obama gave the keynote address at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, he sparked an interest from the party and the voters, even though he was a relatively little known member of the Illinois Senate. Following this address, Obama was able to advance to the United States Senate where he began to gather a very loyal following. In February 2007, Obama announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination for the President of the United States and his grassroots campaign continued to grow. In unprecedented fashion, this seemingly unknown politician from Illinois was able to raise more money than any other presidential candidate in history and overcome the biggest and most wealthy machine in politics, the Clintons. With this type of success, voters began to pay close attention to the Senator and he began to draw comparisons in his speeches and personality to other great presidents. These comparisons have continued as President Obama has taken office to start his term as president.

With these comparisons come expectations that President Obama will have a similar legacy to those of Lincoln, Roosevelt and Kennedy. These previous presidents are considered three of the greatest presidents in the history of the United States according to the general public, historians and political scientists. The expectations put on President Obama that he can perform as well as these men or have a similar legacy raises the question of whether we can predict whether he will be considered great through a personality analysis of his speeches. Over time, research has been conducted on this topic and it has been concluded that personality and, more specifically, the power motive, have a large impact on predicting greatness. A president's power motive level can be determined by coding for specific personality information through public records such as speeches, interviews, press conferences and statements. Using this information in conjunction with a variety of President Obama's public records, it is possible to foresee President Obama's greatness or failure. As so many people are already interested in the outcome of President Obama's administration in comparing him with previous presidents, this study can give insight into his young presidency and potential legacy. In addition it will expand upon previous literature to include the newest president of the United States and offer predictions about his term in office.

## Literature Review

The existing literature examining the impact of presidential personality on greatness tends to agree about the importance of personality as a predictor but varies on which traits and methods can best determine greatness. The following literature review examines the information previously presented by academics to determine which personality characteristics are important predictors of greatness. The literature review is broadly organized into the importance of personality on presidential greatness and personality characteristics that are related to greatness. Using previous literature on the subject in conjunction with greatness ratings of presidents by the masses and historians, a personality assessment of President Obama will then be presented to give insight as to whether he will be considered a great president following the conclusion of his administration.

### *Importance of Personality on Presidential Greatness*

Personality characteristics define people and how they conduct themselves, leading many academics to examine whether personality plays a major role in determining presidential greatness. Personality can be defined as the collective character, qualities and traits of an individual. With the exception of Simonton (1981, 1986) and Kowert's (1996) analysis of presidential personalities, the literature on this subject agrees on the importance of personality on presidential greatness. The importance of personality characteristics in politics dates back to the beginning of research on the topic and has been well studied since then. Browning and Jacob (1964) show that personality propels many individuals to become involved in politics and can help explain extensive political activity. While Browning and Jacob (1964) apply a personality test to politicians, they do not focus their research on presidents and use lab tests to find that motives have a strong influence on politicians. Although their research is not focused on the president, it still provides important information about the relationship of personality to politics. Donley and Winter (1970) use this relationship to further examine personality, and more specifically motives, in relation to the president. Motives are aspects of the personality that are oriented toward a future goal, and therefore, cause an individual to act in a certain way. Browning and Jacob (1964) find that none of the tested

motives are absolutely characteristic of the sample of politicians that are different from non-politicians; however, the authors make it clear that the motivation component of personality is apparent in a politician's decisions, pressures, and acceptance or rejection of decisions.

Donley and Winter (1970) use the basic conclusions illustrated by Browning and Jacobs (1964) in their discussion of personality and presidential greatness. Donley and Winter (1970) look at specific motives that are thought to be central to the presidency. Since two main goals of the president are attainment and system-maintenance, Donley and Winter (1970) examine personality through the power and achievement motives. Winter (1987) expands this preliminary research on presidential inaugural addresses to study these same personality motives; however, Winter also tests for the affiliation motive. The power motive can be defined as a personality motivation in which there is a concern for impact and status that is associated with getting formal power. The affiliation motive deals with a concern for close relations with other individuals and is associated with being close, joined or interpersonal with others. Finally, the achievement motive is defined as a concern for success and excellence and can be associated with moderate risk-taking. Characteristics that are related to the power motive include actions that enforce and express an individual's power, the arousal of strong emotions, and an individual's concern for their reputation. David Winter's (1973) *The Power Motive* describes more specific aspects of the power motive and also explains that important characteristics related to the power motive are threatening, accusatory, reprimanding, attempting to gain the upper hand, taking advantage of others or others' weaknesses, giving unwanted help or assistance, advice, or support and attempting to control another person through influence, persuasion, convincing or bribery.

Donley and Winter (1970) find that, in general, expressed motive levels are closely related to the president's overall term record. Therefore, it is clear that since motives are a component of an individual's personality, personality plays an important role in a president's administration. However, while they find that personality is important, these authors do not focus on personality in direct relation to greatness. Winter (1987) expands upon Donley and Winter's (1970) results which find that not only is personality important when understanding the president, but that the power motive is associated with greatness in that those with higher levels of

power motivation are more likely to be judged as great by historians. Neither the achievement nor the affiliation motives are significant in predicting presidential greatness, but Winter (1987) finds that the power motive is. This signifies the importance of personality on presidential greatness as the power motive is a component of an individual's personality.

Winter (2005) supplements these ideas with overall conclusions drawn from his many years of research. Winter (2005) expands his 1987 research to conclude that personality is very complex with several different elements such as motives, traits and characteristics that exist in social contexts and can be used to understand political behaviors and outcomes. Winter (2005) finds that personality interacts with opportunities and obstacles in a situational context and that this plays a major role in determining both greatness and success. However, personality is also a series of characteristics that are formed because of these situational contexts that affect an individual's actions and forms of expression. Winter (2005) concludes that this influence of personality is apparent since the power motive is a component of personality that also interacts with opportunities to determine greatness.

While the preceding studies conclude the importance of personality on presidential greatness, Kowert (1996) and Simonton (1981, 1986) disagree. In Kowert's (1996) study, the author attempts to discount claims that personality does not contribute to understanding the president. According to Kowert (1996), there are many individuals who argue that presidential personality is unimportant; there is the assumption that the personality theory has little to offer since each president's personality is unique. However, Kowert (1996) does find that some aspects of personality are related to presidential aspects but finds no support for personality having a role in presidential greatness. Simonton (1981) also finds that the power motivation scores make little difference or contribution to presidential greatness. While Kowert (1996) and Simonton (1981) present valid arguments as to why personality is not important in predicting presidential greatness, their findings make up a small portion of research on the topic. The majority of research on the topic predicts the importance of personality on presidential greatness as is exhibited through Winter's (1973, 1987, 2005, 2009) extensive research on the subject.

Not only are these two cases dwarfed by a much more substantial amount of literature supporting personality's impact on

presidential greatness, but these two articles also have significant weaknesses that can be overcome by using personality as a predictor for presidential greatness. Kowert's (1996) research is based on a Q-sort analysis that combines the methods of coding for personality in speeches and historical case studies to produce a personality profile. This profile is then judged by presidential experts, some of whom may have known the president personally. However, these personality profiles are unique to each president and therefore, as Winter and Donley (1970) state, there is no quantifiable measure in which to precisely compare the personalities of different presidents.

While Simonton (1981) finds that personality is not involved in presidential greatness, McCann (1992) discounts Simonton's work through his own research. Simonton (1981) argues that personality does not have a large effect on presidential greatness by using a six-variable formula to derive whether a president is great or not using only one personality variable from among the six. McCann (1992) argues against this belief by stating that none of the fourteen personality variables that are used in assessing greatness were included in the pool of potential predictors for Simonton's (1986) formula. McCann (1992) finds that including these personality traits might improve the prediction of greatness, so he goes one step further to create his own formula in which personality makes up the majority of the variables and is the most important variable. This reverses the main criteria of Simonton's (1986) research and changes its outcome substantially. Simonton's (1986) formula, relying heavily upon situational variables, loses 41 percent of its ability to predict greatness when it is altered by McCann (1992). This supplements the previously described research, which finds that personality is important in understanding the president. However, this research deals solely with a successful presidential performance rather than direct greatness. In addition, Simonton's (1993) research about putting the best leaders in the White House acknowledges the fact that we judge candidates for the presidency on personality which signifies that he has realized the importance that personality plays in politics and political success. This is a different view from his earlier work in which he believed personality has no place among predicting greatness.

While academics do not necessarily agree on the impact personality has on presidential greatness, there are alternative views presented on what can signify presidential greatness if personality is not involved. Simonton (1981) finds that since the power motivation

scores make little difference on presidential greatness, the situations in which a president enters, governs and leaves office matter more than personality factors. In addition, Simonton (1981) claims that the years a president is in office, the number of years a president is at war, possible scandal, whether the president was assassinated, and whether he is considered a war hero are important determinants in understanding presidential greatness. This issue is refuted by Winter (1987) in his claim that personality interacts with the situational context. If personality really does affect these situational variables as Winter (1987) claims, then Simonton's (1981) claim that situations predict greatness would also signify that personality is involved in understanding greatness since one's personality will affect decisions. Winter (2005) also makes the point that it is possible to predict political behaviors from a president's personality due to motivations. According to Winter (1987), high power motivations have been related to war entry, avoiding war in crisis situations, drama, crisis-oriented situations and perhaps confrontational policy. However, this method is risky because no one can always accurately predict future situations, or know what current situations will become problems in the future. Although this is true, in the past, the power motive has been able to predict these situations and they often define great presidencies, showing the link between personality (as the power motive is a component of personality) and presidential greatness.

From the preceding literature, the impact that personality has on politics is very clear. While there remain conflicting opinions on whether personality affects presidential greatness, there is significantly less research claiming that personality does not affect presidential greatness. Finally, research such as Simonton's (1981, 1986, 1993) that suggests that it is situational events and contexts that help predict greatness is much less valuable in predicting whether President Obama will become great. No one can easily or accurately predict future events of great significance, so using personality provides another different yet more attainable option for conducting an assessment of President Obama.

### **Methodology**

A variety of different methods have emerged throughout the previously mentioned literature in determining the importance of personality on presidential greatness. To predict whether President Obama will be considered great compared to previous American

presidents, I coded for power imagery from a selection of Obama's speeches, debates and press conferences. This method follows directly from David Winter's (1987) coding of presidential inaugural addresses in order to determine whether the power motive is related to presidential greatness ratings by historians. This method is the most appropriate for this study due to the influence of the power motive in predicting greatness and the ability to compare the results of this study directly with those of Winter's (1987) in order to analyze the results. However, there has been no general agreement amongst academics as to which of the three main methods is superior: the 6-variable prediction equation, the Q-sort analysis, or the scoring of presidential records.

The 6-variable prediction equation has been used by a variety of authors in attempting to determine what variables predict greatness. Simonton (1986) constructs an equation using six variables, including years in office, war years, scandal, assassination, heroism in war, and intellectual brilliance. The author wants to determine whether situational variables can predict presidential greatness. This six-variable equation was able to produce a ranking of presidents that was very similar to historians' rankings; however, these rankings were in comparison to presidential success, not presidential greatness. This method only includes one variable considered to be a personality trait (intellectual brilliance) and is not sufficient for determining presidential greatness. This is further emphasized in McCann's (1992) analysis of the 6-variable prediction equation. McCann (1992) conducts personality analysis by changing Simonton's (1981, 1986) situational variables for personality traits so that they make up the majority and most important variables in the equation. McCann (1992) finds that this method produces an even stronger ranking of presidents; however, once again, these rankings are of overall performance, not presidential greatness. While this research emphasizes the importance of personality characteristics in understanding presidential success, it does not show any effects of the power motive's affect on presidential greatness. However, none of McCann's (1992) personality traits overlap with the power motive traits, so these traits do not eliminate the power motive as the component of personality that influences greatness. In addition, the Q-sort method preferred by Kowert (1996) is not applicable for this analysis as it is not possible to ask experts to analyze presidential profiles due to restrictions on time and money.

Winter's (1987) article expands on Donley and Winter's (1970)

examination of the inaugural addresses of Presidents from 1905 to 1969 for achievement and power. Donley and Winter (1970) conclude that using biographical facts to compose a personality profile for presidents is not the strongest method of analysis because it lacks a quantifiable way in which presidents can be measured and equally compared to one another. Instead, each president's unique personality would be compared to another completely different personality with no common area in which to make comparisons. In addition, Donley and Winter (1970) state that since there are only a couple of presidents alive at one time, the use of speeches and statements is promising as they are preserved throughout history. Otherwise, one would have to enlist the help of historians or those who had direct contact with the president, which could possibly allow for a personal bias that affects the results. In addition, it is not possible for this research due to the inability to gather experts to judge presidential profiles. The use of records is much more accessible and manageable for the resources allotted for this study. Donley and Winter (1970) conclude that speeches are very important records to use even if speechwriters were involved because the President retains great control over the speech's content and wording. Therefore, speeches and other public records remain an important way to code for power imagery across time and are attainable for conducting this study.

These ideas first established by Donley and Winter (1970) are expanded upon by Winter (1987) who examines the first inaugural addresses of all the presidents dating from George Washington through Ronald Reagan, with the exception of those who came to power upon the death or resignation of the previous president and did not go on to win reelection. While this method may exhibit flaws, it is the strongest because the power motive that Winter (1987) defines actually incorporates findings from a variety of studies that stress the ability of the power motive to influence presidential politics and greatness. The personality traits used in studies that did not find personality important in presidential greatness were traits that did not overlap with those aspects of the power motive, and therefore, did not discredit its reliability and accuracy. Together these traits form the power motive, which can then be used to code personal records in order to predict presidential greatness.

To predict whether President Obama will be considered great, a variety of his speeches, debates and press conferences were coded for the power motive as described in Winter (1973). Although

Winter (1987) focuses solely on the first inaugural address, here, a series of eleven public records were coded. Six speeches from 2004 through President Obama's inaugural address in January 2009, the three debates from the 2008 presidential election, and two press conference transcripts were gathered and coded for power imagery.

To code for the power motive I followed the detailed plan laid out in Winter's (1973) *The Power Motive*, with a few alterations. In Winter (1973) the coder only codes once at the mention of any power imagery and then codes only for the power behavioral sequence. However, this is not how Winter conducted his coding on the presidential inaugural addresses examined in his 1987 study. Winter and Carlson's (1988) text examining Richard Nixon's motives explains that when coding public records, only the power imagery is coded and the number of power imageries are totaled. It is explicitly clear that no coding of the power behavioral sequence takes place. Therefore, the following are the three different areas of power imagery that Winter describes and that are used in coding President Obama's public records:

1. "Someone shows his power concern through actions which in themselves express his power. Statements of affect surrounding the attainment of the control or the means of influencing a person. Specific power imagery is winning an argument, the inability to have your way, wanting to win a point, showing dominance, attempting to gain control, convincing someone of something, putting a point across (controlling the means of influence), statements of wanting to avoid weakness, the desire to teach another person something, inspiring another person or providing interest for another individual" (Winter 1973, 251-253).
2. "Someone does something that arouses strong positive or negative emotions in others. Doing something to attain or maintain the ability to control the means of influencing another person. Specific power imagery is disputing a position, arguing something, demanding or forcing something, trying to put a point across, giving a command, trying to convince someone of something and punishing someone. For this specific area the individual must actually be doing it for it to qualify as power imagery; however, it can be stated in the past or the future tense" (Winter 1973,

254).

3. “Someone is described as having a concern for his reputation or position, that is, about what someone else or the world at large will think of his power. Any statement of an interpersonal relationship where its execution is one in which there is a superior person having control of the means of influencing another individual who is the subordinate” (Winter 1973, 254-255).

These three areas directly stem from the definition of the power motive, the concern for impact and prestige, and are associated with gaining formal social power. When coding for these three areas of power imagery, two consecutive sentences with the same imagery are counted as only one sentence and one power image. These criteria for scoring power imagery are used for coding President Barack Obama’s public records from his Democratic convention keynote address in 2004 up through his early days as president.

The speeches, debates and press conferences were carefully chosen from among Obama’s entire public record since his rise up the national political scene in 2004. The records which were taken include both prepared speeches and records in which the president was not briefed on the questions beforehand. This variety was included in order to avoid a homogenous pool of records that prevents any favorability towards one type of record and to see whether Obama can maintain a consistent power motive throughout. However, there is a much smaller number of records included in this study from both the transition period and his young presidency. This is due to the length of the election season, especially in 2008, and the short time of both the transition period and the start of his administration. Using these records, a careful reading of each transcript was done and the number of power images was totaled. In addition, the total number of words in each record was counted. The raw score for each public record was found by dividing the number of power images by the total number of words and then multiplying by 1000. This raw score is important as it allows this data to be analyzed and compared with Winter’s (1987) work. Without the raw score, Obama’s scores would not be able to be compared with the power motive scores of past presidents of the United States and the ability to predict whether Obama will be a great president using these criteria would be lost.

## Results

Table 1 presents the number of power imagery phrases, the word count, and the resulting raw scores for each of the public records that were coded for the power motive. President Obama's overall raw score was computed by totaling the number of power images and the number of words in all of the records and multiplying by 1000 to get a raw score of 7.299 power images per 1000 words. The Appendix presents each of the public records used in this study with their corresponding number as shown in Table 1.

As discussed in the methodology section, power imagery is the desire to have an impact on other people and to affect their behavior or emotions. Therefore, in coding Barack Obama's speeches, debates, and press conferences, concepts such as influence, authority, inspiration, leadership, control, dominance, and aggression were the most important imagery to consider. In Obama's acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention he states, "America, we are better than these last eight years. We are a better country than this" (Obama 2008a). In this statement Obama conveys influence and inspiration. Further along in the same speech he is aggressive, argumentative and attempting to inspire the masses when he states, "It's not because John McCain doesn't care. It's because John McCain doesn't get it" (Obama 2008a). These examples of power imagery are also found in the 2008 presidential debates. Obama states in the third and final debate, "And 100 percent, John, of your ads – 100 percent of them have been negative" (Obama 2008b). This statement is conveying dominance and aggression in attempting to put a point across and convince the people of something. Finally, an example of power imagery from one of Obama's press conferences is when he states, "I'm going to confront this economic crisis head-on by taking all necessary steps to ease the credit crisis, help hardworking families, and restore growth and prosperity" (Obama 2008c). In this statement, Obama attempts to avoid weakness, convince and inspire the people of his economic procedure and show his leadership and authority over the situation. These examples of power imagery were coded for all eleven of President Obama's records used in this study. Once the transcript was coded the number of power images were added together to determine the scores.

Overall, President Obama's public records were fairly consistent in the amount of power imagery per 1000 words. There are no clearly apparent outliers that were either high or low. This

consistency shows that his overall raw score is not strongly affected by any possible outliers and, therefore, it is a good judgment on his power motive. While there was some variance in Obama's records, this is to be expected as each speech, press conference, or debate is for a different reason with different messages in mind. However, there was only a spread of approximately 2.5 power images per 1000 words between the highest scored record and the lowest. In addition, removing the two highest and two lowest records reduce the spread to just over one power image per 1000 words, showing that the majority of his records all had a close number of power images, reducing error in the raw scores and the overall conclusions that can be drawn from them.

**Table 1:** Power Imagery Scores of President Obama's Chosen Records

Public Record Numbers	# of Power Images	Total Words	Raw Score
1	21	2603	8.068
2	30	4916	6.103
3	15	1949	7.696
4	14	2165	6.467
5	35	4692	7.460
6	18	2413	7.460
7	66	7657	8.620
8	51	7107	7.176
9	57	7335	7.771
10	18	2333	7.715
11	51	7658	6.660

The records were also divided by category into the three groups of speeches, debates and press conferences, as observed in Table 2. President Obama's consistency is present yet again when the data is presented in this way. Press conferences recorded the lowest number of power images per 1000 words, although not by a significant margin. In addition, press conferences tend to explain policies and answer policy questions and they often carry a smaller audience than speeches and debates do so these results are not completely shocking. While this may be expected, Obama's raw score for press conferences is 6.906 and is only .19 power images per 1000 words less than his raw score for speeches. Obama's raw score for debates

was the highest of the three categories with a 7.874. This is also expected as the debate scenario presents the greatest opportunity for arguments and attempts at gaining or maintaining control. This may be due to debates being a contest scenario with an opponent and a clear winner and loser. However, once again, Obama's debate score is only slightly higher (.776 power images per 1000 words) than the speech score of 7.098. These close scores suggest that Obama's personality is very stable and does not drastically change across different types of content. While his power imagery may be somewhat different across different documents, it is not expected for every politician to display different levels of power imagery for these different situations, regardless of their actual levels of power motivation. Therefore, since this method assumes that the words chosen by politicians accurately reflect their personality traits, different individuals who are more versus less motivated by power will exhibit different power imagery scores.

**Table 2:** Power Imagery Scores by Category

Category	# of Power		Raw Score
	Images	Total Words	
Speeches	133	18738	7.098
Debates	174	22099	7.874
Press Conferences	69	9991	6.906

In Table 3 the public records were divided into three categories by time period: the time up until and including election night, the transition period and Obama's presidency, including the inaugural address. The Democratic election period was so drawn out and intense while Obama's presidency is relatively young, causing there to be many more records from the election period than any other period. There is a difference in the scores between the election period and Obama's time in office, which could be attributed to the ongoing and tough election that Obama faced. He had to go up against two powerful candidates who had money, political and financial backers and massive support of the voters whereas Obama started as a newcomer. Since he had to fight so hard to win the Democratic nomination and then the presidency, it is possible that during the election period President Obama exhibited a greater power motive in his personality and upon winning the election was less influenced by this aspect of his personality. However, as

previously discussed, President Obama appears to have a very stable personality, so even though there are some changes and differences in scores, they are very minimal. There is still a relative consistency between the time periods, which show that one has no reason to believe that this slight inconsistency will affect the results. While only one press conference was used from the transition period, the score of 7.715 is only .194 power images per 1000 words away from the pre-election period, which consisted of eight of the eleven public records. Therefore, although there is only one record from the transition period, its relative proximity to the largest period of records shows that it is consistent with the rest of the results. The overall spread of only .864 between the transition period and the lowest scoring period, Obama's presidency, is still relatively small and consistent with the scores already presented. Finally, these results are consistent due to the stability of Obama's personality, which suggests that presidents with different personality traits and therefore a different level of power motivation would exhibit very different results depending on whether they are more or less motivated by power.

**Table 3:** Power Imagery Scores by Time Period

Time Period	# of Power		
	Images	Total Words	Raw Score
Pre-election	289	38424	7.521
Transition Period	18	2333	7.715
Presidency	69	10071	6.851

Using the overall raw score, we can compare Obama's score to the raw scores that Winter (1987) found for each of the previous American presidents (from George Washington through Ronald Reagan), excluding those presidents that never won an election to that office. Winter's (1987) raw scores for each coded president are presented in Table 4. It is apparent that President Obama has high potential to be considered great since his overall raw score of 7.299 fell in between James Madison, who had a score of 7.69, and Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon who both had a score of 7.06. These three presidents are all well known for impressive feats, although not all positive. Only eight former presidents had higher raw scores than President Obama including Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and John Kennedy, all of whom are considered to be

great presidents by historians' rankings. However, the proximity of Richard Nixon's and Jimmy Carter's scores to Obama's show that every high-scoring president is not necessarily going to be extremely successful or popular with Americans, as these two men are often considered failures.

**Table 4:** Winter's (1987) Power Imagery Scores of American Presidents' Inaugural Addresses, 1789-1981, with the Inclusion of Barack Obama, and Historical Greatness Rankings by MSNBC

President	Year	Raw Power Score	Greatness Ranking
Truman, Harry	1949	11.98	5
Kennedy, John	1961	11.81	6
Reagan, Ronald	1981	9.01	10
Cleveland, Grover	1885	8.89	21
Roosevelt, Franklin	1933	8.50	3
Carter, Jimmy	1977	8.16	25
Taft, William H.	1909	7.93	24
Madison, James	1809	7.69	20
<b>Obama, Barack</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>7.30</b>	-
Wilson, Woodrow	1913	7.06	9
Nixon, Richard	1969	7.06	27
Lincoln, Abraham	1861	6.97	1
Monroe, James	1817	6.62	14
Jefferson, Thomas	1801	6.59	7
Pierce, Franklin	1853	6.33	40
Polk, James	1845	6.32	12
Eisenhower, Dwight	1953	6.14	8
Garfield, James	1881	6.10	28
Johnson, Lyndon	1965	6.09	11
Hayes, Rutherford	1877	6.07	33
Hoover, Herbert	1929	5.94	34
McKinley, William	1897	5.55	16
Harrison, Benjamin	1889	5.45	30
Coolidge, Calvin	1925	5.43	26
Jackson, Andrew	1829	5.38	13
Harding, Warren	1921	4.81	38
Adams, John	1797	4.76	17
Buchanan, James	1857	4.69	42

Washington, George	1789	4.62	2
Taylor, Zachary	1849	4.56	29
Van Buren, Martin	1837	4.38	31
Harrison, William H.	1841	4.31	39
Roosevelt, Theodore	1905	4.07	4
Adams, John Quincy	1825	3.74	19
Grant, Ulysses	1869	3.51	23

Note: Does not include: John Tyler (Rank: 35); Millard Fillmore (37); Andrew Johnson (41); Chester Arthur (32); Gerald R. Ford (22); George H.W. Bush (18); Bill Clinton (15); George W. Bush (36)

Finally, if we were to use just President Obama's raw score for his inaugural address, as that is what Winter (1987) uses, his position among the ranking of presidents does not change. While his inaugural score of 7.46 increases slightly from his overall score, Obama maintains his position, again supporting the consistency of his personality across a variety of records. President Obama is moderately to strongly influenced by the power motive in both his overall raw score and inaugural score. The consistency of these two scores reinforces his position in the rankings of America's previous presidents from Winter's (1987) research.

### **Discussion**

These results suggest two conclusions. President Obama's power motive score ranks him among many of the greatest presidents in American history, suggesting that he has the potential to join this group at some later date. Obama also scored higher than Eisenhower and Lincoln, who are consistently ranked among the top presidents by historians. Again, this suggests the possibility for greatness, especially considering circumstances such as the Iraq War, the War on Terror, the struggling economy, as well as many other significant problems currently facing the president. Oftentimes the personality of particular leaders causes them to deal with momentous events in particular ways, which help them to lead effectively, and this may be one of those times. Currently, the United States faces a growing economic crisis – the worst since the Great Depression – a loss of allies abroad, and a deepening war in Iraq. President Obama must also address domestic problems such as health care and energy dependence in order to reverse some of the problems that will

continue to plague this country should they be ignored. President Obama's power motive may have propelled him to run during a difficult time and his personality will be important in how he conducts his presidency, since personality is tied closely with decisions. For example, John F. Kennedy had the second highest power motivation and he came to power with the threat of the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War and a deepening crisis in Vietnam. President Kennedy is considered one of the greatest presidents in our history, and there is no doubt that his personality played a major role in how he conducted the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Obama faces an arguably more difficult task, so the possibility for greatness is there, but it will be years before his success, failure or greatness can be determined.

Obama's power motive score not only ranks closely to great presidents but it also ranks in close proximity to some presidents considered to be failures or destructive to this country, including Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter. Although they are not considered the worst presidents by historians' standards, this does not mean that their presidencies were successful. Obama is only one spot higher than Richard Nixon, who failed so miserably that he remains the only president to ever resign from office. Nixon's administration collapsed around him after it became known that he was involved in the biggest political scandal in American history. In addition, he changed the position and face of the presidency along with the abilities of the president. Obama's rank falls below Carter, who is also considered to have done a poor job in the White House with the Iran hostage affair and failing to follow national interests. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that President Obama will automatically be considered a great president just because his ranking is quite high. There is the possibility for failure or mediocrity; however, his high rank does give potential to the prospect of greatness.

The power motive scores compared to historians' rankings suggest that the higher the power motive scores, the greater chance to either fail or greatly succeed. Very few presidents with high power motive scores are normally considered to be middle-ground presidents or presidents not considered great by historians' rankings. For example, of the top ten ranked presidents by Winter's (1987) power motive scores and not including President Obama, five are frequently considered by historians to be among the greatest presidents to take office. Nixon and Carter might have been unsuccessful in office but remain far from the bottom of historians'

rankings possibly for the way they changed the image of the presidency. Rather, they are averaged around the middle, suggesting that those presidents with higher power motives are rarely considered the worst presidents by historians' standards. This group of presidents with a high power motivation includes Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan. This suggests that by looking at President Obama's power motivation score, he may not be completely successful but he has a small chance of being considered one of the worst presidents in the history of the United States by greatness rankings.

While there is potential for Obama to be considered great, his presidency is so young it remains uncertain what will actually happen. Winter's (1987) study was conducted long after the majority of the included presidents' administrations had concluded, with the exception of Ronald Reagan. However, during the time of Winter's (1987) study, Reagan only had one year left in office so more information was known about him and his presidency to make preliminary assumptions or judgments. This is not the case for Obama as he just took office in January 2009. That prevents anyone from making assumptions based on the actions during his time in office since he is still only in the early stages of his administration. As his term progresses with a possible chance for reelection in 2012, the direction of his presidency and whether he has a chance of being considered a great president in the future will become more clear. However, this early into the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln and John F. Kennedy, it was also unknown whether these presidents would be considered great. The beginning of John F. Kennedy's presidency was considered miserable with the Bay of Pigs disaster and his failed meeting with the Soviet Union's Khrushchev. However, later acts reversed this trend, as is always a possibility with Obama should he have early failures or difficulties. This suggests that early actions by the Obama administration should not be taken out of context in predicting greatness. It will be years before the outcome of his administration is known and the accurate role that he played in American politics is realized.

As Obama goes deeper into his presidency and more speeches and press conferences are given in-depth analysis, this study can be expanded to include more documents from the Obama administration. Here, the spread of public records across time periods heavily favors the pre-election period. With only one document from the transition period and two documents from the presidential period,

this has the potential to skew results as upon being elected there is the possibility that President Obama's level of power motivation will change. While the documents included in this study suggest that the president has remained consistent upon being elected, this may just be luck due to the small number of records. It also may be the case that more documents from this period would alter the results; however, the youth of the Obama presidency restricts the documents from his presidency that could be included. In addition, the transition period of two and a half months was significantly shorter than the pre-election period (21 months). For this reason it is understandable and expected to choose mostly documents from the pre-election period. However, future studies will have more transcripts to include, which will only help strengthen this method of research.

Another aspect of this research that could be improved upon is addition of lower profile speeches for coding due to the possibility that the power motive may trend towards larger and more well-known speeches. However, this study included speeches from before Obama became a serious presidential candidate, which had more potential to leave out power imagery as he was not in serious contention. These speeches, as seen in the above results section, were consistent with the most well-known Obama speeches in their use of power imagery, suggesting that lower profile speeches would not have drastically altered the results. In addition, the inclusion of debates and press conferences in which the president was asked questions without prior knowledge of them shows that the power motive imagery is consistent across a wide spectrum of political records. This supports the consistency of Obama's use of power imagery and suggests that Obama's level of power motivation does not change across different types of records. Finally, as discussed in the results, Obama's stable personality most likely prevents any skewing of results that may occur by including low profile speeches in the study. Since Obama's personality stability has been recognized across a wide range of documents, there appears to be no risk that this would change for low profile speeches if it did not affect the president in debates when he was unaware of the questions prior to answering them.

### **Conclusion**

Obama's personality appears very stable in that his level of power motivation does not change across varying contents. In addition, his

personality has remained stable over a wide range of time as there is consistency throughout his public records and they span almost five years from July of 2004 through February of 2009. Finally, Obama's ability to maintain a stable personality, and therefore, a stable level of power motivation, suggests his ability to remain consistent over the course of the varying degree of events and emotions that he experienced on his almost two year journey to the presidency. Throughout this time he faced failure, defeat, victory and a wide range of political events while maintaining a sound personality throughout his records, which gives hope that he will be able to guide the United States through the difficult issues it faces in the months and years to come.

These conclusions on the Obama presidency are reinforced by a recent study conducted by Winter (2009) predicting the Obama presidency. While his article came out following the completion of this research, it does emphasize the results here while also using the affiliation and achievement motives to make predictions. Winter (2009) supports the conclusion that Obama has a high power motive. He states, "However, his very high power motive score suggests that he also enjoys and is adept in the ways of politics – as one would expect from someone schooled in 'Chicago politics'" (Winter 2009, 7). This assessment of Obama's power motive can be seen throughout his political career as he thoroughly appears to enjoy his career and is extremely skillful in dealing with politics, as we could see throughout his entire presidential campaign. Finally, Winter reinforces this research when discussing aggressive politics, "In addition, presidents scoring high in power motive imagery are prone to aggressive policies, often leading the nation into military action. Obama has consistently advocated withdrawing American forces from Iraq, but is willing to escalate in Afghanistan" (Winter 2009, 7). Winter (2009) believes that a high power motive leads to aggressive policies that we have seen from Obama thus far during both the election period and his presidency. During the election, he went after other candidates, was aggressive in showing how he would be a better leader and was firm in the policies he wished to pursue. Upon taking over as president, Obama has pushed through a number of important pieces of legislation including the stimulus package and budget, which shows his aggressive stance toward attacking America's problems.

Overall, the personality of individuals is very important in terms of their conduct and decision-making. Therefore, personalities can

greatly affect foreign leaders or American presidents with how they conduct the affairs of their nation. Insight into the personalities of presidents provides knowledge on how they will proceed in the future and what the American public can expect from them. In addition, it provides the general public with comparisons they can make with future presidents in terms of voting in presidential elections as well as understanding policies put forth by an individual. Presidential elections or general political elections are very important as they put in place a group of people who determine the course of events for the country and what should or should not be law. Since personality plays a large role in politics and decision-making, in-depth knowledge on the subject can help an individual make more informed decisions as to what type of person they want in office. This is not strictly confined to the United States either, as personality has an impact on individuals throughout the world. Since this type of study could be applied to a wide variety of politicians, it broadens the knowledge that the public has on those select individuals who have the ability to cause drastic change. By recognizing the power motive in an individual, it is possible to understand the motives behind their actions and why they act as they do. The culmination of this knowledge will permit the public to know more about their leaders and give insight into possible future leaders both in and outside of the United States.

#### **Appendix: President Obama's Public Records Used in Study**

Record Number	Description of Record
1	Obama Presidential Announcement Springfield, Illinois February 10, 2007
2	"The Race Speech" Philadelphia, Pennsylvania March 18, 2008
3	Election Night Victory Speech Grant Park, Illinois November 4, 2008
4	2004 Democratic Convention Keynote Address Boston, Massachusetts July 27, 2004

5	Acceptance Speech, 2008 Democratic Convention Mile High Stadium, Denver, Colorado August 28, 2008
6	Obama Inaugural Address Washington, D.C. January 20, 2009
7	Presidential Debate #1 University of Mississippi September 26, 2008
8	Presidential Debate #2 Nashville, Tennessee October 7, 2008
9	Presidential Debate #3 Hempstead, New York October 15, 2008
10	President-Elect Obama's First Press Conference Chicago, Illinois November 7, 2008
11	Economic Press Conference Washington, D.C. February 9, 2009

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## **From *Kulturkampf* to *Kampf der Kulturen*: Political Recognition and Representation of Islam in Germany in the Example of Islam Instruction in German Public Schools**

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*The purpose of my analysis is to better understand how long-established church-state relations – stemming from the Kulturkampf of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – create a space for the political participation and recognition of Muslim minorities in Germany, and how this, when taken advantage of appropriately, can ease today’s perception of the Kampf der Kulturen and provide the Muslim community with a legitimate political voice. I will look specifically at the process of implementing Islam instruction in German public schools within four German federal states: North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Berlin and Bavaria. I conclude that the system for officially recognizing religious communities needs to be updated to accommodate a diverse religious landscape and that the future of a successful Islam instruction and consequently the future political representation of Muslims in Germany lies in local communities, rather than trying to unite vastly diverse groups and interests on a state or national level.*

In the frenzy stirred up by reports about terror bombings, honor killings, headscarves and “parallel communities,” it is easy to forget the broader historical context for analyzing the present role Islam plays in Europe. Islamophobia, drawing legitimacy and fodder from such media coverage, is often based on the assumption that there is something inherently wrong with or evil about Islam itself, making it incompatible with European law, lifestyle and culture (e.g., Fallaci 2006, among others). This paper assumes the opposite, namely that the perceived incompatibility of Islam stems from the lack of organized and credible political representation of the Muslim immigrant community. I will argue that if Europe’s Muslim population, a rapidly growing minority, is to become an active group contributing to politics and society, it is necessary to shift attention away from the nature of Islam itself and its compatibility with Western values and instead look more closely at the pre-existing relationships between religion and the state that can provide Muslims with new channels of political representation, making it possible for

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<sup>16</sup>An earlier version of this article won First Place in the Pi Sigma Alpha 2009 Best Undergraduate Class Paper competition.

Muslims to become an integral part of European society. I ask specifically what the process of implementing Islam instruction in German public schools can reveal about which actors are needed for making the Muslim voice heard in German politics.

### **Thesis**

Several authors have already looked at the topic of Islam in Europe comparatively; therefore I am limiting my analysis to Germany, which proves to be a rich case on its own for several reasons:

- The presence of a significant Muslim minority population, second largest in Western Europe after France. Most estimates state that there are between 3 and 3.5 million Muslims in Germany, two-thirds of whom are of Turkish descent.
- The unique status of religion within Germany's "religion neutral" constitution, the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*); state recognition of a religious community "Public Corporation Status" (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*), already attained by the Protestant and Catholic Church, among other minority religions including Judaism and smaller Christian confessions; the right to receive federal tax money (*Kirchensteuer*) and jurisdiction over cultural and social welfare programs including religious instruction in public schools.
- The established presence of Islam instruction in west German public schools, beginning in the late 1990s and continuing to expand to more and more schools through trial programs.
- The uniqueness within Europe of the Muslim community itself, made up mostly of Turks, due to Turkey's secular Kemalist tradition; Turkey's relationship to Germany is based on post-war worker recruitment, not colonial oppression; low levels of Islamic violence and activism; and the membership of Turkey to NATO and application for membership to the

European Union.

- Germany's federal state system, which allows for comparison across states and the isolation of contributing factors under Germany's own unique situation.

In this article, I draw from a wide-range of English-language and German sources, from scholarly articles and monographs to recent news articles in the German and American popular press. The purpose of my analysis is to better understand how long-established church-state relations – stemming from the *Kulturkampf* of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – create a space for the political participation and recognition of Muslim minorities in Germany, and how this, when taken advantage of appropriately, can ease today's perception of the *Kampf der Kulturen*<sup>17</sup> and provide the Muslim community with a legitimate political voice. This analysis, in part, is comparable to Fetzer and Soper's (2005) *Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany*, in which they argue that the existing institutional structures of church and state best explain the accommodation of Muslim religious practice in Western Europe.

I, however, expand on their case study of Germany by more closely examining the political representation of the Muslim community based on the nature of the actors working within the established structures of cooperation between politics and religion. In order to shed light on this complex issue, I will look specifically at the process of implementing Islam instruction in German public schools within the German federal states (*Bundesländer*). I will compare this process across four *Länder*: 1) North Rhine-Westphalia for its position as a pioneer in Muslim education and an example of a top-down approach; 2) Lower Saxony as an example of the round-table approach for including religious organizations in curriculum development; 3) Berlin for its unique status under the Bremen Clause and the position of the Islamic Federation of Berlin as an administrator of Islam instruction in public schools as well as the recent referendum to give students the choice of taking either ethics or religion as a required course; and 4) Bavaria for the success of grassroots movements in the town of Erlangen and the potential for a

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<sup>17</sup>Refers to the German translation of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." Literally: "Struggle of cultures."

more local approach to Islam instruction.

This analysis of how church-state relations play out on a state-by-state basis will allow me to isolate the most influential players in shaping policy that affects the Muslim community, reveal deficiencies and shortcomings in current channels of representation and make recommendations as to what steps need to be made for Islam (and therefore the Muslim community) to become an integral and accepted element of German politics and society.

I conclude that the most lasting and accepted gains for Islam instruction in German public schools happen locally – often within individual communities – and therefore the future of a successful Islam instruction and consequently the future political representation of Muslim communities needs to originate at a local or community level, rather than trying to unite vastly diverse group and interests on a state or national level. These cases also reveal that the current process for public corporation status recognition is outdated and not relevant to contemporary Germany's diverse religious landscape. For this reason, the grassroots and round-table approaches of Erlangen, Bavaria and Lower Saxony are models that require further scholarly examination and follow-up research.

### **Literature Review**

There is limited research on the Muslim community in Europe as scholarship did not become prevalent until the mid-1980s, following the assumption that immigrants were going to return to their country of origin. Many more studies were published in the 1990s and the bulk of research and press coverage has appeared at the turn of the new millennium in the wake of popular controversies: the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, the PISA-Report in 2001 and again in 2003, the Theo Van Gogh Murder and Madrid bombing in 2004, the July 5<sup>th</sup> 2005 London bombings and also a wave of honor killings in Berlin in 2005. By far the most widely-read authors on the topic of Islam in Germany continue to be journalists writing for a popular audience, who present information that may not be as representative or as fact-based as they claim.

Topics of interest among German authors include the history of Islam in Germany (Abdullah 1981, 1993; Bauknecht 2001; Hunke 1976), multi-culturalism and its pitfalls (Ateş 2007; Kelek 2005), integration (Spuler-Stegemann 1998) and Islam as a security threat (Stern 2005; Theveßen 2005). Notably, many of the authors writing

in Germany are of Turkish descent or are native Germans who converted to Islam. Unfortunately, very few Muslim scholars are entering this field of research (Nielsen 2004).

The discourse among English-speaking scholars tends to take a comparative approach, looking at Islam and the political representation of Muslim minorities across various countries in Europe, most commonly the UK, France and Germany (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Klausen 2005; Nielsen 2004). The discussion of Islam instruction is found primarily in publications of papers presented at conferences, such as the collection of Reichmuth and colleagues (2006) from panels on “*Staatlicher Islamunterricht Deutschland*” at the 29<sup>th</sup> *Deutschen Orientaltag*, or Meyer’s (2007) documentation of the material presented at two sessions of the *Evangelische Akademie Loccum* on the topic of religion and politics. The contributors to such conferences include theologians, education specialists, political science scholars, leaders of religious organizations and representatives from local government. The topic of Islam instruction is also prevalent in current news debates.

### **Theoretical Background: European Secularization and Accommodation of Religious Practice**

Fetzer and Soper (2005) point out that scholarship on economic issues and questions of citizenship associated with immigration to Europe has been relatively thorough. Yet, when it comes to religious identity, there is a significant gap. They argue that this comes from the assumption by many social and political scientists that, as European states become more secular, “issues of church and state are no longer relevant to public policy” (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 6). However, as rates among Europeans for church attendance and other forms of active religious participation continue to decline, the number of Muslims in Germany has been increasing significantly and with this the number of people who identify strongly with their religious beliefs and regularly attend places of worship.<sup>18</sup>

Some theories claim that secularization can make it more difficult for religious minority groups in Europe to gain public policy

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<sup>18</sup>Helinke (2002) argues that even though Turkish “national” identity is above Turkish “Muslim” identity according to Atatürk’s secular conception of the Turkish state, many Turks in Germany have redefined themselves as Muslims, an identity “between states,” because German Turks are influenced by both, but not connected to either one.

that accommodates religion, such as the inclusion of Muslim interests in traditional political parties, the construction of mosques, the provision of Muslim burial grounds and the teaching of Islam in public schools. This conflict of interest between religious versus secular world views (Fetzer and Soper 2005) could explain a general “distrust” among the German general public for religious Muslims, but it fails to explain the implementation process of Islam instruction in German public schools and contradicts the established fact that Islam instruction has gained such broad support across partisan and confessional lines.

In Germany, the constitution or Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) ensures certain privileges for religious communities, therefore, some argue, it is not out of the question that Islam should be treated in the same way (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Fuess 2007). This discrepancy between the micro- and mass-level support of Islam can possibly be explained in the following way: “the Islam-related attitudes of European elites – who are more likely to strive for ideological consistency – are much more constrained by their country’s particular church-state arrangement than are the views of ordinary citizens” (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 145). Although public opinion may be skeptical of the religious orientation and world views of many Muslims, policy makers have the opportunity to take advantage of church-state relations to address the real problems at hand, namely the “disenfranchisement, social discrimination and the lack of economic and political integration, not religion” (International Crisis Group 2007, 31). In accordance with these statements, I will be looking at religion as an integrative force, not as a restrictive one.

### **The Historical Roots of Present Concerns**

#### *From Ottoman Soldiers to Turkish Guest-workers to German Citizens*

In order to understand the Muslim community today in relationship to German political institutions, it is necessary to look back at the history of Muslims in Germany, which began as early as the 18<sup>th</sup> century due to contact between the Prussian and Ottoman armies. By 1925, the Muslim population in Berlin had grown large enough to form the first established religious community, which then planned the construction of the first community mosque in Germany. In 1930, the “German-Muslim Society” (*Deutsch-Moslemische*

*Gesellschaft e.V.*) became the first officially recognized German-Muslim organization (Abdullah 1987).

The end of World War II marks the beginning of a new phase for the Muslim community in Germany, namely the recruitment of Muslim “guest-workers” for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. Since Germany did not have any colonies, recruitment agreements were signed in the 1960s with different Mediterranean countries to bring in unskilled labor for the postwar reconstruction of the country. The Turks represent the largest group of guest-workers. However, they themselves were very diverse, ranging from Sunni Muslims to Alevis, a small group of mostly Kurdish Turks that identifies with neither the Sunnis nor the Shiites. Moroccans, Tunisians and Bosnian Muslims also came in much smaller numbers (Heimbach 2001).

A large number of the first guest-workers were men who came to Germany on their own for a predetermined period of time to earn money for their families back home. In 1973, Germany put a halt on Turkish guest-workers (*Anwerberstopp*) coming into the country in response to the economic crisis. Consequently, many of those who were there at that time started bringing their families over rather than returning to their homelands.

#### *Guest-workers – Guest Religion*

Neither the Germans, nor the immigrants themselves, had prepared for permanent settlement, explaining the relatively recent development of organizations to address the needs of a Muslim community (mosques, religious education, community organizations, etc). At first, the presence of a Muslim (immigrant) community was not considered a domestic issue by the German authorities. It was assumed that such needs would be provided by Turkey as a part of the bilateral worker agreements through organizations like the Turkish-Islamic Association of Religious Affairs (DITIB). Fetzer and Soper write (2005, 1): “Because Islam was effectively treated as a ‘guest religion’ that the state had no obligation to accommodate under the law, Germany was ill prepared to meet the religious needs of its growing Muslim population.” As more families came in the 1980s and more children were born in Germany, there was a greater demand for institutions to address social needs (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 102). During this time the first “home-grown” Muslim organizations started to form in Germany.

The treatment of immigrants as guests was also reflected in

Germany's archaic naturalization laws. Between 1913 and 1999 the Imperial and State Citizenship Law was in effect, under which immigrants could benefit from Germany's welfare state but not the rights of citizenship (International Crisis Group 2007, 5). New laws enacted in 2000 did not change the status of the Turks there before the laws were relaxed, and dual citizenship is allowed only until age 23. This has resulted in a low number of Muslims with German citizenship, less than a third (Klausen 2005, 21).

This historical overview reveals several key points to be kept in mind later during the analysis of the case studies. The late recognition of Muslims in Germany as citizens has delayed their integration into the political system and they remain highly underrepresented. On the other hand, the long-standing presence of Muslims in Germany counters arguments that Muslims are "too foreign" to be incorporated into German society.

#### *The Kulturkampf and the Road to Legal Representation of Religious Communities in Germany*

Some scholars have made the connection between the Jews in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and the Muslims today in order to understand the treatment of religious minorities in Germany (Bauknecht 2001; Helinke 2002). Such an analysis does highlight the historically-rooted concept of "otherness" in Europe, described by Kahn (2008, 12) as "Europe's long history of intolerance towards outsiders." This is a tradition that persists today, yet it does not explain the legal accommodation of religious practice in Germany that has made room for Islam despite anti-immigrant/anti-Muslim sentiments. The *Kulturkampf* led by Otto von Bismarck in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century sets the stage for the integration of religion into German politics today.

#### *"Culture Clash" of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century: National Liberals vs. Catholics*

The story begins with the political conflict that followed the Protestant Reformation. The Catholic and Protestant Churches fought for control of the state, a struggle that then erupted into the Thirty Years' War. The war ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established that the "the religion of the ruler is the religion of the state" meaning that regions of Germany developed with a strong link to the Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinist Church, depending on the ruling prince (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 106). This

set the historical precedent for the close relationship between politics and religion.

In a time of nation-building and German unification led by Otto von Bismarck and Protestant Prussia, there was also a movement led by these same nationalists and liberals to reign in the power of the Catholic Church from 1871 to 1878. Roman Catholics were in the minority after unification, but the Catholic Church had been gaining more influence during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century and was also gaining political power through democratic reforms that had resulted from the 1848 revolution. With the Catholic Center Party's (*Zentrum*) increased number of seats in the Prussian parliament and the assertion of Papal authority over German Catholics with the Decree on Papal Infallibility (1870), liberals saw Catholics as a growing threat to the nation. Catholics were thought to be superstitious, "backward," archaic, particularistic, and provincial and were associated with the lower classes (Kahn 2008, 8) – accusations and fears not at all far from those associated with German Muslim immigrants today.

A set of restrictive laws were enacted against Catholics to "separate German Catholics from the 'reactionary' influences of the Papacy" (Kahn 2008, 3). Bismarck and the national liberals were unwavering in their pursuit, despite its unpopularity, and were unwilling to work with potential partners and allies within the Catholic Church, like the "Old Catholics" who also opposed the influence of Rome (Kahn 2008, 17). The *Kulturkampf* was met with massive resistance by the Catholics: many found ways to evade laws and the measures taken to weaken Catholic influence only served to galvanize the community. By the end of the 1870s it was clear that Bismarck's policy had failed and many anti-Catholic measures were repealed.

Kahn (2008, 24) proposes that much can be learned from the failures of Bismarck's campaign against the Catholics and their subsequent integration into German society:

The experience of the *Kulturkampf* suggests that measures aimed to suppress (or, more charitably, "regulate") a religious minority will in the end spur it to greater political mobilization – this, at least, was what happened with the rise of the Center Party and the determination of the German Catholics to never again put themselves in a position where they cannot respond to legal repression.

The failed tactics of the *Kulturkampf* not only make a strong argument for cooperating with rather than oppressing significant religious minorities, but also their outcome set the stage for modern church and state relations. These early power struggles established religion within politics and the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was able to make compromises to ensure harmonious cooperation between church and state.

### *The Grundgesetz and Religion*

The Weimar constitution adopted state-church separation and protection of religious freedom, but churches still maintained their influence through cooperation with the state on education and social welfare. Church power was limited under the Nazis but then reaffirmed in the new constitution post-WWII, which adopted many articles of the old Weimar constitution.

Article 140 of the Basic Law stipulates that a religious community can gain “Public Corporation Status” (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*), which gives it the right to receive the “church tax” (*Kirchensteuer*) – money that the government collects from members of the religious community to be used towards religious, social welfare and educational programming sponsored by the church (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 107).<sup>19</sup> The Roman Catholic and Protestant churches represent over 90% of Germany’s religious population and so originally, Christian groups automatically gained public corporation status (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 106).

The state governments decide if a religious community is to be granted public corporation status. The guidelines require the group to submit a formal application, prove that the group has existed for at least thirty years, that its members make up at least one-one thousandth of the state’s population and that they respect the law. Muslim groups have generally been rejected on the basis of not being able to prove “permanency,” for not being representative of the religious community or having “undemocratic” ties (Fetzer and

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<sup>19</sup>Residents are required to register with the police (*Bürgeramt*) and they are given the option to declare their religious affiliation, which in turn obligates them to pay the *Kirchensteuer* to the respective religious community. As a member of a particular church, such as the *Evangelische Kirche Deutschland* (EKD), one has the right to get married in that church, among other benefits. Declaring affiliation with a religious community at the *Bürgeramt* is therefore only possible if the religion has public corporation status, thus excluding Muslims (Barker 2000).

Soper 2005, 108). Religious groups other than the Roman Catholic and Protestant Church have been granted status including the Union of Mennonite Congregations, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Christian Scientists and the Jewish community, just to name a few (Barker 2000).

### *The Grundgesetz and Education*

The *Grundgesetz* protects not only the freedom of religious belief, but also the right to practice that religion. Article 4 states: “Freedom of faith and conscience as well as freedom of creed, whether religious or ideological, are inviolable” and ensures “the undisturbed practice of religion” (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 109). Therefore, the Basic Law protects “positive” religious freedom. Accordingly, the administration of religious education is also considered a right of religious communities. Article 7 of the *Grundgesetz* states: “Religious instruction shall form part of the regular curriculum ... in state schools. Without prejudice to the state’s right of supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the doctrine of the religious community concerned.” Parents can decide which class their children attend, or if they should be withdrawn, in which case they are placed in an “Ethics and Values” class.

With over 700,000 Muslim students in German schools there has been a movement to provide them the same right to religious instruction as their Christian peers.<sup>20</sup> In German, there is a clear linguistic distinction between two types of “religious instruction,” and this distinction is central to the debate:

- *Religionsunterricht* “is guided by the conviction that the religious doctrines being taught are true. It uses denominationally specific arguments and gives students a self-conscious and goal-oriented belief system” (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 112). Fetzer and Soper (2005) compare it to church Sunday school. Because it teaches specific religious beliefs, this type of religious instruction can only be taught by a religious community

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<sup>20</sup>Muslims make up only 1% of the population of eastern Germany, therefore for the eastern states, Islam instruction is not an issue. Furthermore, religious instruction itself in East Germany is uncommon, a relic of the former communist state, and usually “ethics” or LER (*Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religion*) is taught (International Crisis Group 2007).

recognized as a “public corporation.” Members of the religious community, not the school or the state, are then directly responsible for administering this type of religious instruction in schools.

- *Religionskunde* or *religiöse Unterweisung* is akin to “religious studies.” It is responsible for conveying information about the cultural and historical background of the religion as well as common religious practices in order for students to gain knowledge and understanding of the religion as a comparative religion course would. It is assumed that the students are not affiliated with the particular religious faith. This type of religious instruction falls under the jurisdiction of the state, not a religious organization (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 112).

Kiefer (2006) argues that the discussion of Islam instruction is often reduced to a legal question of what defines a “religious community” and whether one of the already existing Muslim organizations qualifies as such. The first application for public corporation status, submitted in 1979 by the Islamic Cultural Center in Cologne, was denied. All subsequent applications faced a similar fate, despite appeals made to the constitutional court (Nielsen 2004). Since most groups have not existed for very long, “permanency” is difficult to prove. Furthermore, Germany’s long denial of “the fact of immigration and settlement allows the authorities to question the permanence of Muslim organizations” (Nielsen 2004, 34). The most successful court appeal so far has been from the Islamic Federation Berlin (see below), but they have yet to gain the full rights and status of a federally recognized public corporation.

### **Analysis: Implementation of Islam Instruction in German Schools**

#### *The Question of Islam Instruction in Germany*

Despite the generally “islamophobic” atmosphere prevailing in Europe today, there has been more and more recognition of Islam instruction as a means of integration, as voiced by Wolfgang Schäuble (2006-2007), the former Federal Minister of the Interior

(CDU), among others, at the Islam Conference in September 2006. Many see state-regulated Islam instruction as an alternative for students who otherwise might attend fundamentalist-leaning “Koran schools” led by Imams who cannot speak German and have ties outside Germany (Nielsen 2004, 37). In fact, the topic of Islam instruction came up as early as the mid-1970s in reaction to increasing violence associated with the political crisis in Turkey that had spilled over into Germany. Several Koran schools were subsequently closed. As an alternative, Islam instruction was provided to some Turkish children within already existing hours of supplementary native-language classes some schools provided (Nielsen 2004).

Furthermore, Sidney Verba, among others, has conducted research that corroborates the pedagogical and sociological benefits of religious institutions. Such institutions lay the foundation of a strong civil society by fostering and developing leadership and organizational skills, and such participation can “facilitate public governance and enhance a citizen’s support for democratic values” (Verba, quoted in Fetzer and Soper 2005, 153). Participating in activities that strengthen ties within a community (e.g., Mosque-sponsored gatherings) and that bridge communities (e.g., Inter-faith community initiatives) not only strengthen democracy, they also aid integration.

All Islam instruction programs are aimed not only at conveying the foundations of the religion itself, but also at other goals. These include facilitating inter-religious dialogue between students of different cultural and religious backgrounds, improving Muslim students’ ability to communicate with their peers about Islam in German, improving students’ ability overall to express themselves in the German language, educating students to become tolerant, knowledgeable and active citizens in a democratic society while nurturing each student’s unique cultural background, providing an alternative to Koran schools and encouraging the critical and reflective reception of traditional Muslim practice (Kiefer 2006; Meyer 2007). Although many are in agreement that there is a place for Islam instruction in German schools, approaches to addressing this issue vary drastically and have equally diverse outcomes.

#### *Analysis of Actors at the State and Local Levels*

One of the reasons that there has been relative success of Muslim

communities pushing the issue of Islam instruction is their ability to concentrate power within the state and focus on influencing the local level. Therefore, the analysis of states and local communities is very important for understanding the impact Muslim groups have had on policy-making. Before delving into the multi-faceted process the German states have gone through to introduce Islam instruction into public schools, I will first outline and examine the relevant actors who contribute to the recognition of Islam as a proper school subject.

### *Political Parties in the State Government*

In my research, a logical place to start was with the political parties. As education is the responsibility of the individual state and each state's government is made up of a different constellation of political parties, coalitions and orientations, it would follow logically that parties that tend to be more "pro-immigrant" or "multi-culturalist" like the SPD and, especially, the Greens/Bündnis 90 would support Islam instruction and more conservative states where the Christian-orientated CDU or CSU, long-known for their refusal to recognize Germany as a "country of immigration" and promoting a German *Leitkultur* would be reluctant to support Muslim education. Finally, the Left would be likely to be against religious instruction altogether due to their secular stance on church-state relations, yet they do have a "multi-culturalist" stance similar to the SPD.

What, on the surface, appears to be a simple question of political philosophy turns out to be much more complicated upon further examination. Political parties have not done well in responding to a Muslim presence – traditionally pro-immigrant liberals are anti-clerical and suspicious of religion and, on the other end of the political spectrum, the right has been supportive of religion, albeit Christian values, but tend to be anti-immigrant. Therefore, many Muslim politicians tend to be moderate. They identify with the values and morals of the CDU, but their view on social politics are more in line with liberal political parties:

Abortion, gay rights, and bioethics are some of the issues where religious Muslims find common ground with other religious associations and lobbies. It is clear, none the less, that for many religious Muslims "value conservatism" may be less salient than other issues, which are generally important for the left, in particular anti-discrimination

enforcement and social protection (Klausen 2005, 26f).

In response to the anti-immigrant stance of right parties, such as the CDU's opposition to dual-citizenship, many Muslims have moved to the Green Party. Smaller parties, like the Greens or the Left, have also been more accommodating to Muslim politicians. Cem Ozdamar, for example, has become one of the most influential Turkish politicians as a member of the Green Party. In light of this conflict of finding a party that speaks to Muslim interests and values, it is not surprising that Klausen (2005, 27) reports only half of German Muslims in that study reported party affiliation.

On top of this, there are many barriers to political participation. The first major wave of Muslim immigrants were unskilled workers who lacked skills and experience to be political leaders and the illegal immigrants who came later avoided political participation so as not to draw attention to themselves and risk deportation (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 12). Political leadership has developed out of refugees and university students who have arrived after the labor recruitment phase of the 1960s and 1970s. Still, Muslims leaders in Germany remain immigrants themselves due to naturalization laws and "suffer the same legal disabilities that hobbled the first generation," making it more difficult to push for policy that affects their community (Klausen 2005, 16). The new naturalization laws of 2000 have not made significant changes because many people are reluctant to give up citizenship of their home country.

Current policy has been for integration to precede naturalization, which "tends to encourage the authorities and political class to evade their responsibilities to facilitate this evolution and inhibits the emergence of a political party consensus on the principles that should underlie the integration process," the International Crisis Group (2007, i) argues. This denies Muslims the right to proper political channels for voicing their individualized concerns and keeps them locked in a vicious cycle with full political integration just out of reach.

The failures of the political parties to represent Muslims and the wavering stances of the parties on Muslim issues that tend to shift depending on elections show that the parties are not a key element in policy-making towards Islam instruction. Indeed, Islam instruction is generally accepted by most states, regardless of government coalition in power and progress has not been hindered by elections.

*Muslim Organizations*

As there is a clear disconnect between Muslim interests and traditional party platforms, Muslims tend to participate in civic organizations more than through political parties. Muslim organizations and individuals have covered more ground in advocating for Muslim interests; however, the diverse nature of Islam in Germany, stemming from the many different countries of origin and their respectively diverse cultural and religious practices, has been another major hurdle in the process of establishing Islam in the classroom. Among the approximately 3 million Muslims in Germany there are 2.5 million Sunnis, 400,000 Alevites, approximately 125,000 Iranian and Lebanese Shiites as well as 60,000 who belong to the Ahmadiyya Movement. This diversity has produced hundreds of groups on the local, state and national level and many of them have banded together under larger umbrella organizations in an effort to represent the Muslim community in the way a public corporation would.

The first influential Muslim organizations came to Germany with the first waves of Turkish immigrants. In Turkey, the DITIB, a branch of the official religious affairs office, was created in 1972 by the Turkish prime minister to deal with religious needs of Turks abroad and it became active in Germany in the 1980s (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 103). It controls the religious community abroad by requiring Imams and religious teachers sent to Germany to be trained in Ankara, and having them return to Turkey after serving for 5 years abroad (International Crisis Group 2007, 7f.). The DITIB has more members and controls more prayer spaces in Germany than any other Muslim group because its mosques and Imams are financed by the Turkish government. It is often included in dialogue with government officials and in 2005 it requested the role of official *Ansprechspartner* (partner in dialogue) for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The DITIB, however, only represents the Turks and is therefore not representative of the wider Muslim community.

Due to its connection to the secular Turkish state, the DITIB is also secular by nature and has not always appealed to religious Muslim Turks in Germany. So Muslims in Germany also began to organize themselves, first with the *Verband Islamischer Kulturzentren* (VIKZ) in 1980. However, home-grown Muslim groups face their own set of difficulties: Millis Görüş, for example, is often labeled as being Islamist because it is religiously conservative

and stresses adherence to Islamic law. In reality, its members are better described as neo-orthodox instead of “fundamentalist” and it has limited influence despite the media attention it draws (Pedersen 1999). Nevertheless, Milli Görüş is under surveillance by the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutz*) and because it is blacklisted, it is usually excluded from formal discussions involving local governments. One CDU politician laments, “We cannot meet with half of the Muslims in town because the *Verfassungsschutz* says they are a danger to our values” (Klausen 2005, 43).

A rivalry between DITIB and Milli Görüş has prevented them from ever joining together. Like the DITIB, Milli Görüş funds mosques, organizes hajj or pilgrimages, produces written educational materials and organizes youth and sport activities (Pedersen 1999, 76). Milli Görüş is one of the strongest members of the *Islamrat* (Islamic Council), an umbrella organization of smaller Muslim groups. This is a strong point of criticism against the *Islamrat* and has prevented it from gaining public corporation status.

The Central Council for Muslims in Germany (ZMD), founded in 1994, is not affiliated with either DITIB or Milli Görüş and is modeled after the Central Council of Jews. Only 1% of the Muslims in Germany are organized in this group, but it is still one of the strongest umbrella organizations (Schröter 2005, 84). It was denied public corporation status in 2001 on the grounds that it was not representative of Muslims because it is a rival organization of the *Islamrat*. The ZMD is the only multi-ethnic Muslim association with members from Albania, Bosnia, Turkey, Arab and African countries and German converts, making it the most ethnically and theologically diverse group (Köhler 2007, 301).

The Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB) is an example of a community-based religious organization, also known as a grassroots or roundtable group. Such local or regional groups form around a particular issue: in the case of the IFB, the provision of services and religious education in public schools. The IFB was denied public corporation status in 1982 on the grounds that its religious objectives were not comprehensive enough and could not be distinguished from its legal, social and cultural objectives. They took the case to court again in 2000 and it was ruled that the IFB could administer Islam instruction in public schools without gaining official public corporation status. Since then, the IFB has been responsible for *Islamunterricht* in Berlin (Ewing 2000, 48). The IFB has been under

suspicion for its association with Milli Görüş, but as Pederson (1999, 87) argues, Milli Görüş in reality has little influence on the IFB.

The Alevites are a branch of Muslims that have been very successful in organizing themselves and gaining recognition. About 20% of Turkish Muslims are Alevites but the Alevi beliefs are not covered in Islam curricula developed in NRW, Lower Saxony or Bavaria, nor are there any Alevi teachers involved in *Islamunterricht* trial programs. Therefore, the Alevi Community Germany (AABF) campaigned for the right to hold its own religious lessons.

The Alevites have been able to organize themselves and gain what other groups until now have not. As Fuess (2007, 226) writes: “In Germany, the Alevite creed was officially recognized in the summer of 2005 by several Federal States, after an evaluation of religious and legal experts, as a religion in its own right ... By contrast, the much larger but more divided Sunni group will have to wait.” The Alevites, represented by the AABF, are currently able to administer *Religionsunterricht* in Berlin, NRW, Hesse and Bavaria.

Although the above-named organizations do provide Muslims in Germany with a channel for political representation and activism and act as advocates for Muslim interests where political parties have fallen short, only 10-15% of the entire Muslim population in Germany is actively involved in a Muslim organization or mosque (International Crisis Group 2007, 9). Furthermore, Muslim umbrella organizations are not always the most efficient actors because of their diverse interests and goals and rivalries between groups. Where organizations have stalled in moving Islam instruction forward, certain intellectual elites have been instrumental in advocating for Muslim interests.

#### *Intellectual (University) Elites*

A surprisingly influential group of Muslims in Germany are Germans who have converted to Islam at some point during their lives.<sup>21</sup> Among them is the first chair of the Islamic Studies Department of the University of Münster and at the University of Erlangen. Many also serve as Imams or heads of Muslim organizations (Ayyub Axel Köhler, head of the ZMD, to name one).

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<sup>21</sup>Lau, Jörg. “Christian heißt jetzt Abdul: In den muslimischen Organisationen in Deutschland haben auffallend viele Konvertiten das Sagen. Was macht den Islam für diese Deutschen so anziehend?” *Die Zeit Online*, December 22, 2004. Accessed: 4/5/2009 <[http://www.zeit.de/2004/53/Konvertiten\\_Islam](http://www.zeit.de/2004/53/Konvertiten_Islam)>.

Nielsen (2004, 33) writes, "More than any other European country, German Muslims played a crucial role in the establishment of Islam." This is because German Muslims often took on religious leadership roles that the educated, secular Turks coming to Germany would avoid. They not only fill a gap of Muslim scholars, they also bridge the German and Muslim communities.

One of the biggest obstacles to the expansion of Islam instruction is the lack of trained teachers, but professors and department heads are needed at universities to run programs educating future Islamic Studies teachers. Fuess (2007, 232) explains, "Most migrants have not reached the necessary education level to reach such a position, and it will need some time until there will be a pool of scholars from the second and third generation immigrants who will be academically eligible for such a position." There is an urgent need for educated Islam scholars to represent Muslims in interfaith workshops and other debates instead of turning to just any one who has a strong opinion.

#### *Local Level Actors: Community Partners*

A final group of actors that deserves consideration are certain influential individuals and smaller interest groups. The strength of such leaders from within the local community including parents, school directors, church leaders or local politicians or, on the other hand, the lack of strong leaders, trained teachers or a unified interest group, can make the difference between whether or not Islam is taught in a school. Even though religion is a part of the state educational curriculum, parents have the ultimate say as to whether their child attends a religion class. Therefore, positive (or negative) feedback from parents about their child's involvement in a trial Islam program can affect whether Islam instruction becomes a permanent fixture of public school curriculum (Frontzek 2007, 157). Parents can also appeal to a local mosque if they feel their child's religious needs are not being met in school, pushing the mosque to advocate for Islam instruction within the Muslim organization to which they belong (Mohagheghi and Vladi 2006).

Furthermore, Catholic and Protestant organizations, already long established in German society, have also shown their solidarity with Muslim religious groups and are strong advocates of inter-faith dialogue. The largest mosque in Germany, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Mosque in Mannheim, was built due to cooperation of Christian and

Muslim communities to achieve goals for religious accommodation (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 115). The push for Islam instruction has also seen support from Christian churches like the *Evangelische Kirche Deutschland* (EKD) (Nielsen 2004, 35). Martin Wetzel (in Fetzer and Soper 2005, 128) explains this by saying that if religious instruction is denied to Muslims, then the entire existence of government-run religion classes may be jeopardized.

### Analysis of Case Studies

All of these actors come together during the process of Islam instruction implementation. As presented in Table 1, what the analysis of the four different approaches in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Bavaria reveals are varying levels of engagement of the political parties, state government, Muslim organizations, intellectual elites and community partners.

**Table 1:** Engagement of Actors in Policy-Making and Implementation

Actors	North Rhine-Westphalia	Lower Saxony	Berlin	Bavaria
Political Parties	Medium	Low	High	Low
State Government	High	High	Low	High
Muslim Organizations	Medium	High	High	High
University Elites	High	High	Low	High
Community Partners	Low	Medium	High	High

Note: High Engagement = Actors played an integral role in the development and establishment of Islam program in public schools. Medium Engagement = Actors were involved in the process, but were not essential to its success. Low Engagement = Actors were not involved or not included in the process.

This table shows that each state has taken a different approach to achieve a common goal and, as the case studies show, this results

in differing outcomes based on the level of engagement of the actors involved.

### *North Rhine-Westphalia*

A pioneer in Islam instruction, NRW began the development of a curriculum for Islam instruction the early 1980s. This case is significant because it was the first state to introduce Islam classes in any form and it is also the state with the first university, the University of Münster, to hire a professor to educate future teachers of Islamic Studies (Nielsen 2004, 39). Although state government and intellectual elites have taken a leading role in making Islam instruction a reality in NRW, the failure of the Muslim organizations to unite behind the current Islam program has prevented it from taking hold within the communities. NRW followed a top-down approach: School curriculum was formulated mostly by political leaders and Muslim organizations were excluded from negotiations, except on a limited basis. In the end, this made the Muslim community skeptical and less receptive to the program.

The development of *Religionsunterricht* curricula in NRW is solely in the hands of the state government, but the state does consult with a commission of teachers and religion scholars. In the case of Catholic or Protestant *Religionsunterricht*, a draft of the curriculum is then passed on to the religious community for approval of the content (Gebauer 2006, 33). As there is no such recognized religious community for Islam, the creation of a proper *Islamunterricht* in NRW is not yet possible, but steps were taken to try and circumvent this obstacle.

Originally, a commission of German education experts, scholars of Islam and representatives from the DITIB came together to develop the curriculum that began being taught on a trial basis in 1984. But because the DITIB is not an official religious *Ansprechpartner*, NRW had to develop an alternative to *Religionsunterricht*: “Islam Studies in the German Language.” This course falls into the category of “practical philosophy or ethics” and is therefore not considered actual *Religionsunterricht* as it is more historically, philosophically and sociologically oriented (Gebauer 2006, 28). It is open to pupils of all nationalities who are graded in the subject and the credits from the course count towards passing the grade.

A second major hurdle has been the Muslim organizations’

unwillingness to work together. For example, the DITIB did not attend a conference in 2005 where the *Islamrat*, ZMD and VIKZ were present (Stock 2006). Furthermore, both the *Islamrat* and the ZMD have been denied public corporation status on the grounds that they do not universally represent Muslims, but there have been no attempts to join together.

Although the DITIB was involved to some extent in the original development of Islam instruction in NRW, they have rejected the trial “Islam Studies” program, saying it would lead to the “Germanization of the Turks” and because it seriously questions the qualifications of the teachers. This exposes an inner conflict within the Muslim groups themselves – the desire to integrate into the formal political structures of Germany, yet also to maintain their own religious and national identities. Resistance to homogenization and assimilation can interfere with cooperative efforts between groups and stall compromise. The IGMG, VIKZ, and ZMD have nothing against “Islam Studies in the German Language” per se – the curriculum is very similar to their own conceptions of Islam instruction – however they reject it on the basis that they were not involved in the development process and the class is not on equal footing with other *Religionsunterricht* (Ucar 2006, 56). Due to the lack of collaboration with Muslim groups, many feel the Islam being taught is not “authentic,” some calling the curriculum “Soest Islam” after the institute where it was developed (Schröter 2005, 28).

Since the trial began, almost all Muslim students have attended the classes, where offered, and the parents seem to be satisfied, as there have been no withdrawals from any of the classes. High participation rates show overall acceptance of the class by parents, however many Turkish parents wish there had been more involvement by the DITIB and reject the ZMD as a possible *Ansprechpartner* (Ucar 2006, 56). On the other hand, non-Turks resent the involvement of the Turkish-dominated DITIB (Nielsen 2004, 38).

In NRW, the political parties have had some, however minimal, presence, in the Islam instruction debate and process. The Greens have been at the forefront for promoting Islam instruction, presenting their support for the project in the state parliament (Stock 2006). They have been backed by the CDU, who have called for more cooperation between the state government and the Muslim community. The SPD, who form the governing coalition with the Green Party, have been relatively inactive in supporting solutions for

continuing cooperation (Stock 2006, 130).

As with most Islam programs, the lack of trained teachers was another major hurdle. Most of the teachers involved were formally trained to teach supplemental “native language” classes to Turkish and Arab immigrant students. They have no theological training, but they speak fluent German and have experience teaching Turkish and Arab pupils. Other teachers participating were Islam scholars who were experts in religion, but needed pedagogical training. This group participated in a year-long program to give them the didactic skills they needed. All teachers are practicing Muslims (Gebauer 2006).

Up until now, Muslim teachers have been trained at the NRW School Institute in Soest, but the University of Münster has been making strides by appointing the first Professor of “Religion of Islam” in 2004, Muhammad Kalisch, as a part of the new Center for Religious Studies. Every year, 30 new Muslim students will be trained to teach Islam instruction in NRW schools. The University of Münster has set a precedent which has been followed at other universities. The establishment of an academic department in Islamic Theology will be essential to educating future scholars on the topic of Islam, who can then contribute to the “global Islamic discourse” (Fuess 2007, 228).

Now, “Islam Studies” in NRW is considered a “place holder” until true *Religionsunterricht* can be established. This is not a possibility until a proper *Ansprechpartner* is found and trained Islam teachers begin graduating from the university program – the first graduates will finish in 2008 or 2009. With a Muslim *Ansprechpartner* missing, as in NRW, it was possible for the state to go ahead with program development, but the response from the Muslim community was not as positive as in the following cases.

#### *Lower Saxony*

Where NRW tried to find an *Ansprechpartner* in national-level Muslim organizations such as the DITIB, Lower Saxony looked towards Muslim groups organized at the state level.

In 2001, the majority of the Muslim organizations of Lower Saxony banded together to form the “Working Group for Islam Instruction.” In 2002, this group became formally known as “Schura Lower Saxony” (Yoldas 2007). The Schura represents both Sunnis and Shiites and is multi-ethnic, but has no ties to foreign nations or international political goals. An important characteristic of the

Schura model is that it orients itself on the German federal structure and works as a representative of Muslims solely within German society at the state level. The goal of the Schura is to work with the state and community partners to formulate a “confessionally-oriented” Islam instruction, as close to the *Islamunterricht*, as outlined in Article 7,3, as possible. This distinguishes it from NRW’s “Islamic Studies” approach (Mohagheghi and Vladi 2006, 96). Because it is still considered a “trial program” grades are not given, and the class is not a requirement towards graduation (unlike NRW). Therefore, students must also take a “Values and Norms” class beginning in grade 5.

Before school trials could begin, state officials in the Ministry of Culture met with representatives from the Schura, DITIB and ZMD for a “round-table” meeting outlining the structure of the program and developing the curriculum. The AABF was invited to join, but the Alevi religion was not to be included in the curriculum. All members agreed on establishing a transitional *Islamunterricht* program, even though such a round-table approach is not necessarily in line with Article 7,3 (Mohagheghi and Vladi 2006, 97). As in NRW, it is a temporary solution until Muslims form a community under public corporation status. The round-table developed a curriculum that was based heavily on drafts already drawn up by the ZMD and it was then handed over to pedagogical experts to make the material age-appropriate for pupils in Lower Saxony’s elementary schools (Fuess 2007, 228).

The teachers are selected by the Ministry of Culture, not the Schura, and a major obstacle at the beginning of the program was the lack of trained teachers. The first teachers, many of them originally sent by the Turkish government, had been previously teaching supplemental Turkish lessons provided to immigrant students. They were transformed into Islam instructors without going through a proper training program; however all are practicing Muslims. This led to the development of a Master’s program at the University of Osnabrück for educating teachers. Beginning in 2006, students of education could expand on their already chosen area of studies by participating in the program: “Islamic Religious Instruction in the German Language – Continuing Education for Teachers” (Väth 2006, 75). This program also includes an exchange with universities in Muslim countries abroad. As was the case with NRW, once there are properly trained teachers, there can be further discussion about making the Islam program more permanent (Mohagheghi and Vladi

2006, 99).

The trial program began in the 2003/2004 school year in eight elementary schools in grades 1-4. It originally was intended to last four years, but was then extended due to its success. The program has gained the approval of Muslim organizations and parents alike, a result of the close collaboration between state government and the Schura. The Muslim community felt included in the process, reassuring parents that the Islam instruction their students attended was “authentic.” The inclusiveness of the round-table approach, as well as the support from the state and intellectual elites, ultimately led to its success.

### *Berlin*

Berlin is the topic of many current debates surrounding the future of Islam instruction in its public schools. Berlin is a special case because of its adoption of the “Bremen Clause,” which makes religion class voluntary for all students. The Bremen clause was adopted in 1947 and is an amendment under the Berlin state constitution, stating that religious class is not part of the core educational curriculum and therefore not mandatory. Because religion is an elective course, grades and credits from religion classes do not count towards graduation and required exams, distinguishing Berlin from the other cases. Religious instruction is to be administered directly from a church or philosophical society (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 114), but school officials are responsible for providing classrooms in public schools and subsidizing the teachers’ salaries.<sup>22</sup>

After the successful court appeal of the Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB), it was ruled by the Federal Administrative Court that the IFB could administer *Religionsunterricht* in Berlin schools as a public corporation traditionally would according to Article 7,3 of the Basic Law.<sup>23</sup> In September 2001, two elementary schools began the Islam lessons and in August 2003 the IFB began teaching *Islamunterricht* in 15 elementary schools (Kiefer 2006, 18).

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<sup>22</sup>Fahrn, Joachim. “Subvention für Islamunterricht ausgesetzt.” *Berliner Morgenpost*, September 23, 2006. Accessed: 2/24/2009 <[www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/berlin/article288101/Subvention\\_fuer\\_Islamunterricht\\_ausgesetzt.html](http://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/berlin/article288101/Subvention_fuer_Islamunterricht_ausgesetzt.html)>.

<sup>23</sup>Ströble, Carolin. “Gerichtsurteil: Islamunterricht an Berlins Schulen erlaubt.” *Spiegel Online*, October 25, 2001. Accessed: 2/24/2009 <[www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,164474,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,164474,00.html)>.

Currently, the Islamic Federation teaches over 4,000 pupils in 37 elementary schools.

There continues to be much controversy about the wide influence the IFB has in Berlin as it is under *Verfassungsschutz* surveillance for being associated with Milli Görüş. A further controversy came up in 2006 when the Berlin Senate stopped providing financial assistance to schools for IFB teachers due to a charge brought against the executive director of the IFB for legally questionable elections to the group's executive board. Such controversies have put the legitimacy of the IFB into question and spurred many debates about the IFB's sole authority over Islam instruction (Fahrun 2006). Unlike in NRW and Lower Saxony, the Berlin government is not involved at all with the development of the *Islamunterricht* curriculum.<sup>24</sup>

In 2006, in response to the "honor killing" of a young Turkish woman in Berlin, the city mandated a compulsory ethics course for pupils in grades 7-10.<sup>25</sup> This initiative was supported by the city-state's SPD-Left coalition government and the education program is largely run by the German Humanist Association. In response to this new requirement, a referendum was put forward in early 2009 to put religion class on the same footing as ethics, giving students the choice of which they would like to take as a requirement. Christoph Lehman, a lawyer and father of four, founded the "*Pro-Reli*" movement and was able to gather over 200,000 signatures, enough to hold a referendum. The *Pro-Reli* movement was backed by the CDU/FDP along with the Pope, the DITIB and local churches who helped draw support through mass mailings and public campaigning.

A counter-movement emerged, coined "*Pro-Ethik*," and was backed by the SPD/Left coalition along with the Green Party and the Humanist Association. This side advocated for the maintenance of the status quo, which would keep religion class as an elective. A heated debate on the advantages and disadvantages of religious instruction as a requisite course went on for months, pitting political parties against each other in ways some warned could leave

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<sup>24</sup>Keller, Claudia. "Islamunterricht: 'Keine Distanz zur eigenen Religion.'" *Tagesspiegel*, April 9, 2008. Accessed: 2/24/2009 <[www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/Islamunterricht;art270,2509340](http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/Islamunterricht;art270,2509340)>.

<sup>25</sup>The Local. "Grassroots Effort Boosts Religion Classes in Berlin." January 16, 2009. Accessed: 2/24/2009 <<http://www.thelocal.de/society/20090116-16827.html>>.

irreconcilable divisions.<sup>26</sup> The referendum was brought to a vote on April 26, 2009, but did not pass.<sup>27</sup> Berlin's tradition under the Bremen Clause held strong, setting it apart from other western German states.

Only in the case of Berlin did Islam instruction become a major issue of debate between political parties. On the one hand, we see that the parties in most states are disengaged with the Islam instruction debate and there still seems to be a disconnect between the parties and Muslim interests. On the other hand, the highly vocal reaction of the Berlin parties in the *Reli* versus *Ethik* referendum could also be a reaction to the lack of control the state government has over the development of the Islam curriculum. A major argument on the *Pro-Ethik* side was to keep religious instruction out of the hands of the IFB and leave ethics instruction to the state.

The IFB in Berlin is the only Muslim organization (not including the Alevites) that plays a role in Islam instruction closest to that of Article 7,3 and acts most like a traditional public corporation. Yet the IFB is the subject of more criticism than the "alternative" or "place-holder" approaches found in the other states. Berlin reflects the controversy and distrust that can arise when actors are unable to collaborate – like with the state and the IFB – or are pitted against each other – as with the political parties, even if an *Ansprechpartner* is available. Berlin was lacking any intellectual elites – university professors, scholars – who may have acted as mediators between the IFB and state government and granted the program more legitimacy.

### *Bavaria*

Although there has been less written about Bavaria compared to the previous three cases, it provides an example for an alternative approach to Islam instruction by starting at the municipal level, rather than with the state government. The case of Bavaria demonstrates that a bottom-up approach, which requires organization and consensus in the Muslim community, can take longer, but is more likely to be an accepted and sustainable way of integrating the Muslim community. School trials in various forms have been successful in Bavaria, be it Islam studies (*islamische Unterweisung*)

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<sup>26</sup>DPA. "Streit um 'Pro-Reli': Kulturkampf ist da." *Tageszeitung* Online, February 24, 2000. Accessed: 2/24/2009 <www.taz.de>

<sup>27</sup>The Local. "Grassroots Effort Boosts Religion Classes in Berlin."

or more recently in *Islamunterricht* trial programs (Müller 2008). The particular trial program in the town of Erlangen is often considered a model for how the implementation of Islam instruction at the local level could take place in other states (Fetzer and Soper 2005, 229).

Islamic religious instruction was introduced to a school in Erlangen through the cooperation of the Association of the Islamic Community in Erlangen, which had been recognized in 1999 as representative for the Muslims of Erlangen. This was the result of a community movement led by the “Christian-Muslim Working Community” that gathered support, mostly from Muslim parents, and created a petition for the recognition of an Islamic religious community (Exo 2009). The Islamic Community of Erlangen was then also granted then right to hold *Islamunterricht* by the Bavarian Ministry of Culture.

In order to begin the program at the Erlangen Elementary School, it still required the signatures of the parents, but 45 out of 47 agreed. The program officially began in the 2003/2004 school year, concurrent with the trial program in Lower Saxony, making the two states the first to offer religious instruction most closely in line with Article 7,3 of the Basic Law. The confessionally-oriented German language Islam classes ran in four grade levels by teachers selected by a joint committee of the State Ministry of Culture and Education and the Islamic Religious Community of Erlangen. The curriculum was developed in a similar, cooperative process (Exo 2009).

Although the process took time, it avoided some of the roadblocks that occur at the state level where is more difficult to coordinate actors and meet diverse interests. Also, because of the close cooperation between schools, parents and the ICE, it was widely accepted by the Muslim population. Due to its success, the Erlangen model is being expanded into secondary schools in Erlangen as well as elementary and secondary schools in several other cities across Bavaria (Exo 2009).

The trial programs in Bavaria are under the academic and pedagogical guidance of the “Interdisciplinary Center for Islamic Religious Studies” at the University of Erlangen (Kiefer 2006, 19), which evaluates the programs as they develop. According to the most recent report in November 2008, 85% of Muslim pupils take part in the *Islamunterricht* trial program, where offered. Responses by schools officials, teachers, and parents in interviews and questionnaires reveal an overwhelming approval rating of the current

program giving it an A+, A and A- respectively (Mueller 2008). All three groups were also asked for their input on improvements that can be made to the program and the anecdotal and statistical information gathered from this research report will be used to further develop and fine-tune trial programs as they continue to grow.

The center appointed the first guest professor of Islamic Religious Studies in 2002 followed by the appointment of Harry Harun Behr to a permanent position of Professor of Islamic Religious Instruction at the University of Erlangen in 2006 (Kiefer 2006, 19). The involvement of the University of Erlangen ensures the future of Islam instruction in Erlangen by educating and training teachers and providing continued academic support and leadership.

In Lower Saxony, representation of the Muslim community took place at the state level with the Schura and in Erlangen it happened locally within the city. Yet both approaches appear to have achieved similar goals without the struggle of interests between groups and parties that is taking place in NRW and Berlin. Strong leadership coming from within the community granted the program legitimacy and the cooperative involvement of all actors (except political parties) avoided any power struggles or resentments.

### **Summary of Findings: Public Corporation Status for a New Millennium**

The strength of the Lower Saxony and Erlangen programs lies in their strong connections to the grassroots, where there is more flexibility to appeal to Muslim interests and policy implementers can circumvent out-dated guidelines for religious representation and education. Local- or state-level Muslim organizations were more willing to cooperate and became more engaged in the process than national-level organizations like the DITIB did. Local communities can also initiate movements to change the way the state addresses Islam instruction, as with the *Pro-Reli* movement in Berlin and the parents' petition in Erlangen, Bavaria. The IFB, although local in nature as well, lacked any connection or collaboration with the state government or university elites and therefore lost legitimacy in the eyes of Berliners oriented towards the Bremen Clause status quo. This shows that strong collaboration and communication between actors is needed.

As university Islam programs develop, more teachers are trained and more German-Muslim leaders emerge, the strength of the Islam

instruction will naturally increase. The states are well on their way in this regard. Political parties have yet to play a constructive role in this process, a sign not of their irrelevance to the Islam instruction process, but rather of their fundamental failure to incorporate Muslim political interests and represent a Muslim constituency. Therefore, the political parties themselves are the actors in greatest need of reform and restructuring. So far, community actors and intellectual elites have shown great strength and initiative, so it seems best for them to take a leading role until the Muslim organizations and political parties can come to a consensus on how to best work towards common goals and collaborate effectively with the other actors.

The church-state relationship established after Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* was dealing only with two major religions which then easily accommodated Judaism and smaller Christian confessions post-WWII. The existence of public corporation status gives Muslims in Germany a huge advantage compared to say, France. Yet Article 140 of the Basic Law may be outdated when it comes to dealing with today's complex constellation of religious persuasions. Policy makers and community members are all demanding a legitimate *Ansprechpartner* from the Muslim community, yet requests for public corporation status are continuously denied and progress is stalled until alternatives are found. So why cannot so-called "alternatives" and "trials" become the norm, i.e., permanent solutions rather than temporary ones? The system for providing religious groups with political representation and rights needs to be re-thought, especially when it comes to the definition of "religious community" under Article 7,3. Instead of continuing to deny the application of Muslim organizations, we must look for solutions to give the Muslim community recognition as fast as possible.

### **Conclusion: Perspectives on the Political Integration of the German-Muslim Community**

Germany's historically established relationship between church and state and the legal recognition of religious organizations provides Germany the opportunity to recognize a large minority population it has previously discredited with its "We are not an immigrant country" rhetoric. By legally recognizing Islam, Germany would also be recognizing and legitimizing the presence of its large, predominantly Muslim immigrant community. This is significant

because it would not only acknowledge the culture and identity of millions of people living in Germany, it would also create the potential for Islam to play a positive and constructive role in the integration of immigrants and their children and grandchildren. Muslim youth, the future of Germany, depend on the acceptance of their culture in a way that is consistent with the established democratic order of the Federal Republic of Germany so that they can grow to be active and successful citizens. As German-Muslim hip-hop artist Ammar14 sings in “We are Germany”:

We are Germany – We have been experiencing, shaping and moving with you; Sure we are a part of it and it is finally time that we got our rights; we helped build you up, you’ve looked down on us for long enough. We are Germany – It’s time you understand and see us as citizens, not as guests.<sup>28</sup>

The significance of this analysis extends beyond the classroom of German public schools and has much broader implications for the role of Islam in Germany and Europe overall. By acknowledging the legitimate presence and participation of its Muslim population, this would be a big step towards cracking the “clash of cultures” myth that persists in Europe.

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<sup>28</sup>Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung on-line. Translated from original by J. Norton. Accessed: 4/20/2009 <[http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup\\_grafstat.html?url\\_guid=GEVM8N](http://www.bpb.de/popup/popup_grafstat.html?url_guid=GEVM8N)>.

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