



Volume I

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Number II

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Machiaveli and Locke: The Role of War in a State Wishing to Live in Liberty

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Purdue University Pi Sigma Alpha
Political Science Honorary Society

Brian Aaron Snider
Editor-in-Chief

In Memory of
Dr. Frank L. Wilson
1941-2001

MENTOR, TEACHER, AND FRIEND

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Editor's Preface to the Fall 2001 Edition

Welcome to *The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics & Government*, the premier forum for undergraduate research. After a full semester of work, the editorial board is glad to present eight undergraduate papers that stand out for their expertise and research.

As a former Deputy Editor and now the Editor-in-Chief, I have witnessed *The American Undergraduate Journal of Politics & Government* grow from an idea to a nationally recognized undergraduate journal. We receive papers weekly from coast to coast. We are grateful for the support from the Pi Sigma Alpha National Office and the faculty and graduate students in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University. In particular, we would like to thank the Department Head, William Shaffer, for his support and encouragement.

Thank you.

Brian Aaron Snider
Editor-in-Chief

The Balancing Act:
Determinants of Vice Presidential Selection in Political Context

Julia R. Azari
University of Illinois

"I am against vice in every form, including the vice-presidency." – Morris Udall

Once selected, each presidential nominee faces a choice of whom to select as a running mate. Although some regard vice-presidential choice as relatively insignificant, it is interesting to analyze how presidential candidates select their running mates. Electoral factors such as home state receive media attention, but no factor dominates as each contender for the nomination brings a range of demographic factors, as well as experience, expertise, and skill in a variety of areas. By analyzing the running mates selected from 1980 to 2000, I seek to determine which factors most affect candidates' choices.

The paper begins by describing how the vice-presidency has changed throughout United States history. I provide an overview of some of the literature about running mate selection and a list of potential running mates for each candidate. The subsequent sections deal with four balancing factors: ideology, region, experience, and age.¹ Finally, case studies featuring Walter Mondale's choice of Geraldine Ferraro in 1984 and George H. W. Bush's selection of Dan Quayle in 1988 help conclude whether conventional ideas of vice-presidential selection are accurate and whether the criteria by which potential running mates are evaluated is compatible with their roles in campaigns and administrations.

Introduction

Scholars of the executive branch recognized three major changes in the vice-presidency in the twentieth century. First, the vice-president began to act as spokesperson for the administration. Second, the selection of a vice-presidential candidate is now in the hands of the presidential nominee instead of the party leaders. When party leaders chose the person to fill the second spot on the ticket, they made a discernable effort to "add balance to the ticket, placate a faction of the party, or carry a swing state."² Finally, as the role of the president expanded, the duties of the vice-president increased. The third development accompanied the movement of the federal government into spheres previously dominated by state and local governments with the advent of the New Deal and the emergence of international affairs as a crucial aspect of a president's policy.³

The role of the running mate in the campaign is also significant. Since a president cannot be in two places at once, vice-presidential candidates often make their own campaign

Author: Julia R. Azari, azari@uiuc.edu

¹ I have chosen to omit the popular category of religion due to the lack of focus directed at Catholic vs. Protestant candidates in the media and the lack of scholarly analysis at this time on the effects of Senator Joseph Lieberman's Orthodox Judaism on his candidacy.

² Joel K. Goldstein, *The Modern American Vice-Presidency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 48.

³ *Ibid.*, 17.

visits. Running mates can also praise presidential candidates more lavishly than candidates can themselves.⁴

In the last half of the twentieth century, vice-presidents served as administration spokespersons in several arenas: before Congress, with foreign leaders, and with the electorate. The importance of these duties has varied among different administrations. Carter had little experience working with Congress, so Mondale, a former senator, usually dealt with the legislature, and was generally well received.⁵ While it can be beneficial for a vice-president with experience and allies in Congress to advocate the administration's policies, Goldstein points out that vice-presidents have no real favors to trade independent of the president, which limits their success trying to win favors from Congress.⁶

As foreign policy gained importance in the twentieth century, vice-presidents often played the role of diplomats, visiting foreign leaders and discussing issues such as arms non-proliferation policies and economic issues, as Mondale often did.⁷ A similar pattern occurred with the expansion of the federal government, as vice-presidents were appointed to chair committees that dealt with affairs with which the president did not want to be involved. These were often less than glamorous positions, but they expanded the role of the vice-president in domestic issues.⁸

How Running Mates are Chosen

Current theories on how vice-presidential candidates are chosen fall into two categories, electoral choices and governing choices. More attention and credence is given to the electoral choice, probably because candidates are concerned first with winning office and second with what they will do if they get there.

Research suggests that presidential nominees make electorally driven running mate choices by attempting to “balance” their own characteristics. The set of characteristics usually involved in balancing are demographic traits such as age, religion, and region, as well as ideology and experience. In the “balancing” school of explanation, the characteristics of the presidential nominee are as important as those of the running mate, and the assumption is that there are benefits in presenting a balanced ticket. For example, if voters look for age balance it could be because they believe that a younger candidate provides vitality and familiarity with current problems, while an older candidate brings experience and wisdom. It could also be the case that voters prefer candidates to whom they feel similar because of age, religious beliefs, or regional background so that by balancing the ticket, a candidate can appeal to a new audience.

Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997) construct a model using the balancing characteristics of age, region, religion, experience,⁹ ideology and the independent characteristics of size of home state, and finally, whether the contenders had ever competed for the presidential

⁴ Ibid., 99.

⁵ Ibid., 180.

⁶ Ibid., 182.

⁷ Ibid., 161.

⁸ Ibid., 158.

⁹ They focus mainly on the Washington insider vs. Washington outsider perspective in their treatment of balancing by experience, with relatively little importance assigned to legislative vs. executive (gubernatorial) experience.

nomination against the current candidate. Using their statistical model of these factors, they find that age is an important balancing factor, while ideology, religion, and region are not significant. Also, insider-outsider balancing is actually significant in the opposite direction from their expectations. Washington insiders, who account for most of the presidential nominees, were actually estimated by the model to be more likely to choose other Washington insiders.¹⁰ They find that origin in a large state and having competed in a previous contest for the nomination improve an individual's chances of selection, while having been a recent contender for the nomination hurts a candidate's chances of selection.

The possibilities for a governing choice are less clear-cut, and there is less literature about these types of selections. A careful analysis of these factors might prove that they are more important than usually conceded. It is possible that presidential candidates with less national experience (i.e., governors, especially those of smaller states) select running mates with long records of service in Washington in anticipation of governing. Of course, if this is the case, it is difficult to separate choices made for governing assistance and choices made to create an image of a ticket that balances experience with a fresh outsider's perspective.¹¹

The Puzzle of Ideology

Conventional wisdom has dictated that presidential candidates select running mates to create ideologically balanced tickets. A main reason for this is to appease factions of the party that backed a different candidate for the presidential nomination.¹³ It was suggested this practice has become less common over time.¹⁴ Using the races from 1980 to 2000, I will examine the importance of ideology in running mate selection.

Since individuals do not always affiliate officially with one ideology or another, as they do with a party, it can be difficult to assign an ideology to a political figure, particularly one who has not worked in partisan politics.¹⁵ Furthermore, what is more important to a presidential candidate – a potential running mate's actual beliefs or public perceptions of them? This was a difficult question to address, and the answer could have implications about whether ideology is an electoral or governing factor in vice-presidential selection.

¹⁰ Lee Sigelman and Paul Wahlbeck, "The Veepstakes: Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate," *American Political Science Review* (1997): 861.

¹¹ One limitation in the study of vice-presidential selection is that it can be difficult to determine whom the presidential nominee truly considered for selection as a running mate. Using a composite of several sources: articles from *Time*, *The Economist*, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, and lists compiled by Sigelman and Wahlbeck. I was able to compile a "short list" for each presidential candidate, from 1980 to 2000.¹² In general, I considered first the list provided by Sigelman and Wahlbeck for 1980-1992, and then if a running mate contender were also listed in one of my other sources, I included them in my short lists. For 1996 and 2000, I relied solely on media sources.

¹² Although Colin Powell was frequently mentioned, I omitted him from the analysis because of the portrayal in media sources of his consistent objection to being nominated.

¹³ Sigelman and Wahlbeck, 856.

¹⁴ Goldstein, 75. He also points out that the practice of ideologically balancing the ticket was much more common when the vice-president was chosen by party leaders than in the modern era in which presidential candidates select their running mates.

¹⁵ When possible, I used the designations provided by Sigelman and Wahlbeck; otherwise I made the best composite designation possible based on media and scholarly sources. Ratings such as the Americans for Democratic Action were not consistently helpful because not all potential running mates (or vice-presidential candidates) have legislative records.

The short list assembled for conservative Reagan in 1980 consisted of: fellow conservatives Rep. Jack Kemp (NY 38), Sen. Howard Baker (Tennessee), Sen. Paul Laxalt (Nevada, and Reagan's campaign chairman), and Rep. Guy Vander Jagt (Michigan 9).¹⁷ Moderates on the list included former UN Ambassador George H.W. Bush, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, former President Gerald Ford, and Senator Richard Lugar (Indiana).¹⁸ It is difficult to find a discernable pattern in the candidates considered by Reagan, since his short list consisted of about half moderates and half conservatives. As noted by Sigelman and Wahlbeck, Ford was Reagan's first choice; however, Ford would accept the offer only under certain conditions.¹⁹ Since Reagan was not willing to agree to his terms, he had to make another selection, George H.W. Bush. Since both of his selections were moderate it is possible that Reagan, a key figure in the New Right, felt pressure to unify different factions of the party – particularly since Bush had been one of the “moderate” contenders for the Republican nomination that year.

In 1988, there was no incumbent, so both candidates had to make a selection. Bush was considered a moderate Republican, while Dukakis was a liberal Democrat.²⁰ Both had faced divisive nomination battles and therefore needed to appeal to numerous voter groups. In particular, both wanted to attract the “Reagan Democrats.”

Bush had a fairly deep pool of prominent Republicans from which to choose. Among governors, moderates George Deukmejian of California and Jim Thompson of Illinois and conservative John Sununu of New Hampshire were prominent candidates. Moderate Senators Nancy Kassebaum (Kansas), Robert Dole (Kansas) and Pete Domenici (New Mexico) appeared on Bush's list along with conservative Senators Alan Simpson (Wyoming) and J. Danforth Quayle (Indiana). Conservative New York Representative Jack Kemp and moderate Elizabeth Dole (Secretary of Transportation under Reagan) were also mentioned. Not surprisingly, Bush demonstrated no desire to select a liberal Republican. He also revealed no concern about considering other moderates; in particular, advisors recommended Dole, who had also run for the Presidential nomination. However, his final selection (Dan Quayle) was conservative, creating a balance intended to appeal to the right wing of the party.

Dukakis, a liberal, made what has been called the ultimate balancing selection. His list included politicians of all ideologies: conservative Senator Lloyd Bentsen (Texas), liberal Representative Richard Gephardt (Missouri), moderate Senator Al Gore (Tennessee), and moderate Senator John Glenn (Ohio), and moderate Representative Lee Hamilton (Indiana). His choice of conservative Bentsen was, again, a ticket-balancing selection ideologically.

In 1992, Democratic challenger Bill Clinton, a moderate, broke the rules of ticket balancing. His short list consisted of moderate Senators Bob Kerrey (Nebraska), Bob Graham (Florida) and Al Gore (Tennessee) and moderate Congressman Lee Hamilton (Indiana 9th). His choice of Gore demonstrated no desire to balance the ideology of his

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁷ A *Newsweek* article on July 14, 1980 actually refers to Vander Jagt as a “moderate from Michigan.”

¹⁸ Sigelman and Wahlbeck, 858.

¹⁹ *Economist*, 9 July 1980. Ford wanted a specific and extensive role in foreign policy.

²⁰ Sigelman and Wahlbeck, 858.

ticket and to reach out to the more liberal factions of the party. We will see that the selection of Gore was in defiance of almost all ticket-balancing factors.

After Clinton's new approach proved successful, moderate Dole in 1996, like Bush in 1988, had a large number of possible running mates of both moderate and conservative persuasions. Once again, Jack Kemp made the list, along with fellow conservatives Richard B. Cheney (former representative for Wyoming and defense secretary), Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson, and Michigan Governor John Engler. As in 1988, several moderate women were considered: Senators Olympia Snowe (Maine), Kay Bailey Hutchison (Texas), and New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman. Three other moderate governors appeared on the list: Pete Wilson of California, Jim Edgar of Illinois, and Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania. Dole chose conservative Kemp.

The exceedingly close election of 2000 introduced a new puzzle for presidential nominees. Most of moderate Gore's possible running mates were fellow moderates: Senators Joe Lieberman (Connecticut), Bob Kerrey (Nebraska), Dick Durbin (Illinois), Bob Graham (Florida), Evan Bayh (Indiana), and Dianne Feinstein (California). Moderate governors on the list were Gray Davis of California and Jim Hunt of North Carolina. The liberals under consideration were Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, and former Maine Senator George Mitchell. Gore selected Lieberman, who was regarded as notably closer to the center than many Congressional Democrats.²¹

George W. Bush's selection process reflected even less concern with ticket balancing. Bush, a conservative (albeit a compassionate one), did consider several moderate running mates, such as Governors George Pataki of New York and Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania, as well as Elizabeth Dole, who was a rival early in the primary season. However, his list also included conservatives, Senator John McCain (Arizona) and Governor Frank Keating (Oklahoma), as well as his eventual choice, Richard B. Cheney.

It is difficult to determine a pattern in ticket balancing with the cases from the past twenty years. Mondale, Clinton, Gore, and George W. Bush did not make ticket balancing running mate selections, and there is no pattern among their electoral successes (or lack thereof) or of the level of competition they faced in the primaries prior to their nomination. Similarly, Reagan, Dukakis, George H.W. Bush, and Dole chose running mates with different ideologies from their own. Therefore it is difficult to postulate that ticket balancing is used specifically to placate the faction of the party slighted in the primaries, and no evidence strongly suggests that ticket balancing is a reliable electoral strategy.

Home State Advantage

Evidence suggests that a consistent relationship between a vice-presidential nominee's home state and the popularity of the ticket in that state is doubtful. However, it is worth considering whether the presidential nominee takes geography into account when selecting a running mate.

²¹ Andrew Taylor. "Lieberman: Voice of Rectitude and a Shrewd Politician," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 12 (August 2000): 1977. While Lieberman's voting record is generally aligned with the Democrats on core issues such as gun control and abortion, he has taken more conservative stances on issues such as school prayer and school vouchers, and is known for his ability to work with Republicans on legislation.

Typically, students of national electoral politics divide the country into four regions: South, Midwest, Northeast, and West. Aside from regional balancing, size of states can also be important. Texas, California, and New York are the major prizes but the Midwestern “swing” states, with about twenty electoral votes each, also receive a great deal of media attention. They are considered important not only for their size but for their inconsistent voting records in presidential elections – vice presidential selection is a possible determinant of the outcome of a swing state.²² In the system I devised to determine the geographic desirability of each potential running mate, I also included the factor of whether a contender came from a state that typically votes for the opposite party in presidential elections.

I created a point system for potential running mates, which assigns one point to candidates from a different region than the presidential nominee, one point for being from a swing state (Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania²³), one point for being from a large state (Florida, New York, Texas, and California), and half a point for being from a state that consistently supports the opposite party. The following tables summarize findings on these geographical factors.

Table 1 – Reagan (CA), 1980

<u>Potential Running Mates</u>	<u>State of Origin</u>	<u>Points</u>
Quayle	Indiana	1
Bush	Texas	2
Baker	Tennessee	1
Laxalt	Nevada	0
Kemp	New York	2.5
Lugar	Indiana	1
Rumsfeld	Illinois ²⁴	2
Vander Jagt	Michigan	2
Ford	Michigan	2

While the optimal candidate would have been Kemp,²⁵ the choice of Bush would bring another political figure from a large state in a different region of the country. Between the two of them (assuming their home states would vote for their ticket), they would have nearly a third of the electoral votes needed to win.

²² Polsby and Wildavsky, 168.

²³ Russell O. Wright. *Presidential Elections in the United States: A Statistical History, 1860-1992* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1995). Each of these states has at least 18 electoral votes, and in order to appear on my list had to have several characteristics: each lacks a consistent pattern of voting for Democrats or Republicans in presidential elections, and each votes with the nation consistently.

²⁴ Rumsfeld last represented Illinois in 1969, when he resigned from his fourth term in the US House of Representatives (Thirteenth District) to take a cabinet position (Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity) in the Nixon administration.

<http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/exhibits/cabinet/rumsfeld.htm>

²⁵ Wright, 124. Kemp was from New York, which is not only a large state, but also appears “sixth on the list of states with the highest percentage of the vote for the Democrats from 1972 to 1992.”

Table 2 – Mondale (MN), 1984

Potential Running Mates	State of Origin	Points
Bentsen	Texas	2.5
Hart	Colorado	1
Cisneros	Texas	2.5
Feinstein	California	2
Ferraro	New York	2
Goode	Pennsylvania	2

Mondale's list is the most supportive of an attempt to create regional balance of all the cases I studied. Every contender is from a different region than Minnesota native Mondale, and two are from large, conservative Texas. Two are from the populous states of New York and California, and one is from the swing state of Pennsylvania. His eventual choice was Ferraro from New York, balancing region as well as bringing in a large state. However, since several of his choices were mayors, they may not have easily commanded statewide support.

Table 3 – Bush (TX), 1988

Potential Running Mates	State of Origin	Points
R. Dole	Kansas	1
E. Dole	Kansas	1
Kemp	New York	2.5
Kassebaum	Kansas	1
Simpson	Wyoming	1
Deukmejian	California	2
Thompson	Wisconsin	1
Sununu	New Hampshire	1
Quayle	Indiana	1
Domenici	New Mexico	1

Once again Kemp made the ideal geographic selection for Texas Republican George Herbert Walker Bush. Bush's choice of Indiana Senator Dan Quayle revealed little concern about geography, since Indiana is neither a big state nor a big worry for the Republicans.²⁶

²⁶ Wright, 88.

Table 4 – Dukakis (MA), 1988

<u>Potential Running Mates</u>	<u>State of Origin</u>	<u>Points</u>
Bentsen	Texas	2.5
Gephardt	Missouri	1
Glenn	Ohio	2
Gore	Tennessee ²⁷	1.5
Hamilton	Indiana	1.5

The Dukakis-Bentsen ticket provides an example of classic geographical balancing. Dukakis contrasted his Northeastern origins with a Southerner,²⁸ also providing a contrast between a medium-small state and a large one, and a typically Democratic state with a Republican state. However, it is worth noting that this did not bring Dukakis victory, and though he perhaps out-performed other previous liberal Democrats, he still won only 40.9 percent of Southern votes.²⁹

Table 5 – Clinton (AR), 1992

<u>Potential Running Mates</u>	<u>State of Origin</u>	<u>Points</u>
Gore	Tennessee	0.5
Graham	Florida	1.5
Kerrey	Nebraska	1.5
Hamilton	Indiana	1.5

The three possible running mates that Clinton did not select had higher scores than Gore – Kerrey was from a different region than Clinton, Graham was from a large state, and all three were from Republican presidential strongholds. However, Gore, Clinton’s eventual choice, was a fellow Southerner. Again, Clinton broke with conventional standards of balancing.

Table 6 – Dole (KS), 1996

<u>Potential Running Mates</u>	<u>State of Origin</u>	<u>Points</u>
Kemp	New York	2.5
Snowe	Maine	1
Hutchison	Texas	2
Whitman	New Jersey	1
Wilson	California	2
Edgar	Illinois	1
Cheney	Texas	2
Thompson	Wisconsin	0
Ridge	Pennsylvania	2
Engler	Michigan	2

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 144. In this case, geography may have been particularly significant. Tennessee’s presidential voting record reveals a Republican leaning; however, there is a pattern of preference for Democratic candidates if they are Southerners. This would make the selection of either Bentsen or Gore a potential benefit.

²⁸ 1988 was not one of the years that Tennessee voted for a Democratic ticket featuring a Southerner.

²⁹ Wright, 35.

Dole considered only two other Midwesterners, and finally selected the ultimate geographical balancer, Jack Kemp, who had appeared on two previous lists. He also considered three candidates from swing states, and one from each of the three largest states. Since he was from a Republican state with only six electoral votes, Dole may have been seeking a large state, a swing state, or even, as his choice might suggest, a Democratic stronghold.

Table 7 – Gore (TN), 2000

Potential Running Mates	State of Origin	Points
Gephardt	Missouri	1
Lieberman	Connecticut	1
Feinstein	California	2
Graham	Florida	2.5
Bayh	Indiana	1.5
Mitchell	Maine	1
Davis	California	2
Durbin	Illinois	2
Kerry	Massachusetts	1

Like George Bush, Sr., Gore revealed through his selection that he had concerns other than geographical appeal when he made his running mate selection. Gore was likely to win all of Connecticut's eight electoral votes, with or without Lieberman on the ticket.

Table 8 – Bush (TX), 2000

Potential Running Mate	State of Origin	Points
Pataki	New York	2.5
McCain	Arizona	1
Dole	Kansas	1
Ridge	Pennsylvania	2
Keating	Oklahoma	1
Thompson	Tennessee	0
Cheney	Wyoming³⁰	1

Bush also seemed relatively unconcerned with geographical balancing. Since Cheney had resided in Texas prior to his nomination, Bush actually chose a resident of his own home state. It is also unlikely that Cheney's new residence in Wyoming was considered a major advantage, since its three electoral votes regularly go to Republican presidential candidates.

Out of the eight cases, only three seemed to illustrate an interest in geographical balancing – Mondale, Dukakis, and Dole – all of whom lost by large margins. Otherwise, the candidates seemed to pay relatively little attention to geography when assembling short lists, and even less when making their selections, as many did not choose the optimal geographical contender on their list of possibilities. Additionally, the selection of a geographically desirable running mate does not mean that the candidate chose their partner for that reason.

³⁰ Cheney changed his voter registration from Texas back to Wyoming (where he had been a representative from 1978 to 1988) because the Constitution prevents the Electoral College from voting for a president and vice-president from the same state.

Goldstein suggests that geographical balancing, when it occurs, may be mostly incidental.³¹ The other sections on balancing criteria support this claim – many geographically desirable running mates were also superior to other contenders in other ways as well.

Experience: Qualitative Matters

Experience has the potential to work for or against a candidate.³² Less-experienced candidates claim they are not involved with the failings of the federal government, since they wish to avoid criticism for lack of experience. The converse is true for candidates who have held office for years – they do not wish to be portrayed as “out of touch,” but often boast many accomplishments. Experience can be assessed on a qualitative level (What kind of experience does a candidate have? Do governors typically select running mates who have legislative experience? Is the reverse true?), as well as on a quantitative level, looking at how many years a candidate has spent in Washington, D.C. (presumably as an insider).

Reagan was governor of California, but his first career was as an actor. In light of this fact, one would presume that Reagan might prefer a running mate with experience in Washington. In addition, one might expect him to select someone with a legislative history. Thus it is not surprising that his list included several Senators: Laxalt, Lugar, and Baker, as well as two Representatives, Kemp and Vander Jagt. Reagan also considered former President, Vice-President, and Representative Gerald Ford. George H.W. Bush, meanwhile, had served in the House of Representatives before holding positions such as Ambassador to the United Nations and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.³³ Thus, both Reagan’s original choice, Ford, and his eventual choice, Bush, had legislative experience as well as foreign policy experience, and were familiar with Washington. Reagan was an excellent example of a Washington outsider balancing himself with a highly experienced running mate, as well as a governor seeking a running mate with legislative experience and foreign policy expertise.

Dukakis, like Reagan, was a governor. He had an arguably even greater disadvantage, though he was a career politician, because he was governor of a medium-sized state. Therefore one might expect him to choose an experienced legislator with national prominence. He did compile a list exclusively composed of legislators – three Senators, Gore, Glenn, and Bentsen, and Representatives Gephardt and Hamilton. Bentsen, a senator with nearly thirty years of experience (in addition to seven years in the House), fit both the legislative and the Washington insider requirements.

Bush was the opposite of Reagan and Dukakis. By his 1988 presidential race, he had added eight years of the vice-presidency to his political career. He might have benefited from a Washington outsider. He did consider several governors: Deukmejian, Thompson, and Sununu, as well as Senators Kassebaum, Quayle, Dole, Domenici, and Simpson, Representative Kemp, and former Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole. Quayle, a freshman Senator who had served previously in the House, was not a political novice, but lacked Bush’s years of experience in Washington.

³¹ Goldstein, 70.

³² Sigelman and Wahlbeck, 856.

³³ <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0760625.html>

Clinton's deficiency was similar to those of Reagan and Dukakis. He was governor of Arkansas for almost twelve years.³⁴ His contenders were primarily Senators: Graham, Gore, and Kerrey. His selection of Gore, who had worked with foreign policy in the Senate, was not only balancing the types of institution in which the two had served, but also in areas of expertise.³⁵

Dole had served in the Senate for twenty-eight years, and was the leading Republican in the Senate for twelve years.³⁶ As such, he could have benefited from a "Washington outsider."³⁷ However, his list featured several senators such as Olympia Snowe and Kay Bailey Hutchison. Contenders with more hope for balancing Dole's experience were Governors Pete Wilson, Jim Edgar, Tommy Thompson John Engler, and Christine Todd Whitman. However, Representative Jack Kemp, a presence on the political scene for years, was not really a balancing choice, even though he was no longer a U.S. Representative by 1996.

Gore, like Mondale and Bush, had a great deal of experience, as vice-president for eight years, with prior experience in the senate. Governors Jim Hunt of North Carolina and Gray Davis of California were the most plausible Washington outsiders on his list. The rest were senators or former senators, except for House Minority Leader Gephardt, a prominent Washington figure. He chose Lieberman, who was pursuing his third Senate term, defying the insider/outsider balancing logic.

Bush, at the time of the election, had been governor of Texas for six years. His list of possible running mates included Governors Ridge, Thompson, Keating and Pataki, in addition to experienced Senator McCain, and Elizabeth Dole, who had worked for the Reagan administration and was well known in Washington, D.C. His choice, Cheney, had a long and impressive resume, including several terms in the House of Representatives and an appointment as secretary of defense under George H.W. Bush – arguably he represented the optimal balancing choice.

Balancing of experience seems to be fairly common among presidential candidates who have been governors before (these candidates consistently chose seasoned legislators and/or cabinet members). However, candidates who have spent a good portion of their careers in Washington are not as likely to select a Washington outsider for a running mate.

While experience balancing involves creating an image of a balanced ticket, the choice of an experienced Washington insider by candidates with less Beltway experience suggests that experience may also be a governing consideration. In the next section, an analysis of age balancing reveals an entirely different trend.

³⁴ Jeffrey L. Katz, "Differences that Distinguish Gore from Clinton," *Congressional Quarterly* 11 (July 1992): 2021.

³⁵ "The Gore Equation," *The Economist* 11 (July 1992): 29.

³⁶ <http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/9/0,5716,31319+1+30816,00.html>

³⁷ Robert Marshall Wells, "Dole's Crucial Decision," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 3 (August 1996): 20. Quoted University of South Florida political scientist Susan MacManus.

The Question of the Ages

Comparing the age of each running mate contender for each presidential nominee seems tedious and unproductive, so I will simply make note of whether each candidate selected a running mate within ten years of his age.

The older candidates, Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Dole, were born in 1911, 1924, and 1923, respectively – making them sixty-nine, sixty-four, and seventy-four when they ran for president. Bush was ten years younger than Reagan when selected as his running mate, and he selected Dan Quayle in 1988, who was forty-one – the fifth youngest running mate in the history of the United States at the time.³⁸ Dole’s running mate, Kemp, was born in 1935 – a twelve year age gap.

Younger presidential candidates rarely chose running mates who are significantly older. Bentsen was almost thirteen years older than Dukakis,³⁹ but Gore, Clinton, Mondale, and Bush, Jr. all chose running mates who were within ten years of their own ages. A significant difference is apparent between age balancing when the presidential nominee is over sixty, and when the candidate is younger than sixty.

Conclusions about Balancing

The presidential nominees from 1980-2000 conform to few previously identified patterns of ticket balancing. Ideological ticket balancing seems to have grown less common – between 1980 and 1990, three of the four presidential candidates chose a running mate of a different ideology; between 1990 and 2000, only Dole created an ideologically balanced ticket. One possible explanation for this is that primaries have moved to earlier dates -- making primaries less competitive -- possibly resulting in less hostility between different factions of the parties.

Geography presents an even greater conundrum than ideology. Potential running mates who have held appointed office for many years are difficult to identify with any state. In addition, the connection between a state’s votes and a native of that state in the second spot on the ticket is tenuous. Dudley and Rappoport (1989) discovered that the correlation is stronger for small states, which have few electoral votes and are less enticing prizes.⁴⁰ It seems puzzling that more running mates are not chosen from the “large swing states” in the Midwest, which command attention for their size and tendency to “swing” from one party to the other across presidential races.

Age and experience seem to work in only one direction. Older candidates, since 1980, have a far more consistent record of choosing a young running mate than younger

³⁸ Peter Bragdon, “Quayle Faces the Challenge of His Young Life,” *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 20 (August 1988): 2319.

³⁹ “The Attraction of Opposites,” *The Economist* 16 (July 1988): 23.

⁴⁰ Robert L. Dudley and Ronald B. Rappoport, “Vice-Presidential Candidates and the Home State Advantage: Playing Second Banana at Home and on the Road,” *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (1989): 540.

candidates do of selecting a running mate who is at least ten years their senior. Less experienced presidential nominees seem relatively anxious to augment their tickets with an experienced running mate, but nominees with decades of Beltway experience seem less enthusiastic overall about adding maverick governors or other Washington outsiders to their tickets.

Finally, balancing in general seems less popular in the elections since 1990. This trend may be due to the combination of factors discussed earlier, such as an emerging trend of moderate ideology in the Democratic Party. It is also possible that others picked up on Clinton's success with another young, moderate southerner, or that the role of the vice-presidency is in the process of expanding further, and presidential candidates want running mates who will echo their positions and policies in the work they do with the public, the party, the Congress, and the world.

An Unusual Selection Process and an Unusual Selection

Walter Mondale's selection of Geraldine Ferraro can be viewed in a number of ways. First, there are the formidable electoral obstacles that Mondale faced in 1984. By examining the characteristics that Mondale may have sought in a running mate to make up for his own weaknesses, we may be able to understand why he chose Ferraro. This choice can also be analyzed according to typical criteria for running mates, as established in the previous section. Finally, it is helpful to look at media reports of Mondale's selection process to understand what he sought to gain from the selection.

Mondale's main obstacle was running against a popular incumbent. However, he had some weaknesses that were particular to him and not just the race in which he was running. Mondale needed to overcome his connection to the Carter administration and to counteract Reagan's appeals to Democrats. This was particularly problematic because Reagan could spend time courting the Democrats and swing voters, since he enjoyed such strong Republican support. Mondale therefore needed to emphasize the importance of the party to Democrats, in an effort to win back the "Reagan Democrats" and balance Reagan's emphasis on non-partisan appeals to Democrats.⁴¹

Aside from being at a disadvantage to Reagan in terms of gaining support, Mondale had several other problems. He needed to distance himself from special interest groups, with which he had a reputation of being heavily involved. In addition, he did not have the faith of the electorate as a strong leader. He needed to send a message to the public that he had a clear vision for progress that differed from that of the Reagan administration.

Did the choice of Ferraro address these issues? To some extent, it did. However, in some regards, selecting a woman in general and Ferraro in particular did not enhance Mondale's candidacy. If we consider appealing to the "Reagan Democrats" a major goal in Mondale's candidacy, then Ferraro was probably a poor choice. This group of voters was considered socially conservative, but affiliated with the Democratic Party due to economic status and tradition. Ferraro's gender and liberal views would not prove helpful in bringing these voters back into the Democratic fold.

⁴¹ Paul C. Light and Celinda Lake, "The Election," in *The Elections of 1984*, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), 84.

Ferraro also did not help Mondale shake the connection with the Carter administration, though she did not do anything to make it stronger. However, Mondale also needed to distance himself from special interest groups, and the selection of Ferraro was anything but helpful in this regard. The National Organization of Women and other groups advocated the selection of a woman (or minority) as a running mate, heavily influencing his choice.⁴²

On the other hand, choosing Ferraro did help Mondale “demonstrate his willingness to lead boldly”⁴³ and gave evidence of the kind of progress Mondale might embrace. Representing himself as a reformer in gender and equality issues was probably a prudent move, since people felt that Reagan was competent with the economy and defense,⁴⁴ and weaker on social issues such as women’s rights and assistance to the poor.

Since Ferraro has so far been the only woman to appear on a presidential ticket, the case of 1984 provides an opportunity to look at the possible effects of gender on presidential voting. The results were mixed. The media contended that Mondale was trying to widen the electoral gender gap, which revealed a greater support for Democrats among women.⁴⁵ However, the numbers do not suggest that this actually happened. Exit polls show that forty-two percent of women voted for Carter in 1980, and forty-six percent voted for Mondale in 1984, while forty-seven percent voted for Reagan in 1980 and fifty-four percent in 1984.⁴⁶ The major difference probably results from independent candidate John Anderson’s success winning the votes of nine percent of female voters in 1980.

Unfortunately for Mondale’s candidacy, Ferraro may have detracted more from the ticket than she added. She was constantly defending herself and her husband from allegations of financial dishonesty. As a member of Congress, she had failed to release details on her husband’s assets and income, as required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.⁴⁷ She claimed she was exempt from the requirement because she and her husband, John Zaccaro had separate careers, but since he assisted indirectly with her campaign finances, and she was listed as an officer in some of his businesses, her critics argued that her claim to exemption was invalid.

Ferraro’s financial scandals may not have been the only problem that she brought to Mondale’s campaign. Several polls addressed the effect of Ferraro’s nomination, some probing into the effects of her gender. These surveys revealed that among the minority of respondents for whom her candidacy made a difference, Ferraro “hurt a little more than she helped.”⁴⁸ This was linked to gender through the use of a study that revealed a bias against women candidates in the American public.⁴⁹ However, Ferraro may not have been a completely hopeless choice. In another survey, fifty-four percent of voters who cited vice-

⁴² Gerald M. Pomper “The Nominations,” *The Election of 1984*, ed. Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1985), 24.

⁴³ Light and Lake, 95.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴⁵ Alan Ehrenhalt, “Mondale, Ferraro Seek the Democratic Heart,” *Congressional Quarterly* 14 (July 1984): 1675-6.

⁴⁶ ABC New Exit Poll, reproduced by Light and Lake, 106.

⁴⁷ “Show and Tell,” *Time* 3 September 1987, 15.

⁴⁸ NBC poll, Scott Keeter, “Public Opinion in 1984,” in *The Election of 1984*, ed. Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1985), 105.

⁴⁹ Keeter, 106.

presidential choice as an important factor in their voting decision preferred Mondale and Ferraro.⁵⁰

Another dimension of Mondale's unusual running mate selection is how she fits into typical criteria for vice-presidents. In terms of age, geography, religion and ideology, Ferraro fits conventional balancing models better than many other running mates in the past twenty years. The difference between their ages⁵¹ was within the margin of ten years used by Sigelman and Wahlbeck. However, she was described in the *Economist* as "attractive... quick in mind and tongue,"⁵² bringing an image of youth and vitality to the ticket in contrast to Mondale's more bland image.⁵³ In terms of experience, Mondale was both a senator and vice-president. A Washington outsider, such as a governor, might have created a more balanced ticket. Ferraro, a two-term legislator, brought little experience but was not a Washington outsider either. The geographically balanced nature of the ticket is discussed in a previous section.

However, Ferraro did not balance Mondale in terms of her ideology. Both are termed liberals by Sigelman and Wahlbeck, and her voting record was solidly liberal: she had opposed Reagan's defense and domestic policies and scored a ninety percent in the Americans for Democratic Action 1983 ratings.⁵⁴ Failing to balance the ticket ideologically may have been a fatal error in the political context of 1984. While Ferraro's representation of a working class neighborhood was meant to win appeal to Reagan Democrats,⁵⁵ her liberal voting record and, in particular, her support of abortion rights, may have alienated that group of voters.

Mondale's final choice of a woman was not the only unusual feature of his selection process. His list included two white males: Senators Lloyd Bentsen (Texas) and Gary Hart (Colorado), Mondale's main opponent for the nomination. His other possibilities included several mayors: African-American Tom Bradley of Los Angeles and Wilson Goode of Philadelphia, Hispanic Henry Cisneros of San Antonio, and Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco. The inclusion of mayors was an unusual feature of Mondale's search, even aside from its role in his quest for a minority or female running mate. The other women on the list were Ferraro and Kentucky Governor Martha Layne Collins (the only governor on the list).

Mondale did not appear concerned with ideological balancing. Bradley, Cisneros, Ferraro, and Goode were all liberals, and Feinstein, Collins, and Hart⁵⁶ were considered moderates. Bentsen was the lone conservative. Since Mondale did not seem opposed to a liberal running mate, and in fact chose one, it is clear that factors other than ideological balancing dominated his decision.

Mondale's selection was original and so far unique in United States history. However, the process through which he arrived at it also provides a contrast to the way

⁵⁰ Light and Lake, 108.

⁵¹ Mondale was born in 1928, and Ferraro was born in 1935.

⁵² "The Donkey Lurches to Its Feet," *The Economist* 21 (July 1984): 21.

⁵³ Gerald M. Pomper "The Presidential Election," in *The Election of 1984*, ed. Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1985), 79.

⁵⁴ Diane Granat "Peanut-Butter Sandwiches to Presidential Ticket," *Congressional Quarterly* 14 (July 1984): 1677.

⁵⁵ Ehrenhalt, 1676.

⁵⁶ Hart, who might have brought in different constituencies than the traditional liberal ones among whom Mondale did well, does not even appear on Sigelman and Wahlbeck's list of contenders.

running mates are typically selected. He sought to make history by nominating a member of an underrepresented group in so doing he ignored conventional wisdom on ideological balancing. Unusual as it was, Mondale's choice does reflect an important aspect of what presidential candidates seek from their running mate selections: the opportunity to demonstrate the ability to lead.

Quayle: Delayed Consequences

Those who felt Quayle (who did not even appear on many of the lists published in the media) lacked depth and experience initially criticized Bush's decision.⁵⁸ Bush felt that Quayle's good looks, midwestern origins, and relative youth would be of electoral benefit.⁵⁹ He also wanted a running mate who would not upstage him, unlike Kemp or Dole.⁶⁰ However, Quayle's first campaign appearances as Bush's running mate were less than successful. Campaign officials were quickly frustrated with his bumbling performances on television, and poor handling of potential scandals in his past.⁶¹

Quayle's debate with Dukakis' running mate Bentsen proved disastrous, producing the infamous exchange in which Quayle defended his lack of experience by comparing himself to John F. Kennedy. Bentsen's devastating and memorable reply was, "I served with Jack Kennedy. Jack Kennedy was a friend of mine. Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy."⁶²

Despite Quayle's gaffes, Bush won in 1988. Meanwhile, Quayle's national image suffered as he made high-profile mistakes such as misspelling "potato" during a visit to a grade school spelling bee.⁶³ Rumors circulated that Bush had been advised to drop Quayle from the ticket.⁶⁴

The results of Quayle's waning popularity were apparent in 1992 pre-election polls, such as a *Time/CNN* survey reporting that one out of four respondents said Quayle made them more likely to vote for Bush, while two in five said that Gore made them more likely to vote for Clinton.⁶⁵ Statistics did not reveal that Quayle caused significant electoral losses for Bush in 1992, but his mistakes brought the campaign negative publicity. Quayle exemplifies some of the possible relationships between the governing and electoral aspects of a running mate choice. While Quayle was selected to back up the ticket and the administration, his lack of experience and image as an "intellectual lightweight"⁶⁶ hurt his ability to credibly serve as a spokesperson for the administration.

Conclusion

⁵⁷ Peter Goldman and Tom Matthews and the *Newsweek* Special Election Team, *The Quest for the Presidency: The 1988 Campaign* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1989), 314.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 315.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 325. These scandals included an alleged affair as well as his service in the National Guard during the Vietnam War.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 383.

⁶³ Paul J. Quirk and Jon K. Dalager, "The Election: A 'New Democrat,'" in *The Elections of 1992* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 62.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁶⁵ Dan Goodgame, "Quayle vs. Gore," *Time* 3 August 1992, 38.

⁶⁶ Quirk and Dalager, 62.

After analyzing several important balancing factors and discussing two running mate selections in depth, one is left with many questions. How do the characteristics prescribed by conventional wisdom compare to empirical evidence? How do the electoral criteria that appeared to truly be important in vice-presidential selection compare to the jobs a vice-president will perform in the campaign? How do they relate to the roles a vice-president might play in an administration?

Examining the balancing factors of age, region, experience and ideology from 1980-2000 reveals that these old stand-bys are not obsolete, but there is a pattern that suggests they are changing. These characteristics are investigated frequently in the literature on the vice-presidency and vice-presidential selection, while those that are more difficult to quantify, such as campaign skill or specific expertise in an area of policy, are typically left untested.

It is also common belief that vice-presidents are selected based on criteria that have nothing to do with the functions they perform in office. However, in accordance with the logic of electoral choices, the ticket must win before its members can fulfill the duties of office. A running mate's primary responsibility in a campaign is to be the spokesperson for the ticket. The trend away from ideological balancing prepares candidates to be more effective "cheerleaders" for presidents. If balancing is decreasing, then it is possible that presidential nominees are seeking running mates whose strengths are in their abilities to win voters across different regions (rather than relying on the tenuous home state advantage), or gain media support. All of these characteristics that are more difficult to measure are more closely related to the campaign duties of a vice-presidential candidate.

As for responsibilities of the vice-president once in office, experience and ideology may be the most important characteristics. If a president wants to have an active vice-president, they are best advised to choose a running mate who has a great deal of experience dealing with domestic or foreign affairs, and who will be able to represent the administration favorably.

This suggests that the trend against ideological balancing may be quite appropriate. A vice-president who agrees with the president about most issues will be better suited to assist the president in enacting policies, convincing Congress to pass their legislation, and furthering their agenda in foreign policy.

In the ideal world, a presidential nominee would be able to find a running mate with the perfect set of characteristics to complement him or her, and also to appeal to a wide spectrum of voters. In the context of contemporary elections, however, presidential nominees must choose from the available candidates, who may fall short of their balancing ideal. A potential running mate has a myriad of characteristics they can bring to the ticket -- age, geography, likeability, appearance, intelligence, experience, religion, ideology -- as well as past accomplishments and scandals, and a presidential nominee faces the enormous task of sorting through them to make the best selection to fill both electoral and governing needs.

The Changing of Southern Politics:
The Case of George Wallace

Wendy Tegge
Emory University

The South has dramatically changed from the end of World War II to the present day. The political climate has necessitated change in the electoral strategies of Southern Democrats from the white primary to a two party competitive system. George Wallace was been a successful high profile candidate for governor in Alabama before, during, and after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. As the political climate changed, George Wallace changed his electoral appeals to garner enough votes to win both primary and general elections. This paper studies those changes in the Wallace campaign that led to his governorship in 1962 and 1982.

Introduction

In contemporary American politics, the South is increasingly a Republican stronghold. The Republican Party typically expects to carry the states of the Old Confederacy in presidential election years. In 1996, Republican candidate Bob Dole carried each state in the Deep South except Louisiana; in the 2000 election, Republican candidate George W. Bush carried all the southern states. However, the Republicans did not always have such a strong base in the South. Historically the South was a Democratic stronghold. The changing party system in the South has encouraged the spread of two-party competition with Republicans making strong gains in national, state, and local elections in the region.

The South has also been a historically racist and segregated society. From the days of slavery through Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the South remained a separatist and segregationist society; blacks were accorded no rights or privileges. Beginning with the Civil Rights Movement in the middle of the twentieth century, blacks (and, by extension, Latinos and other minorities) have gained the rights they are Constitutionally provided, including the right to vote and hold public office. The number of African-Americans in the Southern electorate, combined with the growth of two-party competition, has contributed to changing styles of political campaigns in the South.

George Wallace's political career provides a unique opportunity to study the changing South. Serving as Alabama's governor in different decades, Wallace's political career epitomizes many of the changes in Southern politics in the twentieth century. Wallace's 1962 gubernatorial campaign exemplifies the old Democratic Party of the Deep South. This campaign was filled with blatantly racist remarks and advertisements, reflecting the racist attitude in Alabama. His campaign was geared toward winning the Democratic primary, since the general election was an empty formality without a Republican opponent. Wallace's gubernatorial campaign of 1982 exemplifies the changed South. No longer filled with deep-seated racism, Wallace instead sought to form a biracial coalition. Wallace's 1982 campaign was aimed at winning the general election rather than the Democratic primary; with the increasing numbers of Republican voters, the November elections were no longer a formality but an actual competition. This paper will highlight changes in Southern politics, particularly as they are reflected through Wallace's political career.

The 1962 Election: The Old South

The Role of Race

Alabama in 1962, representative of the Old South, was extremely racist. “The implicit long-run strategy of white leaders was to keep as many blacks as possible in positions of dependency upon whites and to limit the growth of the black middle class to the bare minimum needed to perform tasks for other blacks that whites did not wish to undertake.”¹ White Southerners, who opposed any major changes in the system of race relations, saw the color line between whites and blacks as natural. White leadership perpetuated class relations to dispel any potential challenges (from both African-Americans and from non-Democrats) and to continue the advantageous white way of life. Blacks were economically and socially subordinate to whites. Although the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution stated that, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” African-Americans were routinely disenfranchised through often ingenious means—the white primary, literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses.²

In this racial context, George Wallace began his second bid for the Democratic nomination for the governorship. In order to stand out among the seven different Democratic candidates, Wallace would “claim to be the most defiant of all the candidates.... Wallace hammered constantly at the theme that he would be the most adamant of all the candidates in resisting desegregation.”³ In particular, Wallace focused on maintaining segregation in the school system. He declared that he would, “stand in the doorway” of Alabama schools to prevent court-ordered desegregation. Comparing Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s use of federal troops to enforce the court-ordered desegregation to a military dictatorship, Wallace declared that Alabama schools would remain segregated should he be elected governor, a position supported by Alabama voters. At a campaign appearance in Talladega, Alabama, “pickets from nearby Talladega College, a Negro institution, were expected.”⁴ In response, Wallace told his supporting audience that he was in favor of “Negro schools for Negroes and white schools for whites.”⁵ Wallace again promised to use his elected power to resist federally forced integration.

Federal enforcement of integration spawned particular resentment from Wallace during the Democratic primary campaign. Wallace “believed as most [white] Southerners believed, that race problems were best handled by local and state governments, which in Alabama meant a segregated social and educational order.”⁶ Wallace claimed that he would “Stand Up for Alabama” against the federal government. He was a vehement states’ rights

Author: Wendy Tegge, webbigail@hotmail.com

¹ Merle Black and Earl Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard College Press, 1987), 79.

² Winton U. Solberg, ed., *The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 382.

³ Michael Dorman, *The Wallace Myth* (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), 25.

⁴ Bill Jones, *The Wallace Story* (Northport, Alabama: American Southern Publishing Company, 1966), 42.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁶ Jones, *The Wallace Story*, 34.

advocate who opposed any federal intervention in state matters. Race relations and voter qualifications, according to Wallace, should fall into the hands of the state governments. According to a press statement released on May 3, 1962, the most salient issues of the Wallace campaign were education, local government, and integration. The areas where those three issues intertwined were of particular importance to Wallace.⁷

To win the Democratic nomination and the general election, Wallace sought the support of racist organizations. During the 1962 campaign, Wallace “courted and received the ardent support of leaders of such notorious hate organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, the American Nazi Party, the Minutemen, and the National States’ Rights party.”⁸ Robert M. Shelton of Tuscaloosa, Imperial Wizard of the United Klans, the largest KKK group in the United States, raised money for Wallace and “has boasted that the Klan put Wallace in office.”⁹ In return, Governor Wallace later assisted the KKK in legal matters, ordering the early release of Klansmen from prison and blocking the investigation and arrest of Klansmen accused of murdering a Civil Rights worker in 1963. Wallace also blocked the Alabama Attorney General from investigating Klan terrorist activities.¹⁰ In his campaign, Wallace stimulated the white voters who opposed desegregation to elect him; he appealed to tradition, supremacy, and segregation to convince white voters to place him in office.

During both Democratic primary elections in 1962, George Wallace fared best among white voters in the Black Belt of Alabama, those areas that have a majority or near-majority African-American population. These areas, too, were the most resistant to racial change; because of the size of the black population in these counties, the white population felt particularly vulnerable. The white residents of the Black Belt counties were the most receptive to Wallace’s racial and segregationist tones, leading them to vote overwhelmingly for Wallace in the 1962 campaigns. In these Black Belt counties, Wallace earned forty-nine percent of the vote in the first primary and seventy-one percent in the run-off primary.

The Role of One-Party Dominance

Two party politics was almost nonexistent in the South in 1962. The Democratic Party was deeply supported in the Old South, as it was the party of Davis, not of Lincoln. It was the party that opposed the abolition of slavery and protected the South during the Civil War. For Southerners, Republicanism was “something to hate, despise, and excoriate.”¹¹ Old South Southerners associated the Republican Party with Abraham Lincoln, the Civil War, and the abolition of slavery. In *Politics and Society in the South*, Black and Black state that, “Southern Democrats decimated their political opponents—blacks, white Republicans, and white Populists—in state after state during the 1890s and 1900s and thereby established one party politics.”¹² In the Old South, the Democratic Party dominated the political arena, making general elections “into empty and meaningless rituals.”¹³ The 1962 gubernatorial election in Alabama followed the same pattern. The Democratic candidate, Wallace, won

⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁸ Dorman, *The Wallace Myth*, 80.

⁹ Ibid., 81.

¹⁰ Ibid., 85.

¹¹ Black and Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 233.

¹² Ibid., 3.

¹³ Black and Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 5.

96.3% of the total vote, and 100% of the major vote, carrying each one of Alabama's counties. The Republican Party did not nominate a candidate for the office, realizing that such action was worthless. Wallace carried every county in Alabama in the November election.¹⁴

Because the Democratic candidate for any office always won the general election, the true contest for any political office in the South was the Democratic primary. For decades, the South, including Alabama, had relied on "some version of the direct primary system to nominate Democratic candidates. In its most typical form—the dual primary system—Democratic nominees had to demonstrate wide acceptability by winning a majority, not simply a plurality, of the total vote."¹⁵ Should a candidate not receive a majority, the states required a second, run-off primary election between the two candidates with the largest number of votes. The 1962 Alabama gubernatorial election, following the pattern of the one-party dominated system, was essentially the competition for the Democratic nomination.

The first Democratic primary election occurred on May 1, with a total of seven candidates—George Wallace, Ryan deGraffenried, James E. Folsom, MacDonald Gallion, Eugene "Bull" Connor, Bruce Henderson, and Wayne Bodie Jennings. The Republican primary was held the same day, with no candidates entered in the contest. No majority winner emerged among these candidates, although three candidates did receive majorities in a combined total of fourteen counties. Wallace carried eleven counties, deGraffenried, one county (Tuscaloosa), and Folsom two counties (Macon and Cullman). With the exception of a few outlying counties, Wallace's support was largest in the southern and middle portions of Alabama, while deGraffenried and Folsom had strong support in the northern part of the state. Wallace's support was also strongest in the most rural counties in Alabama. In rural areas, Wallace won thirty-seven percent of the vote, while obtaining only twenty-five percent of the vote in the urban areas of the state.¹⁶ The final vote of the first primary showed Wallace with a slight plurality (32.8% of the vote), followed closely by deGraffenried (25.5% of the vote) and Folsom (25.3% of the vote), with Gallion and Connor as distant followers, with 12.7% and 3.6% of the vote, respectively. Table 1 details the percentage of the vote earned by each candidate in each of Alabama's counties. Following the May 1 primary, the race for the Democratic nomination—and assured victory—for governor went into a second, run-off primary, held on May 29 between Wallace and deGraffenried.¹⁷

Between the two primaries, the sole new issue was who was to gain the endorsement of Jim Folsom, who had finished a close third to deGraffenried. On May 20, Folsom endorsed deGraffenried, although his support "did nothing to alter the outcome of the race."¹⁸ The May 29, 1962 primary challenge saw Wallace defeat deGraffenried for the governorship. DeGraffenried captured the majority of the vote in only eleven counties, while Wallace received the majority of the vote from the remaining counties. Wallace received 55.9% of the votes cast, while deGraffenried received only 44.1%. As in the first primary, deGraffenried's support was mainly in the northern part of Alabama and those counties around Birmingham;

¹⁴ Richard M. Scammon and Alice V. McGilliray, *America Votes 5* (Washington, DC: Elections Research Center Congressional Quarterly, 1964).

¹⁵ Black and Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 5.

¹⁶ Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, *Southern Elections: County and Precinct Data, 1950-1972* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1978).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Jones, *The Wallace Story*, 43.

deGraffenried captured fifty-two percent of the vote in the northern Piedmont counties. DeGraffenried also fared extremely well in the urban areas of Alabama, where he won fifty-five percent of the vote. Wallace's support was strong throughout the state, although he won with smaller majorities in the northern counties of the state than in the southern part of the state. As in the first primary, Wallace fared considerably better in the rural and small town areas of Alabama than in the metropolitan areas. Table 2 details the results of the second primary by county.¹⁹

The 1982 Election: The New South

The Role of Race

Contemporary Southern politics is no longer as concerned with the preservation of the racial status quo. The Civil Rights Movement, coupled with industrialization and urbanization of the Southern states, helped to remove the blatant racist tones in Southern politics. "Southern race relations now lies somewhere between old-fashioned strict segregation, on the one hand, and complete racial integration, on the other. The entrenched and pervasive racism has been ameliorated, and many white southerners have been released from the obligation to practice white supremacy."²⁰ New levels of black voters has lowered the once-overt racism in Southern political campaigns. The pattern of an all-white majority leading to a political victory has been weakened if not removed from Southern political campaigns, especially when the candidate seeking office is a Democrat. Rather, biracial coalitions have become the norm in Southern Democratic politics. Democratic candidates typically win a large majority of the black vote; a sizeable minority of the white vote (depending upon the size and cohesiveness of the black vote) can lead a Democrat to victory in the contemporary style of Southern politics.

Wallace's 1982 strategy for the governorship was dictated by this idea of a biracial coalition. Starting in the mid-seventies, "Wallace's first broad objective was to attract Alabama's black voters. Blacks now constituted more than a quarter of the state's electorate, and Wallace wanted to eradicate his racist reputation once and for all."²¹ Wallace crowned the black homecoming queen at the University of Alabama and he appointed blacks to state offices. Wallace also began to campaign directly for the black vote, speaking to black groups, such as the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Selma, where he said,

Some of my attitudes were mistaken, but I haven't been an evil man. I never intentionally hurt anybody. I never advocated anything for the devil. But every man has sinned and come short of the glory of God. Now, I can see it was wrong, but it was honest. But it's been a long time. It's ancient history. We've got to move forward. My door is always open to black and white.²²

¹⁹ Bartley and Graham, *Southern Elections*.

²⁰ Black and Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 293.

²¹ Stephan Leshner, *George Wallace: American Populist* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994), 493.

²² Art Harris, "George Wallace's Visions and Revisions: Wooing Alabama's Voters Away from His Own Past," *Washington Post*, 1 September 1982, B1.

When he announced his candidacy for the governorship, he “won the endorsements from a number of black public officials, a couple of black voter groups, and an important black community newspaper, the *Birmingham Times*.”²³

Throughout his campaign in 1982, Wallace apologized for his racial attitudes and actions during the Civil Rights Movement, especially his stance on desegregation in schools. “Rural blacks did forgive Wallace. They believe him when he recounts his ‘mistakes.’”²⁴ In recounting a 1982 visit to Alabama, University of Arkansas professor Roy Reed commented that, “The prospect [of a Wallace victory in 1982] no longer unduly alarms blacks and white liberals, and that tells much of the altered conditions of George Wallace, Alabama, and the South.”²⁵ In Wallace’s own words, “Have I changed? Everybody has changed.”²⁶ He spoke of the wrongs he, and other white leaders, committed during the Civil Rights Movement. When asked whether or not he regretted the pain of blacks and their white supporters in the 1960s, Wallace replied, “Yes, and I was to blame for a lot of it.”²⁷ Wallace told audiences that he had never held any personal animosity toward African-Americans; rather, his opposition to integration stemmed from his opposition to Washington control. “I believe that segregation is wrong. And I don’t want it to come back. I see now that we couldn’t live in a society like that. In those days, I thought segregation was best for both races. But a short time after that, I came to see that this society can’t exist with a dual system.”²⁸

Wallace also appealed to African-American voters by making the race “a referendum on Reganomics,” stating that the economy of Alabama was horrendous and that his name recognition would bring more business and jobs to the economically depressed state.²⁹ “Wallace...deluged black radio stations with advertisements pitching his ability to bring jobs to a state racked with a 14.2 percent unemployment rate” in an attempt to shift the focus from his role in the history of race relations to the troubled Alabama economy.³⁰ “He drew well enough among laid-off steelworkers, blue collar workers, and rural blacks to offset McMillan’s surge in the cities such as Birmingham.”³¹ Many African Americans were more willing to forgive and forget Wallace’s past if he were to improve the Alabama economy. “I can forget all that civil rights stuff ever happened if George Wallace can get me a decent job,” [African-American resident Eddie] Reeves said.³²

His populist record of “free textbooks, money for public schools, vocational and technical education, new roads, new factories, state help for the needy” helped to sway African-American voters to support Wallace much more than his past swayed them not to vote from him.³³ In addition, Wallace’s consistent stance on education persuaded many African-Americans to vote for him. Franklin Reese, a Baptist minister in Selma, Alabama,

²³ Leshner, *George Wallace*, 493.

²⁴ Art Harris, “For Wallace, A Question of Clock Turning Backward or Forward,” *Washington Post*, 26 September 1982, A8.

²⁵ Roy Reed, “George Wallace’s Bid for the New South,” *New York Times*, 5 September 1982, sec. 6, p. 14.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Art Harris, “The 1982 Elections: The Alabama Primary Runoff,” *Washington Post*, A2.

³⁰ Harris, “For Wallace, a Question of Clock Turning Backward or Forward.”

³¹ Harris, “The 1982 Elections: The Alabama Primary Runoff.”

³² Harris, “For Wallace, A Question of Clock Turning Backward or Forward.”

³³ Reed, “George Wallace’s Bid for the New South.”

commented that, “Education flourished under the Wallace administrations,” a trend the preacher hoped would continue under a new Wallace administration.³⁴

Following his narrow victory in the Democratic primaries, Wallace attempted to solidify his support among African-Americans. Wallace, like other Democrats, knew that the strategy most likely to be successful was to establish a biracial coalition. Because Wallace’s opponent, Emory Folmar, was opposed to all social and economic programs of the federal government (typically advocated by the Democratic Party), Wallace was “endorsed, somewhat reluctantly, by his defeated primary opponents and by black organizations.”³⁵ Joe Reed, a leading black politician in Alabama, endorsed Wallace, calling Folmar the worst nominee the Republican Party could have provided. “You can’t believe a word he tells you. He’s not for blacks. He doesn’t support education. And he’s not for working folks.”³⁶ Joe Reed had also called Wallace, “a man who had kicked [African-Americans’] tail for two decades,” commenting that black support for Wallace was unimaginable.³⁷ African-American leaders, originally opposed to Wallace’s candidacy (Corretta King campaigned against Wallace throughout Alabama during the campaign), ultimately supported Wallace against Folmar in a classic case of choosing between the lesser of two evils.

As a result of Wallace’s successful image campaign as a “changed man” and Folmar’s lack of support for programs and issues important to Alabama’s black community, Wallace received almost unanimous support among the state’s black voters (about one-third of the population). The necessity to appeal to the African-American voters of Alabama stemmed from the rising number of black voters (who traditionally vote as a cohesive bloc) as well as the “Republicanizing” of the region. Wallace feared that he could no longer assume the support of all white voters; by mobilizing and attracting a large number of black voters, Wallace would no longer need an overwhelming majority of white voters to win the mandatory fifty percent of the vote. In 1982, black voters were thirty percent of the population. Wallace knew that if he were to capture ninety percent or more of these black voters, then he would need only thirty-three percent of white voters to win. In actuality, Wallace captured a healthy percentage of the white vote, leading him to a sixty percent majority vote in the November 1982 election.³⁸

The Role of Two-Party Politics

The 1982 gubernatorial election was vastly different from the 1962 election. In the twenty years between the two Alabama elections, the Republican Party began to make inroads into Southern politics. Beginning with the 1952 Presidential election, white Southerners were increasingly likely to support a Republican candidate over a Democratic candidate. Southern Democrats felt increasingly isolated from the national Democratic Party, particularly on issues of race. Southerners often voted for those candidates—mainly Republican—who were more in line with their political and social views. As rising numbers of Southern Democrats felt isolated and polarized from their national party, the Republican

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Leshner, *George Wallace*, 498.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Harris, “For Wallace, A Question of Clock Turning Backward or Forward.”

³⁸ Ibid.

Party began to take advantage of the conservative South, allowing two-party competition to flourish and spread in the region. The Democratic Party in the South has also seen a large influx of black voters. When African-Americans were re-enfranchised in the 1960s, they often registered and voted as Democrats, a result of their upbringing in a Democratic-dominated system and of the more liberal stance on race relations of the national Democratic Party.

“The present party system is splintered into *minorities* of Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. The old Democratic majority has collapsed, but it has yet to be replaced by a Republican party that has attracted a new majority or even a plurality of the electorate.”³⁹ While Southern states often vote for the Republican presidential candidate, Republicans have had a more difficult time in nonpresidential elections in the South, “because governorships are less likely to be directly affected by national issues, events, and personalities....”⁴⁰ In the early 1980s, Democrats held a small but present advantage over the Republican Party in terms of state gubernatorial elections, helping Wallace in his 1982 bid for the Alabama governor’s mansion.

Wallace ran for Alabama governor again in 1982; while his main competition in the 1962 election came mainly from other Democrats vying to live in the Governor’s Mansion, the 1982 campaign combined the primary challenge with one in the general election. “General elections for governor are now far more likely to be genuine contests than empty rituals.”⁴¹ Although Wallace ran stronger in the Democratic primary in 1982 than he had in 1962, he won less than the mandatory fifty percent of the vote, forcing Wallace to face McMillan in a runoff. Wallace won the run-off by only twenty-four thousand votes. “The narrowness of the victory induced Wallace to augment his courtship of black voters because, for the first time in his career, he now faced a serious Republican challenger in the general election.”⁴²

The Republican candidate in 1982 was almost as popular as the Democratic candidate. Although Wallace carried all but five counties in the general election, county contests were extremely close. In addition to the five counties carried by Folmar, the Republican candidate received forty-percent of the vote in nine other counties. Table 3 lists the results of the 1982 gubernatorial election by county. The areas where Folmar made the largest gains surround Alabama’s largest cities: Montgomery (where Folmar was mayor), Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile. The urban and suburban parts of the South were the first to support Republican candidates (a direct result of in-migration of Northerners sympathetic to the Republican Party), a pattern that held in the 1982 gubernatorial race. Folmar captured fifty percent of the vote in Montgomery County, fifty-two percent in Jefferson County, sixty percent in Shelby County, and fifty-two percent in Madison County. Folmar also received over forty-percent of the vote in the counties surrounding Montgomery, Birmingham, Huntsville, and Mobile. Folmar received his highest percentage of support from Shelby County, receiving sixty percent of the vote in a county of seventy thousand residents. The counties where Wallace had the largest lead were those counties that were

³⁹ Black and Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 237.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 278.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁴² Leshner, *George Wallace*, 497.

predominantly rural, often with a large majority of blacks.⁴³ In the smallest county of Alabama, Bullock County, Wallace received seventy-five percent of the vote; Wallace received his highest percentage of support in Choctaw County, receiving eighty-four percent of the vote in the county of eleven thousand residents.⁴⁴

The Changing South: Beyond Wallace's Alabama

George Wallace's two separate and distinct gubernatorial campaigns in Alabama reflect the nature of the changing South. In the year 1962, old party politics dominated the South. The Democratic Party continued to dominate the region. The Democratic Primary attracted a higher voter turnout than the general election because general elections were largely uncontested empty rituals. White opposition to civil rights legislation allowed Wallace to run an overtly racist campaign, determined not to be "out-niggered again" in 1962 as he was in the 1958 Democratic Primary against Bull Connor.⁴⁵

The changing South forced Wallace's 1982 campaign to differ from his earlier bids for the governorship. In the twenty years between these two campaigns, the Republican Party had gained significant amounts of support at the expense of the Democratic Party. While the Republicans remained a minority party, the Democratic Party was transformed from a majority to a minority party. The 1982 campaign involved both a competitive primary challenge, as in 1962, but also a genuine challenge in the general election. Changing race relations, both in the state of Alabama generally and in Wallace as a person, allowed him to successfully build a biracial coalition of support. In the 1982 campaign, Wallace not only relied on the support of African-Americans, he also actively sought their support.

The changes in voter turnout over time also illustrate the rise of two-party competition. In the Old South, the Democratic Primary was seen as the more essential election. The candidate who won the primary also won the general election. The 1962 gubernatorial race in Alabama followed this pattern. In the first Democratic Primary held in May 1962, approximately nineteen percent of the entire population (based on the 1960 census) voted. In the second primary, eighteen percent of the population voted. In the general election in November 1962, only nine percent of the population voted.⁴⁶ These percentages are not accurate indicators of actual voter turnout; they discount neither those Alabama residents who were not of voting age in 1962 nor those blacks that were disenfranchised by the Alabama racial structure. However, they do reflect the trend of more people voting in the Democratic Primaries than in the general election. In general, voters participate in those elections that make the most difference in the final outcome. In the old system of Southern politics, those elections were the Democratic Primaries.

The 1982 gubernatorial race in Alabama reflected the trend of higher voter turnout in the general election than in the primaries. The 1982 general election saw twenty-eight percent of the Alabama residents (based on the 1980 Census) vote in the general election and

⁴³ Richard Scammon and Alice V. McGilliray, *America Votes 15* (Washington, DC: Elections Research Center Congressional Quarterly, 1983).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Dorman, *The Wallace Myth*, 25.

⁴⁶ Bartley and Graham, *Southern Elections* and Scammon and McGilliray, *America Votes 5*.

twenty-five in each of the two primaries.⁴⁷ This higher turnout reflects two changes in the state. By 1982, the party system in Alabama had become more competitive between the parties, making the general election more important than the Democratic primaries. The higher percentage of population voting is also a reflection of the enfranchisement of African-Americans following the Civil Rights Movement and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These numbers, like those for the 1962 elections, are not completely accurate, for they do not exclude residents ineligible to vote.

During the twentieth century, the Southern style of politics changed. Originally a Democratic stronghold, the South has become a source of support for the Republican Party. Once the preserver of traditional segregation, the South has become a quasi-integrated society to the same extent as other regions of the country. Wallace's gubernatorial campaigns, spanning three decades, exemplify these transformations of the American South. These changes, beginning with the 1952 presidential election, have transformed not only the South but also the country. No longer is the South written off to the Democratic Party during the presidential election years, nor is it written off to the Republican Party. While the Republicans do enjoy a slight advantage over the Democratic Party in the South, the party system of the region is no longer one of uncompetitive races. In the present, and in the future, neither party can be assured of its advantages in the region. Both parties presently do, and will continue to campaign in the South. Both parties have to address the need for candidates who, at the national level, are attractive to the distinctive regions of the country; no presidential candidate can win the election by sweeping the Southern states and winning no other states. Conversely, no candidate can concede the entire South to his or her opponent and expect a victory. In the scope of presidential politics, the South has become of increasing importance in the national election, a position that it will not vacate easily or soon. In all likelihood, the Southern states will rise in importance in the upcoming years, resulting from the spread of two-party competition within the South and the growing number of swing independents.

⁴⁷ Scammon and McGilliray, *America Votes* 15, 96.

Table 1: Democratic Gubernatorial Primary, 1962
 Percentage for Each Candidate by Alabama County⁴⁸

	Connor	deGraffenried	Folsom	Gallion	Wallace
Autauga	1.9	17.3	12.0	22.5	46.4
Baldwin	0.7	26.4	19.5	20.6	32.8
Barbour	0.7	2.3	8.5	3.8	94.7
Bibb	7.8	12.5	19.8	33.8	26.1
Blount	3.8	25.1	36.3	9.9	25.0
Bullock	2.4	9.7	24.0	3.0	60.8
Butler	0.8	15.6	20.1	18.9	44.6
Calhoun	3.7	28.1	16.9	18.1	33.3
Chambers	1.3	40.7	14.5	14.5	29.0
Cherokee	0.9	16.8	43.5	4.3	34.4
Chilton	6.0	11.0	20.2	14.8	48.0
Choctaw	1.0	7.3	24.2	8.8	58.8
Clarke	1.8	15.3	18.0	22.5	42.3
Clay	5.7	18.6	20.5	24.2	31.1
Cleburne	1.8	12.9	28.8	16.7	39.9
Coffee	0.5	7.6	34.6	8.7	48.6
Colbert	2.8	28.2	34.0	4.4	30.6
Conecuh	0.7	10.5	25.0	13.6	50.2
Coosa	4.1	21.4	28.7	18.1	27.7
Covington	0.9	13.5	18.6	14.5	52.5
Crenshaw	0.5	11.9	27.5	14.5	45.5
Cullman	1.8	15.8	60.2	7.4	14.8
Dale	1.0	6.9	15.2	6.5	70.4
Dallas	2.6	19.1	13.0	19.5	45.8
DeKalb	0.7	20.4	47.4	7.4	24.1
Elmore	1.5	16.9	13.8	18.1	49.6
Escambia	0.8	13.6	27.6	18.6	39.4
Etowah	5.1	39.1	25.7	10.4	19.6
Fayette	3.9	20.5	31.3	9.5	34.8
Franklin	1.8	22.1	38.4	3.2	34.5
Geneva	1.1	10.2	24.6	7.3	56.8
Greene	3.2	29.8	23.6	9.8	33.6
Hale	5.8	23.3	13.2	12.0	45.7
Henry	0.9	5.3	15.5	10.4	67.9
Houston	1.6	11.4	20.3	8.4	58.3
Jackson	0.9	23.8	39.0	5.7	30.7
Jefferson	9.4	38.0	17.4	13.5	21.6
Lamar	22.8	21.4	32.4	4.3	39.1
Lauderdale	1.8	29.3	35.4	3.8	29.7
Lawrence	2.7	20.9	38.2	5.9	32.2
Lee	0.6	35.6	15.4	10.3	38.1
Limestone	2.0	30.8	32.5	9.0	25.9

⁴⁸ Bartley and Graham, *Southern Elections*, 13-14.

Lowndes	0.5	12.7	27.3	13.0	46.4
Macon	1.5	10.5	52.4	10.1	25.5
Madison	2.3	44.7	27.8	7.9	17.4
Marengo	2.1	16.2	13.0	15.3	53.3
Marion	2.7	15.7	48.7	3.5	29.9
Marshall	2.4	23.4	49.1	4.9	20.3
Mobile	1.4	26.4	23.7	20.9	27.5
Monroe	0.7	14.8	19.6	20.4	44.5
Montgomery	0.7	19.2	18.6	16.2	45.3
Morgan	3.1	32.7	29.4	10.0	24.7
Perry	3.6	12.1	15.6	20.9	47.9
Pickens	7.4	21.0	17.0	11.7	42.8
Pike	1.2	15.7	15.2	9.7	58.3
Randolf	2.6	15.8	40.5	9.8	31.2
Russell	0.7	14.6	22.8	14.0	47.9
Shelby	7.6	22.3	16.7	19.6	33.8
St. Clair	6.7	21.1	25.6	12.9	33.6
Sumter	2.8	25.9	16.2	15.3	39.8
Talladega	9.0	24.6	21.0	19.8	25.7
Tallapoosa	3.3	25.1	23.7	18.6	29.23
Tuscaloosa	3.5	54.6	15.5	8.2	18.1
Walker	6.2	18.9	36.1	6.3	32.5
Washington	3.9	7.8	24.8	21.0	42.5
Wilcox	1.4	16.8	15.6	18.6	47.6
Winston	2.3	22.0	45.3	3.9	26.4

Table 2: Democratic Gubernatorial Second Primary, 1962
Percentage for Each Candidate by Alabama County⁴⁹

	deGraffenried	Wallace
Autauga	25.5	74.5
Baldwin	42.4	57.6
Barbour	8.9	91.1
Bibb	23.2	76.8
Blount	45.7	54.3
Bullock	31.5	68.5
Butler	28.1	71.9
Calhoun	44.6	55.4
Chambers	52.5	47.5
Cherokee	47.2	52.8
Chilton	23.6	76.4
Choctaw	24.3	75.7
Clarke	29.9	70.1
Clay	40.4	59.6
Cleburne	30.4	69.6
Coffee	24.0	76.0
Colbert	56.4	43.6
Conecuh	21.1	78.8
Coosa	46.8	53.2
Covington	27.9	72.1
Crenshaw	23.6	76.4
Cullman	43.0	57.0
Dale	16.7	83.3
Dallas	26.8	73.2
DeKalb	46.6	53.4
Elmore	26.3	73.7
Escambia	31.0	69.0
Etowah	58.8	41.2
Fayette	36.6	63.4
Franklin	43.5	56.5
Geneva	24.0	76.0
Greene	42.9	57.1
Hale	27.1	72.9
Henry	16.2	83.8
Houston	22.1	77.9
Jackson	39.0	61.0
Jefferson	58.0	42.0
Lamar	36.1	63.89
Lauderdale	52.5	47.5
Lawrence	47.4	52.6
Lee	43.0	57.0
Limestone	54.6	45.47

⁴⁹ Ibid., 15-16.

Lowndes	23.0	77.0
Macon	60.3	39.7
Madison	65.1	34.9
Marengo	21.3	78.7
Marion	28.9	71.1
Marshall	51.8	48.2
Mobile	48.7	51.3
Monroe	24.3	75.7
Montgomery	33.6	66.4
Morgan	62.2	37.8
Perry	24.1	75.9
Pickens	32.8	67.2
Pike	21.6	78.4
Randolf	33.8	66.2
Russell	29.6	70.4
Shelby	38.9	61.14
St. Clair	42.7	57.3
Sumter	39.9	60.1
Talladega	43.9	56.1
Tallapoosa	42.2	57.8
Tuscaloosa	64.9	35.1
Walker	41.6	58.4
Washington	25.5	74.5
Wilcox	25.3	74.7
Winston	42.8	57.2

Table 3: 1982 Gubernatorial General Election
Percentage of Each Candidate by Alabama County⁵⁰

	Folmar	Wallace
Autauga	45.5	54.5
Baldwin	49.7	50.3
Barbour	20.0	80.0
Bibb	22.3	77.7
Blount	39.2	60.8
Bullock	20.6	79.4
Butler	36.8	63.2
Calhoun	40.4	59.6
Chambers	34.9	65.1
Cherokee	20.4	79.6
Chilton	38.0	62.0
Choctaw	15.8	84.2
Clarke	34.2	65.8
Clay	33.4	66.6
Cleburne	29.7	70.3
Coffee	37.5	62.5
Colbert	28.2	71.8
Conecuh	27.2	72.8
Coosa	31.0	69.0
Covington	36.8	63.2
Crenshaw	29.5	70.5
Cullman	39.2	60.8
Dale	36.6	63.4
Dallas	39.0	61.0
DeKalb	36.2	63.8
Elmore	44.9	55.1
Escambia	29.0	71.0
Etowah	32.4	67.6
Fayette	28.9	71.1
Franklin	24.2	75.8
Geneva	26.8	73.2
Greene	16.4	83.6
Hale	24.4	75.6
Henry	26.2	73.8
Houston	46.1	53.9
Jackson	20.1	79.9
Jefferson	51.5	48.5
Lamar	19.6	80.4
Lauderdale	35.2	64.8
Lawrence	18.0	82.0
Lee	55.6	44.4
Limestone	29.9	70.1

⁵⁰ Scammon and McGilliray, *America Votes 15*.

Lowndes	22.2	77.8
Macon	18.2	81.8
Madison	51.9	48.1
Marengo	32.4	67.6
Marion	23.0	77.0
Marshall	35.2	64.8
Mobile	43.7	56.3
Monroe	30.7	69.3
Montgomery	50.1	49.9
Morgan	42.6	57.4
Perry	24.5	75.5
Pickens	27.8	72.2
Pike	36.2	63.8
Randolf	29.3	70.7
Russell	22.5	77.5
Shelby	41.8	58.2
St. Clair	59.6	40.4
Sumter	18.1	81.9
Talladega	37.0	63.0
Tallapoosa	38.9	61.1
Tuscaloosa	42.2	57.8
Walker	29.3	70.7
Washington	17.2	82.8
Wilcox	20.8	79.2
Winston	41.5	58.5

Spanish Language Use During the 2000 Campaign Cycle

Darya V. Pollak
Rice University

In 2000, Hispanics comprised 7 percent of the U.S. electorate, and 55 percent of U.S. Hispanics expressed a preference for Spanish language use. With Hispanic voter participation growing rapidly, presidential and congressional candidates are targeting them as an important emerging demographic. This study examines voters' reactions to the many uses the candidates made of the Spanish language through Internet websites and speeches along campaign stops, and whether candidates gave the address in Spanish or had a proxy communicate the message. Candidates hope that through the use of Spanish in campaigns they will connect with Hispanic communities and form strong party ties with immigrants. With the diversity of American society and the high level of out-reach supported by candidates on the presidential and congressional stage in 2000, we should expect the Spanish language to increasingly contribute to the U.S. election process.

Introduction

By 2010, Latinos will be the largest minority group in the United States of America. During the 2000 election cycle, George W. Bush and Al Gore battled for the votes of 8.5 million Hispanic registered voters, concentrated in key states including Florida and New Mexico. Hispanic voter participation is growing rapidly and their turnout is becoming on par with that of the general population. In 2000, they comprised 7 percent of the electorate, up from 4 percent in 1996. What was once regarded as a group of non-citizens and non-voters to be ignored by political players has transformed into a critical element of electoral success in much of the United States. Politicians at all levels of government are realizing that the Latino vote can and must be courted. This paper takes a preliminary look at the role Spanish language plays in that courting.

For the first time in U.S. campaign history both candidates for president aggressively pursued the Hispanic vote, with Spanish language use as a major tactic. Hispanic Trends, a research firm that studies and analyzes the Hispanic market, found that 55 percent of U.S. Hispanics express a preference for Spanish language. Raul Yzaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) pointed out the rapid rate at which Latinos are naturalizing and that “newly naturalized citizens have a greater proclivity to register and actually get out to vote.”¹ These people are less likely to have complete English fluency. Hispanic Trends also found an increase in support for George Bush from “Latinos who are more comfortable speaking Spanish than English and those who get their news coverage from Spanish-language television networks.”²

Author: Darya V. Pollak, darsbars@yahoo.com

¹ “Debate Chats 2000: How Will the Latino Vote Affect 2000 Elections?”
www.abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/Debatechat09028.html, 28 (September 2000).

² Stephanie Ernst, “Black, Hispanic Vote Could Swing Presidential Election.”
www.hispanictrends.com/analysis.html, 20 (November 2000).

Spanish Appreciation

In their paper on the acquisition of political partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans, Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner posit that increased comfort with the English language leads to the development and intensification of party affinity. Although this suspicion does not hold up to statistic verification, they do find that “for Latinos the percentage of strong [party] identifiers increased steadily with time spent in this country by immigrants and by generation.”³ By putting their message into Spanish, politicians are better able to access recent immigrants before their partisanship and commitment to a party has developed. The authors relate “trends in party choice or partisan intensity... to greater exposure to U.S. politics and, more specifically to information about the major political parties.”⁴ Communicating in Spanish thus allows the parties to generate increased exposure for themselves and provide political information to these potential voters as quickly as possible. They begin to build a relationship from the outset, sometimes even before Latinos naturalize.

In *Counting on the Latino Vote*, Louis DeSipio describes the potential political rewards for courting Latinos prior to naturalization. He finds that the majority of noncitizens fall into a behavioral or attitudinal category that can later be linked to increased voting likelihood. He points out that in his study:

the partisanship of the noncitizen... was largely unformed. Those who had begun the process [of naturalization] were more likely to have a partisan identification. Nonetheless, among those who had begun to naturalize, the majority of Mexican Americans and Dominican Americans were unaffiliated.⁵

Although he hypothesizes that the newly naturalized will most likely follow the party preferences of their citizen co-nationals, “the high rate of unaffiliation offers opportunities for both parties, should either take the initiative.”⁶ Campaigning in Spanish is an important way of doing this. Although candidates do not specifically target noncitizens, the information coming through Spanish language media is certainly accessible to noncitizens and helps them form an interest in the political process and a potential party affinity. While Spanish may strike a cultural chord with the assimilated Latino voter, its use as a communicative mechanism reaches beyond current voters to possible future participants in the American political process.

This study aims to provide an overview of the use of the Spanish language during the 2000 campaign, looking at House, Senate, and the presidential races. This overview will be presented with an understanding of Spanish language use as playing both a symbolic and pragmatic role. When used as a symbol, language is employed as a signifier. It serves as a political tip of the hat to convey that the candidate identifies with speakers of the language and “is one of us” or “cares about us.” Language use is a particularly effective political

³ Bruce Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Carole Uhlaner, “The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans.” *American Journal of Political Science* (May 1991): 390-419.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Louis DeSipio, *Counting on the Latino Vote* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996).

⁶ Ibid.

symbol because of its deep emotional charge. The pragmatic function of language is as a communicative mechanism necessary for the transmission of ideas and information. Clearly, the two are not mutually exclusive. The symbolic capacity of language usage is inherent in any pragmatic application of Spanish. I will examine both roles in terms of the media, message, and individuals employed.

Internet and Spanish Language

When looking at the media used, I aim to acquire a sense of what types of campaigning occur in Spanish. Is its use restricted to speeches, pamphlets, and websites, or does it extend to phone banks, precinct walkers, and position papers? Have campaigns hired Spanish-language media consultants and, if so, what is the extent of their responsibilities?

The communicative context is also important. Are the messages put forth in Spanish merely translations of previously created English language materials, or is content actually altered when addressing an audience in Spanish? If the messages are altered, what is included and what is left out?

Another key part of communication is who delivers the message. Is the communicator Anglo or Hispanic? Is it the candidate who speaks, or does he or she deputize someone else to do it? If so, is that person a supportive Latino politician, a Spanish-speaking staff person, or perhaps a Latino family member? Does this surrogate speaker merely play the role of messenger or does he or she also become a symbol?

Although this paper attempts to address all communication media, a primary focus will be placed on the Internet and the Spanish language content of campaign websites. This focus was chosen because of the novelty of the Internet as a campaign medium and its potential impact on the future of campaigning. Furthermore, Latino computer ownership and Internet usage is quickly increasing as Latinos achieve greater economic prosperity. The rates of growth are rapid and far outpace those of the general market and most other ethnic groups. Currently, 47 percent of U.S. Hispanic households own a personal computer with an average of 2.2 users per household. Sixty-four percent of adult Hispanic computer owners report using the Internet for activities other than e-mail.⁷ Spanish language websites can therefore be thought of as a powerful new way for politicians to target their message to a more prosperous subgroup of Latinos, who might feel overlooked if candidates had only a general, English language site. The Gore campaign, for example, estimated that 10-18 percent of daily traffic on its website was in Spanish.⁸

The 2000 election demonstrated the beginnings of a solid presence for Spanish language on political websites, although it can by no means be considered widespread. Of all the state party websites in states with significant Hispanic populations, only California's Republican Party has Spanish on its site. This is particularly noteworthy because of the poor relationship that existed between California's Latinos and the state's Republican government during the Pete Wilson administration. Of the candidate sites I examined, it seemed that the higher profile and more contested races were those more likely to have Spanish language on their sites. Both the New York senatorial candidates had significant Spanish language sites,

⁷Raul Yzaguirre, "The Digital World of the US Hispanic II." *Cheskin Research*. www.nclr.org (2001).

⁸ Ben Green, Director of Internet Operations for Al Gore's presidential campaign, telephone interview with author, 19 December 2001.

as did the victors in the New Jersey and Florida senatorial races. In California, by contrast, the senate race was not at all close and Spanish was absent from the sites of both candidates, although Hispanics are the state's largest minority group at 30 percent. Both *georgewbush.com* and *al Gore.com* had extensive Spanish language content. I also found Spanish language content on the website of a few Hispanic congressional candidates, but it was not present in the majority of sites I examined.

My methodology for finding sites was basically to look at the state party websites and follow links to candidates with Hispanic surnames. If the candidate did have Spanish on his or her website, I then went to the opponent's website (if it existed) for comparison. In addition, I checked senate races in states with large Hispanic populations and, of course, the presidential candidate sites.

The format and content of the Spanish language section of websites varied dramatically across the board. The formats differed substantially, but the links from the English homepages to the Spanish ones were usually easily identifiable and sometimes quite prominently displayed. The California GOP website took this to a higher level by opening with a banner greeting that alternated between "Welcome to the California Republican Party website" and the Spanish equivalent "*Bienvenido al website del Partido Republicano de California.*" In order to enter the site, visitors must click on "In English" or "*En Español*" to be brought to the corresponding index page. The most noteworthy formatting discrepancy I saw was between the Gore and Bush sites. On Gore's page, the "*En Español*" link appeared prominently in a banner across the top of the screen. Following the link, the Spanish page looked very much like the English one, but the Gore-Lieberman logo on the upper left hand corner was altered to read "Viva [Live! or Long Live!] Gore-Lieberman," the same logo present on some of Gore's campaign signs. On the Bush page, the link was small and off to the side, and said in English, "Spanish." Over the many times I looked at the site, the Bush campaign kept changing the location of its Spanish link and changed from the phrasing "Choose Your Language" where one must click and then select Spanish, to simply reading "*En Español.*" The result was that the Spanish link on the Bush site was much more difficult to find and much easier to overlook.

The content of the various websites ranged from a simple welcome message to significant coverage of campaign news, issues, and positions. Some of the sites were near mirrors of their English counterparts, containing translated versions of the articles appearing on the English side. Others had near translations with a Hispanic tweak. Still others had content substantially different from that of their English counterparts, focusing on issues and events relevant to the Hispanic community. Never was the Spanish language content of a site completely comparable to that of the English site, although many came quite close. English sites were always at least slightly more extensive and up-to-date.

The campaigns with the most extensive Spanish language content were the most high profile ones. On sites with less Spanish language, it seemed that a welcome message and candidate biography were always available in Spanish, but the links to issues, campaign information, etc would usually lead the user back to English or to a very brief Spanish language snippet. When the sites did make extensive use of Spanish, their content fell into one of two categories: a mirror or near mirror of the English site, or a Hispanic oriented and Hispanic centered site.

New Jersey's senator-elect had one such mirror site: www.votecorzone.com provided both Spanish and Portuguese versions of its site with the same structure as the English one. Articles and speeches were literal translations of the English language originals. New York senatorial candidate Rick Lazio put a slightly different spin on this by making use of literal translations from the English side but adding in a sentence or two aimed directly at Hispanics. [www.lazio.com's](http://www.lazio.com) section on community begins with:

to be an effective representative, you must work hard to improve the quality of life for your constituents.

The Spanish equivalent states that:

to be a representative that is truly at the service of the Hispanic community, one must work hard to create opportunities that improve [their, your] quality of life.

It then continues with text identical to that of the English site. When discussing housing, the site tells readers that "owning a home is part of the American dream" but tells Spanish language readers that "owning a home is part of the dream of many Latinos." While maintaining essentially the same content, Lazio's campaign still uses the Spanish website as a way to target Hispanics and show that he is aware of the Hispanic community and its issues.

The victor in the New York senate race, Hillary Rodham Clinton, took a much different approach with her Spanish language website, which featured more Hispanic specific content. The Spanish site had articles about Hillary Clinton participating in the Puerto Rican Day Parade and about the commencement of the campaign to promote her "Latino Agenda." Clinton's Spanish language site lauded her as "a champion for children" and discussed "children and families" in Spanish. She has a biography and an "in the news" section in Spanish, but sections about youth, volunteering, and contributing to the campaign are available only in English. She also has an "issues" section in Spanish but not all issues covered on the English side appear in Spanish translation. The www.hillary2000.org won an HOLA award for "excellence in design, content, user interface, and great value to the Hispanic online community" from HOLA, a Madrid based magazine.

Presidential Websites

George W. Bush and Al Gore's websites take similar approaches to that of Clinton's in the sense that they vary content significantly between English and Spanish. Their Spanish sides both open with lead stories about issues of interest to the Hispanic community such as education, medical care, or Hispanic specific content such as "Al Gore honors the Hispanic Congressional Committee." Gore's site also includes a Hispanic specific welcome message that speaks of "the values found in the heart of being Latino" and the desire that "all workers have the opportunity to live according to their values and realize their dreams." It concludes by asking Hispanics to "join your forces with mine."

Both candidates' sites contain news releases and texts of speeches, some Hispanic specific. Al Gore's Spanish site included an article about the candidate's appearance on the Spanish-language variety program "Sábado Gigante." It also contained the Spanish language translation of an anti-crime speech delivered in Boston, but I was unable to find the corresponding English language text on the English side. A bilingual response to a town hall question regarding relations with Mexico was also displayed on the site. Both Bush and Gore's sites allow visitors to view English and Spanish language commercials produced by the campaigns. The sites have broad Spanish language coverage and provide positions and updates on many key issues. Of the 30 plus issues that appeared on Gore's site, ten were available in Spanish with content very similar to that of the English sections. Bush's site offered six or seven issues in Spanish that differed significantly in content from the English side. His Spanish language education section, for example, centered more on the academic achievements of Hispanic students in Texas. The lead issues on the Bush site (that is, the ones featured on the homepage) were usually very different from the issues leading on the Spanish site. In late October, the English home page featured "the greatest generation, the blueprint for the middle class, renewing America's purpose, and ending the education recession" whereas the Spanish leads were "foreign policy, education, immigration, and an agenda of opportunity and prosperity that includes all."

From the presidency to the congressional races, all campaign websites that included Spanish language versions of candidate positions had one thing in common: the issues that appeared translated in Spanish were first and foremost education and health care. These are two of the three key issues for Latinos in the 2000 election as identified by Arturo Vargas of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials.⁹ Other issues of importance, according to a National Council of La Raza report, include economic development, immigration, and civil rights.¹⁰ These issues were the next to appear in Spanish language sites, although some sites went beyond and touched on more subjects than the five mentioned above.

Webmasters - How Spanish Language Content is Determined

To gain more insight into the thinking behind Spanish language websites, I conducted interviews with webmasters in charge of Spanish language political sites, posing questions about both the Internet site and the overall Spanish language campaign. I also asked about their visions for the future of Spanish language and Internet campaigning. I spoke with Ben Green, director of Internet Operations for Al Gore's presidential campaign, Dave Harper, webmaster for Rick Lazio's senatorial campaign, Mark Middlebrook, webmaster for California congressional candidate Rodolfo Favila, and with Stuart Devo, communications director for the California GOP. I also interviewed advertising mogul Lionel Sosa, a Hispanic media consultant for the Bush campaign

I asked the interviewees about the manner in which the Spanish language content of the sites was determined and what factors influenced this. All said that it was important that the Spanish language sites be as complete as possible and should not lag behind the English

⁹ Debate Chats 2000.

¹⁰ Raul Yzaguirre, "The Latino Agenda: Issues at Stake in the 2000 Presidential Election." *National Council of La Raza*. www.nclr.org (2000).

site in quality or timeliness of the news items posted. Lionel Sosa stressed that readers of the Spanish language site should not feel left behind or relegated to lesser importance, and that issues of special interest to the Hispanic community were given first priority. The content of the Bush site was determined by the general campaign team and then assigned to the Spanish-language web consultant for writing or translation. Gore's campaign had a Hispanic outreach committee that could post articles directly to the web. Other times, the website director received English language articles that a bilingual staff person then translated.

Mark Middlebrook explained that the Favila for Congress campaign chose to include Spanish language for purposes of perception: to show that the candidate relates to the Hispanic community. The campaign decided that it had the capacity to do a complete Spanish language site and that it would not have achieved the perception it sought if it had not done a complete job. Existing members of the campaign staff translated the text of the Spanish-language site. Completeness was also stressed by Lazio's campaign, although Harper cited time constraints as a reason why the site did not include much content specific to Hispanic issues, but rather was a near mirror of the English side. The Lazio campaign hired a professional translation company to provide the Spanish text. The California GOP, which aimed for a full content mirror site, contracted with a professional free-lance translator who consults with the party from time to time.

A major concern cited by all I interviewed was that the language used on the website be "correct Spanish" and not "Spanglish." They mentioned the importance of properly translating electoral or campaign vocabulary and of avoiding using a style of Spanish specific to a certain country or region. Within itself, the Hispanic community of the U.S. is extremely diverse and campaigns made conscious efforts not to alienate any group by using regional or colloquial Spanish.

I asked why the campaigns chose to include Spanish language on their websites and was told, in the case of Favila, that since the candidate is himself Hispanic and the district has some large Hispanic communities, the campaign felt it was important to show the proficiency of the candidate in Spanish language and Hispanic culture. Mr. Middlebrook explained it was done for purposes of perception, and not because they believed that people would not be able to understand the message otherwise. Mr. Devo pointed out that California is a minority state with a large Hispanic population, and that the California GOP's objective is to put forth a message. After looking at polls and research, they determined that the message would be better transmitted to new immigrants through Spanish. The party is concerned that no one be restricted from access to this message. Dave Harper noted the important Spanish speaking demographic in New York State. Both Al Gore and George Bush themselves made the decision to include a website in Spanish. According to Ben Green, not doing it was never a consideration. "We assumed that we would have to do it and just did."¹¹ The Gore campaign considered Hispanics part of their "winning coalition." Mr. Sosa told me that George Bush decided that a Hispanic outreach effort was important and that this should include the Internet. He stated that Bush wanted to "reach out for every single vote," paying special attention to Hispanics and women. The campaign recognized Hispanics' increasing numbers and political participation, and felt that Hispanic outreach was important in promoting the governor's message of inclusion and uniting people. The Republican Party has traditionally earned between 15 to 22 percent of the Latino vote, but set

¹¹ Green, interview.

its goals for 35 percent in 2000. It earned an estimated 38 percent according to Sosa, or 31 to 35 percent according to the *New York Times*.¹² Sosa attributes this success to the active Hispanic outreach campaign.

When voters made contact with any of the campaigns by email, there were mechanisms in place to respond to the emails in Spanish. Although, as with any political organization, emails are not always responded to. The same procedure was in place at the Gore campaign. Twenty-five percent of the emails received by *www.favila.com* were in Spanish.

In my interviews, I asked for opinions about the future of Spanish language use in campaigns and received varying responses. The strategists I spoke with from the presidential campaigns both believed it would become more and more important in future races. "As long as both candidates are out there fighting for Hispanic votes," said Sosa, "the Hispanic population is going to win." Mr. Devo said Spanish language use depends on the individual candidate and campaign, but that the key to campaigns is reaching voters and that for the California GOP this means being able to communicate in several languages. He sees the inclusion of languages like Chinese and Armenian in the future. Mr. Harper and Mr. Green also believe we may see an extension into languages other than Spanish. Mr. Middlebrook said he does not foresee an increase in Spanish language Internet campaigning, because it is for the purpose of perception, not for the purpose of transmitting information.

None of the interviewees reported substantial political backlash from non-Hispanic voters nor do they expect such a backlash to occur. Even if it were to occur, Mr. Devo stated that if you feel it is right in principle, it will transcend criticism. All agreed that criticism of this nature would not be politically correct. Mr. Sosa said his focus groups have shown that all Americans are beginning to understand the multi-cultural nature of the nation and realizing that we can learn from each other. He believes that people are becoming more tolerant.

Campaigning and the Internet

With respect to Internet campaigning in general, all seemed to feel its importance would grow, especially as targeted email becomes manageable. This could in turn lead to sending targeted email in Spanish. Political ads could be streamed and sent over the web. Mr. Devo predicts a major increase in political usage of the Internet and believes that campaigns will not be forced to spend as much money on television and will be able to reach voters directly, hurting special interests. Mr. Harper describes the value of the Internet in facilitating political activism by making it easier to become involved. For example, people can now send electronic postcards to friends reminding them to vote or encouraging their support of a particular candidate. The Internet will become a new method for organizing volunteers and accumulating donations. Internet growth will also allow for more detailed policy information, eventually allowing voters to make educated decisions based primarily on resources available online. Mr. Green believes the Internet and television will converge as media, which will result in a greater emphasis on Internet campaigning. Mr. Sosa foresees Internet use as an important new method of fundraising and getting out the vote. He thinks it allows for a much closer feeling between the voter and the campaign, allowing more

¹² Eric Schmitt, "Hispanic Voter is Vivid in Parties' Crystal Ball." *New York Times*, 9 (April 2001): A14.

extensive communication on the part of the candidate and a feeling of being in touch on the part of the voter. Mr. Middlebrook of Favila for Congress sees an increase in spending on banner ads and the use of the Internet as a means of providing information to voters through sites like *www.cnn.com* or *www.voter.com*. He does not view the web as a main driver for campaigns and believes that the number of campaigns with websites will increase, but slowly.

Although the Internet was the Favila campaign's primary Spanish language communication medium, excepting a few print ads in local Spanish publications, many other campaigns have far more extensive Spanish language components. Hillary Clinton's campaign included the distribution of bilingual campaign materials and interviews with members of the Spanish language media. The California GOP conducted a paid media campaign and a bilingual voter registration effort in heavily Latino areas. They also opened a campaign office in predominately Hispanic East Los Angeles and gained free coverage in Spanish language media.

In the presidential race, Spanish language made frequent appearances. Both candidates made efforts to include some Spanish in Hispanic focused speaking engagements, peppering their English language statements with a few words in Spanish. In a July news conference Bush, who speaks some Spanish, told reporters "I like to fight that stereotype that somehow we [Republicans] don't have the *corazón* [heart] necessary to hear the voices of people from all political parties and all walks of life."¹³ Gore, speaking about drugs before the National Council of La Raza "contrasted his promises with Bush's *palabras* [words]."¹⁴

Candidates or their spokespeople also appeared on Spanish language media to tout their policies. The Bush campaign created a position new to the history of presidential politics: Spanish language relations spokesperson. They hired Sonia Colín, a former anchorwoman on both of the major U.S. Spanish Language television stations, to fill the post.

In the Democratic camp, vice presidential candidate Joe Lieberman was interviewed on Univisión, the nation's largest Spanish language television station in late October. In August, Al Gore and his family appeared on Univisión's Saturday night variety show, "Sábado Gigante." Bush also made an appearance on the show and was interviewed for Univisión's news program.

In addition to this free media exposure, both campaigns purchased commercial time on Univisión and its competitor Telemundo. These commercials, which were aired in two swing states (i.e., Florida and New Mexico) with significant Hispanic populations, addressed themes of opportunity and education.¹⁵ They were also available for viewing on the Internet. The Gore ad "faces" featured Latinos of all ages talking about opportunity and what the future holds, stating "we have come far, but there is more to accomplish." Patriotic music plays in the background. Gore appears only at the very end and does not speak. One Bush ad "un nuevo día" [a new day] tells voters the American dream is for all and that George W. Bush shares "our" values and cares about "our" children, without ever using the word Hispanic or Latino. Without explicitly stating it, the ad's purpose seems to be to convince Hispanics that George Bush is like them and understands them. At the end of the ad, George Bush says in heavily accented Spanish, "*es un nuevo día*" [it's a new day]. In a commercial

¹³ Christian T. Miller, "Bush Aims at Latino, State Vote." *Los Angeles Times*, 6 (July 2000): A7.

¹⁴ Stephen Braun, "Gore Takes Drugs Plan to the Experts." *Los Angeles Times*, 4 (July 2000): A3.

¹⁵ Laura Meckler, "Bush, Gore Ads Courting Hispanics." www.dailynews.yahoo.com, 19 (October 2000).

focused on education Bush says in Spanish, “For me, education is number one because our children deserve the best.” In a third ad called “America the beautiful,” the song plays while an announcer tells voters that Bush knows how “we Latinos contribute much to American society.” The commercial uses the inclusive first person plural conjugation “we,” instead of the third person plural “they” thereby creating a sense of closeness between the campaign and the targeted audience. It also states that “Latino pride is also part of the Bush family, it’s part of its blood” while flashing images of George Prescott Bush, the 24 year-old Hispanic nephew of George W. Bush.

George P. Bush- A New Face for the Republican Party

George Prescott Bush is the eldest son of Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Columba Garnica Bush, originally from Guanajuato, Mexico. Until dropping off the campaign to begin law school in September of 2000, G.P. Bush was an active part of the Bush campaign’s Latino and youth vote efforts. He made campaign appearances, gave interviews, and posed for photos where his dark hair and skin reflect the physical appearance typical to most Latinos. George P. also made eight television commercials on his uncle’s behalf, both in English and in Spanish (in which he is fluent). His ads had themes of youth, voter participation, and family. In one Spanish language ad, he tells Latinos that “we have become the most important electoral block” and in another he identifies himself as “a young Latino from this country,” “in many ways, like any American,” and “very proud of my roots.”

Lionel Sosa believes George P. caused people not predisposed to voting Republican to take a second look.

He breaks a barrier for people who would never, ever listen to a Republican message. All of a sudden they’re saying, “Wait a minute. Listen to this. He is one of us.”¹⁶

George P. Bush’s Spanish language commercials told Latinos “I have an uncle who wants to be president. His name? The same as mine.” Sosa thinks George P. Bush’s presence erased some misconceptions about Republicans and Latinos, but cautions that George P. speaking Spanish was not enough. He warns that to reach Latinos, English must be used so that Hispanics will not feel left out of the general market and so that non-Spanish-speaking Latinos will feel included. Latinos need to see people with Latino faces speaking English, so they know that “he’s talking to me.”¹⁷ George P. therefore made four ads in English that aired in high-density Hispanic areas.

When I spoke with George P. Bush I asked his opinion of the ads he appeared in. He said that the purpose of the ads was to introduce George W. Bush to the Latino community and to help change the reputation of the Republican Party within this community. “To see a young Latino on a campaign is pretty exciting,” he said. “It shows Latinos they can take more control over the political process.”

George P. Bush did not create the ads, although he worked closely with Lionel Sosa to ensure he felt comfortable with the scripts. While on the campaign trail, he was

¹⁶ Massie Ritsch, “The Bush with *Muy Guapo* Appeal.” *Los Angeles Times*, 27 (July 2000): E1.

¹⁷ Lionel Sosa, personal interview with author, 18 December 2000.

responsible for creating the text of his own speeches, focusing primarily on his own experiences, testimonials about his uncle, and some policy information.

I asked George P. Bush how much of his campaigning was actually done in Spanish, and he replied that it varied a great deal by geographic region as well as by the type of group being addressed (a Latino political organization versus recent immigrants, for example). For the most part, he employed Spanish in its symbolic form, dropping a few words of Spanish into an English language speech to energize the crowd. Spanish was employed heavily in South Florida, in migrant farm communities in Wisconsin, and in California's San Fernando Valley. In one example of pragmatic usage, Bush gave an impromptu all-Spanish speech to a group of roughly 1,000 recent Colombian immigrants near Atlanta.

George P. Bush described the reactions to his use of Spanish as very positive. The Bush campaign encouraged him to use Spanish as much as possible (although they did not explicitly state this). He said people seemed shocked that a Republican knew Spanish and that using Spanish was a way of telling them that he understands their culture. Bush pointed out that Spanish language use is not imperative in reaching most of the Latino community but that it is respected. He described his role as primarily symbolic because the Latino demographic the campaign was interested in already knows some English. According to Bush, when his Anglo uncle, George W. Bush spoke in Spanish it was also quite well received, although he believes some people might find it patronizing when a non-Latino candidate speaks Spanish.

As far as the future of Spanish language campaigning, George P. Bush expects an increase on local and sometimes state levels but believes that at the presidential level it will remain at its present level and continue to be "piecemeal." He described Spanish language in the presidential campaign as "here to stay" and said future campaigns must include it at some level.

At the Republican National Convention in August of 2000, George P. made an appearance, addressing the crowd in both English and Spanish. The speech was primarily in English but included a few phrases in Spanish like *el sueño Americano* [the American Dream]. In Spanish, Bush told delegates that "as governor of Texas, my uncle has created more opportunities for our people than any other politician" (words echoed in the Bush commercials). In English he spoke of unity through diversity and said "I respect leaders who respect my heritage." Initially George P. Bush intended to include more Spanish in his speech but convention coordinators asked him to scale it back for fear of alienating non-Spanish-speaking viewers.

The Republican National Convention also featured the first ever U.S. political convention speech delivered entirely in Spanish by California State Assemblyman Abel Maldonado. Hector Barreto, California co-chairman of the Bush campaign, also included Spanish in his convention speech.¹⁸ The Democratic National Convention included a speech by Dr. Cynthia Telles, wife of California State Assembly leader Bob Hertzberg and daughter of Raymond Telles, the first Hispanic mayor of a major U.S. city (El Paso) and first Hispanic appointed an American ambassador. Telles addressed delegates first in English and then in Spanish.¹⁹

¹⁸ Dana Calvo, "A New Accent." *Los Angeles Times*, 3 (August 2000): A18.

¹⁹ Julie Tamaki, "'Big Kahuna' Bob Hertzberg, Making the Most of His Time to Shine." *Los Angeles Times*, 17 (August 2000): A10.

Latino Reactions

Latino reactions to the prominence of Spanish language during the 2000 campaign have been mixed. While all welcome the heightened attention the Hispanic vote has received, many are concerned that it is merely political lip service, not a real commitment to the concerns and issues facing the Hispanic community. “Politicians cannot just come in, speak a little Spanish, march in the *Cinco de Mayo* parade and think they can get the Latino vote” said California Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante in July of 2000.²⁰ Raul Yzaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza explained that “both candidates have shown a lot of interest in marketing for our community: doing the right kinds of ads, focus groups, finding the right phraseology and symbolism to attract our votes.”²¹ But he also noted his concern that the election be “not a referendum on photo ops, but a contest of ideas and issues that are relevant to the Latino community.”²² “Issues and substance,” said Yzaguirre, “more than marketing and symbols, will decide who Latinos will vote for at all levels of government.”²³

Hispanics have made it clear that using Spanish purely for symbolic purposes is not sufficient. Univisión nightly news anchor María Elena Salinas told the Miami Herald that,

It isn't enough that candidates for the nation's most influential job speak a few words in Spanish. To get my attention and possibly my vote, they also need to show some understanding of who we are, of the experiences that shaped us and of the concerns we share.²⁴

In an October news broadcast, Univisión reporter Lourdes del Rio, in a story about the Latino and Immigrant Fairness Act emphasized that “despite a few words in Spanish, neither Bush nor Gore has given Hispanics very much support on the immigration issue.”²⁵

Hispanics I spoke with expressed similar concerns. I interviewed both naturalized and native-born Hispanics of varied socioeconomic status and language fluency regarding their impressions of the 2000 campaign. I asked how they feel when a non-Hispanic candidate speaks in Spanish or has campaign materials in Spanish. Most responded that they were pleased because it shows the candidate recognizes the importance of the Hispanic community and is trying to make a connection to it. They said it shows a concern for issues of importance to Hispanics and they appreciate the extra effort to communicate with potential voters. Those with limited English fluency were more likely to view it favorably simply because it enables them to understand what the candidate is saying, although one person I spoke to noted that this happens only during elections and afterwards there is no Spanish.

More acculturated, English speaking Hispanics tempered their positive responses, expressing skepticism and the hope that the candidates were being sincere and not speaking

²⁰ Stephen Braun, “Gore Takes Drugs Plan to the Experts.” *Los Angeles Times*, 4 (July 2000): A3.

²¹ Debate Chats 2000.

²² Debate Chats 2000.

²³ Raul Yzaguirre, “Statement.” *National Council of La Raza*, www.nclr.org, 10 (August 2000).

²⁴ www.hispanictrends.com.

²⁵ Laurien Alexandre and Henrik Reh binder, “Campaign 2000 on Univision and Telemundo.” www.hispanictrends.com/media.html, 29 (October 2000).

Spanish only for campaign purposes. One said that she perceived it as trying to pretend candidates have a tie to Hispanic culture although they really don't, and was quick to note that issues are what matter most. A Hispanic university professor active in Latino politics felt that Spanish language use was acceptable if it was informational or bilingual but felt that otherwise it was "taking advantage of people by language" and viewed Spanish language use as a claim by the candidate to be "one of us." "Don't try to say that you're one of us," he cautioned. "You don't know who we are or what about us is important."

I then asked the people I interviewed how they felt about Hispanic candidates speaking in Spanish or having campaign materials in Spanish. Reactions were either positive or neutral, some said that it was expected. Finally, I asked how they would feel about a Hispanic candidate who was not able to speak Spanish. Most of the people I interviewed expressed discomfort with this although they agreed that the ability to speak Spanish would not affect their vote. Bilingual Latinos felt they would identify less with the candidate and that they would regard it as (in the words of one interviewee) "minus a point." Another said the candidate "should be ashamed of himself for missing a part of who he is" although he also agreed it would not directly affect his vote. One Hispanic not fluent in Spanish says she would probably identify more with the candidate although she would be surprised at his inability to speak Spanish. Another said that this would not bother him unless the candidate denied his background. Most non-English fluent Hispanics said they would feel disappointed because they could not understand the candidate and would not identify very well with him. Being Hispanic, the candidate should be able to speak Spanish. One said that she would not identify less because she has children that do not speak Spanish. All agreed that it would not affect their vote because "we understand that not everyone learned Spanish" and that "we are in an English speaking country and we should speak English."

As these interviews show, opinion on the political use of Spanish language is varied and emotionally charged. I am pleased with the breadth of my sample as far as language capabilities and socioeconomic status, although I am concerned because I interviewed only Hispanics living in Texas. They are primarily Mexican in origin and as a group they historically have a far better relationship with the political establishment than do Hispanics in other states, notably California.

As far as the breadth of campaigns I discuss, I am less pleased. The majority of campaigns I studied were those of Anglo candidates. In an Anglo-Latino relationship, an Anglo politician attempts to reach out to Latino voters. As my interviews have shown, language may function as an entryway for the Anglo, a means for the candidate to show prospective voters he or she cares about them and identifies with their community. On the flip side, the Anglo candidate may be perceived as an interloper or be accused of tokenism and pandering to the community, using a linguistic cloak to conceal policy inadequacies.

In future research, I hope to learn more about Spanish language use in campaigns where Latino candidates seek Latino votes. This occurs more frequently in congressional and local races. Since I focused my study on presidential and senatorial campaigns, the opportunity to study Latino-Latino communication was more limited. When this type of communication does exist, language becomes a variable of authenticity. If the candidate does not speak Spanish, is she or he really "one of us?" Can she or he be trusted? On the other hand, all Latino voters are by no means Spanish speakers. Although many may have some familiarity with the language, there are significant numbers who are not fluent. This

raises the question of the relevance of Spanish campaigning to second and third generation Latinos, who are more likely to be citizens and assimilated into the dominant culture. Arturo Vargas, executive director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials points out that

the patterns of Latino immigration demonstrate that Latinos are acculturating very quickly. By the third generation, English has completely replaced Spanish as the primary language that's spoken in Latino households.²⁶

Given this, could the use of Spanish actually work against a candidate by alienating acculturated Latino voters? What would be the point of transmitting a message in Spanish to a population that cannot actually understand the message and that may even harbor some cultural guilt for not being able to do so?

It is difficult to get a sense of this from the limited number of interviews I have conducted, although it does not seem to be the case. As the Latino population continues to assimilate and acculturate, these issues may become more poignant. These are certainly questions worth pursuing.

For the time being, I have presented a thorough overview of Spanish language use as it played out during the 2000 campaign cycle. My findings indicate the presence of Spanish language in federal level campaigns is still in its nascent stages. As the U.S. Hispanic population continues to grow both in sheer numbers and in its level of political participation, I believe we will see an increase in both the depth of Spanish language political content and the breadth of its distribution.

We can expect Spanish to play a greater role in congressional and senate campaigns as the Hispanic demographic shifts to new regions of the country and strengthens its presence in current locations. More and more politicians will become cognizant of the sleeping giant that is Hispanic voters and realize that although Latinos are largely Democrats, this party affiliation is less established and more susceptible to change than that of other portions of the Democratic coalition.

One cannot divorce the Spanish language from Latino outreach efforts although regarding them as synonymous misunderstands and misrepresents the needs of the Hispanic population. For most Latinos currently involved in the political process, Spanish plays a powerful symbolic role by demonstrating the (Anglo) candidate's understanding of and sensitivity towards the Hispanic community. The pragmatic role of Spanish, distributing political information to those who would otherwise be unable to understand it, is reserved for a smaller portion of politically active Latinos.

Conclusion

The future implications of a pragmatic use of Spanish may be quite staggering given current rates of immigration and naturalization. If Spanish speakers have access to the political process from the moment they arrive in the U.S., even before they learn the language or become citizens, there is tremendous potential for political parties to develop strong party identification in these individuals. This will serve the general good by

²⁶ Debate Chats 2000.

encouraging more members of American society to quickly become citizens and to participate once naturalized. It will also serve the party well by naturalizing an individual with an existing relationship to a particular party. The *New York Times* reports that “Mr. Bush’s strategists are already planning to build on the [existing] Spanish-language outreach program” and warn that:

If Mr. Bush wins the same percentage of minority voters in 2004 as he did last year, he would lose by three million votes... the Hispanic share needs to rise to about 40 percent.²⁷

These figures demonstrate that the stakes are high and the rewards large. As we enter into this period of the tremendous diversification of the American polity, we can expect to see Latino outreach and with it the use of the Spanish language become a permanent, expected feature of American campaign life.

²⁷ Schmitt, A14.

The 1940 Destroyer Deal with Great Britain: What Might Have Been

Marko Djuranovic
Duke University

In May 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill asked President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the loan of 40 or 50 older American destroyers. The use of the destroyers was to bridge the gap between the British Navy and the German U-boats. The real issue was not the destroyers but rather United States foreign policy. The Destroyer Deal began a chain of events that pushed the United States away from isolationism and towards the Second World War.

The Value of a Counterfactual Analysis

There is nothing new about counterfactual inference. Historians have been doing it for at least two thousand years. Counterfactuals fueled the grief of Tacitus when he pondered what would have happened if Germanicus had lived to become Emperor: "Had he been the sole arbiter of events, had he held powers and title of King, he would have outstripped Alexander in military fame as far as he surpassed him in gentleness, in self-command and in other noble qualities.

-- Introduction to Philip
Tetlock's essay
"Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World
Politics."

What makes case studies of historical events so interesting? The answer is that those who study historical events see them as important puzzles to be solved. Be it a social uprising to right the wrongs caused by fluctuating prices of cash crops, an epic battle for ultimate control of sacred territory or an election for the head position in the country's executive branch, all these events are puzzles. How did these events take place? What forces brought about these specific outcomes? Why is one interpretation of these events more appealing than another? Is there a causal mechanism that can explain what took place at this point in history? We can ask such questions about almost any historical event and then spend years in a laborious search for the answers. The conclusions we subsequently reach at least add to the growing collection of knowledge on the subject and at most produce prescriptive behaviors and profound insights into life.

But every analysis of a historical event also contains within it a certain implicit respect and awareness of an alternate reality – while time may still be an unchangeable dimension, that does not mean that it is free of speculation about that which was not. Moreover, some events in human history only make sense when viewed in the larger context of what was possible and what else could have taken place. The Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, is not so much historically significant for the consequences it generated but instead for the aftermath. Indeed, our appreciation of events past sometimes takes on true meaning only when viewed through the prism of that which did not happen. That Hitler's war machine ground to a halt and bled white in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union is an event that draws

its importance from a consideration of what the world would have looked like had the Third Reich stretched from Normandy to Novosibirsk by the end of 1942. Thus, a serious case study of a historical event gains much insight when it temporarily departs from the realm of historical fact and delves into a speculative but carefully scripted “what if?” scenario.

Delving into such a scenario allows us to add an extra layer of analysis to this inquiry and ask the following question: Is this event a nexus? A nexus is often defined as a connection, tie, or link between individuals of a group. Applying this definition to the imagery of timelines and “what if” scenarios, a nexus serves as a point in time where several timelines cross and intersect. It is a point in time where leaders make important decisions and where the slightest change in variables can have a long-lasting and tremendous impact. To visualize the point more clearly, a nexus event is the equivalent of pulling the lever that switches train tracks – this single action can send the train on two completely separate tracks.

But how can we know whether an historical event is a nexus? The answer lies in counterfactuals. By carefully changing the outcome of some happening in history and examining the available data, we can peek into alternate realities and hypothesize on what could have happened. The greater the importance of the events that could have taken place as a result of a minimal re-write of history, the greater the likelihood that we have found a nexus.

A counterfactual considering the Roosevelt Administration decision not to exchange 50 American “town class” destroyers from World War I for British bases, is one example. While it is important to consider what the 1940 Destroyer Deal accomplished and the events it set into motion, it is equally useful to consider down which track the train of consequences would have departed had the Destroyer Deal never been reached.

Still, while we may never know with utmost certainty what would have taken place had Roosevelt not completed the Destroyer Deal with Britain, it does not mean that speculation on the effects of such a change in policy is a matter for mere “parlor games.” Exploring what might have been had the Destroyer Deal not gone through allows us to evaluate the importance of this event in history and determine its far-reaching consequences. After all, not exchanging destroyers for bases would have made the Japanese think twice about the Tripartite Pact and would have brought Germany much closer to its goal of stifling British merchant shipping. At the same time this outlines the overall importance of the Destroyer Deal in keeping Britain in the war and in giving the Japanese one more reason to strengthen their ties with Germany.

In an attempt to offer such proof and better illustrate why the Destroyer Deal should rightly be labeled as a nexus event, this paper begins by offering a brief overview of the background against which the story of the Destroyer Deal is set. A narrative account of how the Destroyer Deal came about – how it went from a political and a legal impossibility to a military reality – comes next. This narrative is followed by a counterfactual that poses the question of what would have taken place had the United States not completed the destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain. Finally, the paper’s conclusion is an attempt to take a step back and offer a holistic view of how individual decisions whose importance is rather blurry and unclear at the time can interact with policy-making to produce far-reaching consequences on world-wide events.

A Turning Point in U.S. Foreign Policy

The concept of “non-belligerency” like that of “measures short of war” has no legal status. It is apparently designed to justify breaches of neutrality or acts of war, perhaps with the hope that they will not result in a state of war. With full deference, it is not easy to justify that part of the President’s message informing Congress of the destroyer-bases exchange reading: “This is not inconsistent in any sense with our state of peace.” It will be interesting to see whether “measures short of war” can long avert a state of war.

-- Edwin Borcharad analyzing
the effects of the Destroyer
Deal in October of 1940.

In mid-May 1940, the future looked bleak for Great Britain. In the first two weeks of May alone, the Royal Air Force lost more than half of the planes it had stationed in France and faced serious shortages of anti-aircraft defenses. The British Expeditionary Force in France was on the retreat as the Germans broke through the Allied front at Sedan. The German armored units that were pouring through this gap and the impending fall of France were just two of the serious problems facing British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Britain desperately needed destroyers, a key component of the country’s U-boat defense strategy, to confront the force of the Germans. Thus, facing a continental foe that now rivaled Napoleon in territorial gains and surpassed him in zeal, Churchill could do little but offer his countrymen blood, sweat, tears and take a long, hopeful glance across the Atlantic. A sleeping behemoth lay there, whose prowess the world knew well. In World War I, America’s entry into the war tipped the scales in favor of Britain and her allies. Could Uncle Sam provide a similar type of assistance once again?

On May 15, 1940, Churchill sent a telegram to Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States. In this telegram, among other items necessary for sustaining the war effort, Churchill asked for a “loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war.” On surface, the request may appear to be a simple question of governmental procedure; in reality, this telegram set in motion a chain of events that half a century later appears to have been a turning point in American foreign policy. Shortly after Prime Minister Churchill made his request, Roosevelt informed him that such a move would encounter serious opposition in the Congress and that it would run contrary to America’s national interest. Yet a little less than four months later, the destroyers were on their way to Britain with congressional support; the United States had taken a dramatic step away from isolationism and toward greater involvement in the Second World War.

Reasons for Britain’s Shortage of Destroyers

Mr. Churchill noted that this mighty battleship [H.M.S. Nelson] was unescorted by destroyers: “I thought that you never went to sea without at least two [destroyers], even for a single battleship,” he said. “Of course that is what we would like,” replied Admiral Sir Charles Forbes. “But we haven’t got the destroyers to carry out any such rule.”

-- Mr. Churchill's visit of the
Home Fleet on the first night of
WWII.

The reasons for Britain's shortage of destroyers were many, but the majority of the blame rested on the shoulders of officials in charge of Britain's naval building program in the late 1930s. They put this type of ship at the bottom of their priority list, choosing instead to focus on larger ships that took longer to construct. As late as 1938 there were still no appropriations for building any additional destroyers in the naval building program. When the threat of war became evident, British policy planners realized that they had failed to take into account the increasing technological complexity of destroyers and the limitations these complexities put on construction yards.¹ Unfortunately, these oversights could not be fixed immediately. Although the British shipyards started building destroyers in 1939, key government officials realized that these ships would not be available for duty until the middle of 1941.² Thus, Britain entered World War II in September of 1939 with only 201 destroyers; at the end of World War I it had 433. Losses that were incurred later during the campaigns in Scandinavia and the evacuation at Dunkirk made the need for destroyers even more pressing.³

The beginning of World War II showed British officials that they had gravely misjudged the nature of the Nazi threat. But how did this happen? It appears that British officials simply miscalculated. Since Germany still did not have a U-boat fleet or even a robust U-boat construction program as late as 1935, the British Admiralty believed that its greatest threat would come from surface raiders, not U-boats. They primarily figured that the effectiveness of already existing World War I anti-submarine defenses would force Hitler to construct a naval force composed primarily of surface ships. A new technological development, an underwater listening device known as the Asdic, also led British officials to believe that the U-boat threat could be easily eliminated.⁴ "The submarine should never again be able to present us with the problem we were faced with in 1917 – there will be losses, but nothing to affect the scale of events," read a report delivered by the Royal Naval Staff to the Shipping Defense Advisory Committee in 1937. As a result, Britain focused its construction program on heavier ships, and left behind the idea of replenishing its ability to implement the convoy system. But this decision proved to be costly as soon as the war started because there was not much use in being able to detect a submarine if one lacked the necessary firepower and escort fleet to carry out and sustain a depth charge attack. Consequently, the Asdic proved to be less useful than predicted.

In May 1940, the British Admiralty found itself in a real bind upon realizing that U-boats would pose an increasingly greater threat to British shipping as its destroyer fleet diminished. This issue became especially important with Germany's acquisition of important ports after the fall of France. These ports enabled U-boats to refuel in the region with

Author: Marko Djuranovic, md5@duke.edu

¹ Philip Goodhart, *Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo- American Alliance* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), 6.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 34-37.

⁴ Ibid., 8.

relative ease, increasing the number of missions a U-boat could complete.⁵ Cognizant of this situation, and aware that the German U-boat operations had effectively closed off shipping in the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, Churchill made the obtaining of between 40 and 50 “town class” destroyers from the United States a top priority.⁶

Domestic Situation

England needs destroyer ships to replace those that have been damaged or sunk. The United States has some destroyers which were built during the last World War and are now being put back in active service. Do you think we should sell some of these ships to England?

Response:

Yes: 60%

No: 40%

-- Mid-August 1940 Gallup
poll

In 1940, Roosevelt, believing he was the perfect man for the job, ran for an unprecedented third term.⁷ However, the impact of the 1940 presidential election upon the Destroyer Deal was not particularly significant. The biggest obstacle in this matter could have turned out to be Roosevelt’s challenger. Yet when the Republican Party announced Wendell Willkie as its presidential candidate, insiders within Roosevelt’s administration agreed that the matter could not have worked out better for the purposes of aiding Britain.

Willkie was a political outsider and a vibrant, fresh alternative to the already famous Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. More importantly, Willkie was an ardent internationalist who in June of 1940 boldly proclaimed that England and France were the first line of defense for the United States against Hitler.⁸ Had Senator Taft been nominated to challenge Roosevelt, isolationism would have been touted in greater detail and with greater frequency, which would have certainly made sending help to Britain a difficult matter. But the fact that Willkie won the nomination shifted the debate toward how each candidate would respond to the coming crisis. The primary issue was not whether aid should be given to Britain but to what extent this should be done. In this manner, Willkie’s nomination moved many isolationist ideas away from the center of discussion.

Public opinion seemed to be leaning in that direction during the middle of 1940. Various polls at the time reported that between 60% and 80% of Americans favored the Allies. In a poll conducted in April of 1940 two-thirds of those interviewed said they would vote for a presidential candidate who offered all aid to Britain except troops, as opposed to a candidate who refused to offer any help whatsoever.⁹ Also, 81% of those interviewed said that they would favor the U.S. buying British, French and Dutch possessions if the Allies needed more money to sustain the war effort.¹⁰

⁵ Kevin Smith, *Conflict over Convoys: Anglo- American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War* (New York: Press Syndicate of University of Cambridge, 1996), 30.

⁶ Kathleen Burk, “American Foreign Economic Policy and Lend-Lease” in *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance*, ed. Ann Lane (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 49-51.

⁷ Robert Shogan, *Hard Bargain: How FDR Twisted Churchill’s Arm, Evaded the Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency* (New York: Scribner Press, 1995), 95-96.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 110; Goodhart, 107.

⁹ George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Volume 1, 1935- 1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), 215, 222.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 228.

However, this favoring of the Allies was to a great extent counter-balanced by a strong isolationist stance that was still present in American society. A September 1939 Roper poll reported that 29.9% of Americans wanted to have nothing to do with any warring country, not even trade on a cash-and-carry basis.¹¹ An April 28, 1940 Gallup Poll revealed that while 93% of Americans felt like Germany was not justified in invading Norway, an even greater percentage, 96%, insisted that the United States not enter into a war with Germany.¹² Coupled with all this was a general fear for America's safety, as expressed in a May poll which revealed that 85% of the nation thought the American armed forces were not strong enough to defend the United States from attack by any foreign nation.¹³

These attitudes had also been exhibited in the political arena several years prior to 1940. In 1937, Indiana Congressman Louis Ludlow actually proposed a Constitutional amendment that would stop Congress from declaring war unless American territory was invaded and a national referendum on the issue determined the country's wishes. Even after considerable opposition to this idea from the White House, Congressman Ludlow's proposal was only narrowly defeated in a 209 to 188 vote.¹⁴

The nation appeared to be split on the issue as shown by this September 1940 Gallup poll: which of these two things do you think is the most important for the United States to try to do – to keep out of war ourselves or to help England win, even at risk of getting into the war? Forty-eight percent said to “keep out” while 52% said, “help England.”¹⁵ A politician wanting to effect change in foreign policy had to move cautiously.

Congress Will Not Support Britain's Request For Ships

For God's sake, don't send us any more controversial legislation...

-- Rep. Martin Dies (D)
pleading to President Roosevelt
in early 1940.

June 10, 1940, the day when Italy declared war on the Allies, was an opportunity for Roosevelt to announce a new thread of his foreign policy, one that greatly favored Britain. Roosevelt promptly responded to the Axis attack in a speech with the following words:

We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and at the same time we will harness and speed up the use of these resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense.¹⁶

The statement was received warmly on the other side of the Atlantic the next day. But to Churchill's disappointment, Roosevelt's words were not followed by the delivery of the destroyers. If anything, the issue of selling the destroyers to Britain had reached a standstill

¹¹ Goodhart, 16; Gallup, *The Gallup Poll*, 243.

¹² Gallup, 220.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁴ Goodhart, 18, 22-23.

¹⁵ Gallup, 243.

¹⁶ Goodhart, 68.

by then. Although there was some discussion of the issue, whichever way the dice fell it appeared that the British were not going to receive the destroyers. Five days earlier on June 5, Roosevelt told Harold Ickes, his Secretary of the Interior, that the obsolete destroyers would not only require an act of Congress to sell but that they would also be of little, if any, use since the British situation was so desperate. On the other hand, Arthur Purvis, director of the British Purchasing Mission in Washington D.C., had also been told on two separate occasions in late May that the destroyers were not only needed for America's defense, but that the administration had not been particularly impressed with the gravity of British naval losses.¹⁷ Such conflicting reports understandably caused Churchill to throw his arms up in desperation and proclaim to Ambassador Lothian: "Up 'till April they were so sure the Allies would win that they did not think help necessary. Now they are so sure we shall lose that they do not think it possible."¹⁸

Despite all this surface confusion on the matter the real reason why Roosevelt was so cautious about handing over the destroyers to Britain had much to do with his keen political mind. Roosevelt knew that he could not push the Destroyer Deal through Congress. To hand over these destroyers – and it should be noted that many Americans viewed the Navy's ships as an integral part of the nation's front line of defense – meant more than just getting rid of old equipment. It essentially meant greatly extending America's front wall of defense to encompass the British Isles and committing almost completely to the Allied cause. Even though the public supported the Allies, a third of the Congress, as well as a great percentage of the American people, had serious reservations about further involvement in the war. Roosevelt clearly saw that the sale of destroyers would encounter some unpleasant obstacles and he was not going to take this opposition lightly; as a member of President Woodrow Wilson's administration in World War I, Roosevelt personally witnessed how a dedicated core of opposed senators could wreck a president's foreign policy.¹⁹ Roosevelt also knew that he needed no such enemies and he could see that Massachusetts Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Committee, was capable of re-enacting the role of Henry Cabot Lodge.²⁰

Moreover, Roosevelt had already strained his relationship with Congress in the years prior to 1940 with his vigorous campaigns to push through New Deal legislation targeted at curing the depression. Even though some members of Roosevelt's network of administrators believed there was congressional support in this matter, the polls and surveys told a different story. In early August, twenty-three senators (twelve of them Democrats) opposed the sale of destroyers to Britain; seven were "probably in favor" of the deal while 63 senators classified themselves as "undecided" on the issue.²¹ Even if the president had been able to win over a great majority of the undecided senators, he still would have faced the strong isolationist opposition who could hopelessly drag out the process by use of filibuster. Additionally, there was great dissent within the president's own party. Despite being wined and dined for an entire day and taken for a cruise on the presidential yacht, Chairman of the Senate Naval

¹⁷ Goodhart, 72.

¹⁸ Winston Churchill, *Second World War: The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 228.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Even though several Republican senators, including Willkie's running mate Charles McNary, expressed interest in seeing the destroyers sold to Britain they still could not do so due to their past voting records, which were distinctly isolationist.

²¹ Shogan, 188-189.

Affairs Committee David Walsh continued to tell Roosevelt, as late in the process as August 19th that “it would be a great and grave mistake” to sell the destroyers to the British. He claimed the public would perceive it as pursuing policies that would eventually lead the nation to war. Senator Gerald Nye of the isolationist camp held a similar view. He thought that sending ships to Britain would be a belligerent act that would not only weaken the country’s defenses but also make her a party to the war.²² Overall, there was insufficient congressional support to make the deal work and little could be done to change it.

Additionally, as great as Churchill might have viewed his plight for the destroyers, in June of 1940 the United States was more concerned with keeping France in the war or dealing with its collapse. One of the issues that was resolved just days before the signing of the armistice between France and Germany, were contracts for weapons production and delivery between the French and Americans. The transfer of contracts was completed on time, but had this not been done the quisling regime in France would have had legal rights to obtain war resources from the United States. Still, an even larger issue loomed – that of the French fleet. Until the terms of the armistice were announced, there were great concerns within Washington of how the balance of power would shift if Hitler obtained the fourth largest Navy in the world as a result of his invasion of France.²³ Thus, it would have been extraordinarily difficult to convince Congress to give up 50 destroyers at a time when the extent of Hitler’s naval power had yet to be ascertained.²⁴

Other issues concerned Roosevelt as well. There was the question of whether any transfer of weapons in time of impending war could be legally accomplished.²⁵ During the June 21st debates in the Congress about expediting a naval shipbuilding program, Senator David Walsh used the opportunity to express his displeasure with attempts to sell destroyers to Britain. But more importantly, Senator Walsh read out a part of the law that forbade the sale of weapons to a belligerent nation.

During a war in which the United States is a neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdiction of the United States any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war... with any intent or under any agreement or contract, written or oral, that such vessel shall be delivered to a belligerent nation, or to an agent, officer, or citizen of such nation, or with reasonable cause to believe that the said vessel shall or will be employed in the service of any such belligerent nation after its departure from the jurisdiction of the United States.²⁶

Senator Walsh then proposed an amendment that would require the Chief of Staff of the Army to certify that material sold to other nations is “not essential to the defense of the

²² Shogan, 194, 231.

²³ Eleanor M. Gates, *End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance, 1939-40* (Los Angeles: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1981). The terms of the armistice, however, specified that the French fleet was not to be used for warmaking, but would simply remain in ports.

²⁴ The fleet issue was resolved decisively, if a bit brutally, by British admirals who did not want to take any chances – they ordered a surprise attack that crippled the French fleet while most of it was still docked.

²⁵ Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas eds., *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1975).

²⁶ Goodhart, 90-91.

United States.”²⁷ At a time when Hitler’s armies were marching across Europe, it was difficult for any branch of the government to label armaments or ships as “surplus” and release them for sale to other countries. Declaring war material surplus was also a difficult decision if one recalls the poll, which revealed that 85% of Americans thought their country, was not safe from an outside attack.²⁸

Also, since Britain looked to be losing the war, the issue of what would happen to the British fleet became an important one. American officials wanted to receive assurances that if the British Empire collapsed its navy would not fall into the hands of Hitler. But this was a tricky issue because Churchill felt that any such declaration would have a devastating effect on morale.²⁹ “The nation would not tolerate any discussion of what we should do if our island were overrun. Such a discussion, perhaps on the eve of an invasion, would be injurious to public morale, now so high,” Churchill insisted.³⁰

With so many obstacles in the way, transferring destroyers to Britain appeared to be a lost cause. Therefore, the only thing the American president could do was reiterate to Churchill his stance from the original May 16 reply: “A step of that kind [transfer of destroyers] could not be taken except with the specific authorization of the Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.”³¹

But What If Congress Could Be Bypassed?

No Legal Bar Seen to Transfer of Destroyers: Ample Authority for Sale of Over-Age Naval Vessels to Great Britain Exists in Present Laws, According to Opinion by Leading Lawyers.
-- August 11, 1940 *Times*
headline

The issue that finally broke the stalemate and allowed the destroyer transfer to take place was of course the exchange of military bases for the ships. This was not an entirely new proposal; a rough form of this idea was raised as far back as May 24, 1940 when Lord Lothian suggested that Britain make a formal offer of the use of landing grounds and facilities in Bermuda and Newfoundland.³² Additionally, many American columnists and journalists had previously written about the possibility of obtaining some military bases in exchange for resources, usually putting forth the idea that Allies could pay their WWI debts by giving America strategic bases.

But how did Roosevelt and his administration get around the fact the United States needed these destroyers and there was a law against giving them away? The solution has to be credited to a brilliant lawyer and unsung hero of the Destroyer Deal, Ben Cohen. Although his initial proposal differed greatly from the final agreement, Cohen was the one who found the loophole in existing neutrality laws and preserved the ray of hope for the

²⁷ Shogan, 181.

²⁸ Gallup, 225.

²⁹ Loewenheim, 104-5; Churchill, 405.

³⁰ Joseph P. Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941: The Partnership That Saved the West* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976).

³¹ Loewenheim, 95

³² Woodward, 359-361; Goodhart, 145.

British. With some work and legal maneuvering that loophole was eventually expanded to accommodate an entire fleet of destroyers. On July 19 Cohen submitted a memorandum to Roosevelt on top of which he wrote:

I am sending you a memorandum which I have prepared which I think shows that there really is no legal barrier... which would stand in the way of the release of our old destroyers from our naval service and their sale to the British – if their release for such purpose would, as at least some naval authorities believe, strengthen rather than weaken the defense position of the United States.³³

Cohen's memo argued that a broader interpretation of neutrality laws would allow for actions that were in the national interest. Since giving Britain the destroyers would increase America's capability to defend itself, the Destroyer Deal was in the national interest.³⁴ In this way, Cohen laid the groundwork for the deal. But what happened next is a tale on par with the most famous of "what if" scenarios.

Cohen's memo was first slid aside. Roosevelt read it, but decided that its proposal was too convoluted and unworkable. He did, however, pass it down the line marked as "worth reading." And most importantly Cohen's closing words in the memo echoed the sentiment of Roosevelt and his aides. Cohen wrote:

There is no reason for us to put a strained or unnecessary interpretation on our own statutes contrary to our own national interests. There is no reason to extend the rules of international laws beyond the limits generally accepted by other nations to the detriment of our own country.³⁵

But the entire idea would have still been forgotten and scrapped had Cohen not persisted. He enlisted the help of an old mentor, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, who had a history of offering advice to members of the executive branch. Frankfurter told him that the way to capture Roosevelt's attention was to get some well-respected lawyers to approve the measure and vouch for its legal reasoning. Cohen did just that. He paired up with Dean Acheson and over three sleepless nights they hammered out a tight and polished legal argument ready for presentation.³⁶ Interestingly, Acheson and Cohen had no problem finding prominent lawyers of similar inclination. Many, however, were unable to sign on to the draft because of their ties with the Roosevelt administration.³⁷ In the end, Cohen and Acheson settled on three individuals: Charles C. Burlingham, a respected member of the New York Bar; Acheson's prominent Washington D.C. law partner George Rublee; and Thomas D. Thatcher, a former U.S. Judge and Solicitor General of the United States.

³³ Goodhart, 152.

³⁴ Shogan, 181.

³⁵ Goodhart, 161.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 162-163; Shogan, 184,187-188.

³⁷ Among these were John Foster Dulles and Frank Polk and Cohen himself whose signature did not appear in print.

Together the men wrote a letter outlining their proposal to *The New York Times*. The editor of the *Times*, Charles Merz, was an undergraduate friend of Dean Acheson from days when they both attended Yale. He ran the letter in greater length than usual in the editorial section of the Sunday, August 11 edition. The letter also received its own headline – three columns wide – and took up half the page. The basic thesis of the letter was:

In the present state of the world, the maintenance of British sea power is of inestimable advantage to us in terms of our own national defense.... there can be no question that there is the highest military and naval authority in support of the view that the release of at least fifty of our over-age destroyers for sale to Great Britain is not only compatible with, but is vitally important to, the safeguarding of our own national defense. If Britain is able to resist German aggression and maintain her sea power, the danger of German aggression being directed against us in the immediate future is enormously reduced.³⁸

Attorney Gen. Robert Jackson, who had been vacationing at that time, noticed the letter. Jackson, who saw himself as the administration's attorney, gladly took up the issue and soon worked out a thorough explanation of how the destroyers could be sold without a need to consult with Congress. Roosevelt called a meeting on the afternoon of Tuesday, August 13, with one agenda item: getting destroyers to Britain.³⁹ For the first time in the entire process top officials in Roosevelt's administration seriously considered bypassing Congress and letting the destroyers steam away to Britain without congressional approval.

An Empire and a Republic Strike a Deal

"But Empires just don't bargain," said Churchill.

"Well," countered Att. Gen. Robert Jackson, "Republics do."

"The trouble is, I have an Attorney General and he says I have got to bargain," said Roosevelt, to which Churchill responded with:

"Maybe you ought to trade these destroyers for a new Attorney General."

With the Royal Air Force's success in the skies over Britain it appeared to Roosevelt that the island nation might actually stick through the war. Every day that passed and every cable that Churchill sent made the destroyers all the more important and increased the support for the idea of making the sale.⁴⁰ Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes told Roosevelt:

It seems to me that we Americans are like the householder who refuses to lend or sell his fire extinguisher to help put out the fire in the house that is next door, although that house is all ablaze and the wind is blowing in our direction.⁴¹

³⁸ *The New York Times*, 11 August 1940, E8.

³⁹ Shogan, 191. Secretary Stimson, Sumner Welles, Henry Morgenthau and Frank Knox were in attendance.

⁴⁰ Loewenheim, 107.

⁴¹ Goodhart, 153.

Because Cohen's letter mentioned no exchanges for bases, the final Destroyer Deal was an amalgamation of two different approaches. Since early August, Roosevelt had been negotiating with the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, about what the United States might get in exchange for the destroyers. Prior to the publishing of the letter in the *Times*, Roosevelt had been exploring the option of attempting to push the deal through Congress. Roosevelt felt that the only way to avoid getting bogged down in Congress was to feed the House and the Senate "molasses" – concessions from the British which would allow the President to argue that the nation's security would not be weakened by giving up the destroyers. This, however, was no easy going because Roosevelt wanted two things: first, assurance by the Prime Minister that the British fleet would not be turned over to Germany if Britain lost the war; second, use of British bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana.⁴² However, the British government was unprepared to offer the U.S. its requests. Not only were the British unwilling to give up some of the aforementioned bases, Churchill was also unwilling to comment on the status of the British fleet – he thought it would negatively impact morale.⁴³

Throughout the process, a fundamental misunderstanding about the issues at hand remained. Jackson attempted to explain to Churchill that the strongest interpretation of the law was the one that looked at America's defense as a whole so that the acquisition of the bases was of greater military worth than the fifty destroyers. Yet Churchill, bothered by this vast difference in value, kept insisting that he be allowed to make a specific and finite gift of military bases to the United States. After that gift, the United States would generously give Britain fifty of its old destroyers and the whole matter would be an unrelated exchange of gifts.⁴⁴ But Jackson could not accept this offer. The law refused to allow the President to simply give away government property. As a result, for the next few weeks the whole deal appeared once more like it would not go through.

Thankfully, Secretary of State Hull's Solicitor General Green Hackworth came up with a compromise: a part of the deal would be designated as a gift while another part would be considered as an exchange.⁴⁵ This solution appealed to both parties so that when the Destroyer Deal was finally hammered out on September 2 and 3, its basic provisions were:

- The United States acquired rights to British bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda. These were gifts given with no strings attached by the British in light of the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain.
- The lease of bases in Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British Guyana was given to the United States in exchange for fifty destroyers that had seen service during World War I.
- The lease of military bases was for 99 years.⁴⁶

⁴² Loewenheim, 108-109; Warren F. Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill and the Second World War* (New York: William Morrow and Company Inc., 1997).

⁴³ Woodward, 335.

⁴⁴ Shogan, 222.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 223-224.

⁴⁶ *Congressional Digest* 20 (January 1941):15; *American Journal of International Law* 34 (October 1940): 729.

The president explained the details of the agreement's legality in full in his message to Congress a day later. Instead of decreasing the nation's defensive capabilities, the Destroyer Deal actually increased them by obtaining a key set of strategic bases and was therefore legal.⁴⁷

Upon its arrival, the Prime Minister was ecstatic to hear the news. In his speech to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill showed not only how happy he was to receive the destroyers, but he also explained why this was such an important decision. His words were simple: "I have no doubt that Herr Hitler will not like this transference of destroyers, and I have no doubt that he will pay the United States out, if he ever gets a chance."⁴⁸

Fait Accompli

Say, ain't you the Commander-in-Chief? If you are and you own fifty muzzle-loadin' rifles of the Civil War period, you would be a chump if you declined to exchange them for seven modern machine guns – wouldn't you?

-- President Roosevelt's mythical conversation with a neighbor, intended to explain the Destroyer Deal to the lay public.

The only thing now left to do was sell the issue to the American public, and here the British benefited from some positive developments that had occurred within the United States since June. As the German forces continued to overrun Europe, a multitude of non-governmental organizations sprang up with a mission of aiding the Allied war effort. The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies was a key leader, led by the unmistakably Midwestern William Allen White. White's campaigning strategies proved very effective and substantial amounts of money in support of his cause were donated.⁴⁹ White advocated that America's national interest was in helping Britain any way it could. Since his meeting with Roosevelt in late June, White urged the American people to write to their Members of Congress and push for the selling of over-age destroyers to Britain.⁵⁰ A pamphlet distributed by White's organization read:

The frontier of [US'] national interest is now on the Somme. Therefore all disposable air, naval, military and material resources of the United States should be made available at once to help maintain our common front.⁵¹

With the help of the Century Group – a gathering of influential businessmen who believed that the solution could be reached by tying the Destroyer Deal with military bases – White convinced retired General John "Black Jack" Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Force in WWI, and a host of other notables to offer their own public support

⁴⁷ *American Journal of International Law*, 728-736.

⁴⁸ Goodhart, 175.

⁴⁹ Lise Namikas, "The Committee to Defend America and the Debate Between Internationalists and Interventionists, 1939-1941," *The Historian* 61 (1999): 843.

⁵⁰ Goodhart, 110-112.

⁵¹ The isolationists had their own special interest groups as well but these groups were not as well organized.

for the measure. Finally, when Roosevelt spoke to the press on the issue, he compared the deal to the Louisiana Purchase and framed it in truly colorful terms quoted at the beginning of this section.⁵² Roosevelt's opponent Wendell Willkie, who could only offer the following words, perhaps best summed up the administration's success:

The country will undoubtedly approve the program... it is regrettable, however, that the President did not deem it necessary in connection with this proposal to secure the approval of Congress or permit public discussion prior to adoption.⁵³

Looking back on the destroyers-for-bases exchange sixty-one years later we can see with great clarity what Willkie could only conjecture in 1940 – that the acquisition of the destroyers was not only essential for Britain's survival but also an important change in America's foreign policy. The Destroyer Deal was an important portent of America's increasingly interventionist approach to world affairs.

Antecedent Event and its Plausibility

Trying to justify the transfer of destroyers to Britain, when everyone believed this was prohibited by law, Cohen relied on hairsplitting technicalities and improvable assertions about national defense. His memorandum stretched the law, creating a loophole wide enough for the warships to steam through on their way to join the Royal Navy.

-- Author Robert Shogan on
Cohen

What might have been without the Destroyer Deal? How would the erasure of this event from the annals of history have affected the real timeline? To address this question, this section will be divided into two parts. The first will evaluate the overall plausibility of the proposed alteration to the original timeline of history – heretofore referred to as the antecedent event – while the second part will consider how not giving Britain the destroyers it claimed to need so desperately would have affected the world. Mainly, Britain's ability to defend itself would have been seriously compromised and the Tripartite Pact might not have come to fruition – raising the question of whether withholding the destroyers from Britain would have averted the infamous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Before discussing the consequences which might stem from not selling destroyers to Britain in 1940 it is first important to realize that while every historical event lends itself to an infinite number of alternate outcomes, only a handful of those are viable and enlightening choices. Therefore, it is first necessary to discuss the plausibility of this alternate reality. Simply put, there were numerous ways in which the Destroyer Deal could have broken down. As early as two weeks before the final destroyers were exchanged for the bases, Roosevelt was convinced that the deal could not be completed. Alternatively, the whole issue of satisfying Congress by feeding it “molasses” greatly annoyed Churchill and he later commented:

⁵² Goodhart, 180-185.

⁵³ *New York Times*, 4 September 1940, sec. 1, p. 3.

For the sake of giving the President what he calls ‘molasses’ for a Congress whose attitude was in any case uncertain, we were now for the sole sake of getting a number of second-hand destroyers to barter away our freedom of action in regard to the future of the fleet.⁵⁴

Recalling the earlier explanation of Roosevelt’s difficulties with Congress and its unwillingness to get involved in Britain’s affairs, it is quite possible that negotiations about destroyers could have stalled over the specifics of “molasses.”

Still, perhaps the most plausible point for the antecedent is the legal hair-splitting and re-interpretation that allowed the Destroyer Deal to go through in the first place.⁵⁵ Both key ideas – Hackworth’s to offer fifty WWI destroyers for British bases on a quid pro quo basis and Cohen’s memo to bypass Congress – were quite novel and products of brilliant minds. Even Churchill later admitted that neither he nor anyone else in his administration had considered such an exchange.⁵⁶ Although many individuals should rightly take credit for striking the bargain, the entire process rested on Cohen’s July 19 memorandum. Although the memo was ruled untenable because Roosevelt believed the proposal’s legal foundations were shaky and the storm it would raise by bypassing Congress would not be worth it, it is safe to say that Cohen’s legal argument was the precursor to the final agreement. Without it, there would have never been a Destroyer Deal.⁵⁷

The implications of this link are tremendous. Had Roosevelt’s secretary simply misplaced the memo, it is quite conceivable that Cohen’s legal reasoning would not have been replicated. Hackworth traversed that same crooked path through neutrality laws in early August and found no plausible legal argument for bypassing Congress.⁵⁸ After that point in time even the *Times* letter would have had little effect because Roosevelt would have focused negotiations on extracting greater concessions from the British for the purpose of pleasing Congress.

But this is just one possibility and there are many others. If the editor of the *Times* had not been so sympathetic to Acheson’s cause, if Cohen had not been so persistent in his search for legal companions to accept his argument,⁵⁹ if Attorney General Robert Jackson held different views about his role in the administration,⁶⁰ if Hackworth had not devised a way to split the Destroyer Deal into two parts, if Churchill had decided to make no announcement about the state of the British fleet, or if he had refused to give the U.S. the

⁵⁴ Shogan, 203; Churchill, 414.

⁵⁵ The legal argument went something like this: Although the original Walsh amendment prohibited the sale of ships that were deemed necessary for the national defense without congressional approval, the Chief of Navy had to adopt a broader view of what constituted national defense. Thus, Cohen argued, exchanging these old destroyers for British bases actually increased America’s defensive capability and was thus within the president’s authority.

⁵⁶ This is not entirely true. There had been some consideration of the matter prior to the beginning of the war but the notion of selling off parts of the Empire was classified as outside the realm of politics. Loewenheim, 106; Woodward, 376.

⁵⁷ Shogan, 182-183.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ There were many respected lawyers who thought that Cohen’s argument did not hold water.

⁶⁰ Another interesting note exists here. Jackson was a good friend of Acheson’s so that when Acheson had to interrupt Jackson’s vacation to explain the *Times* letter, Jackson was patient and attentive for the sake of friendship.

bases it wanted – any of these events would have forced Roosevelt to either give up on the destroyers transfer altogether or try to push the deal through an unfriendly Congress where there were not enough votes to support the measure. Keeping in mind Roosevelt’s political wisdom and prudence, it is safe to say that this American president would not have made a futile attempt to get congressional support – which means that the Destroyer Deal would have died a silent death in a pile of memos sitting on Roosevelt’s secretary’s desk.

Antecedent Consequences

In September 1940 [Roosevelt] draws still nearer to the war. He turns over to the British fleet fifty destroyers of the American Navy in return for...several British bases in North and South America.

-- Excerpt from Hitler’s
declaration of war on the
United States.

Supposing that the Destroyer Deal was never completed, what effect would this alteration have on other historical events?⁶¹ Although many consequences could be spun from this one change in the fabric of time, this part of the paper will focus on two primary ones. First, not having the destroyers would have greatly hurt Britain’s chances of enduring the war. Second, not selling the destroyers to Britain would have re-affirmed America’s neutral stance in world affairs and thus brought into question Japan’s need for the Tripartite Pact, possibly even delaying the Pearl Harbor attack.

When the destroyers finally reached the island nation, it first appeared that Britain’s need for these ships was not as grave as Churchill had made it seem. The British were slow in incorporating them into the main portions of their fleet and, additionally, Churchill himself admitted that he may have been “painting the picture in rather vivid colors.”⁶² The destroyers were also not the greatest of ships when it came to seaworthiness – one American officer supposedly said that the ships’ hulls were barely thick enough to keep out the water and small fish. The ships also had trouble turning, maneuvering in the high seas and generally spent a large portion of their time in dock, under repair.⁶³ The following incident describes the situation adequately:

Within forty-eight hours of the handover the difficulty of maneuvering these vessels in close quarters was clearly demonstrated when the new H.M.S. Chesterfield⁶⁴ rammed the Churchill’s stern, withdrew apologetically, and then rammed her again. The damage suffered by both vessels was too extensive to allow them to leave for Great Britain with the remaining destroyers.... At St. John’s, Newfoundland, the H.M.S. Cameron had to turn back with generator

⁶¹ This paper will address only the immediate consequences (up to December of 1941) because as one moves further away from the antecedent event the ability to predict decreases exponentially.

⁶² Shogan, 218-222.

⁶³ Shogan, 248-252.

⁶⁴ The Royal Navy renamed the American destroyers which had previously held names of American towns, from which their name “town class” destroyer stemmed.

trouble... [while] H.M.S. Hamilton and H.M.S. Georgetown collided with each other while preparing to refuel.⁶⁵

However, the value of these ships was still immense. In June of 1941 the British Navy had around 200 destroyers fit for duty – of those, thirty-nine were American “town class” destroyers. These ships also accounted for five of the twenty-seven submarines sunk by surface ships during the war. Additionally, even if they were the lowest class of destroyers that sailed under the Royal Navy’s flag, these destroyers provided an important deterrent to potential attacks.⁶⁶ For the enemy to see an escort fleet composed of three destroyers instead of one is a psychological effect that cannot be measured in sunken tonnage. As Churchill wrote to Roosevelt in March of 1941:

On March 8th the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau approached one of our convoys north of the Cape de Verde Island but on seeing our battleship’s escort retreated.⁶⁷

In fact throughout 1941, Goodhart estimates that between a fifth and a quarter of the escorts available in the Battle of the Atlantic were “town class” destroyers traded to Britain for military bases. Thus had the overall number of available destroyers been reduced by 20 percent, which is what not implementing the Destroyer Deal would have essentially done, the small margin of success that separated British survival from a complete failure in the seas and domination by the German U-boats could have easily disappeared.⁶⁸ There was also the additional intangible effect of the deal – it gave the British greater cause to believe in their chances of getting through the war. America’s willingness to help its linguistic ally in a time of need invigorated the citizens, because even though the U.S. did not want to get involved in the war, Roosevelt seemed happy to provide the British with some war materials.⁶⁹

In the political realm, the effect was opposite. While many domestic sources pretended that the destroyers were not a big deal or a marked change of direction in U.S. foreign policy, a careful analysis reveals that it was. Roosevelt’s critics recognized this fact in 1940. While *The New York Daily News* warned that the “US has one foot in the war and the other on a banana peel,” the *Post Dispatch* clearly predicted the shedding of blood of millions of Americans. “The sale of Navy’s ships to a nation at war would be an action of war. If we want to get into war, the destroyers offer as good a way as any of accomplishing the purpose,” Col. Robert McCormick wrote in the August 6 issue of the *Chicago Tribune*.⁷⁰ Churchill recognized this fact too, but saw it in a different light; he told his War Cabinet that,

⁶⁵ Goodhart, 196-197; Shogan, 252-253.

⁶⁶ Smith 31-32; David Shears, “Hitler’s D-Day,” *No End Save Victory*, ed. by Robert Crowley. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2001).

⁶⁷ Loewenheim, 135.

⁶⁸ James William Morley, *The Final Confrontation: Japan’s Negotiations with the United States, 1941*. Trans. David A. Titus. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).; Goodhart, 194-195. In October of 1940 alone Britain lost 103 ships.

⁶⁹ Kimball, 57; Burk, 49.

⁷⁰ Shogan, 244.

“the first step in constituting an Anglo-Saxon block or indeed a decisive point in history had been taken.”⁷¹

The German Foreign Office did its best to play down the importance of the deal and issued the following statement shortly after the deal was completed: “Germany takes note of the fact that Great Britain has sold out valuable areas of its empire to the United States for fifty old destroyers.”⁷² Later in the war, Hitler’s declaration of war cited the Destroyer Deal as a clear breach of neutrality.⁷³ Neither Germany nor Italy needed reminding of what America’s involvement in the war meant. Hitler remembered quite vividly that America’s might helped turn the tide in World War I and forced an armistice.

While not consummating the Destroyer Deal would have done little to speed up Operation Sea Lion, Germany’s plans for an invasion of the British Isles, it would have had other important impacts.⁷⁴ On the other hand, not signing the Destroyer Deal most likely would have put on hold the development and signing of the Tripartite Pact.⁷⁵ Seeing that the British were not going to be subdued as easily as they had predicted and witnessing America’s increased involvement with the Destroyer Deal, Berlin officials resumed their talks with Japan about a possible alliance. Hitler’s idea was to force the issue of a two-front war upon the United States and thereby discourage it from getting further involved on the European front.⁷⁶ Berlin officials believed that what kept Britain in war were two things: American material aid and a belief that this aid would increase with time. Thus, Hitler believed if the United States could be prevented from increasing its involvement with Britain, Churchill would soon be forced to sue for peace.⁷⁷ The way to do this was to create concern in America about the Japanese fleet.

The German drive toward incorporating Japan into the existing Rome-Berlin alliance was accompanied by a Japanese desire to take advantage of a favorable political situation. While Britain was still strong – and growing stronger with American help – Japan could obtain territorial guarantees from Hitler that she would essentially have a free hand in Southeast Asia.⁷⁸ The Japanese military planned to pounce on British and French colonial possessions once the countries had become too weak to protect them. But since Britain seemed to hold out longer than expected and was strengthened even further by American aid, the Japanese began to worry that they may have to unite with Germany and Italy in order to guarantee their colonial possessions against the U.S. and Britain.⁷⁹ After the Destroyer Deal was announced, Japanese leaders also began to worry that the United States and Britain may complete another trade for warships – but this time for bases in the Pacific:⁸⁰

⁷¹ Alistair Horne. “If Hitler hadn’t” *National Review* 43 (December 1991): 36.; Shogan, 253.

⁷² Goodhart, 198.

⁷³ Nicholas Henderson. “Hitler’s Biggest Blunder.” *History Today* 43 (April 1993).

⁷⁴ The Royal Air Force had done its damage in the air and it had become obvious even to Hitler that a landing operation could not be completed without adequate air support.

⁷⁵ The Pact was signed on September 27, 1940 – less than a month after the announcement of the Destroyer Deal.

⁷⁶ Kimball, 60-61; Shogan, 256-258.

⁷⁷ Ernst L. Presseisen, *Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941* (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 254. ; Johanna Menzel Meskill, *Hitler and Japan: The Hollow Alliance*. (New York: Atherton Press, 1966).

⁷⁸ Presseisen, 255,257.

⁷⁹ Morley, 1-4; Henderson, 35.

⁸⁰ Morley, 115.

The idea that the United States might obtain bases in the South Pacific, or send its fleet to Singapore, greatly upset the Japanese. If anything, they became even more determined to arrive at an accord with Germany.⁸¹

Germany faced similar concerns because additional destroyers in the Royal Navy meant an increased chance that the British fleet might attempt to station warships in the Mediterranean or at other points close to the European battlefields.⁸² Additionally British-American ties meant that in the event Britain lost the war, its fleet would fall to the Americans, thereby strengthening Japan's Pacific rival even more.⁸³

In this manner, where the three powers previously had little reason to cooperate, now their mutual interests were growing and an alliance appeared an attractive political option. But without the Destroyer Deal, this mutual concern would most likely have never existed. For one, it is almost certain that the increased danger of British ships being dispatched to Singapore and the Mediterranean would not have materialized. If Churchill had not received the destroyers he requested it is doubtful that he would have given Roosevelt any public assurances, however weak, about who would inherit the British fleet in case of its fall. Even more importantly, not transferring the destroyers to Britain brings into question the possibility of a Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. If the United States had clearly demonstrated that it was not willing – or not capable due to strong isolationist tendencies of the public – to aid the Allies, would Japan still have felt it necessary to bank its success in the war on a surprise attack? The Destroyer Deal was to a great extent the precursor to Lend-Lease agreements of 1941, which incensed the Axis powers so much. Would there have been a Lend-Lease without a Destroyer Deal? If Japan could have obtained the coveted colonial possessions of France and Britain by simply waiting for these countries to fall while the United States sat by and watched, would there be any reason to launch a pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941? The evidence suggests that without the pressures of the Tripartite Pact and interventionist actions of the United States, Japan would have had no reason to attack Pearl Harbor.⁸⁴

Interplay Between Law and Policy-Making

⁸¹ Presseisen, 256.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 257.

⁸³ Morley, 115-6.

⁸⁴ This is obviously an issue that could warrant – and has warranted – a complete counterfactual study of its own. The point here is to highlight the relative importance of the Destroyer Deal due to its great impact on U.S. foreign policy – so far-reaching that the Pearl Harbor attack could have been prevented had the deal not taken place.

The destroyers have by now been transferred; but let no one say that it was accomplished "legally;" supplying of these vessels by the US government to a belligerent nation is a violation of our neutral status, a violation of our national law, and a violation of international law.

-- Herbert W. Briggs, of the board of editors of the *American Journal of International Law*, commenting on the sale of destroyers.

The debate over the legality of the destroyer transfer was not reserved just to the editorial pages of *The New York Times*. The *American Journal of International Law*, for example, devoted its entire October 1940 issue to the Destroyer Deal. In one of the articles, Edwin Borchard called Roosevelt's actions a "veritable *tour de force*."⁸⁵ This is as it should be because the actions that surrounded the transfer of destroyers show the difficulty of attempting to create a lawyer-proof law. Regardless of how specific a law is, there will always be skilled lawyers who will attempt to turn the law's foundations on its head with a carefully reasoned interpretation. But this is not necessarily a bad thing. The key aspect of law is that, if it is crafted correctly, it allows for great flexibility in its application. Strict rules are acceptable and desirable but only to the extent that they allow for exceptions that conform with the spirit of the law but not its letter – and Cohen showed how the law's flexibility can be used to push through matters that were within the President's view of the national interest but outside the realm of strict legality.

Of course, legal positivists would vehemently disagree with this assessment. They would argue that the rule of law suffered as a result of Cohen and Acheson's twisting and hair-splitting of the Neutrality Laws. Shogan, for example, named the last chapter in his book about the Destroyer Deal "Breach of Trust," and in it chided the president for having such a self-centered approach to public policy. Shogan's assessment of these mid-summer 1940 events is one of mild disgust at the cavalier manner in which the Roosevelt administration allowed ends to justify the means. In this light, the issue of the Destroyer Deal pops up from time to time in the popular press whenever an American president commits an act of strained and shaky legality – it is often referred to as the Roosevelt Precedent.⁸⁶

But perhaps that is the very lesson of the Destroyer Deal – that finding an effective middle ground between the pressing needs of public policy and the strict confines of law is a very elusive task. And perhaps that is the reason why Roosevelt's action does not stand alone in the history of the American presidency. It was repeated as recently as 1999 with President Clinton's use of NATO bombers to enforce a peace settlement in Kosovo.

Laws that are enacted by the legislature are not mere suggestions about how to conduct policy, they are steadfast rules that need to be obeyed. But what happens in situations when seeking legislative approval will simply take too long to accomplish a desired goal? Indeed, what happens in situations when the lives of many – perhaps even the

⁸⁵Edwin Borchard, "Confiscations: Extraterritorial and Domestic," *American Journal of International Law*, 34 (October 1940): 690.

⁸⁶ See George J. Church, "But what laws were broken? In the face of damaging Iran-contra testimony, the White House shifts its strategy," which includes a related article on how President Franklin Roosevelt utilized the legal loophole. *Time*, 1 June 1987, 24.

free world – hang in balance? At what point in time does the system of checks and balances and limitations upon the powers of an ambitious president take a back seat to the pressing needs and opportunities of national interest? These are tough questions that have no entirely correct answers.

However, a careful look back upon the events that surrounded the Destroyer Deal reveals a vibrant interaction between law and public policy that gives much hope for the future of America's foreign policy. To recall the sheer plausibility of the counterfactual and to imagine all the things that could have prevented the Destroyer Deal from taking place is to realize how incredibly difficult it is for a president to bypass an uncompromising Congress on matters of foreign policy. The transfer of destroyers was completed and accepted as foreign policy only because the following had taken place:

- *Substantial concessions were obtained from Britain in the form of naval and air bases.*
- *A team of two young and creative hotshot lawyers concocted a shaky interpretation of existing statutes and then convinced a number of famous lawyers to sign on to it.*
- *The Attorney General adopted the attitude of serving as the administration's lawyer which meant that he did not nitpick the legal foundations of the Cohen-Acheson argument but instead simply required that it meet the bare minimum burden of proof.*
- *An able activist convinced a retired war hero to publicly endorse the deal and launched a nation-wide campaign to whip up the public's support which was financially supported by an elite group of influential businessmen.*
- *The opposing party's presidential candidate was of the same pro-British persuasion so that he did not attack Roosevelt's policy on the sale of destroyers in the press.*
- *The editor in chief of a major newspaper gave Acheson, his college buddy, a prominent spot in the Sunday editorial pages to advance his argument.*

These were many pieces of the puzzle that had to fall in place in order for the deal to come through. I am thus inclined to say that if a situation like this – one that allows for a stretching of the law beyond its limits in order to accommodate an action perceived to be in the national interest – presents itself so rarely and with so many shaky “what ifs,” the legal system can truly be said to serve as an effective moderator of foreign policy. In this manner, the balance between laws enacted by the legislature and ambitions of a president's foreign policy appears to resemble greatly an ideal middle ground. The law has to be respected on all occasions, yet it can be broken in the most special and pressing of cases. But even in those special cases, it is by no means an easy task. It requires innovation, dedication and just a little bit of luck. To comprehend this point is to grasp the fact that we live in a system of government where political ambition in foreign policy is effectively curbed, yet still flexible enough to allow for a proper response in case of an emergency or great opportunity. And that is a truly reassuring thought.

APPENDIX

Throughout this paper I made numerous use of two sources: Robert Shogan's *Hard Bargain* and Philip Goodhart's *Fifty Ships that Saved the World*. There are two simple reasons for this: first, to the best of my knowledge, these are the only two full-length books written about the Destroyer Deal; second, both of these sources are credible and deserving of praise and they complement each other well. While Goodhart's analysis was from a historical perspective, Shogan approached the Destroyer Deal from the perspective of a political scientist, focusing not so much on events but upon the larger context of the event and the political interplay that made it possible.

Cast of Less-Known Characters

Benjamin Cohen	A New Deal lawyer and General Counsel to the National Power Policy Committee within Harold Ickes' Interior Department. Sent a memorandum to Roosevelt in which he argued that the sale of destroyers to Britain was both legal and in the national interest of the United States.
Dean Acheson	Another well-respected lawyer of great legal and political acumen who helped Cohen sell the idea of a destroyers-for-bases exchange to Attorney General Robert Jackson. Briefly served as the Undersecretary of Treasury in the Roosevelt administration.
William Allen White	A 72-year-old Progressive Republican and organizer of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. He played an integral role in ensuring the support for the Destroyer Deal of the Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie. White was not connected to the Roosevelt administration in any official manner.

Chronology of Events

May 15, 1940	After hearing that German forces broke through French defense lines at Sedan earlier that morning, Churchill cables Roosevelt and makes a number of appeals. Among these is a request for a loan of between 40 and 50 destroyers from World War I.
May 16, 1940	Roosevelt informs Churchill that the destroyers cannot be loaned to Britain without congressional approval. In the letter, Roosevelt expresses his belief that Congress would not approve the loan.
May 20, 1940	Churchill writes to Roosevelt again. He warns Roosevelt that the British fleet could be used as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations with Germany if the conflict turns for the worse.

June 11, 1940	Churchill re-asserts Britain's need for destroyers. Roosevelt answers three days later stressing his inability to move without congressional approval.
June 15, 1940	Churchill makes yet another plea for the destroyers, this time more forcefully. Roosevelt's stance is unchanged. The parties appear to have reached a stalemate and formal negotiations stop.
July 31, 1940	One month and a half after his last letter on the subject, Churchill writes to Roosevelt that the fall of France has provided Germany with a foothold in the Channel. He classifies Britain's need for America's old destroyers as "most urgent."
August 11, 1940	<i>The New York Times</i> prints a letter signed by Dean Acheson titled: "No Legal Bar Seen to Transfer of Destroyers. Ample Authority for Sale of Overage Naval Vessels to Great Britain Exists in Present Laws, According to Opinion by Legal Experts."
August 13, 1940	Roosevelt informs Churchill that a deal for the destroyers may be possible after all. However, in return for fifty old destroyers Roosevelt demands several naval and air bases as well as a declaration that the British fleet will not fall into German hands.
August 15, 1940	Churchill offers 99-year leases of bases but refuses to make an announcement about the fleet for fear of lowering public morale.
August 22-5, 1940	British officials insist that the destroyers should not be exchanged for the bases but that the two should be separate gifts.
September 2, 1940	Churchill agrees to terms of the exchange in principle and fact.
September 3, 1940	Roosevelt informs Congress of the bases-for-destroyers exchange – an event that later came to be known as the Destroyer Deal.

About-Face:
International Forces, the American Military, and the Reversal of
Japanese Occupation Reforms

Tana Reisenauer
University of Wisconsin

The American occupation of Japan initially sought to change Japan's political, economic, and societal structure in such a way that Japan could never again mobilize for militaristic purposes. However, changes in the domestic and global contexts prompted the United States to swiftly and radically alter its overall foreign policy strategy, and consequently, to abandon and even overturn many of its prior reforms. The forced reforms of the Occupation era and later change of course were significant for a number of reasons. This was arguably America's earliest unilateral attempt to create democracy undemocratically. Furthermore, changes in the global context had an inordinate amount of influence over the final composition of Japan's domestic policies due to the fact that the United States had assumed a great deal of responsibility for coordinating worldwide responses to changes in the global balance of power. Lastly, the "reverse course" provides an outstanding demonstration of constrained presidential power and the security-democracy conflict.

Introduction

After the war in the Pacific during WWII ended with Japan's surrender, the Allied Powers – led by General Douglas MacArthur – occupied Japan and initiated a myriad of reforms. The reformers sought to change Japan's political, economic, and societal structure in such a way that the country could never again mobilize for militaristic purposes. However, prompted by souring relationships in the global arena as well as criticism in the domestic realm, the United States swiftly and radically altered its overall foreign policy strategy.

This transition fundamentally altered the country's perception of and goals for its relationship with Japan, resulting in the abandonment of a significant number of the reforms. Indeed, many scholars of American foreign policy have pointed to the post-World War II era as a turning point, a time in which the United States openly embraced its global leadership responsibility for the first time. The occupation of Japan, as a largely unilateral initiative of the U.S., is widely recognized as a manifestation of the country's acceptance of this new role.

However, the Occupation reforms and their subsequent reversals are extraordinary for additional reasons. The Occupation represents one of America's earliest independent attempts to create democracy undemocratically. Moreover, because Japan's domestic policies were determined by a foreign conqueror that was increasingly responsible for coordinating worldwide responses to changes in the global context, international forces exerted an inordinate amount of influence over the final composition of Japan's domestic policies. In addition, the "reverse course" provides an outstanding demonstration of a pair of central foreign policy themes: constraints on presidential power and the conflict between security and democracy. Thus, further exploration of the undemocratic nature of democracy-

creation, the contextual changes that led to significant modifications of Japanese domestic policies, and the constraints and dilemmas inherent in U.S. foreign policy is crucial.

Japanese Militarism

To better understand the initial objectives of the Occupation reformers, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the factors that apparently fueled Japan's militarism in Asia. Observers frequently cite Japan's original constitution, which had been modeled after the Prussian constitution of the late 1800s, as the root cause. Although the Meiji-era charter is often commended as the earliest non-Western constitution, it nevertheless created a highly centralized system in which parties, elections, and popular priorities played relatively minor roles.¹

The nature of the constitution may have invited the political dilemmas of the early 20th century. Its writers had designated the emperor as the nation's supreme authority, and even at the time of the document's creation, there was recognition that those with ambition could claim to act in the emperor's name, thereby benefiting from his power. Professor J.A.A. Stockwin notes, "According to the Meiji Constitution, sovereignty rested with the *tenno*, but since the *tenno* for the most part in practice did not rule, the effective location of sovereignty was a shifting thing, depending on the balance of power at any one time between the various political elites."² A number of scholars have argued that the Pacific War was largely attributable to the imperialistic military class's ability to benefit from this ambiguity and exert influence over the whole of society.³

Japan's gigantic family-controlled banking and industrial conglomerates (*zaibatsu*) further fueled the war machine. After Japan's surrender, an official Washington report posited,

[N]ot only were the zaibatsu as responsible for Japan's militarism as the militarists themselves, but they profited immensely by it... unless the zaibatsu are broken up, the Japanese have little prospect of ever being able to govern themselves as free men.⁴

Not surprisingly, then, the initial Occupation reforms were products of broad twin goals: demilitarization and democratization (in both a political and an economic sense).

Authoritarianism and Idealism

Soon after the end of the hostilities in the Pacific, the Allied Powers participated in an internal struggle that laid the foundation for the authoritarianism and idealism of the early Occupation years. The struggle centered on the efforts of General Douglas MacArthur, the

Author: Tana Reisenauer, tana.reisenauer@uwalumni.com

¹ T.J. Pempel, *Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 84.

² J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy* (New York: Norton, 1999), 38.

³ Sydney L. Mayer, *MacArthur in Japan* (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1973), 11.

⁴ Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 56.

U.S. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP in Asia) to enhance his own power while protecting Japan from an Occupation similar to that of Germany. Historian and MacArthur-biographer Sydney L. Mayer points out, “MacArthur’s attitude was simple. He believed that the Allies’ role in postwar Japan should... be in proportion to the wartime role, which was negligible.”⁵

Joseph Stalin had once proclaimed, “With Japan, we are invincible.” MacArthur believed that this was true, and he was consequently determined to shield Japan from Soviet influence. The Allies reached a solution by authorizing the Far Eastern Commission (consisting of representatives from the eleven nations that had fought against Japan) to supervise MacArthur during the Occupation. However, in-fighting severely hampered the advisory group’s effectiveness, and MacArthur retained his nearly limitless authority in Japan.⁶

The U.S. Government’s main economic instructions were to liberalize the labor movement and dissolve the *zaibatsu*,⁷ and MacArthur enjoyed considered latitude in pursuing these objectives. The vagueness of Washington’s directives led the general to view his task as “one of replacing ancient Japanese institutions with carbon-copies of American ones as MacArthur understood them.”⁸ As Supreme Commander, MacArthur implemented Allied policies, and due to the U.S.’s role as the major power and the United States’ relative silence on specific policies, MacArthur became the de facto ruler of 83,000,000 Japanese. MacArthur’s ability to wield “almost absolute power over a great foreign nation was unique in the annals of American history.”⁹

The early years of reform were fraught with idealism. One Japanese financial expert said that the policies were “reforms that New Dealers wanted to realize in Japan but could not carry out in the United States.”¹⁰ President Truman and General MacArthur would strongly clash in later years, but during the first part of the Occupation, the President generally acquiesced to his subordinate’s vision for Japan.

Although MacArthur’s power had been conferred by Allied officials, the authority of the general and the Occupation forces was not granted via Japanese laws. In fact, the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy had issued the following directive to the general:

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.¹¹

Historian John W. Dower further explains,

⁵ Mayer, 17.

⁶ Mayer, 18-19, 23.

⁷ Finn, 52.

⁸ Mayer, 14.

⁹ John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), 63, 66.

¹⁰ Finn, 52.

¹¹ Atsushi Kayashima, *American Democracy on Trial in Japan* (Tokyo: Otori Shobo, 1993), 48.

Although occupation authorities required the Japanese to abrogate the repressive peace-preservation legislation of the pre-surrender era, they themselves had ensured law and order through issuance of a web of their own peace-keeping edicts and ordinances.¹²

MacArthur chose to legitimize his power by associating with the emperor, a tactic not unlike that used by the militarists of the 20th century and the military regime (shogunate) of Tokugawa-era Japan. Mayer asserts, “MacArthur as a latter-day shogun, acting for the Emperor who had no real power, was one of those fortunate accidents of history when the right man is chosen to do a job which, in retrospect, seemed destined for him from the beginning of his career.”¹³ Despite MacArthur’s apparent “destiny,” however, there was an underlying paradox in “an authoritarianism that offered the promise of democracy.”¹⁴

Together with demilitarization, democratization was one of the “great catch-cries of the occupying authorities,”¹⁵ but even in the years immediately after the war, democratization was not allowed to develop naturally. Yoshida Shigeru, who served as prime minister during much of the Occupation, reluctantly supported SCAP’s objectives while simultaneously attempting to lay the groundwork for a reversal of the reforms after sovereignty had been regained. In fact, at least one observer has complained that if the prime minister had had his way, “post-surrender Japan would have been subjected to little more than a mild purge and a lengthy lecture on ‘diplomatic sense.’”¹⁶ The premier followed MacArthur’s instructions but personally opposed most of SCAP’s initiatives, despite the fact that Occupation reforms (such as the removal of wartime leaders) had actually facilitated his rise to power.

Although the Occupation authorities initiated countless reforms, four pivotal ones will be discussed here. An early objective was the “purge” of wartime political, military, and business leaders. Military officers accounted for the majority of the 210,000 prewar elites who were prohibited from holding official positions, but between 1,800 and 3,200 business executives from over 270 corporations also succumbed to the personnel purge.¹⁷

At the same time, left-wing political parties, which had been severely oppressed during the war, were allowed to organize and at times were even encouraged to challenge the predominance of the conservative Japanese politicians. The Allied conquerors also freed Communists who had been imprisoned for speaking out against the militarists. Initially, the fact that “the most principled resistance to the war had come from dedicated Communists gave these individuals considerable status,”¹⁸ but the growing influence of the Left would alarm SCAP officials within only a few years. On October 11, 1945, General MacArthur announced that he expected:

¹² John Dower, *Empire and Afterwards* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 366.

¹³ Mayer, 25.

¹⁴ John Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (New York: New Press, 1999), 229.

¹⁵ Stockwin, 38.

¹⁶ Dower, *Empire...* 310, 312.

¹⁷ Pempel, 87.

¹⁸ Stockwin, 40.

the encouragement of unionization of labor – that it may be clothed with such dignity as will permit it an influential voice in safeguarding the working man from exploitation and abuse and raise his standard of living to a higher level.¹⁹

By the end of 1946, nearly 5 million workers had organized into 187,266 unions.²⁰ Yoshida disparagingly attributed such initiatives to “the clique of Red or fellow-traveling ‘New Dealers’ within General Headquarters.”²¹

The reformers also declared war on the *zaibatsu*. MacArthur himself publicly derided the family-controlled conglomerates as “a form of socialism in private hands”²² and authorized the dissolution of approximately 1,200 companies. The Americans, in keeping with pervasive New Deal sentiments, sought to “punish the economically powerful and to pursue ‘economic democracy’ over ‘growth.’”²³ Economic deconcentration was perceived as a type of economic democratization in which economic (and political) power would be distributed more broadly and evenly.²⁴

Political democratization, however, was forcefully established via the creation of a new Japanese constitution. The Occupation authorities ordered the Diet (Parliament) to write a new charter, but by February 1946, MacArthur had become frustrated by the reluctance of the Japanese government to stray too far from the Meiji model, which placed sovereignty with the emperor. The general instructed the Government Section (GS) of SCAP to secretly formulate a radically different document, which was to be used as a “model” for the Diet’s draft. SCAP threatened to present its proposal directly to the populace if the politicians did not cooperate, and Japanese officials understood that a rejection of the new model could endanger the imperial system as well as their own power.²⁵

Although MacArthur’s suggestion of seeking public support for a new constitution seems to mesh with democratic ideals, the general’s reliance on threats and other ploys belie the tenets of democracy. Asian Studies professor Nishi Toshio asserts that MacArthur, with “characteristic self-righteousness... dismissed the possibility of spontaneous development of Japanese democracy.”²⁶ In the end, the Diet agreed upon a constitution that was strikingly similar to the draft created by the Allied reformers. The most intriguing portion of the new document is the infamous Article 9, which reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as

¹⁹ Pempel, 88.

²⁰ Finn, 54.

²¹ Dower, *Empire*...336.

²² Masahiro Hosoya, “Selected Aspects of the Zaibatsu Dissolution in Occupied Japan 1945-1952: The Thought and Behavior of Zaibatsu Leaders, Japanese Governmental Officials and SCAP Officials” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1982), 154.

²³ Pempel, 87.

²⁴ Stockwin, 40.

²⁵ Dower, *Empire*... 321.

²⁶ Toshio Nishi, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan: 1945-1952* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 111.

well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²⁷

There is significant debate about the origins of this section. Some researchers have claimed that MacArthur himself penned the clause, while others assert that it was proposed by Japanese leaders. Yet in spite of such disagreements, a number of observers admit that the revised constitution is noteworthy for establishing popular sovereignty, promoting antimilitarism, and guaranteeing an impressive range of human rights.²⁸

Contextual Changes

Due to the fact that U.S. foreign policy effectively determined Japanese domestic policies during the Occupation, it is not surprising that as conditions within the United States changed, so did American policies regarding Japan. Washington was prompted to reassert its authority, and America's goals concerning Japan turned from authoritarianism and idealism to multilateralism and pragmatism. In the United States, the foremost causes for policy change included Truman's reinforced mandate, the Republican onslaught against communism, and "a growing U.S. public and business climate hostile to what was increasingly criticized as the 'socialist experiment' in Japan."²⁹

In 1946, the Republicans regained ground in Congress and instigated an attack on the Democrats. A few years earlier, the Left had criticized the Right for ignoring fascism, but in the postwar era, the tables were turned: the Right was "condemning the Left for its past indifference to the Communist menace and trying to prove still that a New Dealer was half-way to Communism."³⁰ Meanwhile, the shifting tide of U.S. public opinion reinforced the Republicans' increasing Congressional power. The populace impatiently condemned the "punish-and-reform" policy that had been heartily embraced immediately after the war,³¹ and many Americans complained that the deconcentration program had promoted a controlled economy requiring high levels of U.S. aid contributions to a former enemy.³²

At the same time, the changing global context and balance of power prompted a transition in U.S. foreign policy. While the alliance between the Soviet Union and the West disintegrated due to ideological and territorial clashes, Communists gained support in China and significantly eroded the power of America's ally, Chiang Kai-shek. The expansion of communism in Eastern Europe and Asia greatly alarmed the U.S. and its allies. Political scientist T.J. Pempel explains, "By 1947-48... in the face of a whole series of domestic and international changes, the American orientation shifted... American actions no longer aimed at eradicating the prewar order and turned instead toward creating a pro-Western, conservative, procapitalist order designed to serve American cold war interests and turn

²⁷ Stockwin, 46.

²⁸ Dower, *Embracing...* 244.

²⁹ Pempel, 91.

³⁰ James F. Reston, "Memorandum to General MacArthur," in *The Korean War*, ed. L. Gardner (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 162.

³¹ Yamamura Kozo, *Economic Policy in Postwar Japan: Growth versus Economic Recovery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 21.

³² Dower, *Empire...* 344.

Japan into America's foremost strategic ally in Asia."³³ Secretary of State Dean Acheson proclaimed, "Economic well-being is not enough by itself... Defensive strength is as integral to recovery as a fence is to a cornfield."³⁴

America's relationship with the Soviet Union rapidly deteriorated in the late 1940s. In February 1948, the Soviet Union consolidated its power in Czechoslovakia, and in June the Soviets denied British, French, and American ground access to West Berlin. Support grew for the "containment" policy advocated by George Kennan, a Russia-specialist and member of the State Department. He observed,

[I]n a totalitarian regime like that of the USSR defensive and offensive motives are always inextricably intertwined, and the anxieties of such a regime for the safety of its own internal power prevent it from reacting normally, or even from speaking frankly, in problems of this kind.³⁵

Kennan had identified five strategic areas of the world (Russia, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, and the U.S.) and warned that Communism must be "contained" so that it would not spread from Russia to the other key countries.

American policy-makers may have been preoccupied primarily with threats to Europe, but Communism also appeared to be gaining ground in Asia. Mao Zedong's army brought northern China under its control in 1948 and forced Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist army to flee to Formosa in 1949. Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines hosted strong communist movements as well, so that by the end of 1949, half of Asia, whether measured in population or in land area, was communist.³⁶ In his "doctrine," President Truman had already promised to assist "free people" in fighting communism, and the American perception of a "communist monolith" was solidified by events in China and the Soviet Union.

George Kennan, fearing that Japan remained too weak to resist the growing communist threat from its neighbors, visited Asia for three weeks in 1948 as the new director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. After his return to the United States, Kennan submitted a report to Secretary of State Acheson recommending an Occupation policy shift from reform to economic recovery. Specifically, he suggested relaxation of the purge and a build-up of Japan's police force.³⁷ Adopted by the National Security Council as NSC 13/2 on October 9, 1948, the initiative formally implemented the reverse course and "made economic recovery, second only to United States security interests, the primary objective of United States policy in Japan."³⁸

³³ Pempel, 83, 91.

³⁴ Dean Acheson, "What Is the Present? What Is the Future?" in *The Korean War*, ed. L. Gardner (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 182.

³⁵ George F. Kennan, "Let Peace Not Die of Neglect," in *The Korean War*, ed. L. Gardner (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 151.

³⁶ Finn, 192.

³⁷ Masumi Jinnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 185.

³⁸ Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant's Account* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1979), 213.

Japan's reverse course was inextricably linked to events in neighboring Korea. One scholar describes the Korean conflict as "the eye of the storm in Northeast Asia, the vortex of the confrontation of Soviet, Chinese, Japanese and American power."³⁹ In earlier military victories over the Chinese and Russians, the Japanese had forcefully demonstrated the Korean peninsula's strategic geopolitical location. The peninsula's division at the 38th parallel – which resulted from a 1945 decision that the Russians would accept the surrender of the Japanese above the line and the Americans would do the same below the line – was later solidified by disagreements over the election of Korean leaders. John Foster Dulles, visiting Korea in June 1950 as a representative of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, exacerbated the precarious situation by promising U.S. assistance to the South Koreans. He proclaimed:

The American people welcome you as an equal partner in the great company of those who make up this Free World, a world which commands vast moral and material power and resolution that is unswerving. That power and that determination combine to assure that any despotism which wages aggressive war dooms itself to unutterable disaster. Therefore, I say to you: You are not alone. You will never be alone so far as you continue to play worthily your part in the great design of human freedom.⁴⁰

This promise was put to the test only a few weeks later, when North Korean forces invaded South Korea.

Shift from Idealism to Pragmatism

The perceived dangers of the global context, as well as pressures within the United States, led American leaders to focus on intercepting the enemy of the future rather than on disciplining the enemy of the past. Political scientist James W. Morley points out,

America shifted its strategy from suppressing Japan to rehabilitating it, from forcing Japan to beat its swords into plowshares to encouraging it to remold its swords and persuading it to use them in the service of its own independence and the vast international coalition being built against the Communist powers.⁴¹

The challenges posed in the global arena prompted Washington to reassert its authority over the Occupation reforms in order to combat communism globally. America's defeated foe was to become an exemplar of democracy and prosperity in Asia. Morley, whose assessment of Korea could be even more appropriately applied to Japan, points out,

³⁹ James W. Morley, *Japan and Korea: America's Allies in the Pacific* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965), 39, 54.

⁴⁰ John Foster Dulles, "To Save Humanity from the Deep Abyss," in *The Korean War*, ed. L. Gardner (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 88.

⁴¹ Morley, 2.

[T]he vitality of the... regime is important to our campaign to persuade other 'new' or 'newly emerging' peoples that independence, democracy, and economic growth are not only desirable, but reasonable objectives, and that if they associate more closely with America and other free Western societies, they may attain these objectives more surely and more speedily than might otherwise be the case.⁴²

Due to the "fall" of China and the fragile position of Formosa, Japan became one of the few remaining Asian countries that could successfully display Western-style democracy.⁴³ Japanese self-sufficiency acquired new urgency due to anxieties within the United States as well. For example, the Under-Secretary of the Army, William Draper, Jr., "was particularly concerned about the economy-minded Republican Congress...[and] felt Washington had to push SCAP and the Japanese to do better."⁴⁴ Furthermore, American taxpayers had complained that economic deconcentration (and the resulting need for U.S. aid) had made their financial burden even more difficult to bear.

Moreover, international actors recognized that Japan occupied a strategic location. George Kennan asserted, "[I]f at any time in the postwar period the Soviet leaders had been confronted with a choice between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the latter."⁴⁵ The United States hoped to build military bases in Japan and convince the country to rearm itself. MacArthur also acknowledged that either American troops would have to remain in Japan permanently, or Japan would be vulnerable to Soviet aggression. Consequently, he chose to interpret Article 9 as a prohibition of offensive – but not defensive – forces, arguably rendering the clause "quite meaningless."⁴⁶

Policy-makers noted that rearmament could either work for or against the United States. Weapons purchases would signal Japan's alliance with whichever bloc had acted as a supplier, regardless of official assurances of continued neutrality.⁴⁷ Therefore, America chose to rejuvenate its former enemy and enlist its help as soon as possible against the threat of communist expansion.

The importance of Japan's strategic location and its potential as a democratic, prosperous ally against communism in Asia took precedence over earlier aspirations of the Americans to mold an ideal Japan. Richard B. Finn, the former head of the U.S. State Department's Office of Japanese Affairs, notes, "Firmly ensconced 'under the eagle's wings' since the surrender, Japan had been almost totally insulated from the winds of change... But Japan could no longer remain isolated. It had to reenter the world."⁴⁸ Thus, the brief era of idealism was preempted by a renewed emphasis on pragmatism.

⁴² Morley, 53.

⁴³ Lindsay Parrott, "The Touchy Issue of Peace with Japan," in *The Korean War*, ed. L. Gardner (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 57.

⁴⁴ Finn, 191.

⁴⁵ Junnosuke, 183.

⁴⁶ Mayer, 30.

⁴⁷ Parrott, 64.

⁴⁸ Finn, 192.

Reverse Course

America's shift to pragmatism pleased many of Japan's conservative political leaders, particularly Prime Minister Yoshida, who had intended from the beginning to reverse many of the reforms after the country had regained its sovereignty. In fact, the term "reverse course" (*gyaku koso*) was originally coined by the Japanese press in 1951 in order to describe the Japanese government's efforts to cut back the Occupation's liberal reforms. Later, both Japanese and Americans began to apply the term to many of the actions taken by SCAP and the Japanese leaders in the final years of the Occupation.⁴⁹ The reversals of earlier reforms included the reinstatement of wartime leaders, sanctions against the labor movement, the abandonment of *zaibatsu* dissolution, and, most dramatically of all, efforts to rearm Japan, despite the explicit prohibition contained in the constitution.

During the initial years of the Occupation, SCAP had directed a large-scale purge of wartime leaders, in compliance with the Allies' Potsdam Declaration. By early 1948, however, the United States publicly recognized that "the men who were the most active in building up and running Japan's war machine – militarily and industrially – were often the ablest and most successful business leaders of that country, and their services would in many instances contribute to the economic recovery of Japan."⁵⁰ In 1949, reinstatement was fully underway, and by the end of the Occupation, the vast majority of the 210,000 individuals originally banned from public activity were once again able to participate.⁵¹

At the same time, Communists and other Left-leaningers in positions of power were persecuted in the "Red Purge," a campaign that began in the public sector in 1949 and spread to the private sector after the outbreak of the Korean War. Nishi points out, "Those Japanese intellectuals who had always liked to study Marxism, but were never allowed to put it to open test, now faced the same old fight for their intellectual freedom. This time their persecutor was not the familiar imperial government that had thrived on intellectual intolerance, but a supposedly democratic popular government that was believed to flourish on ideological diversity."⁵² Working with the private sector and the Yoshida government, SCAP successfully dismissed approximately 22,000 employees in the public and private sectors.⁵³

The Red Purge campaign was closely related to attempts at weakening the recently liberalized labor movement, which had steadily strengthened its ties to the Japan Socialist Party. Public sector labor unions had planned a large-scale strike for February 1, 1947. With the date drawing near, and under pressure from Washington, MacArthur unilaterally forbade the strike. Yoshida and other Japanese conservatives welcomed the general's action, interpreting it as a sign that SCAP had finally "come to its senses."⁵⁴

Although MacArthur had repeatedly predicted that failure to disband the industrial combines would almost certainly lead to a grassroots revolution,⁵⁵ the Occupation officials

⁴⁹ Ibid., 142.

⁵⁰ Dower, *Empire...* 332, 333.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Nishi, 242-243.

⁵³ Dower, *Empire...* 366.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 313.

⁵⁵ Hosoya, 155-156.

eventually abandoned the economic democratization initiative. In the later years of the Occupation, the number of targeted corporations was reduced from 1,200 to 325 to 30 and finally, to only nine. After these nine had been dissolved, the reformers announced that the deconcentration program had been successfully completed.⁵⁶

In the end, the levels of deconcentration remained remarkably similar to wartime levels. Economist Tsuru Shigeto posits,

Once the tide was thus turned, any measure which appeared, or was alleged by the Japanese, to retard recovery was either watered down or suspended... Few people considered whether certain aspects, at least, of the anti-monopoly measures might not be of benefit to the long-term health of Japanese capitalism.⁵⁷

Furthermore, the bureaucracy-big business relationship of the Korean War era was much like that of the 1930s, with the United States replacing the *zaibatsu* in the promotion of war-related industrial production in Japan.⁵⁸

The most dramatic abandonment of earlier Occupation goals, however, was America's push to rearm Japan, in apparent violation of Article 9 of the country's constitution. North Korea's invasion of its southern neighbor prompted General MacArthur to order the limited rearmament of Japan. On July 8, 1950, he informed Prime Minister Yoshida that Japan's national police reserve should be increased by 75,000 men and its maritime safety force should add 8,000 men.⁵⁹

Significantly, the supplementary police reserve was to be separate from the original police force. In addition to skirting the spirit if not the letter of Article 9, this directive conflicted with democratic principles, because control of the police reserve would rest with the Prime Minister's Cabinet rather than with the Diet. Thus, the rearmament directive signified a radical change of heart for General MacArthur, who had, only a few years earlier, discouraged cabinet ordinances and declared that the country should be permanently disarmed.⁶⁰

Yet this noteworthy transition did not satisfy John Foster Dulles. In early 1951 he strongly urged the prime minister to assemble an additional 350,000-man force, but Yoshida, realizing that such a contingent would be very expensive and almost certainly prompt public outcry so soon after the war, resisted. However, the Security Treaty signed by the United States and Japan in 1951 stipulated that Japan would "maintain forces in and about Japan 'in the expectation... that Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression.'"⁶¹ By 1954, Japan had agreed to establish self-defense forces.

These reversals undermined the initial Occupation goals of democratization and demilitarization. Wartime leaders were permitted to once again rise to prominence in the

⁵⁶ Mayer, 38.

⁵⁷ Shigeto Tsuru, *Essays on Economic Development* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Bookstore Co., Ltd., 1968), 127-128.

⁵⁸ Dower, *Empire*... 343.

⁵⁹ Finn, 263.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁶¹ Stockwin, 48.

public realm; at the same time, Leftists were persecuted, much as they had been by Japanese militarists during the Pacific War. SCAP removed many of the liberties it had granted to the labor movement and abandoned the objective of democratizing the business world. Most dramatically, the United States blatantly disregarded Japan's democratic constitution and coerced its ally into rearmament. Clearly, the reverse course defied not only the earlier Occupation reforms but also the democratic ideals publicly proclaimed by the United States in its global onslaught against communism.

Constraints on Presidential Power

The reverse course of the Occupation was implemented in response to domestic pressures, the threat of communist expansion, and the outbreak of war in Korea. As such, it presents a clear demonstration of the numerous limitations placed on Harry Truman's exercise of presidential power. Enemies in Congress, an unhappy public, and opponents within the Democratic Party – as well as members of his own staff – stood in the way of Truman's personal initiatives.

The elections of 1946 allowed the Republicans to gain significant power in Congress and to commence an onslaught against the Democrats for "allowing" communism to expand throughout the world. Senator Joseph McCarthy rose to prominence for his assertion that Communists within the U.S. government had facilitated the defeat of the Chinese Nationalists. Even Truman's proactive response to the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49 did not satisfy the president's critics, and he "naturally felt a sense of frustration and resentment."⁶²

Despite his attempts to obstruct the spread of communism, Truman encountered serious opposition – and even threats of impeachment – from his enemies in Congress. Senator William Jenner of Indiana proclaimed:

[T]his country today is in the hands of a secret inner coterie which is directed by agents of the Soviet Union. We must cut this whole cancerous conspiracy out of our Government at once... Our only course is to impeach President Truman and find out who is the secret invisible government which has so cleverly led our country down the road of destruction.⁶³

Truman's interactions with Congress acquired an adversarial tone, and the president remained painfully aware of the fact that friends and foes alike carefully examined every move he made.

The American public further constrained the president by voicing its mounting dissatisfaction with the speed of the reconstruction of Japan and by complaining about the large amounts of money flowing to a defeated foe.⁶⁴ As the world witnessed the spread of communism, Americans also derided Truman for his perceived inaction. Mayer explains,

[T]o an American public familiar with the failure of appeasement policy in the face of German, Italian, and Japanese aggression before the Second World

⁶² Mayer, 62.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁶⁴ Finn, 191.

War, the failure to act decisively against what seemed to be a similar threat to world security by Russia could be laid at the feet of Truman.⁶⁵

Even members of his own political party were not entirely satisfied with President Truman. The left wing of the Democratic Party resented his increasingly confrontational stance against the Soviet Union, while the Southern wing opposed Truman's pro-civil rights position.⁶⁶ For a time, in fact, both the Democrats and Republicans considered General Dwight Eisenhower (who had not declared a political affiliation) as their next presidential candidate. While Republicans opposed his initiatives, the president could not rely on his own party members for support, and it is therefore likely that Truman's unpopularity within the Democratic Party was a key factor in his decision not to run for a second elected term.

Members of Truman's own staff further undermined the president's power. At least one scholar has called attention to the fact that John Foster Dulles, a prominent member of the Republican Party, was responsible for redirecting the U.S.'s official policy toward South Korea when he visited the 38th parallel only a few weeks before the North's attack.⁶⁷ Dulles' promise of American assistance to South Korea does not seem to have been authorized by the commander-in-chief.

The "Truman-MacArthur controversy" is one of the most famous instances of a president's personal conflicts with subordinates. General MacArthur, a staunch conservative with political aspirations, enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in orchestrating the occupation of Japan. Although it was not heavily utilized during the early years of the Occupation, the official chain of command ran from Truman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur. Unfortunately, this chain of command "was not slated to be a smooth one. For MacArthur was no ordinary general, who simply executed the orders he received from his superiors. MacArthur was a powerful Pacific force in his own right."⁶⁸ Until his rather surprising victory in the 1948 election (which gave Truman a stronger mandate than he had had from assuming the presidency after Roosevelt's death), the president refrained from becoming heavily involved in the administration of the Occupation.

MacArthur's years of insulation from presidential influence allowed him to fortify his own power base and thereby present a stronger challenge to the president after the outbreak of the Korean War. The general firmly advocated an American military presence in Korea; MacArthur could exert his control if soldiers were there, but in the absence of troops, the Korean campaign would be administered by the "untrustworthy" State Department, which according to Senator McCarthy was contaminated by Communist subversives. Furthermore, according to one scholar, the general maintained hopes that Truman would mishandle the Korean conflict and provide MacArthur with fuel for a second presidential campaign.⁶⁹

In order to maintain his control in Korea, the general took a series of actions (such as publicly criticizing the president's handling of the war) that were contrary to Truman's instructions. The President, who already resented the general's popularity and feared his

⁶⁵ Mayer, 51.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁶⁸ Spanier, 65.

⁶⁹ Mayer, 62, 64.

political aspirations, was further angered by this defiant stance.⁷⁰ Historian Richard Lowitt asserts,

Of course every second lieutenant knows best what his platoon ought to be given to do, and he always thinks that the higher-ups are just blind when they don't see his way. But General MacArthur – and rightly, too – would have court-martialed any second lieutenant who gave press interviews to express his disagreement.⁷¹

The conflict culminated in Truman's dismissal of MacArthur in the middle of the Korean War. Dire implications, such the continuation of civilian supremacy over the military and of presidential authority over United States foreign policy, lay at the core of the controversy.⁷² The Truman-MacArthur dispute also contributed to a domestic climate that enabled Dwight Eisenhower, another popular Republican military figure, to become the next president of the United States.⁷³ Clearly, restrictions on Truman's power came from all sides: from the public, Congress, the Democratic Party, and even from his subordinates.

Conflict Between Security and Democracy

In addition to demonstrating the constraints on presidential power, the Occupation provides an illustration of the conflict between security and democracy, another key foreign policy theme. The pursuit of security may contradict democracy, while the promotion of democracy can undermine security. Political scientist Jerel Rosati explains:

Democracy demands an informed and active citizenry, individual access to information, an open dialogue about the ends and means of society, and governmental accountability – often a cumbersome process. The demands of national security are quite the opposite: secrecy, distrust of enemies from without and within, unquestioning mass support, and an efficient process allowing quick responses to events abroad. Therefore, democracy and national security are in constant tension with one another.⁷⁴

As a result, states must choose their priorities carefully. In the early years of the Occupation, the United States conspicuously lauded democratic ideals, despite the contradictions to democracy that were inherent in American actions even at that time.

The country bypassed the other Allies in its determined efforts to make the Occupation a unilateral initiative, and MacArthur was criticized consistently for his brushes with authoritarianism in pursuing U.S. objectives. An Australian delegate to the Far Eastern Commission, for example, complained in the 1940s that the general unwisely tended “to

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁷¹ Richard Lowitt, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), 26.

⁷² Spanier, vii.

⁷³ Lowitt, 1.

⁷⁴ Jerel Rosati, *The Future of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 10.

equate what is un-American and what is undemocratic.”⁷⁵ The general’s dominance was so pervasive that his shortened title, SCAP, soon came to designate the entire Occupation administration.⁷⁶ The Supreme Commander fancied that his accomplishments in Japan were comparable to Julius Caesar’s achievements in Gaul, and he apparently lamented the fact that their historical significance was not fully appreciated in the United States.⁷⁷

The Occupation forces’ coercive actions concerning constitutional revision clearly demonstrate the dangers of bypassing democratic means in the pursuit of democratic ends. Historian Kenneth B. Pyle disapprovingly describes the six-day constitution-writing process as occurring in an “almost Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere.” After the SCAP draft had been approved by the cabinet and the emperor, MacArthur “gave a poker-faced statement to the press praising the Japanese for ‘such an exemplary document which so coincided with his own notion of what was best for the country.’”⁷⁸ This revolution-from-above was not entirely dissimilar to the one initiated by the elite reformers who had framed Japan’s original constitution.⁷⁹

It is not only in hindsight that the contradictions of forcefully created democracy come into focus. Indeed, observers immediately noted the apparent hypocrisy of the United States. Journalist Mark Gayn, writing in Tokyo during the Occupation, brought attention to the questionable goals of the American reformers. He remarks:

No one can fathom the motives of the Americans who tailored the new constitution for Japan. One motive could be General MacArthur’s desire to go down in history as the maker of Japan’s basic law. Another could be the military man’s belief that anything could be done through a military order – even a democratic constitution. And no one apparently has thought of the contradiction inherent in the idea that any constitution forced down a nation’s throat could be democratic.⁸⁰

Despite such criticism, the United States (and the Occupation forces it controlled) continued to give vociferous lip service to the ideals of democracy.

Democratic ideals were quickly discarded, however, in response to the threat of communist expansion. As relations with China and the Soviet Union grew more and more tenuous, the need for an ally in the East took precedence over the desire to realize a truly democratic Japan.⁸¹ According to Dower, “U.S. policy concerning Japanese capitalism had passed from ‘economic demilitarization and democratization’ through ‘self-sufficiency’ to a concept of ‘U.S.-Japan economic cooperation.’”⁸²

⁷⁵ W. MacMahon Ball, “Japan – Enemy or Ally?” in *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present*, ed. J. Livingston, J. Moore, and F. Oldfather (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973), 126.

⁷⁶ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co., 1996), 213-214.
⁷⁷ Hosoya, 166.

⁷⁸ Pyle, 218-219.

⁷⁹ Jon Livingston, Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfather (eds), *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: Random, 1973), 17.

⁸⁰ Mark Gayn, “Drafting the Japanese Constitution,” in *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present*, ed. J. Livingston, J. Moore, and F. Oldfather (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973), 24.

⁸¹ Livingston et al., 4.

⁸² Dower, *Empire*...307.

The Occupation's reverse course is particularly striking because in implementing the reversal, the United States defied not only Japan's constitution but also the democratic tenets that America proclaimed in its global onslaught against communism. Not surprisingly, a number of U.S. allies, particularly those countries that had been victimized by Japan in World War II, reacted to this transition with shock and dismay.⁸³ In the end, however, such protests were largely disregarded.

Many Japanese elites, particularly politicians and business people, took advantage of America's policy shift in order to regain their prewar power and wealth. The conservatives who had effectively controlled the Japanese government throughout the Occupation eagerly joined in suppressing the emerging labor groups and political parties.⁸⁴ During the final two years of the Occupation, Yoshida and his cabinet began to rearm the country, approved an indefinite American military presence in Japan, and increased its participation in the containment of communism in Asia.⁸⁵ By the early 1950s, security concerns had clearly triumphed over democratic ideals, leaving democratization incomplete and demilitarization unrealized.

Conclusion

The American occupation of Japan initially sought to change Japan's political, economic, and societal structure in such a way that the country could never again mobilize for militaristic purposes. However, changes in the domestic and global contexts prompted the United States to swiftly and radically alter its overall foreign policy strategy, and consequently, to abandon and even overturn many of its prior reforms. The forced reforms of the Occupation era and later change of course were significant for a number of reasons. This was arguably America's earliest unilateral attempt to create democracy undemocratically. Furthermore, changes in the global context had an inordinate amount of influence over the final composition of Japan's domestic policies due to the fact that the United States had assumed a great deal of responsibility for coordinating worldwide responses to changes in the global balance of power. Lastly, the "reverse course" provides an outstanding demonstration of constrained presidential power and the security-democracy conflict.

Demilitarization and democratization were the broad goals of the early Occupation years. At the time, many policymakers adhered to the belief that Japan's "undemocratic" Meiji Constitution had been at the root of the island country's spiraling militarism. However, it could be argued that the United States' Occupation policies were similarly undemocratic and insufficiently monitored. Not only did the United States circumvent the Allies, but the Supreme Commander also bypassed his American superiors (including President Truman) on occasion. MacArthur bolstered his authority through association with the emperor and implemented his reforms with the reluctant support of Japanese political leaders such as Yoshida Shigeru, but his power was not legitimized by Japanese laws.

The purge of wartime leaders (and the release of certain prisoners), the legalization of labor unions, and the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* were among the central Occupation

⁸³ Livingston et al., 121.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁵ Dower, *Empire*...317.

initiatives. However, the most drastic and controversial undertaking was the forced revision of the Japanese constitution. MacArthur and his subordinates coerced the Cabinet into endorsing a largely foreign document, threatening to present it directly to the Japanese people if the political leaders did not comply. Such efforts disregarded the U.S. Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, which stipulated, “[I]t is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.”⁸⁶

As conditions within the United States and around the globe changed, so did U.S. policies toward Japan. Washington reasserted its authority, and America’s stance toward Japan turned from relative authoritarianism and idealism to multilateralism and pragmatism. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 promised aid to “free people” in the struggle against the expansion of communism, particularly in Eastern Europe and Asia, and in 1948, the National Security Council adopted George Kennan’s recommendations as “NSC 13/2,” signifying the commencement of the reverse course in Japan.

The reversals of earlier reforms included the reinstatement of wartime leaders, sanctions against the labor movement, the abandonment of *zaibatsu* dissolution, and most dramatically of all, efforts to rearm Japan, in spite of the explicit prohibition contained in the constitution. Reacting in the 1940s, Australian W. MacMahon Ball of the Far Eastern Commission expressed outrage at America’s moves to help Japan “regain her prewar position as the workshop of East Asia.”⁸⁷ Article 9 was reinterpreted to allow (and even encourage) rearmament, and control of the newly formed “supplementary police force” was delegated to the Cabinet rather than to the entire Diet.

Washington hoped that the policy reversals would reinforce the island country in the fight against communist expansion. Japan, whose strategic location was widely recognized, was to be an exemplar of prosperity and Western-style democracy in the East. A re-emphasis on pragmatism preempted the brief era of idealism, but the transition was problematic. Nishi elucidates:

A painful irony for those involved in the governance of Japan was that, when the democratic reforms started working, the ‘rationed democracy’ became obvious. The gap between principle and practice continued to irritate the Japanese and to embarrass the American policymakers. Per haps, this embarrassment was the most precious lesson of democracy that the Americans left for the Japanese.⁸⁸

In many ways, the shift toward pragmatism not only contradicted the earlier goals of the Occupation, but also defied the democratic ideals publicly proclaimed by the United States in its efforts to thwart communism.

The reverse course was a response to domestic pressures, shifts in the global balance of power, and the conflict in Korea. Thus, it plainly displays the numerous limitations placed on Harry Truman’s exercise of presidential power. Congressional enemies, opponents within

⁸⁶ Livingston et al., 7.

⁸⁷ Ball, 127.

⁸⁸ Nishi, 139.

the Democratic Party, members of his own staff, and a dissatisfied public inhibited Truman's initiatives.

The Occupation experience also illustrates the conflict between security and democracy. It may be that the resolution of security issues had been at the heart of U.S. motives all along, and the promotion of liberal democracy in Japan was used as a means toward this end. In the early years, the United States endorsed democratic ideals even while its agents acted undemocratically.

In the later years of the Occupation, democratic ideals were gradually abandoned, while the resolution of security dilemmas took precedence. When earlier reforms stood in the way of U.S. security goals, policy makers de-emphasized the need to remake Japan. Thus, the occupation of Japan clearly presents a theme — snubbing democratic means in the pursuit of democratic ends — that has tainted American policies throughout the 20th century.

Kennedy, Khrushchev, and The Missile Crisis:
The Politics of Cumulative Misperception

Katherine Lavin
Princeton University

In January 1961, a young and eager John Fitzgerald Kennedy ascended to the presidency. Having won the November election by a slim margin,¹ the former senator from Massachusetts hoped to prove his presidential ability early on. Kennedy looked to foreign affairs to mobilize the people in support of his administration. He recognized the importance of the precarious American-Soviet relationship during his presidency, drawing attention to the issue in his inaugural and State of the Union addresses. Nevertheless, he could not have predicted that the tension between the two nations would evolve into the most potentially destructive event in human history – the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

One can best understand the Cuban Missile crisis by analyzing the relationship between Kennedy and the Chairman of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev. From Kennedy's election to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba, hostility between the two nations had been increasing. Failing to understand the other's intentions, neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev could take a step back from the conflict to reevaluate the situation. Instead, they continued to act impulsively and myopically, thereby precipitating the ensuing conflict. This paper examines this spiral of misperception and mounting hostility in the period leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Approaching the subject chronologically, this paper will look at both Kennedy's personal role and that of his presidential administration in the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union. I will analyze four distinct stages in the spiral of misperception: Kennedy and Khrushchev's initial impressions of each other, the effect of Kennedy's anti-communist rhetoric, Khrushchev's response to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961, and finally, Kennedy and Khrushchev's face-to-face confrontation at the Vienna Conference in June of the same year. This analysis will provide a detailed account of the role of misperception in the evolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Chronology

November 8, 1960	Kennedy elected president of the United States by a slim margin
January 1, 1961	Khrushchev gives New Year's Toast
January 6, 1961	Wars of Liberation Speech
January 20, 1961	Kennedy's Inauguration
January 30, 1961	State of the Union address
February 1, 1961	Test launching of Minuteman ICBM

Author: Katherine Lavin, katherinelavin@hotmail.com

¹ James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1977), 293.

March 28, 1961	Special Message on Defense Budget
April 17, 1961	Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba
June 3-4, 1961	Kennedy and Khrushchev meet at Vienna
August 13, 1961	Erection of the Berlin Wall
August 28, 1961	Soviets begin a series of nuclear tests
October 21, 1961	Address by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric
July 11, 1962	Khrushchev gives speech to Moscow "peace congress"
September 8, 1962	Khrushchev agrees to New Year's 1963 target date for test ban
October 16, 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis and blockade

The Theory of Misperception

Arguing that international relations is dependent on how individuals perceive others, Robert Jervis contends that one misunderstanding can lead to a "spiral" of misperception in which neither party can step back and evaluate the situation.² In Jervis' model, each state, fearful of the intentions of others, pursues its own interest. Any questionable initiative by a state in an antagonistic position will be counteracted. Seeing the counteraction as an act of aggression rather than a response to his original offensive, the initiator will feel compelled to act again. It is this inescapable repetition of action, which one might describe as a helical progression that explains the nomenclature of the model.

Affirming a Hobbesian view, Jervis asserts that in "a world without a sovereign, each state is protected only by its own strength."³ Such a world system makes the maintenance of security a particularly difficult goal. According to Jervis, a state will feel menaced by the very presence of another state of comparable or greater strength and in response to this apparent threat, increase its defense.⁴ The irony in the spiral model is that a state completely

² Robert Jervis, "Perception, Misperception and the End of the Cold War," in *Witnesses to the End of the Cold War*, ed. William Wohlforth (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1996), 227. Jervis argues that misperception played a substantial role in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The sharing of documents and memories from the Cold War makes it increasingly clear that each side lived in its own world. Each thought that its perceptions were universally valid and failed to realize that others saw a very different world. This is not unusual: it is hard to find any case of international conflict, or even of sustained international interaction, in which each participant was able to grasp the others' perceptions."

³ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁴ Jervis, 65. Jervis cites the words of Lord Grey, the British foreign secretary before World War I, used in retrospect to describe diplomatic affairs at that time. "The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce consciousness of strength, and a sense of security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust

ignores the rationale behind its own apprehension when considering its behavior towards others. In other words, a state feels threatened by other states' security strengthening operations yet fails to realize the effects of its own actions. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the existence of a bipolar system further aggravated the potential conflict since both the United States and the Soviet Union felt threatened by the only other nation with comparable military and technological prowess. Moreover, the very nature of a bipolar system suggests that hostility will be directed towards the most obvious competitor.

The spiral model also has a psychological aspect. After all, it is a state's cognitive inability to confirm another state's intentions that causes the state to doubt its security in the first place. This psychological aspect of the spiral model clarifies both the reason for the state's disquietude and for the perpetuation of that initial attitude. Psychology tells us that "once a person develops an image of the other – especially a hostile image of the other – ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image... people perceive what they expect to be present."⁵ These general psychological tendencies of people, coupled with the circumstances of the early months of Kennedy's presidency, were responsible for his entrapment in the spiral.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the Road to Public Approval

John Fitzgerald Kennedy's policy towards the Soviets was greatly influenced by domestic concerns, specifically a desire to gain public approval. He hoped to eliminate the doubts that some Americans had about his maturity and ideological commitment. Kennedy was the youngest man ever elected to the presidency, but he was experienced beyond his years. After all, he had been preparing for a political career all his life. His father, Joseph Kennedy, a self-made millionaire and the U.S. ambassador to England from 1937 to 1940, promoted political discussion amongst his sons at an early age and educated them, through fine schools and European travel, for a future in public service. Furthermore, before his election to the presidency, Kennedy had served three terms in the House of Representatives and eight years in the Senate. These years in Congress molded Kennedy's approach to politics. As suggested by Meena Bose in *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy*, "during his fourteen years in Congress, Kennedy showed himself to be a political pragmatist, concerned with policy feasibility as much as policy content."⁶

Kennedy's frequent use of the media, particularly live television, successfully exhibited his intelligence, eloquence, and commitment to democratic ideals and national security. As a Democrat, succeeding Eisenhower in the era of McCarthyism, Kennedy needed to prove not only his maturity, but also his firm resolve to fight against communism. Kennedy used emotional anticommunist rhetoric to rally the support of the American people against a common adversary. Going against his fellow Democrats, Kennedy took a hard line

and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each Government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every Government regards every precaution of every other Government as evidence of hostile intent."

⁵ Ibid., 68.

⁶ Meena Bose, *Shaping and Signaling Presidential Policy: The National Security Decision Making of Eisenhower and Kennedy* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 10.

position in his dealings with the Soviets. In *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev*, Michael R. Beschloss suggests that “Kennedy knew it was politically safer to err on the side of seeming too tough on the Soviets than too soft.”⁷ In his personal interactions with fellow Democrats, Kennedy was not as passionately anticommunist. However, in the public arena he used a different approach seeking to appease those who still believed in the superiority of Eisenhower’s methods. Kennedy believed that powerful anticommunist rhetoric would help him gain the confidence of doubting Republicans and the general public. He knew that the American people wanted a leader who could assure the nation’s complete security. As Beschloss points out,

With his slender victory margin, [Kennedy] needed to build national support that would help him to push his defense, foreign policy, and other programs through Congress. He knew Americans were more likely to rally to him in an atmosphere of mounting crisis.⁸

Kennedy was a talented orator and, with the help of his aide Theodore Sorensen, he developed speech tactics that helped him inspire the American people. In his book, *The Presidential Character*, James David Barber characterizes Kennedy’s speechmaking in this way: “The directness, the projection of restrained rage, the intellectuality, the humor and statistics, candor and vagueness were his trademarks.”⁹ Kennedy recognized the significance of words and the importance of the press and tried to establish strong relationships with his audiences. He made a conscious effort to treat reporters with the utmost respect. In addition, he used carefully planned gestures while delivering speeches to demonstrate his steadfast purpose and undoubted capability. At the podium, he was able to convey his quick wit, charm, and a sense of spontaneity, winning the hearts of many Americans.

However, when speaking about the Cold War, Kennedy took a much more pessimistic approach than his predecessors had. Whereas Eisenhower had spoken calmly about U.S.-Soviet relations, Kennedy used fervent language, giving an ominous portrayal of the future of the Cold War. This may have been the result of Kennedy’s coming of age during the Second World War. As James David Barber suggests, this unique introduction to international politics may have caused Kennedy to view the Communists as he had Hitler. After all, as Barber elaborates, “He had come along into politics immediately after a war in which the good guys and the bad guys were sharply distinguishable. Some of that climbed up into his brain again.”¹⁰

Hoping to inspire the people and stir emotional responses, Kennedy was particularly careful about his choice of words, not just the ideas he conveyed. This appeal to emotion was effective in improving his political standing, however Kennedy and his staff did not pay enough attention to the signals his words might communicate to the Soviets.¹¹ The rampant passion and unfettered anti-communist sentiment of Kennedy’s words caught the attention of

⁷ Michael Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963* (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), 64.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Barber, 314.

¹⁰ Ibid., 317.

¹¹ Bose, 78.

Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Already wary of possible conflict, Khrushchev took Kennedy's powerful words as an indication of Kennedy's aggressive intentions. This offered a startling contrast to Khrushchev's original perception of how a Kennedy presidency might ease the tension of the Cold War.

STAGE ONE: FIRST IMPRESSIONS

Khrushchev had hoped Kennedy would win the election because, as he later said, he "thought they would have some hope of improving Soviet-American relations if Kennedy were in the White House."¹² The Soviet Union had been suspicious of the United States before the Kennedy presidency. Towards the end of 1960, Soviet intelligence reports had predicted a US invasion of Cuba, making Khrushchev particularly watchful of the United States. Likewise, the U.S. government had its doubts about Soviet intentions since the USSR had not disclosed the actual strength of its armed forces for several years. Evidently, the two nations were trying to gauge where the other stood while masking their own intentions.

Khrushchev wanted to meet with the president-elect. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson also thought the two leaders should meet, because, as Beschloss writes, Thompson, "Understood the degree to which Khrushchev was affected by personal relationships. He wanted Kennedy to understand at first hand Khrushchev's aspirations and anxieties."¹³ However, Thompson's wish never came true. The two leaders would never truly understand the other's intentions. On New Year's Eve 1961, Khrushchev toasted the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union and the United States. It seemed the two nations would start the New Year on a friendly note. However, as Beschloss argues, "The glowing promise of better relations with the Soviet Union was fast eclipsed in Kennedy's mind by a secret speech Khrushchev had given in Moscow."¹⁴

Khrushchev delivered his Wars of Liberation speech to Soviet ideologists and propagandists on January 6, 1961. However, the Kremlin did not release the text of the speech until January 18, two days before Kennedy's inauguration. In this speech, Khrushchev declared Soviet superiority in long-range missiles and proclaimed that while capitalism was declining, socialism was on the rise. He also announced, "Communists are revolutionaries, and it would be a bad thing if they did not exploit new opportunities."¹⁵ Kennedy believed Khrushchev's reference to "bringing imperialism to a heel" by "wars of national liberation"¹⁶ was a direct threat to US security. Beschloss argues that the experienced Eisenhower would not have reacted in the same manner as the fresh-faced Kennedy. While Eisenhower would have looked at the bigger picture, Kennedy failed to examine the context of the speech and did not consider that the Chairman might have been referring to the Soviet's turbulent relations with the Chinese.

Instead, Kennedy interpreted the speech as a clear demonstration of Khrushchev's feelings towards the United States. Up to this point, Kennedy had been unable to determine what the Soviet leader wanted, but now he believed he had a documented glimpse into

¹² Beschloss, 33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Khrushchev's seemingly complex mind. For Kennedy, this evidence was crucial. Referring to the "Wars of Liberation" speech, he told his officials, "You've got to understand it, and so does everyone else around here. This is our clue to the Soviet Union."¹⁷ Evidently, Kennedy took Khrushchev's words very seriously. However, two days later, in his inaugural address, Kennedy failed to recognize the similar effect his words would have on Khrushchev, therefore perpetuating the misperception between the two states.

KENNEDY AND THE POWER OF WORDS

Kennedy believed that speechmaking was the way to gain the support and confidence of the people, but he did not realize the unintentional messages his words would convey to the Soviets. In his inaugural address on January 20, 1961, two days after receiving a copy of Khrushchev's "Wars of Liberation" speech, Kennedy eloquently declared his administration's position on foreign affairs. He proclaimed, "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."¹⁸ With these words, the charismatic Kennedy affirmed the United States unfaltering commitment to liberty and democracy. At face value, Kennedy's speech seemed harmless since he simply explained the United States ideological position. However, to a nation newly aware of a United States plot to invade Cuba, these words demonstrated a serious challenge to their non-democratic society and distinct way of life.

Beschloss gives a convincing account of Khrushchev's response to Kennedy's speech. In a meeting with Ambassador Thompson, Khrushchev acknowledged that he had read Kennedy's inaugural address, and realized that he and the President had different perspectives. Khrushchev voiced his belief that the United States was seeking world domination, the very accusation Kennedy had made about the Soviets. Thompson blamed himself for the misperception between the two leaders, but the misunderstanding was the result of personal feelings, bold inferences, and misinterpretations of words. Giving his inaugural address, Kennedy responded to what he had perceived as questionable Soviet intentions. Meanwhile, Khrushchev saw Kennedy's speech as a threat to the Soviets and their communist ideology.

Ten days later, January 30, 1961, Kennedy delivered his State of the Union address. With a strong voice and carefully planned gestures, he voiced that America's "greatest challenge [was] still the world that lies beyond the Cold War – but that [their] first great obstacle [was] still [their] relations with the Soviet Union."¹⁹ To a wary Khrushchev, the word "obstacle" may have been perceived as a warning of what was to come. Furthermore, Kennedy went on to warn Americans that they "must never be lulled into believing that either power has yielded its ambitions for world domination."²⁰ This raised American concerns as the general public, and even military and government personnel, watched their new and newly popular president give considerable weight to such a cautionary message.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁸ Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton* (New York: Martin Kessler Books, The Free Press, 2000).

¹⁹ *Congressional Almanac*. Congressional Quarterly Inc., Volume 17, 1961, page 858.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

Americans, following Kennedy's lead, now perceived the Soviet Union as an ever-present threat to their national security.

Again, Kennedy raised fears later in the speech when he announced, "Each day the crises multiply. Each day the solution grows more difficult. Each day we draw nearer the hour of maximum danger as weapons spread and hostile forces grow."²¹ Here it is evident that Kennedy believed the Soviets were expanding their arsenal of weapons due to feelings of "hostility." As Jervis predicts, Kennedy failed to realize that the Soviets, like the Americans, felt a defensive need to increase military forces. In fact, later in the speech, Kennedy declared a need for increased military spending and a strengthening of American armed forces. He said, "We are moving into a period of uncertain risk and great commitment in which both the military and diplomatic possibilities require a Free World force so powerful as to make any aggression clearly futile."²² Calling for a thorough reassessment of US defense strategy, Kennedy ordered an increase in spending to expand American submarine, aviation, and missile programs. He even specified a need for "an invulnerable missile force."²³

This defense buildup fully revealed the spiral of misperception. Suspicious of Soviet intentions, Kennedy wanted to reevaluate the American defense strategy. Moreover, he was responding to Soviet efforts to increase their military power. As Jervis' model suggests, the Soviets felt threatened by Kennedy's words and increases in US military spending and answered by expanding their own supply of weapons. Beschloss also asserts that "Khrushchev almost surely thought Kennedy's State of the Union address a deliberate slap in the face."²⁴ However, from Kennedy's perspective, he was simply responding to the threat he perceived in Khrushchev's "Wars of Liberation" speech. Khrushchev did not realize that Kennedy had interpreted the aforementioned speech in that manner. Beschloss continues, "With his eternal assumption that American leaders were telepathic enough to read his mind, [Khrushchev] probably thought that Kennedy knew his 'Wars of Liberation' speech had been delivered mainly for Chinese consumption."²⁵ Both Kennedy and Khrushchev were speaking their true intentions, however, neither had the perspective to recognize that from another standpoint, particularly one already clouded by doubt, these intentions would be misunderstood.

STAGE TWO: BUILDING UP DEFENSE

Perceiving a real Soviet threat, Kennedy emphasized defense both to demonstrate U.S. preparedness and to show the Soviets how strong U.S. forces really were. On February 1, 1961, just days after Kennedy's State of the Union address, the US test launched its Minuteman ICBM. According to Beschloss, "The American press predicted deployment in large numbers by the middle of 1962. The Kremlin knew that these missiles placed in hardened silos, could be used for a first-strike nuclear attack against the Soviet Union."²⁶ In

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 859.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Beschloss, 64.

²⁵ Ibid., 65.

²⁶ Ibid.

less than a month's time, Khrushchev had delivered his "Wars of Liberation" speech, Kennedy his inaugural and State of the Union addresses, and the United States had begun to reevaluate their defense strategy and test new missiles. The situation was intensified by the rapidity with which these events had transpired. They were impulsive actions, motivated by a perceived threat. Neither party took the time to gather all the relevant information and thoroughly consider the other's intentions.

While domestic concerns were affecting Kennedy's foreign policy decisions, Khrushchev was unable to understand these pressures. He took Kennedy's words as clear indications of mounting American hostility. Drastic increases in US defense spending and missile testing only confirmed Khrushchev's concerns. On March 28, Kennedy issued the "Special Message on the Defense Budget," a plan that redefined US defense policy. In the message, Kennedy declared that the United States was not planning any act of aggression and voiced American resolve to use their weapons ultimately to secure peace. He concluded the message citing the need for expansion and improvement to ensure national security.

Our military position today is strong. But positive action must be taken now if we are to have the kind of forces we will need for our security in the future. Our preparation against danger is our hope of safety. The changes in the Defense program, which I have recommended, will greatly enhance the security of this Nation in the perilous years which lie ahead.²⁷

Despite the fact that Kennedy began the message affirming the United States' commitment to peace, he ended it with a very different tone. In closing, he alluded to an imminent conflict. Assuredly, Kennedy believed that such a conflict would arise at the hands of the Soviets. However, Khrushchev, with Kennedy's anticommunist speeches and the resulting military buildup in mind, may have conjectured that these "perilous years" ahead would result from a United States offensive.

Two months later Kennedy delivered "The Special Message on Urgent National Needs" which may have confirmed Khrushchev's impression of Kennedy's position. In this speech, Kennedy called for the reorganization and modernization of the army, the addition of one hundred million dollars to the defense budget, an increase in existing forces, including special forces and unconventional warfare, and the more rapid deployment of highly trained reserve forces.²⁸ Kennedy also advocated a review of the nation's intelligence efforts. Kennedy's requests relayed a clear message to the American public and the USSR: the United States was preparing for serious military action.

STAGE THREE: FAILURE AT THE BAY OF PIGS

This offensive action, namely the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, would greatly strain the Soviet-American relationship and change the way Kennedy and Khrushchev would deal with each other. The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been planning an attack on communist Cuba since May 1960. On April 5, 1961, 1,400 Cuban exiles, flying American planes, bombed Cuban air bases. Two days later, they landed at the Bay of Pigs

²⁷ *Congressional Almanac*. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Vol. 17, 1961, 906.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 924.

where they were met by Castro's troops. The exiles were expecting assistance in the form of an American air attack, but according to James David Barber, the attack had been "cancelled because it would look too much like the United States was attacking a tiny neighbor."²⁹ The exiles were no match for Castro's army of 20,000, and by April 19 his men had captured and incarcerated over 1100 exiles.

The failed invasion had serious consequences for Kennedy both on the domestic and international scenes. Still early in his presidency, some thought the Bay of Pigs was an indication of how Kennedy intended to deal with communism. In truth, the plan for the invasion had been in the works long before the Kennedy presidency. It had originated during the Eisenhower administration and Kennedy, although hesitant to authorize the invasion, believed its execution would demonstrate his courage and firm stance against communism. Compelled by domestic pressures, he approved the CIA plan. Unfortunately for Kennedy, the plan was flawed. Both his administration and the CIA had not fully considered the consequences of the attack. Beschloss states that "Kennedy had abolished much of the apparatus devised by Eisenhower to scrutinize covert projects. This forced him to accept at face value the judgments of novice secretaries of State and Defense."³⁰ The Kennedy administration could not thoroughly analyze the potential outcomes of the planned invasion. Moreover, Beschloss suggests that Kennedy did not consult Soviet experts on possible Soviet responses to such an invasion and did not realize the importance of how Khrushchev would respond. Additionally, Kennedy was not even aware of the military capacity of the Cuban forces. Their defensive strength took him by surprise. Kennedy wanted to keep the operation small to hide, or at least muddle, American involvement. As Beschloss points out, that approach was Kennedy's mistake. "Wishing to intervene without paying the price of intervention, he therefore ordained an operation too small to succeed and too big to hide American involvement."³¹ The plan was doomed to failure.

The Bay of Pigs invasion greatly affected Khrushchev's perception of Kennedy and US intentions. He found Kennedy to be inconsistent and hard to predict, which in a relationship of muffled intentions and covert operations made him a very dangerous person to deal with. After the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev believed he needed to take a harder line in his dealings with the United States and assure Kennedy that the Soviets would not tolerate such actions. Beschloss indicates:

For perhaps the first time, the Chairman made the clear public argument that he considered Soviet interests in Cuba now to be parallel with American interests in countries along the Soviet perimeter like Turkey, where the United States maintained a substantial military establishment.³²

In making this statement, Khrushchev declared that continued American actions in Cuba, would justify the execution of similar acts by the Soviets in Turkey. If Kennedy had paid more attention to this statement, he may have better anticipated the Cuban Missile Crisis. Beschloss continues,

²⁹ Barber, 320.

³⁰ Beschloss, 133.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

What logically followed from this was that if the United States continued to commit hostile acts against Cuba, it gave the Soviet Union the right to harass American allies along its border. For the United States to place missiles in Turkey that the Soviets considered offensive for instance, granted the Soviet Union similar license in Cuba.³³ Kennedy was extremely troubled by the failure at the Bay of Pigs. His brother Robert wrote:

[JFK] felt very strongly that the Cuba operation had materially affected ... his standing as President and the standing of the United States in public opinion throughout the world. We were going to have a much harder role in providing leadership. The United States couldn't be trusted. The United States had blundered.³⁴

Kennedy allowed his fears to influence his perception of Khrushchev rather than giving sufficient attention to Khrushchev's words. Just as Jervis claims, "People perceive what they expect to be present."³⁵ After the failed invasion, Khrushchev was eager to meet with Kennedy and believed a summit, as proposed nine weeks earlier, would give the Soviets an opportunity to demonstrate their power.

STAGE FOUR: THE CONFERENCE AT VIENNA, JUNE 3-4, 1961

The conference at Vienna was a significant turning point in the Kennedy-Khrushchev relationship as both leaders vied face-to-face, to demonstrate their unfaltering strength. With the Bay of Pigs invasion fresh in his mind, Khrushchev arrived at the summit viewing Kennedy in a new light. He felt that he had taken the wrong approach in his previous dealings with the President. He had been too optimistic, too complacent. At Vienna, this attitude would change. As Kennedy said at the start of the conference, "The purpose of this meeting is to introduce precision in judgments of the two sides and to obtain a clearer understanding of where we are going."³⁶ However, for Khrushchev, Vienna was an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity to "deal with Kennedy." By pouncing on Kennedy's lack of conviction in Cuba and his previous avoidance of the Berlin issue, Khrushchev hoped to prove that he was the stronger of the two leaders.

Over the course of two days, the leaders engaged in debate on a variety of subjects. First they discussed their competing ideologies. Beschloss argues that Kennedy was overconfident that he could change Khrushchev's mind on ideological issues. However, Khrushchev had been committed wholeheartedly to the communist ideology for more than half a century and would not allow a smug American leader to lure him into submission to the capitalist way of life. Khrushchev considered Kennedy's approach an "[embodiment of] the arrogance of American power."³⁷ Kennedy's presumptuous attitude angered Khrushchev

³³ *Ibid.*, 131-132.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 143.

³⁵ Jervis, 65.

³⁶ Beschloss, 197.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 206.

who responded with vehemence, reaffirming his commitment to communism through an ardent desire to prove Kennedy wrong.

The next topic of discussion was the possibility of a nuclear test ban accord. Kennedy hoped to return to the US having reached such an agreement, but Khrushchev would not concede. He wanted complete disarmament, believing it was the best method for the prevention of war. Moreover, Khrushchev argued that Kennedy's request for inspection stations throughout the USSR was too invasive. Fearful that the United States would take advantage of their military superiority, Khrushchev did not want detailed disclosure of Soviet military capacity. However, at the same time, this refusal caused Americans to perceive a hidden Soviet military threat.

The meetings ended with a heated discussion of Berlin as both Kennedy and Khrushchev tried to protect their nation's interest in the city. Khrushchev hoped to put an end to the American presence in Berlin. Kennedy would not accept such a proposition, since he believed it would destroy the international balance of power. Whether he knew it or not, Kennedy's desire to maintain this balance was a direct challenge to Khrushchev's "ideal of dynamic world communism."³⁸ Khrushchev would not back down and believed that Kennedy was too weak to push him from his foothold. Moreover, Beschloss recalls that Eisenhower had recommended a compromise on Berlin, twenty months earlier. Kennedy's obvious departure from previous policy alarmed Khrushchev.

Now, in Khrushchev's view, [Kennedy] was arrogantly brandishing the superior might of the United States. Despite his earlier rhetoric about parity, Kennedy seemed to be saying that since America was more powerful, it could afford to ignore Soviet concerns about Berlin.³⁹

The timing of the Vienna conference was very significant. Had the two leaders met earlier, things would have been very different. However, by June, Khrushchev was not only troubled by Kennedy's anticommunist rhetoric, but also by Kennedy's repeated increases in the United States' defense budget and his aggressiveness in the Bay of Pigs invasion. Moreover, unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was unwilling to compromise, and from the Soviet perspective, was rubbing Khrushchev's nose in American nuclear supremacy. Khrushchev wanted to assure Kennedy that the Soviet Union was willing to wage war over Berlin. He would not part with his lifelong commitment to "dynamic world communism" just to appease the president of the United States. Instead, he forced Kennedy to leave Vienna with an overwhelming fear of crisis. As Beschloss suggests, Kennedy had expected to return with a test ban treaty and "a working relationship with Khrushchev, and other achievements that would help to overcome his narrow victory margin and the international setbacks of the spring of 1961."⁴⁰ Inexperience and overconfidence were the cause of Kennedy's downfall at Vienna.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 231.

A TEMPORARY SOLUTION, A TEMPORARY PEACE

Fearing conflict, Kennedy would accept a temporary solution to the Berlin dispute just two months after the Vienna summit: the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961. Kennedy had encouraged Khrushchev to build the Wall, but thereafter only mentioned it in passing when addressing the American public. At that point, Kennedy believed the construction of the Wall was the best way to prevent a crisis. It seemed that Kennedy had been able to calm the storm. However, on August 28, Kennedy learned that the Soviet Union had initiated a series of nuclear tests. The President was furious and deeply troubled. The US and the Soviet Union had observed a voluntary moratorium on testing since 1958, and at Vienna, Khrushchev had promised to uphold this agreement. Now, it seemed that Khrushchev had knowingly deceived Kennedy at Vienna.

Kennedy's first instinct was to recommence testing in the United States, but his advisors warned him to hold off before implementing any sort of reactionary policy. Kennedy waited until October before showing the Soviet Union just how superior United States military forces really were. He delegated this task to his Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric. Explaining his decision, Kennedy said, "When I get up and say those things, it sounds too belligerent."⁴¹ While confirming the United States' commitment to peace, Gilpatric's speech boasted American superiority in both abundance of weapons and efficiency and rapidity of response. Gilpatric declared, "The fact is that this nation has a nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy move which brought it into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part."⁴²

Gilpatric's speech was both detailed and direct. He asserted American superiority and indicated the United States' ability to mobilize their defense in the event of a conflict. Gilpatric compared United States power to that of the Soviets, insinuating the possibility of conflict over Berlin and the United States' readiness for such a conflict.

The destructive power which the United States could bring to bear even after a Soviet surprise attack upon our forces would be as great as – perhaps greater than – the total undamaged force which the enemy can threaten to launch against the United States in a first strike. In short, we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first.⁴³

By asking Gilpatric to deliver such a speech, Kennedy completely humiliated Khrushchev. He may have taken the less hostile route by not giving the speech himself, but nonetheless, the message reached Khrushchev, loud and clear. Beschloss claims that "Khrushchev had fashioned an illusion of Soviet strength most of all so that the United States would treat his country as an equal."⁴⁴ Citing powerful statistical evidence, Gilpatric forthrightly denied Soviet claims of military parity exposing Khrushchev as both inferior and deceitful.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 329.

⁴² Bose, 151.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Beschloss, 331.

As 1961 came to a close, the two leaders reflected on the past year. On December 29, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a telegraph stating that “1961 had been a troubled year,” but he hoped that 1962 would prove to “strengthen the foundations of world peace and bring an improvement in the relations between our countries.”⁴⁵ Khrushchev responded with a similar message. He ended it declaring, “As always, the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to ensure a durable and lasting peace on our planet.”⁴⁶ However, as Beschloss argues, before this “durable peace” could be achieved, Khrushchev needed to correct the image of an inferior Soviet Union that Gilpatric had put forth.

OCTOBER 1962: THE CRISIS

To discredit Gilpatric’s declaration of American military superiority, Khrushchev would take an offensive approach. First, on July 11, 1962, Khrushchev assured a Moscow “peace congress” that the United States and the Soviet Union still had comparable military strength. He dismissed Gilpatric’s claims as “unrealistic” and argued that the flaunting of American military superiority was “designed to aggravate... the threat of war. But it [was] quite without foundation.”⁴⁷ Khrushchev was infuriated by the recent American declarations. Moreover, he felt threatened by Kennedy’s attitude and believed that refuting American assertions of nuclear dominance would prevent Kennedy from taking aggressive action. After all, “The Soviet Union was not Laos, not Thailand or some other small state,” he said, “... Those who threaten us will get back everything they are planning for us!”⁴⁸ Surely, Khrushchev’s confidence to make such bold claims emanated from his recent agreement with Castro to install Soviet missiles in Cuba.

In August, United States intelligence reports confirmed that Soviet ships were sailing towards Cuba carrying troops and hidden supplies. General Marshall Carter informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that,

There was a Soviet ‘crash program’ to build as many as twenty-four SAM sites on Cuba. Since mid-July, about sixty-five Soviet bloc ships had been discovered sailing to the island: roughly ten were known to have carried military equipment and technicians.⁴⁹

Kennedy responded by calling up 150,000, reserve members of the armed forces so he would have sufficient manpower if a conflict were to arise. Furthermore, on September 4, Kennedy issued a warning to Khrushchev: “if the United States ever found offensive ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba, the gravest issues would occur.”⁵⁰ Unfortunately, Kennedy’s warning came too late. Khrushchev had already begun the operation and there would be no turning back. Moreover, the specificity of Kennedy’s warning would limit his choice of action upon

⁴⁵ Ibid., 352.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 407.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 414.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 420.

discovery of missiles in Cuba. To remain true to his word, Kennedy would have to respond forcefully.

Over the next few weeks, CIA reports documented several instances of Soviet activity in Cuba. Beschloss imparts that Khrushchev continued his correspondence with Kennedy throughout this period, most likely to throw the President off guard. On September 28, Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's proposal of a test ban to begin on New Year's day 1963. Undoubtedly, Kennedy believed he had finally made headway with the Chairman. The test ban accord he had planned for Vienna was becoming a reality. At the same time, Khrushchev also sent the president a conciliatory message. He said, "There was no reason for the United States to be concerned about Cuba. This was the time to lower the temperature and calm the atmosphere and not to raise tensions."⁵¹ Clearly, Khrushchev hoped to appease Kennedy and then take him by surprise by announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Catching the United States unprepared would give Khrushchev a better position from which to conduct negotiations with the United States' president. However, Kennedy perceived the test ban arrangement and Khrushchev's words as an indication of possible agreement between the two nations, making the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba less than a month later, all the more shocking.

On Monday, October 15, 1962, intelligence photos confirmed that the Soviets had installed medium-range missiles in Cuba. Kennedy's aides later reported that "the President took the news calmly but with an expression of surprise – a complex emotion which also included anger."⁵² Khrushchev had convinced Kennedy that no such action would take place. Kennedy felt betrayed, not understanding how he could have misinterpreted Khrushchev's intentions. As the week went on, American intelligence confirmed the presence of missiles targeting specific American cities with the capacity to kill 80 million Americans in minutes.⁵³ The spiral of misperception had led Kennedy to the most potentially destructive situation the United States had ever known. Fortunately, Kennedy had greatly enhanced his presidential capability since the Bay of Pigs, and through carefully planned actions was able save the nation from disaster.

MISPERCEPTION AND THE MISSILE CRISIS: A FINAL LOOK

In dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy returned to the root of the problem. As his brother Robert Kennedy reported, "The final lesson was the importance of placing ourselves in the other country's shoes."⁵⁴ This lesson highlights the very flaw in Kennedy's prior approach to the Soviets. Until crisis was a frightful reality, Kennedy had failed to evaluate the possible responses to his action, or pay sufficient attention to the message his actions would send Khrushchev. The startling photographic evidence of atomic warheads aimed at the United States made it overwhelmingly evident that mass destruction could result from any hasty action. This serious danger gave Kennedy the capacity to step back from the situation, enabling him to realize the importance of Khrushchev's perception of American actions.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 426.

⁵² Barber, 332.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Barber, 337.

For Kennedy, clarity of thought came at the expense of crisis. Kennedy and Khrushchev might have escaped the spiral of misperception, avoiding the conflict altogether, had they understood the significance of their words and actions early on. However, once enveloped in a spiral, it is both a mental and psychological challenge to emerge. Robert Jervis suggests that misperception can only be avoided if states abandon their inherently competitive nature and take on a “problem-solving perspective.”⁵⁵ In this way, they will consider the best solution for both parties and their intentions will be clear from the start.

Analysis of the responsibility of misperception in the escalation of hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union provides a valuable lesson for today’s leaders. Globalization and technological advances have changed certain aspects of international affairs. Nations have become increasingly interconnected and current technology allows for rapid deployment of arms, better intelligence efforts, and the capacity to strike targets accurately from greater distances. Since events can transpire so quickly, misperception has the potential to be even more dangerous. To impede misperception, states must make their intentions clear, approaching international disputes with a cooperative, rather than competitive, attitude. Effective advisory systems and thorough methods of information gathering can assist this process. Undoubtedly, perception continues to influence international affairs. With history to instruct and political science and psychology to guide, we have both the knowledge and the perspective to stop the accumulation of misperception and the crises it may cause.

⁵⁵ Jervis, 82.

The Communist Mirage:
Women's Representation in Cuba, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua

Lisa Schnal I
Washington University in St. Louis

This paper examines women's political representation in three varying political arenas: communist Cuba, democratic Costa Rica, and formerly authoritarian Nicaragua. The differing levels of political representation and participation are explained by examining each country's political history, the year in which women were granted suffrage, popular attitudes regarding female politicians, and the type of electoral system used. Communist Cuba was found to be the most progressive regarding women's involvement in politics, although women's influence in politics is questionable as Cuban legislators have little authority to change policy. Regardless of the level of influence Cuban legislators are able to attain, communist countries tend to elect more women than democratic countries. If Cuba were to revert to democracy in the future, it is likely that women's political representation in Cuba would be adversely affected.

Introduction

Currently, Cuba boasts a relatively high percentage of women in its National Assembly compared with the rest of the world. Cuba, long a communist nation, ranks 12th out of 176 countries, with 27.6% female legislators. In contrast, Costa Rica ranks 28th, with 19.3% female legislators, and Nicaragua ranks a distant 62nd, with 9.7% female legislators.¹ Interestingly, then, communist Cuba outranks democratic Costa Rica and, less surprisingly, formerly authoritarian Nicaragua. Why does Cuba, a nation regularly castigated for its repressive governmental structure, possess a higher percentage of female representatives than Costa Rica, the "Switzerland of Central America," a country renowned for its longstanding democratic traditions in a region known for its instability and violence?² Saint-Germain's (1993) emphasis on political history, along with Kenworthy and Malami's multi-faceted explanation, including year of women's suffrage, popular attitudes about female politicians, type of electoral system, and left party government clarifies the apparent paradox. Specifically, Cuba's comparatively high percentage of female legislators can be attributed to its progressive attitude towards female suffrage, its emphasis on education and labor force participation, and the tendency for leftist parties to support and promote women's political participation. However, Cuba's legislators are merely puppet representatives; they lack true power to effectively implement or influence policy. Thus, Cuba's percentage overstates women's actual involvement in the political process.

Author: Lisa Schnal, sh0rtie311@aol.com

¹ Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000, "Women in National Parliaments: World Classification." Online. <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>. (30 Nov 2000).

² Michelle A. Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power of Women Legislators in Costa Rica and Nicaragua," *Women's Studies International Forum* 16.2 (1993): 121.

Political History

Cuba's governmental difficulties date back to its prolonged struggle for independence in the nineteenth century. Whereas other Central American countries attained their independence from Spain between 1810 and 1824, Cuba remained under Spanish control until the end of the nineteenth century. In 1898, Jose Marti and his followers won Cuba's independence from Spain two decades after the first failed attempt at autocracy.³ However, Cuba's troubles did not end with their second war for independence. Rather, the country quickly fell under U.S. control, remaining subject to the whims of various U.S. installed dictators. On January 1, 1959, six years after a failed attempt Fidel Castro seized control of the government from Fulgencio Batista and has retained control ever since.⁴ Thus, Cuba has never experienced democratic government, subject first to Spanish control, then to dictatorial regimes, and finally to Castro's communist autocracy.

Although both Nicaragua and Costa Rica won independence from Spanish rule in 1821, the countries' paths diverged soon after. Nicaragua's turbulent history includes almost a century of civil war between the two dominant parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. As in Cuba, the United States intervened in the early 1900s, undermining some governments and supporting others in the hopes of gaining access to a proposed Nicaraguan canal that was never actually built. The departure of the U.S. paved the way for the Somoza dynasty, which reigned from the mid-1930s until 1979, when the Sandinistas ousted them from power.⁵ Only recently, then, has Nicaragua experienced any semblance of democracy and peaceful transition of power.

Costa Rica, on the other hand, has enjoyed democratic elections since 1889, with only two exceptions in 1917 and 1948.⁶ Latin America's oldest democracy has indeed experienced various skirmishes and battles; however, the country is relatively placid compared to the other nations in the region.⁷

Granting Women Suffrage

Judging by the political histories of the three countries, one might assume that Costa Rica first awarded women the right to vote. However, Cuba was the first to grant women the right to vote in 1935.⁸ In 1949, Costa Rica became the first Latin American country to extend women the right to vote and to run for political office.⁹ Perhaps not surprisingly, given its authoritarian background, Nicaragua was the last of the three to extend suffrage rights, granting women the right to vote in 1955, twenty years after Cuba and six years after

³ Judy Maloof, *Voices of Resistance: Testimonies of Cuban and Chilean Women* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 21.

⁴ Maloof, 24.

⁵ Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 124.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁷ Richard E. Matland and Michelle M. Taylor, "Electoral System Effects on Women's Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 30.2 (1997): 187.

⁸ Maloof, 24.

⁹ Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 121.

Costa Rica.¹⁰ Like Cuba, Nicaragua granted women only the right to vote, and not the right to run for office.¹¹

The countries extended suffrage to women for a variety of reasons. The first National Congress of Women in Havana in 1932 was the impetus behind the Cuban decision. Women's Congress participants mobilized around the issue and demanded governmental action.¹² In Costa Rica, on the other hand, women attained suffrage because of various outside influences, rather than because of internal mobilization around the issue. Specifically, women's increased economic participation during World War I and II, their increased educational opportunities after the establishment of the University of Costa Rica in 1942, and their involvement in the 1948 skirmishes, along with international pressure, convinced the Costa Rican government to permit women to vote and to run for political office.¹³ International pressure also impelled Anastasio Garcia Somoza to amend the Nicaraguan constitution to permit women's suffrage. Somoza anticipated political rewards in the form of female support for the Liberal Party as a result of his action.¹⁴

Significantly, the timing of female suffrage in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica directly corresponds with their respective percentages of female legislators. Kenworthy and Malami reason that the longer women possess the right to vote, the larger the female voter turnout and thus the greater the percentage of female legislators elected.¹⁵ Granted, the timing of suffrage is not the sole determinant of the number of female legislators. Switzerland did not extend women the right to vote until 1971, a mere twenty-nine years ago. Presently, Switzerland ranks 22nd out of 176 countries, with 23% female parliamentarians in the lower house and 19.6% in the upper house.¹⁶ Switzerland thus far outranks the United States, where women have possessed the right to vote for eighty years now. However, timing of suffrage, when taken into account with other factors such as societal perception of female politicians, electoral structure, and left party government, does indeed offer a credible explanation of the extent of women's representation.

Societal factors account for one possible reason Latin American women attained suffrage relatively late. Cultural perceptions of women in Latin America revolve around

¹⁰ Ibid., 124. Sources revealed inconsistencies in dates for women's suffrage in both Cuba and Costa Rica. Maloof reported Cuba's suffrage as occurring in 1934, while Nikki Craske maintained 1935. Nikki Craske, *Women and Politics in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999). Similarly, Saint-Germain reported Costa Rican suffrage occurred in 1945, while Craske (and other sources) reported 1949.

¹¹ Cynthia Chavez Metoyer, *Women and the State in Post-Sandinista Nicaragua* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 19. It is unclear when or if Cuban and Nicaraguan women were extended the formal right to run for office. The first female Nicaraguan legislator was elected in 1958, three years after women attained the right to vote. Saint-Germain "Paths to Power..." 120.

¹² Maloof, 24.

¹³ Saint-Germain "Paths to Power..." 121.

¹⁴ Anne M. Fernandez Poncela, "Nicaraguan Women: Legal, Political, and Social Spaces," *Gender Politics in Latin America: Debates in Theory and Practice*, ed. Elizabeth Dore (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1997), 37; Saint-Germain "Paths to Power..." 124.

¹⁵ Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami, "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis," *Social Forces* 78.1 (1999): 239. This assumes, of course, that women vote for women candidates.

¹⁶ IPU, (2000).

'machismo' and 'marianismo' characterizations.¹⁷ Men, associated with "aggressiveness, stubbornness, arrogance, strength, and virility" contrast with women, who exude grace, virtue, and humility.¹⁸ Chaney notes that 'decente,' the Spanish word used to describe a 'good' woman, "connotes honesty, decorousness and gentility, modesty, reasonableness, seriousness, appropriateness, even neatness and order!"¹⁹ Women are thus elevated to a realm above that of men; they preside in the private realm of the household. The machismo/marianismo classifications posit men as strong leaders and women as obedient followers in the public realm of government. "Politics is viewed as part of the male arena and tainted by corruption. Consequently, it is not the place for 'decent' women unless...extreme circumstances prevail or their participation reflects 'social issues.'"²⁰ Women can only validly participate in politics if the men are preoccupied with war (i.e., are off fighting) or, alternatively, if the women focus on appropriate, 'female' issues that reflect their role as mothers.

Gender Roles in Politics

Women who do choose to participate in politics discover the importance of maintaining traditional gender roles in office in accordance with the 'marianismo' stereotypes. "Female politicians are more likely to be successful in the political arena when they bring a feminine image into public life, openly express strong traditional family values, and demonstrate a commitment to their roles as wives and mothers."²¹ Because motherhood is the primary, societally accepted role for women in Latin America, aspiring female politicians must exhibit appropriately feminine characteristics to demonstrate that they fit the 'marianismo' mold although they seek political office. Violeta Chamorro relied heavily on her status as widow and mother in her successful 1990 campaign for the Nicaraguan presidency. "Just as Chamorro kept her own household in order, this mother of Nicaragua would reconcile the country."²² Chamorro strategically portrayed her politically diverse children united at her kitchen table to demonstrate her ability to successfully bring together warring factions.²³

However, not all women enjoyed such political success. Women's position in the family effectively precluded them from possessing political views of their own. Female guerrillas fighting in the revolutionary war in Cuba were perceived as loyally assisting male friends and relatives, instead of valiantly fighting for a cause in which they personally believed.²⁴ Women were thus accomplices rather than equal allies with their male counterparts. Women fared even worse in Nicaragua, where the constitution deemed them inherently unequal to men: "All Nicaraguans are equal before the law, except as regards women for the differences

¹⁷ Marlea Furlong and Kimberly Riggs, "Women's Participation in National Level Politics and Government: The Case of Costa Rica," *Women's Studies International Forum* 19.6 (1996): 634; Craske, 11-13; Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 123.

¹⁸ Furlong and Riggs, 634.

¹⁹ Chaney (1979), 32-34 as quoted in Furlong and Riggs, 634.

²⁰ Craske, 13.

²¹ Furlong and Riggs, 639.

²² Metoyer, 44.

²³ Indeed, once elected, Chamorro oversaw the end of the war in June 1990, the subsequent disarmament of the Contras, significant reduction of the military, and economic stabilization. Metoyer, 52.

²⁴ Craske, 144.

that result from her nature and for the good of the family.”²⁵ Thus, all Nicaraguans were equal, except women, whose innate differences from men merited special protection.

Despite the obviously unequal treatment of men and women, there is evidence that Latin Americans—especially Costa Ricans—are becoming more open-minded regarding female politicians. The 1988 “Law of Real Equality for Women” aimed to increase the proportion of female officeholders in Costa Rica. Much to the surprise of the bill’s proponents, public opinion polls revealed 56% public approval for the bill as a whole, and 73% approval of a requirement for gender equity among candidates for public elections.²⁶ Granted, polls rely on only a sample of public opinion, and the bill that finally passed was quite different (and weaker) than the bill originally proposed. However, other polls have revealed similar attitudes regarding female politicians. A 1993 survey of 1,195 Costa Ricans found that 73.5% of men and 75.4% of women believed a woman could be president in Costa Rica.²⁷ Currently, women are regularly nominated vice president in Costa Rica (a nation with multiple vice president positions, to be sure).²⁸ In Costa Rica, at least, the machismo/marianismo stereotypes appear to be fading, as individuals elect female representatives and discover women’s political effectiveness.

Effects of the Electoral Structure on Women

In addition to predominant cultural attitudes, the electoral structure affects voter choices. Rule asserts that electoral systems account for about 30% of the difference in women’s parliamentary success in 19 democracies.²⁹ Costa Rica and Nicaragua both have proportional representation systems, in which parties are awarded seats based on the proportion of the votes they win.³⁰ Political scientists generally agree that proportional representation systems tend to be ‘women-friendly.’³¹ Proportional representation spreads the wealth of elective office by permitting several individuals the opportunity to succeed. Parties have an incentive to nominate heterogeneous individuals in the hopes of appealing to a broad proportion of the electorate.

Unlike in Nicaragua, Costa Rican legislators cannot run for immediate reelection.³² Incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage because of (among other things) their access to the media, name recognition, and their ability to acquire pork barrel projects for their districts. Because male legislators outnumber female legislators in Costa Rica, they are

²⁵ Saint-Germain, “Paths to Power...” 124.

²⁶ Michelle A. Saint-Germain and Martha I. Morgan, “Equality: Costa Rican Women Demand ‘The Real Thing,’” *Women & Politics* 11.3 (1991): 52.

²⁷ Furlong and Riggs, 636.

²⁸ Matland and Taylor, 189.

²⁹ Wilma Rule, “Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?” in *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*, eds. Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 16.

³⁰ Saint-Germain, “Paths to Power...” 130.

³¹ Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, “Women and Democratization in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Introduction,” in *Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe*, eds. Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 10; Rule, 18.

³² Morgan, 68.

disproportionately affected by the prohibition. In other words, female politicians benefit, because all fifty-seven assembly seats become open seats every electoral cycle. However, Costa Rica's use of closed lists detracts from the benefits of proportional representation. Closed lists do not permit voters to order specific candidates; rather, voters simply choose one of the given party lists. Political parties could thus include women on the ballot, but place them low on party lists, where they have little chance of actually winning a seat. Matland and Taylor discovered exactly this sort of subterfuge upon examining Costa Rica's party lists for elections between 1974 and 1994. "Women are represented disproportionately in the ornamental list positions. There is, however, a general upward trend for women's representation in both winnable and ornamental positions."³³ The percentage of female legislators in Costa Rica has the potential to increase if they are placed higher on the party lists.³⁴

Both Costa Rica and Nicaragua have established gender quotas to increase women's political representation. In 1997, Costa Rica's Chamber of Deputies adopted a law requiring 40% of all candidates be female.³⁵ Women's percentage in the legislative assembly subsequently increased from 14% to 19%. In addition, the Partido Unidad Social Christiana (PUSC, the Social Christian Unity Party) voluntarily adopted gender quotas of 40%.³⁶ This is even more striking when one considers that PUSC is more conservative than Partido de Liberacion Nacional (PLN, the National Liberation Party), the other major Costa Rican party. Like the PUSC, the Nicaraguan Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) party voluntarily adopted gender quotas of 30%.³⁷ However, women receive low placements on party lists, and some women turn down the FSLN nominations altogether.³⁸ Gender quotas will not exhibit the desired effect of substantially increasing women's electoral success until party leaders place women in 'fighting' or 'mandate' spots and stop relegating them to the dregs of the party list. However, their implementation does represent a step towards more equal gender representation.

Communism and Women

Despite accusations of repression and authoritarianism, communism has paved the way for women to enjoy services not offered in other countries and to participate in politics in larger numbers than their democratic counterparts in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. "The Communist regimes went further than Capitalist nations to provide women with an extensive system of subsidized day care, free health, education, abortions, family and parental leave,

³³ Matland and Taylor, 190.

³⁴ Indeed, the Costa Rican Supreme Electoral Court ruled in 2000 that parties must place women in electable positions on party lists. However, the Court failed to specify what it meant by 'electability,' leaving parties leeway to stall (Mala Htun, "El liderazgo de las mujeres en America Latina: Tendencias y retos," *Seminar on "Liderazgo de la Mujer: Teoria y Practica,"* Interamerican Development Bank: Cancun, Mexico (August 28-30, 2000), 8.

³⁵ Htun, "El liderazgo..." 20.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Metoyer, 116.

and opportunities to integrate into the public sphere.”³⁹ Cuba’s subsidized education system allows all citizens to attend school and encourages them to pursue higher education. Individuals with strong academic backgrounds are more likely to pursue professional positions, jobs that tend to yield high numbers of politicians.⁴⁰ Cuba’s emphasis on education and labor force participation thus permits women the opportunity to attain a solid education, acquire a good job, and eventually seek political office, if desired.

Cuba’s ‘oppressive’ governmental system may be castigated by the United States, but Cuba, unlike the U.S., has ratified the UN Convention to End Discrimination Against Women, as have Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and all other Latin American nations.⁴¹ Saint-Germain cautions against assuming that democracy is necessarily beneficial to women: “While democracy may open up spaces in civil society for women’s participation and spaces within state structures to hear women’s claims, there is no reason to think that just because society is democratizing, women’s lives will change at the same rate.”⁴² In fact, Cuba’s percentage of female legislators is more than double that of the U.S., which had around 12.5% female representatives before the November 2000 elections.⁴³

Is communism more likely than democracy to foster women’s political participation? On a broader scale, are leftist parties more likely than other parties to encourage women’s political participation? Kenworthy and Malami assert that, “countries with ‘Marxist-Leninist’ oriented one-party governments are likely to have greater female legislative representation than nations with otherwise similar political systems, socioeconomic features and cultures.”⁴⁴ Darcy et al agree, but note the existence of conflicting evidence about party ideology and female-friendly practices. “In some nations, the Socialist and Communist parties take the lead in nominating and electing women. There is contradictory evidence, however, that parties of the left are no more likely to run or elect women than are parties of the center or right.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, Darcy et al admit that the advantages leftist parties offer are quite small:

When political performance in electing women is examined over time and the party’s electoral gains and losses controlled, Socialist [and] Communist...parties are found to be electing slightly more women than center or right parties, but the difference averages only one or two additional women per election.⁴⁶

³⁹ Lalith DeSilva, “Women’s Emancipation Under Communism: A Re-evaluation,” *East European Quarterly* 27.3 (1993): 312.

⁴⁰ Matland and Taylor, 240.

⁴¹ Mala Htun, “Women’s Participation in Democratic Politics in Latin America,” in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, eds. Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2nd ed forthcoming), 21.

⁴² Michelle A. Saint-Germain, “*Mujeres ’94*: Democratic Transition and the Women’s Movement in El Salvador,” *Women & Politics* 18.2 (1997): 85.

⁴³ IPU, (2000).

⁴⁴ Kenworthy and Malami, 239.

⁴⁵ R. Darcy, Susan Welch and Janet Clark, *Women, Elections, & Representation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 152.

⁴⁶ Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 153.

However, even the additional few women per election add up over time, creating a larger pool of experienced female politicians.

Women and Party Affiliation

Craske best clarifies the left/right party dilemma by explaining that parties on the right possess more female members, while parties on the left enjoy greater electoral success of female candidates, suggesting that parties on the right may not emphasize the election of women to political office.⁴⁷ The fact that many female legislators belong to leftist parties implies that while such parties may not eradicate gender inequalities, they do successfully channel women into positions of power. However, because parties on the right boast a larger female constituency, additional efforts on their part to encourage women to run for office could result in increased numbers of conservative women representatives.

Evidence from Costa Rica and Nicaragua proves inconclusive. The leftist National Liberation Party (PLN) has expressed support for women and female-friendly legislation; however, they have not nominated more female candidates in winnable positions than other Costa Rican parties.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, most female legislators belong to the PLN.⁴⁹ The leftist party in Nicaragua, the FSLN, has also demonstrated female-friendly behavior, vowing in 1969 that the revolution would “abolish the odious discrimination that women have been subjected to compared to men...[and] establish economic, political and cultural equality between women and men.”⁵⁰ Indeed, many female participants in FSLN connected organizations have sought political office.⁵¹

However, the leftist FSLN has been criticized for its failure to effectively support women. Poncela attacks the FSLN’s “progressive theoretical posturing,” suggesting the party’s ideological and actual stances differed dramatically.⁵² According to a Nicaraguan teacher, “I believe that there is a contradiction between what the Front wants us to be and what we want to be. It wants to perpetuate our dependence on men’s political will; always to be governed by him, to do only what he says.”⁵³ This frustration, expressed twenty-one years after the FSLN’s vow to achieve gender equality, suggests the party’s failure to accomplish its goal, or, alternatively, suggests that the goal ranks low on the FSLN’s priority list. Metoyer echoes Poncela’s dissatisfaction, emphasizing the FSLN’s failure to truly assist women:

Although the Sandinista ideology supported women’s rights to an education and employment outside the home and the notion that women were viewed properly as citizens, the government did very little to challenge existing patterns of gender relations within the home. In the end, equal access to education did not necessarily mean that women and men would gain the same

⁴⁷ Craske, 78.

⁴⁸ Matland and Taylor, 196-197.

⁴⁹ Saint-Germain, 122.

⁵⁰ Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization Without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the State, and Revolution in Nicaragua,” *Feminist Studies* 11.2 (1985): 238.

⁵¹ Molyneux, 127.

⁵² Poncela, 45.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

skills. Nor did women's integration into the labor force automatically lead to equal pay or decision-making power for women.⁵⁴

Metoyer distinguishes the FSLN's intentions from its practical effects on women's lives, asserting the party attempted only superficial changes that had little practical effect on women's lives.

However, this criticism of the PLN and the FLSN, both leftist parties that supported women's participation more than other parties, may be somewhat unfounded. Parties failing to support female political participation are held to lower standards, and thus escape censure for their failures. That is, those parties that did not specifically announce their intention to promote women's participation are lauded when additional women participate, but not blamed if women do not. Yet parties that did express an interest in gender equality are expected to transform the entire structure of gender relations. Rather than holding parties who failed to support female political participation accountable, some political scientists instead erroneously target the parties that did offer women some semblance of control.

Women and Political Power

Although communist and other left oriented parties elect more women than other, more conservative parties, the political power offered is illusory at best. Although women occupy parliamentary seats, "[women's] presence [is] more symbolic than effective. The highest circles of power remain predominantly masculine."⁵⁵ Saint-Germain agrees, highlighting the distinction between "*de jure* equality" and "*de facto* equality" in politics.⁵⁶ Though parties do not explicitly discriminate against women, female voters and legislators still remain second-class citizens, subordinate to male party leaders, male politicians, and a male-dominated society. Rather than focusing on the quantity of female representatives, additional attention should be paid to the quality of the power they wield. Costa Rican parties regularly nominate female candidates; however, as described earlier, too often these women wither at the bottom of party lists, where they are unlikely to win a seat.⁵⁷ In Nicaragua as well, women actively participate in the FSLN, only to be overlooked during the candidate selection process. Despite the fact that women accounted for 21% of FLSN membership and 56% of the "positions of responsibility" in the party, they rarely comprised more than 15% of FSLN candidates for the legislature.⁵⁸ In addition, the leadership positions women held generally did not compare to those held by men. "The responsibilities and posts women do control tend to be secondary and there is little general awareness of the issue of women's subordination."⁵⁹ Women struggle to become candidates in the first place, only to discover the inequalities persist after they win office.

Cuba, too, despite communism's purported emphasis on gender equality, fails to offer women an effective voice in governmental matters: "although Castro has preached an official

⁵⁴ Metoyer, 37.

⁵⁵ Htun, "El liderazgo..." 10.

⁵⁶ Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 131.

⁵⁷ Matland and Taylor, 190.

⁵⁸ Poncela, 40; Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 128.

⁵⁹ Poncela, 44.

policy of women's equality....a look at statistics proves that it is men who really control the island and make all the important decisions."⁶⁰ Indeed, the Cuban legislature meets only a few days out of the year, mainly to rubber stamp initiatives proposed by Castro and his predominantly male Communist Party cronies. While Cuba appears to rank high on the Inter-Parliamentary Union list of female representation, in actuality, those women elected occupy largely ceremonial positions, since they lack the ability to substantially modify or implement legislation:

Communist legislators did not represent constituencies, as is the case in functioning democracies, but were used by the leadership to legitimate its policies and to promote support for decisions made (by men) at the top. Women's representation brought international accolades...but it was largely window-dressing; women were marginalized from the centers of power.⁶¹

As a result of women's lack of access to true political power, issues particularly relevant to them have received little, if any, attention:

This absence—even exclusion—of women from decision-making positions is....suggested...by the fact that abortion was disallowed for a number of years after the revolution, and that only recently was there public access to information on the potential side effects of certain birth control devices. It is evidenced in the militaristic and patriarchal bent of Cuban education. It is evidenced in the chronic underfunding of support services for working women while millions were spent to maintain tens of thousands of Cuban troops in Africa for more than ten years. It is suggested by the great official silence on domestic violence and rape.⁶²

Women's effective lack of political power has thus detrimentally affected not only their own political party or constituency, but also the female populace of the country as a whole.

This is not meant to imply that female legislators only care about so-called 'women's issues,' such as education, childcare, social security, or reproductive health issues. Female and male legislators alike elevate party beliefs over gender loyalty when voting.⁶³ Saint-Germain reveals that party platforms and personal financial status, rather than "traditional female values," most influence female Nicaraguan legislators' political agendas.⁶⁴ However, female politicians tend to initiate discussion and introduce legislation specifically related to women's issues.⁶⁵ In addition, the existence of female politicians demonstrates the capabilities of women in public life. While Chamorro was not a feminist in any sense of the word, her ascendancy to president "was symbolically important, showing adults and future generations of girls and boys that women can occupy high positions and assume important

⁶⁰ Maloof, 38.

⁶¹ Jaquette and Wolchik, 11.

⁶² Smith and Padula (1996), 182 as quoted in Maloof, 40.

⁶³ Htun, "Women's Participation..." 25; Matland and Taylor, 204.

⁶⁴ Saint-Germain, "Paths to Power..." 135.

⁶⁵ Htun, "Women's Participation..." 18; Matland and Taylor, 204.

responsibilities.”⁶⁶ Chamorro failed to combat the gender stereotypes inherent in machismo society, yet her ability to win election in a region that had never before elected a female head of state signified the beginning of a new, more inclusive era of Latin American politics.⁶⁷

Future of Women’s Political Representation

Having discussed the intricacies of the various political systems in Costa Rica, Cuba, and Nicaragua, and the effects of the political systems on female representation, the future of women’s representation in these countries can now be addressed. The future for female politicians in Costa Rica appears promising. Matland and Taylor discovered a positive correlation between women’s representation and party magnitude in Costa Rica, concluding that women’s numbers in office would increase as they became more politically assertive.⁶⁸ Furthermore, since Costa Rica devotes a full quarter of its budget to education,⁶⁹ women will be able to attain higher levels of education and qualify in larger numbers for professional occupations, which tend to yield a disproportionate quantity of politicians.⁷⁰ Education also positively correlates with political participation, suggesting that as women pursue higher levels of education, they will become more likely to vote. Assuming women vote for female candidates, increased female voter turnout could increase the electoral successes of female candidates.⁷¹

Unlike Costa Rica, the future for female politicians in Nicaragua is more uncertain. Women’s participation in the labor force has increased from 26.7% in 1977 to 36% in 1995.⁷² Women’s membership in professional and political groups has also increased over the past years.⁷³ Furthermore, women of all political ideologies increasingly view politics and political action as effective methods of expressing their discontent.⁷⁴ However, Saint-Germain aptly notes that the FSLN, the Nicaraguan party most receptive to and supportive of women, was defeated and no longer enjoys its past popularity.⁷⁵ Other Nicaraguan parties proved less willing to support women’s political participation. With the FSLN no longer popular, female politicians may face a tough journey towards electoral success.

The fate of Cuban female politicians inevitably hinges on the political destiny of the country. Fidel Castro has wielded control for almost forty-two years now, and eventually, ill health, old age, or death will force him to relinquish his power. The effects a new leader will have on the country are unclear. Would Cuba remain a communist bastion or revert to an alternative political system? The downfall of communism in the former Soviet Union

⁶⁶ Metoyer, 47.

⁶⁷ The other two female presidents of Latin American countries, Estela de Peron of Argentina and Lidia Gueiler of Bolivia, were not elected to office, and served short terms before military coups ousted them from power (Craske, 60).

⁶⁸ Matland and Taylor, 206.

⁶⁹ Saint-Germain, “Paths to Power...” 121.

⁷⁰ Matland and Taylor, 240.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 239-240.

⁷² Metoyer, 5.

⁷³ Saint-Germain, “Paths to Power...” 134.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

resulted in a substantial decrease in female representation.⁷⁶ Rule discovered a fairly substantial 17% decrease in female legislators in six East European communist strongholds after the collapse of communism. The average of female representatives in these nations plummeted from 27% to 10% after the 1990 elections.⁷⁷ Based on the latest IPU statistics, the regional average of female parliamentarians of those countries rests at 13%, dropping to 9.42% when Germany is excluded.⁷⁸ A post-communist Cuba would likely experience similar results.

Thus, although Cuba outranks Costa Rica and Nicaragua in its percentage of female legislators, the percentage does not accurately reflect the miniscule impact the female politicians have on implementing or modifying legislation. Their roles are largely and unfortunately ceremonial only, since their lack of true political power precludes them from achieving substantive goals. The eradication of communism would likely result in a substantial decrease in female legislators; however, with the implementation of a proportional representation political system, women could gradually regain legislative seats and, with them, power to implement policy.

⁷⁶ Carol Nechemias, "Democratization and Women's Access to Legislative Seats: The Soviet Case, 1989-1991," *Women & Politics* 14.3 (1994): 2; Rule 22.

⁷⁷ Rule, 22. The six countries included were Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Russia.

⁷⁸ Rule's study included East Germany only and Germany's average of 30.9% female MP's far outnumbers the percentages of the other nations, suggesting that Germany's unification and the inclusion of West German statistics, and not East Germany's political system, is responsible for the high percentage of female MP's. Lower or single house percentages were used in this calculation. Upper house percentages (where available) were disregarded. In every applicable case, however, the percentages of female MP's in upper houses were lower than in lower houses, substantially so in Romania and the Russian Federation.

Machiavelli and Locke:
The Role of War in a State Wishing to Live in Liberty

Joanna Sabina Gedzior
Yale University

This article links Machiavelli's dynamic political philosophy with the refinement of Locke as functions of their overall perception of Liberty. Special detail is paid to Locke's recognition of the value of a pre-emptive action on the part of the people to secure and monopolize upon their liberty before there exists an opportunity for it to be restrained by the operative means of the government. This exhortation is subsequently contrasted with Machiavelli's instrumental provisions against excesses on the part of the ruling elite already in power over the people. Machiavelli's idea of perpetual conflict as the best disinfectant against tyranny of organized power is addressed. Later, part of this text qualifies the effectiveness of rule according to Locke and Machiavelli with respect to the elements of structure of government, its duration, liberty of its citizens and the willingness in the state to participate in war.

Introduction

The sharp contrast between Machiavelli's dynamic, powerful, and agency-capitalizing recognition of flaring conflict as a means for ultimate popular liberty, and the refined, withdrawn elegance of Locke's beautiful, liberal optimism may at first glance render the two philosophers ideologically incompatible. It is customary to meet frowning disapproval of many quick to judge the first as a notorious advisor to tyrants, while the other is thought to be a symbol of modern liberalism, a founder of political equality and toleration. In light of recent political scholarship, John Locke is interpreted as a humanist and political theorist concerned with the individuality of the human race and its application to the rise and fall of societies over time.¹ Lockean ideas have been proclaimed to be political theology, albeit removed from the heavily dogmatic tint so prevalent in the writings of philosophers who would have religiosity permeate all spheres of government. As advanced by Ellis Sandoz, civil theology and liberal democracy date back to Locke at least to some very significant extent. "Out of the experimental rubble of fragmented history, disintegrated philosophy, and faction-ridden Christianity, Locke created a scientific myth of man, society, and civil government."² It is precisely the tranquility of civil government that clashes with Machiavelli's tumultuous influx of forceful and active conflict of classes. Ingrained in scholarship to date is the idea of Machiavelli's orchestrated society forever prepared for war;

Author: Joanna Sabina Gedzior, joanna_gedzior@hotmail.com

¹ Ruth W. Grant, "Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism," *The Journal of Politics* 50 (February 1988): 44. Grant presents Lockean thought as an immediate issue of John Locke the author. Grant argues that Locke's ideas on tolerance, etc, stem from his interest in humanity, as evidenced in his fascination with travels and anthropological accounts of the exploration of the New World. Of particular significance in Locke's thought was his study of the organization of societies in lands unknown. Collectively, Grant argues, these influences were certainly not without value to Locke as he was composing his *Treatises*.

² Ellis Sandoz, "The Civil Theology of Liberal Democracy: Locke and His Predecessors," *The Journal of Politics* 34 (February 1972): 2-36.

what is missing from the critique of writers like Charles McCoy³ and Felix Gilbert⁴ is that this war in itself is not the chief goal of a Machiavellian society. “We find nothing about the desirability of peace; in *The Prince* and *Discourses* war appears as an inescapable, grandiose, and terrifying force.”⁵ While the above interpretation is no doubt correctly applied to the *immediate* literal argument of Machiavelli, it lacks the realization that it is the *process* of instigating and resolving conflict, not infrequently through war, that invigorates popular liberty of the people.

Drawing from the scholarship contained in the above works, I will elaborate and extrapolate on the above conclusions to reconcile what may seem two divergent strains of political thought. It is the goal of this article to convince that there is indeed an unifying theme in the writings of the two fascinating thinkers; that this theme centers on their advocacy and extolment of popular liberty and the common good. This paper is divided into three parts,⁶ each addressing the three crucial points, which coherently support the above thesis. First, the structure of each society will be discussed in terms of its applicability to the propagation of liberty, as well as to its justification and treatment of Law of the land. Second, the role of War in establishing this liberty and promoting said Law will be investigated. Part Three will address dissolution of government and its impact on the future of society, and therefore, on the longevity of liberty of the people living within it. Through this approach, I will argue that while both Locke and Machiavelli value concern for liberty at the supreme level, they employ different methods for its attainment. Locke presents a system where people fight for their liberty *ere* it be taken away by the government, because “...men can never be secure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it, till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it but to prevent it.”⁷ By contrast, Machiavelli offers a relief for the people as they *already* are, to borrow from Locke, ‘perfectly under’ tyranny.⁸ This idea is very articulately presented by McCoy, who argues that “the evil in Machiavelli is not, as was commonly thought, that he favored the rule of a despot, but it is that the rule of a republic, which he favored was no different from the rule of a despot.” This still is not the complete representation of Machiavelli’s political thought, and it needs to be taken a step further. Stopping here, we would not give Machiavelli credit for delineating, consciously or not, the meticulous checks of the power of this nebulous ‘despotic republic.’ Just as Locke advances explicit preventive measures to secure Liberty, so Machiavelli, in his blinding love of Rome, does not fail to instill his work with more subtle, implicit avenues of action for the people whose liberty is constantly threatened in the precarious enterprise of a government.

³ Charles N.R. McCoy. “The Place of Machiavelli in the History of Political Thought,” *The American Political Science Review* 37 (August 1943): 626-641.

⁴ Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶ In order to be true to the Magic Flute (Masonic) scale of E flat, with three flats.

⁷ John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (London, Everyman Press, 1993), 220.

⁸ It may be argued that Machiavelli’s tyranny is no tyranny at all: after all, he liked to believe that Rome was a true Republic. However, the regime is like the reign of a tyrant, in the disguise of a representative popular government. The manipulations of the people by the nobles, their recruitment to fight wars, and finally the similar tone of his Republic-centered *Discourses* to that of *The Prince*, provide support to the above advanced supposition.

Development

Structure of the State

“But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence.”⁹ Thus begins a rather memorable passage in which Locke presents the foundation of what it means to be incorporated into a society. This incorporation is always voluntary, because it is prompted by each individual’s concern for his property, where property is not protected in the state of nature. Reason teaches men to combine into units of organized government, where Law reigns supreme. The underlying validation of such Law is the consent of the governed, which again results from the people’s anxiety for their life, possessions, and liberty when left unattended in the state of nature. By performing a classic cost-benefit analysis, men find it more to their individual favor to live under law of nature in a society. Indeed, “political societies are formed when free individuals agree to incorporate and establish a public authority to protect their property from the violence of other men.”¹⁰ Concern for material possessions is certainly a focal point in Locke, but it is by no means the most crucial one. His treatment of Liberty as even more important an element is of profound impact because it justifies the creation of a society. Here lies the originality of Locke in his political thought. According to William Dunning,

Locke departs from his predecessors and defines [liberty] ... as exemption, not from every rule save the individual’s arbitrary caprice, but from every rule save the law of nature. This law is conceived, thus, not as a limitation upon human freedom, but as an essential concomitant of it....¹¹

Law of nature is the ultimate limit of human government: no law can be rightfully passed and expected to be obeyed save one in accord with the law of nature. Moreover, Locke thus limits the individual in his own actions by submitting him to the constraints which naturally are set in place so men may live free from absolute and arbitrary exploitation. In a government operating in accord with the law of nature there is no avenue through which men may be oppressed by each other because a) oppressive laws (ideally) need not be followed and b) a higher force restrains all men from enslaving and destroying each other.

Machiavelli, working within the framework of his idolized Roman republic, cannot dismiss the ways and appropriations of the ruling class, the way Locke does. The nobles comprise the class of the senators, who are virtuous leaders of the intrepid republic. While the people may possess virtue by discernment and strength by their nature and numbers, it is always the individual patrician who is, at least in Machiavelli’s eyes, more fitting to command the masses. This leads to the many problems generated by such a government, namely, extravagant insolence of the aristocrats, persecution of the people, etc, with the effect of weakened internal stability. Machiavelli realizes the precarious nature of his regime

⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰ Grant, 44.

¹¹ William Dunning, “The Political Philosophy of John Locke,” *Political Science Quarterly* 20 (June 1905): 223-245.

and addresses it frequently in his works. In Book I of the *Discourses*, he notes the dangers of the “young nobles, to whom [the decemvir] ... gave the property of those they condemned: with such gifts the young men were corrupted, preferring as they did the licence granted them to the liberty for all.” Machiavelli does not overly lament this corruption. He is, instead, quick to investigate the many vents to popular frustration that exist in Rome, in order that the liberty of the people, which he equates almost always with the ability to participate within the political affairs of the Republic, is not permanently obliterated. Of essential importance is the ritual of public indictments, and their recognition as a legitimate channel for directing popular grievances. He specifically condemns as harmful private unsubstantiated accusations perpetuated by false rumours. The only way to legitimately resolve disputes is through open popular trials.¹² The chief advantage of the Roman judiciary is that it allows the people a popularly accepted method of conflict resolution. An impartial arbiter, or a body composed of such men, administers decisions so that his recommendation is accepted and executed. The society has a means of self-healing, which negates all temptation to introduce a foreign force through appeal, to remedy ills at home. There is nothing more subversive to the existing republic than the institution of “any other powerful stranger. ... For it will always happen that some such person will be called in by those of the Province who are discontented either through ambition or fear... and the weaker powers [i.e. the people] will side with him, moved thereto by the ill-will they bear towards ... [the senators] who ... [have] hitherto kept them in subjection.”¹³ While the above is excerpted from *The Prince*, its warning is equally applicable to a Republic, which houses within its bounds the same liberty-seeking people, and has instead of a prince a representative government. Machiavelli thus illustrates the necessity of supplying the people with just the minimum means of preserving their liberty, so that they are content with the government instituted above them, or, as in the Republic, with their (questionable) input.

The Element of War in Connection to Preservation of Liberty

In addition to and irrespective of the merits of the above mechanism, Machiavelli’s Rome has a much more ambitious project for resolution of the perpetual class-fueled antagonism. In his works “the world appears in permanent flux.”¹⁴ In order to disrupt the nobles in their complacent reign over the people, Rome risks its fortunes in on-going wars of territorial expansion. The system is so well established that soon it becomes self-feeding; the spoils of victory finance consecutive wars so that the republic’s treasury is untouched, if not augmented. Since Rome fills its armies with representatives of the most numerous class – chiefly, the plebeians – it needs their cooperation. Here is elucidated the Machiavellian check against excessive tyranny of the ruling class, any and all conflict between the people and the nobles centers on the semi-symbiotic relationship they have with each other. People comprise the army, a means for aggrandisement of the state, which the nobles, through their individual skill and virtue, lead to countless victories. Soon, Rome achieves not only stable republican control over her own subjects, but moreover enjoys such a reputation that “there

¹² Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 7 & 8.

¹³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (New York: Dover Publications, 1992), Chapter 3.

¹⁴ Pareto, *Makers of Modern Strategy*.

remained in all world neither prince nor republic that, individually or altogether, could oppose Roman forces.”¹⁵

In light of the above, one might ask a very significant question: why should the Roman nobles exercise any limits in their desires to oppress the people?¹⁶ The answer is very simple, and is not unlike Locke favouring man’s withdrawal from the State of nature and aggregation into society. In the *Treatises*, man does so, prompted by the capitalistic desire to protect and maximise his possessions, only by entering the society does he have a legitimate assurance that this, in fact, will be the case. Similarly, the Roman nobles want to conquer with the most expedient efficiency. To do so, they must confer liberty upon the people, because they realise that “states have never increased in dominions or in wealth save while they lived in liberty.”¹⁷ According to McCoy, liberty “is ordained to the acquisition of power, but power for the people. ... In the light of the *Discourses*, Machiavelli’s prince is clearly seen as an artist whose work it is to bring the people out of their lethargic state, out of their weak corruption” and, by himself being virtuous he secures the liberty of the people themselves. By the ‘prince,’ one may also understand the nobles – senators – in Rome, as they are on a parallel level to the prince in a republican political framework. The people-nobles combination thus strives to reinforce mutual benefits within the one body politic. Call to war, instigated by the nobles (senators, alternatively consuls) aggregates the people into momentous armies with unsurpassed conquering abilities. War is instigated only for a marked period of the year, the remainder of which gives the consul ample time to “enjoy a triumph.”¹⁸ With the appointment of a new consular pair, new wars are waged and the cycle continues. The ordeal of warfare in the mother republic obliterates all marks of the people’s lethargy and the citizens awaken to active participation within the political system. Since “the voice of the people is compared with that of God,”¹⁹ its tribune-mediated exercise in turn contributes to the health of the republic as a whole. Machiavelli narrates countless examples of the people not being deceived in matters of particular importance,²⁰ which wisdom, lacking among the denser nobles, catalyzes the passage of just laws and the overall stability and greatness of Rome. It must be accented, however, that the people alone are incapable of being activated to comprehend their instrumentality within the government, only ritualistic wars animate the desire to participate.

Machiavelli has devised a system where there exists continuous conflict between the two humours, representative of the people and the nobles. Liberty from oppression, is a mutual goal for both, being the chief goal of the one, and a means for military conquest for the other. However, both parties are essential to its fruition and are prompted by different incentives. The whole is a beautifully complementary body politic that is only achieved through constant conflict between its parts. In the absence of one part, the mechanism shuts down and liberty perishes at the delight of rising tyranny.

¹⁵ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, Book 2 Chapter 1

¹⁶ That they will want to oppress is taken for granted by Machiavelli; for there exists two kinds of humours in the society: those who oppress and those who wish not to be oppressed. These ideas and their derivatives permeate both *The Prince* and *Discourses*.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Chaper 2.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Book 1 Chapter 7.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Book 1 Chapter 58.

²⁰ Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Book I Chapter 47.

In Locke's philosophy, a state resorting to war loses its mandate of authority over its subjects. Legitimate government is a response to the people's desire to quit the state of war and organise into an ordered and peaceful society. War in itself is a characteristic of the state of nature and as such opposes the above definition of government. A warring state has lost the popular consent, because by employing force it violates fundamental rules of maintaining a peaceful state in which men's lives, property, and liberty are not threatened. A state of war precludes the existence of a legitimate government, because the only reason men succumb to its authority in the first place is to avoid war. Once violent conflict ensues, the contract with the people is broken, and all retort back to the state of nature to enjoy unlimited personal freedom and liberty. In Locke's words: "to avoid this state of war ... is one great reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of nature. For where there is an authority ... from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded."²¹ This happens only when a government freely consented to by the people appoints magistrates who are empowered to resolve disputes in a way that does not place any man at the absolute arbitrary power of another. Men govern themselves so that slavery, the fundamental opposite of liberty, is nowhere in effect. Not having the ultimate authority over their own lives, men cannot rightfully enter themselves in bondage to another. Locke's state does not for a moment allow for the possibility that there exists ties of obligation that bind one man to another, beyond the expectations of free coexistence that the law of nature imposes equally on all. Participation in battle, therefore, is the ultimate breach of the Lockean understanding of governance. Not only does war place the life, liberty, and property of citizens at the mercy of arbitrarily executed violence, it also marks the failure of the government whose only legitimate role is to prevent it.

Alternatively, "the state of war may exist as well in civil society as in the natural state of man, and it does appear whenever attempts are made upon one's life, liberty or property by force."²² Wars of aggression instigated by a Lockean government, by definition, nullify said government's rightful existence. A defensive war, however, may be justified to some extent. In his *Second Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke writes that men "have no other end of their society, but their mutual defense against their common enemies. In these, the captain, or prince, is sovereign commander in time of war; but in time of peace, neither he nor anybody else has any authority over any society." While Locke may hesitantly recognise the actuality of an enemy intrusion upon the above described consented government,²³ he still devises the most limiting restrictions on any hints of authoritative power emerging in his cherished free state.

The temporary endowment of a prince in command of a society parallels Machiavelli's benevolent dictator in Rome at times of a great crisis. Here lies, perhaps, the greatest natural convergence of both philosophers. Throughout his writings Locke defines the many restraints that law of nature imposes on earthly government. In his treatment of a prince in time of defensive war, he stays true to this trend and only allows so much solitary

²¹ Ibid., Chapter 21.

²² Dunning, 231.

²³ One must recognise that his native England, being an island state, was significantly less vulnerable to outside attack than the countries within the continental Europe. This might explain but does not justify England's excessive claims to territorial expansion symbolised in the years after Locke with the proud proclamation that "the sun does not set on the British Empire."

power to one man as is needed to reinforce and defend the consented government predicated by internal security and peace. Machiavelli is not as liberal in his enumeration of the checks on concentrated power throughout his political discourses; however, on the question of dictatorship in the Roman republic, he responds with the most meticulous care to stress the temporary nature of the office. The timing and institution of the dictator coincides with consensus within the republic's entire ruling body on the point that such a figure does indeed need to assume complete leadership. Because the consuls must first recognise the need for dictatorship in order for the senators to actually appoint him, the circumstances must be grave indeed for anyone involved to willingly transfer power to a solitary actor. The potential danger facing the republic as it sacrifices its liberty to one ruler is so great, that only the purest necessity justifies this action. Here Machiavelli is quite concurrent with Locke, who would only grant any temporal power over his state to a prince in a time where destruction by an enemy is imminent. It is quite interesting to observe Machiavelli enumerate the impediments to unitary rule in Book I, Chapter 34 of the *Discorsi*, especially when contrasted with the encouraging recommendation for such rule in *The Prince*. The dictator may only be "named for a fixed period ... and only to deal with the problem that caused him to be appointed. ... [while in office] he could do nothing to curtail the government, such as taking authority away from the senate or from the people, or abolishing the city's old institutions and creating new ones." The defensive war supervised by the dictator is not a return to the state of nature, nor does it totally disregard it. Rather, war in the above context is a tool for maximising the efficiency of the executive in times when, lack thereof, would lead the people even more surely to bondage under the enemy's tyranny.

Dissolution of the Government

If Machiavelli offers a very intricate self-checking scheme for maximum popular liberty, what limits or sanctions does Locke advance to achieve the equivalent vitality of autonomy? Upon initial consideration, Locke does not need to remedy any significant intrusions against the people's sovereignty because his government is only sanctioned so long as it upholds its role of safeguarding individual property. However, Locke is so concerned with downsizing the power and extent of government that he does delineate a course for dissolution of this body politic in cases where popular liberty has been critically threatened. The possibility of invalidating the existing ruling structure comes from the notion that a government draws its justification only from the consent of the people. This implies that the existence of government is predicated on the people's support of it, with diminishing support the validity of the government is likewise lessened to the point where no support, or alternatively no consent equates with the end of the government's rightful existence. At this moment, and only after "great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, [and finally a succession of] abuses, prevarications, and artifices all tending the same way" the people rouse themselves from the stupor of oppression and rebel against it.²⁴

The government's break of natural continuity does not automatically shift people back into the state of nature however. It signifies only the discontinuity of a government no longer fulfilling its sacred obligations as per the law of nature. People in such a state reorganise and

²⁴ Locke, 225.

regroup in efforts to obliterate the old and institute a new government based on their mutual consent. “This overruling power of the ... civil society ... is conceived by Locke as ordinarily dormant, becoming active only when the government is dissolved. It is a cardinal point in his system that government may be dissolved while the society remains intact.”²⁵ The society does not regress to the state of nature where precariousness of property reigns supreme. Instead, “the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislature, differing from the other ... as they shall find it most for their safety and good.”²⁶ Here Locke completes his progression of the government’s duration. He starts this series with man’s communal realisation of governmental utility to guard property from attacks of others. Collective consent of the governed promotes the chief object of implementing and enforcing law of nature. Any and all deviation from this role is a direct result from the decisions of magistrates to place some men under absolute arbitrary rule of others. This in turn diminishes the government’s authority to a point where a prolonged abuse of its power renders it obsolete and no longer responsive to the needs of the people. Just as they are vested with the building initiative to establish a government and emerge from the state of nature, the same agency is given the people to resist the mistreatment they suffer by the government. Temporary obliteration of the government borders on a reentry to the state of nature and is a liminal period which ends with the re-institution of a new structure better equipped to fulfill the role of authority within the ramifications of law of nature. The new government functions with the consent of the people as long as it does not breach this implied contract, at which point a new revolution may occur. Thus the Lockean theoretical cycle is complete.

According to Machiavelli, there is no end to Rome more ignominious than the introduction of a Caesar. It would be the worst kind of nightmare to allow a republic to sink into the rule of one man, who tends to the preservation of his own property and places the publico bono at the very bottom of his priority scale. The progression from a republic to a principality signifies the very end of popular liberty and the failure of popular virtue to prevent the enthronement of a tyrant. Notwithstanding all the twenty-six chapters of Machiavelli’s conciliatory measures of a prince, the three books and one hundred forty two chapters devoted to a republican rule testify to his clear predilection for the later form of authority. One can only imagine his distress at the passing of his native Florence into the hands of the princely Medici, which despair might in some way excuse him from attempting to please them with his offer of *The Prince*.²⁷ Machiavelli’s republic is maintained by the opposing forces of people and nobles, which forces act on a non-zero sum game level in a matrix, where the individual good of each party is perpetuated and multiplied by the cooperation of the other. The people’s virtue only manifests itself when prompted by the oppressive tendencies of the nobles. The nobles, on the other hand, holding the sole monopoly of individual virtue, direct their agencies at the preservation of the body politic of the republic. One reinforces the other through a brilliantly devised scheme of checks and

²⁵ Dunning, 241.

²⁶ Locke, 220.

²⁷ Unless, of course, he had ulterior motives for doing so. Machiavelli wrote that if the “enemy is committing a gross error, it should be assumed that there is a trick behind it” (*Discourses*, Book III Chapter 48). In light of the above, should one consider Machiavelli an enemy of the Medici, his ‘error’ of appeasing them with his work can only be seen as a means of inducing their fall? The validity of the conspiracy theory involving Machiavelli and Lorenzo de Medici is left to the evaluation and imagination of the reader.

balances. In times of a crisis, the republic elects a dictator but only while exerting the strongest pressures against his subverting the government to suit his personal needs. The republic purges itself of conflict during the temporary reign of a dictator who has every incentive to relinquish his title at the swift resolution of the disharmony that has empowered him. An end to republican government comes about only at a time when a military dictator, such as Caesar, assumes total authority and rules with the object of satisfying his personal needs at the expense of the republic, and, consequently, at the demise of popular liberty.

Institution of a tyrant marks the end of the tumultuous republic and Machiavelli does not provide instructions for a 180 degree return to the republican status quo. The only way for a republic to be re-founded is the overthrow of the prince, which may be accomplished through a variety of means if the tyrant has the misfortune of being hated and despised by his subjects.²⁸ Even if the prince is vanquished, however, a virtuous leader may found a republic only in a city where princely corruption has not permeated his subjects. If this is not yet the case, there is some hope to rescue the principality and bring it back to the bounty of a viable republic. By contrast, only the most severe means can be employed if the corruption of the prince has leaked far into the foundation of the city. To quote Machiavelli, "I shall assume that the city in question is extremely corrupt, which will further increase this difficulty [of creating a free government within its borders], because neither laws nor institutions will be found in it sufficient to check universal corruption."²⁹ The wish to avoid this difficulty is precisely the driving force behind Machiavelli's many channels that prevent the republic from disintegrating into a principality, which channels his regard for popular liberty and is of paramount significance.

Conclusion

States seeking models of government should not find solutions wanting. With regard to popular liberty, the range of choices available covers anything from Machiavelli's inclusive, dynamic liberty to Locke's refined, perfect balance of freedom within a state. Yet it appears that friction is an element common to both designs. In the first, the price of liberty is so high that only a constant state of war seems sufficient to cover initial down payments on it. In the second, the will of the people to resist an oppressive government is often too weak to effectively induce change.³⁰ In between reality and theory lies a vast stretch of vacancy into which men skilled at command enter and lead their states according to their own perceptions of liberty. The agency of those surrounding such a solitary figure, be it the senators within the republic or the commoners in the state of magistrates, often proves to have instrumental influence on the extent of his actions.

In the pragmatic world, where reality often successfully battles theory, the question remaining to be asked is not how much Liberty people might enjoy, but rather, what is the chance that Liberty will in the end triumph over Tyranny? Leaving the reader to ponder the above, I will take whatever liberty I might welcome in the composition of this project and

²⁸ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Chapter XIX.

²⁹ Machiavelli, *Discourses*, Book I Chapter 18

³⁰ As Grant points out: "... practically, Locke's problem is to encourage men to be sensitive to abuses of power and to be watchful of their rulers. Men are likely to be too obedient. This impression is confirmed by the discussion of resistance at the end of the *Second Treatise*." [discussed on previous pages] (Grant, 56)

present a view of politics espoused by a wealthy Florentine pater familias, Machiavelli's contemporary - Leon Battista Alberti:³¹

Lionardo: Do you, by chance, use the word honor [onore] as some of our fellow citizens do, to signify holding public office and being in the government?

Giannozzo: Far from it ... There is nothing I think which a man should consider further from enhancing his honor than his participation in all these governments. ... I have always thought any other way of life preferable to that of all these public men, as we might call them. Who can help being repelled by such a life? A life of worries, anxieties, and burdens, a life of servitude. ...

There you are, seated in office. What does your advantage there consist of but this: you can now steal and use violence with some degree of liberty.

You hear complaints, innumerable accusations, great disturbances, and you are personally beset by litigants, avaricious creatures, and men of the grossest injustice who fill your ears with suspicions, your soul with greed, and your mind with fear and trouble. ... The madness of men – who think so much of going heralded by trumpets ... – is that they abandon domestic tranquility and true peace of mind.”³²

³¹ Leon Battista Alberti, (1406-1472), one of the major figures of the Renaissance, an elaborator of mathematical perspective and theoretician of art. www.mega.it/eng/egui/pers/lbalber.htm. In his third book on family, Alberti, through the figure of Giannozzo, answers questions posed to him by the youths of his family. Of particular interest are his answers regarding politics (as given above), fortune, and women.

³² Leon Battista Alberti, *The Family in Renaissance Florence Book 3* (Prospect Height, Ill: Waveland Press, 1994).

