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Editor’s Preface to the Fall 2008 Edition

We are pleased to present the Fall 2008 edition of The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics. This is the ninth edition of the Journal sponsored by Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society, and the sixteenth edition since initial publication.

There are many people we wish to recognize. First, we would like to thank the Pi Sigma Alpha Executive Council and the Executive Committee, particularly President James Campbell, Executive Director James Lengle and Administrator Nancy McManus. The Journal would not be possible without these dedicated individuals. Additionally, we wish to acknowledge all of the faculty Advisory Board and Editorial Board members, as well as Dr. Kira Sanbonmatsu for serving as a guest member of the Advisory Board. It is their continual dedication and efforts that make the Journal a reality. Finally, we express our gratitude for the unending guidance and enthusiasm of our Faculty Advisor, Zoe Oxley.

This Fall 2008 issue marks our first one as Editors of the Journal. We hope that you will continue to promote this important outlet for undergraduate political science research with your fellow students and colleagues.

Thank you.

The Editors
Submission of Manuscripts

*The Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Journal of Politics* welcomes submissions from undergraduates of any class or major; submissions from Pi Sigma Alpha members are especially encouraged. Our goal is to publish manuscripts of the highest quality. In general, papers selected for publication have been well-written with a well-developed thesis, compelling argument, and original analysis. The maximum page length for submissions is 35 pages. Manuscripts should include an abstract of approximately 150 words. Citations and references should follow the American Political Science Association *Style Manual for Political Science*. Authors may be asked to revise their manuscript before it is accepted for publication. Submissions must be in the form of a Microsoft Word document and should be e-mailed to psajournal@union.edu. Please include name, university, and contact details (i.e., mailing address, e-mail address, and phone number).
Technology and Intelligence: A Strategic and Tactical Analysis

Second Lieutenant Michael Snelgrove, United States Air Force Academy

Due to the increase in technological intelligence-gathering capabilities, military forces and civilian agencies have struggled to fully understand the changing nature of intelligence. The result of this struggle has been an overreliance on technology in intelligence-gathering on the tactical and strategic levels. On the tactical level, the limitations of technology have caused problems in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially in counterinsurgency efforts. On the strategic level, the influence of technology is most evident in the post-Cold War transformation of the CIA, which has resulted in faulty intelligence. The most effective intelligence is often the result of a combination of sources and technological assets offering innovative methods that can be utilized to gain important intelligence. However, until the United States dedicates itself to increasing its human intelligence capabilities and relying less on technology, the current imbalance in the intelligence community will continue to misguide the country down a dangerous path.

More than one hundred and seventy years ago, Prussian general Karl von Clausewitz addressed the limitations of intelligence during wartime. Broadly referring to intelligence as information, Clausewitz (2000, 319) discussed its “unreliability and uncertainty.” Clausewitz clearly cautioned against a reliance on intelligence when making decisions. He stated that a “great part of information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is somewhat doubtful” (Clausewitz 2000, 319). He emphasized this concept throughout his work, asserting that the fog and friction of war are inevitable. For Clausewitz, perhaps the greatest military strategist in history, the uncertainty of intelligence is to be acknowledged and managed, but not eliminated.

Since Clausewitz’s death in 1831, revolutionary changes have occurred in the realm of intelligence. While nineteenth century European armies relied mainly on scouts and spies, technological

*The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
advances in the past one hundred and seventy-seven years have completely altered intelligence gathering, especially within the United States. The most significant of these advances has occurred in the last fifty years, spurred by the massive intelligence requirements of the Cold War. Reconnaissance satellites and surveillance aircraft now provide real-time electronic and imagery information to military forces and civilian agencies with almost complete global coverage. As a result of this exponential improvement in technological intelligence gathering capabilities, military and civilian agencies in the United States have struggled to fully understand the changing nature of intelligence. The result of this struggle has been an overreliance on technology in intelligence gathering on both the tactical and strategic levels, as well as the common misconception that technology can dissipate the fog of war. Solving these issues requires a significant improvement in our current human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.

Tactical Level

On the tactical level, the impact of technology on intelligence remains most evident in contemporary United States military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are two main reasons for this. First, the cultural and language barriers that exist between the United States military forces and the local populations of the closed societies in Iraq and Afghanistan are overwhelming (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 2005, 366; hereafter WMD Commission). As a result, it has been extremely difficult to gain information from the local populace and infiltrate insurgent organizations using conventional methods. However, human intelligence is often the most valuable type and should not be abandoned simply because of the difficulty in attaining it. Second, technological advances now offer military forces a vast array of capabilities, including real-time video coverage and communications interception. The military has sought to integrate these technologies into its operations. Unfortunately, rather than using technology as a force multiplier, the military has become dependent on it for many aspects of mission planning and execution (Naylor 2005, 307-308). While dependency on technology has increased, HUMINT remains underutilized.

Adapting to the varying customs and courtesies of Arab
countries is often difficult and time consuming. It is part of Arab tradition to temporarily abandon local grudges in order to expel a foreign invader. This prevents United States’ forces from gaining valuable information from feuding factions. Furthermore, gaining the trust of local civilians is nearly impossible in many instances due to tribal and familial loyalties. In circumstances when military forces are able to extract information, terrorists use threats and violence to prevent any further sharing of information from the local population. These barriers present a large obstacle to intelligence gathering capabilities, making it much more difficult to obtain reliable HUMINT. Even when collected, military and CIA personnel often view intelligence gained from human sources as less reliable (Naylor 2005, 157).

However, the information gained from human sources, when reliable, is often the most important. In February 2002, a variety of United States military forces in Afghanistan began planning for the largest operation since the start of the invasion, Operation Anaconda. In doing so, the forces initially relied heavily on HUMINT. For example, CIA efforts ranged from questioning “locals who approached the safe house looking to trade information for cash to hiring more traditional spies among the … population” (Naylor 2005, 74). Some of the best information collected came from shopkeepers, shepherds and taxi drivers, as al-Qaeda relied heavily on these occupations for logistics. These sources proved “invaluable” for mission planning (Naylor 2005, 77).

HUMINT also produced critical tactical intelligence. Just days prior to the start of Operation Anaconda, the CIA gathered crucial intelligence on the location and strength of the local terrorist force targeted by United States military forces. A CIA source had “divulged a treasure trove of information that would have significantly changed the outlook of those” responsible for planning the mission (Naylor 2005, 156). Once again, HUMINT provided time-sensitive and accurate information. Unfortunately, the intelligence was not disseminated, possibly due to the fact that it contradicted intelligence gained from satellite and aircraft reconnaissance.

Beyond the difficulties of collecting accurate human intelligence, the increasing ability to gain information from technological sources has heavily influenced efforts to gather HUMINT. Before the introduction of satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, HUMINT was the main method of collecting intelligence.
Currently, however, technology offers a wide array of options, many of which can substitute in part for HUMINT. The tendency to use technological means to gather intelligence and the subsequent overreliance on it at the expense of HUMINT is the result of the growing capability of technology. Also, many politicians and citizens prefer cleaner and less risky methods of intelligence collection, further supporting the use of technological assets.

We witnessed the epitome of this transition during the initial insertions of Operation Anaconda. Contrary to conventional practices of relying on satellites and aircraft, three reconnaissance teams traveled on foot very near the enemy positions in order to view the valley in which the operations would take place. One of the recon teams discovered a heavy machine gun and guard post directly on the route that several helicopters planned to take just days ahead. The military and CIA collected a significant amount of imagery on the area before inserting the reconnaissance teams, but the heavy machine gun and guard post were not identified. As an embedded Operation Anaconda reporter later wrote, “this was a lesson for anyone who thought the U.S. military’s billions of dollars’ worth of spy satellites and surveillance aircraft obviated the need for ground reconnaissance” (Naylor 2005, 174). Fortunately, the recon teams were able to gather the intelligence needed to save the operation before it started, without relying exclusively on satellite imagery and reconnaissance aircraft.

In another instance during Operation Anaconda, one commander used last minute technological capabilities as a substitute for a lack of prior planning. In order to clear landing zones for his team’s infiltration, a Navy Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) commander relied on an AC-130 for this purpose. The AC-130 pilots “scanned both landing zones with their sensors and pronounced each LZ [landing zone] secure” (Naylor 2005, 310). Unfortunately, when a helicopter landed on the supposedly safe LZ, an enemy presence was immediately apparent. Rather than proceeding through the usual process of intelligence collection before an insertion, a rash decision was made to simply rely on aerial coverage. A special operator in Afghanistan, highlighting the larger cultural change, stated that “the special ops community has gotten so that we can’t go in now unless a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] … or an AC-130 is looking” at the insertion point (Naylor 2005, 307).

Military forces in Iraq are also encountering difficulties when using technological advances, such as UAVs and satellite coverage,
to fight urban insurgents. There are two main issues with these technologies. First, although satellites have wide viewing angles, they are not continuously on scene. Second, UAVs are limited by their “slow flight and relatively small peripheral vision … especially in urban environments” (Fulghum 2003, 20-22). As a result, Army generals have been stressing the growing importance of HUMINT, hoping to combine HUMINT successfully with other intelligence mechanisms. However, the remarks of Major General Raymond Odierno, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, still reflect the emphasis placed primarily on technology; General Odierno’s “point is that human intelligence is needed to quickly fill in the blank spots left by UAV and other technical means of intelligence gathering” (Fulghum 2003, 20-22). Instead, UAVs and satellites should fill in the blank spots left by HUMINT. The explicit predisposition in favor of technological intelligence assets is dangerous, as the ability to collect intelligence from the local population in a counterinsurgency role is indicative of the overall effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort.

Specifically relating to intelligence in counterinsurgency warfare, technology has significant limitations. As witnessed by the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, technological capabilities can only paint so much of the picture. Discussing the influence of technology on Soviet unconventional warfare, Air Force Colonel Edward Westermann (1999, 11) highlighted its limitations:

Technology cannot determine which person or persons, in a household of five or fifteen, are sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause. Nor can technology accurately predict the impact of a given military operation, or bombing strike, in either catalyzing increased opposition or breaking the enemy’s will to fight. In the unconventional arena, technology remains a tool, and not a guarantee for success.

The United States’ current experience in Iraq suffers from the same overreliance on technology. The lack of solid HUMINT is supported by the fact that about seventy-five percent of “suspected insurgents being held at … facilities run at the military brigade and division levels” are released within a few days of arriving.*

Despite limited contemporary examples of the effective use of HUMINT, the overall situation on the tactical level indicates an overreliance on technology. The military’s experience during the initial invasion of Afghanistan exemplifies this reality, as technological assets played the primary role in intelligence gathering. Furthermore, the attitude of the SEAL commander also indicates the belief that intelligence gained from satellites and aircraft makes the battle space transparent. This perception directly contrasts with Clausewitz’s ideas on fog and friction. Unfortunately, many of the lives lost during Operation Anaconda could have been saved if technology had not been used as the primary and unfailing source of intelligence.

**Strategic Level**

On the strategic level, the overreliance on the capabilities of technology is most evident in the transformation of the CIA since the end of the Cold War and in the failure to accurately assess both the status of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the subsequent emergence of an insurgency. In the post-Cold War era, the CIA increasingly relied on technological advancements for its intelligence gathering requirements, neglecting the craft of HUMINT and strategic analysis (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 91; hereafter 9/11 Commission). The effects of the CIA’s transformation became blatantly apparent in the years following the invasion of Iraq, as the validity of the CIA’s prewar estimates came into question. As a result, CIA leadership “is aggressively exploring new human intelligence methods” (WMD Commission 2005, 370).

Unlike the current global war on terrorism, the Cold War offered an extremely predictable and slow paced environment for intelligence gathering. However, with the recent change to “a more fluid international environment with uncertain, changing goals and interests,” the CIA has emphasized speed over accuracy when creating intelligence reports (9/11 Commission 2004, 91). Satellite imagery and signals intelligence provided much more utility in such an environment, as recruiting and gaining useful information from human sources proved to be a slow and often frustrating process. As a result, the more timely collection of intelligence resulted in increased use of technological assets compared to HUMINT. We saw this transformation in 1995 when the CIA Clandestine Service
only trained twenty-five new officers. Not surprisingly, these new officers had skill sets useful in the Cold War, “but were not equipped to seek or use assets inside the terrorist network” (9/11 Commission 2004, 90-92). In the aftermath of September 11th, “the total number of undergraduate degrees granted in Arabic in all U.S. colleges and universities in 2002 was six” (9/11 Commission 2004, 92). This severely limited the pool that the CIA could choose from, further hindering its ability to develop foreign intelligence sources in the Arab world.

The organizational culture of the CIA changed dramatically when confronted with the new global threat. Although the new environment provided several novel challenges, the adjustments made to correct the imbalance failed. Instead of attempting to raise the priority of HUMINT, CIA leadership decided technological advancements were key to understanding the changing environment. The pace of the transformation increased in the mid-1990s under CIA Director James Woolsey. In Woolsey’s previous employment, he served as “an arms control negotiator who depended on covert satellite photography” (Coll 2004, 245). As a result, instead of correcting the profound problems in the CIA’s clandestine office, Woolsey “concentrated on a campaign to refurbish the nation’s spy satellite system” (Coll 2004, 245). As satellite images replaced foreign contacts, the CIA’s ability to accurately assess international issues drastically decreased. In 1998, after nuclear testing by Pakistan and India completely surprised the United States, a subsequent report on intelligence ineffectiveness highlighted “the declining attention to the craft of strategic analysis” (9/11 Commission 2004, 91).

Career CIA clandestine officer Robert Baer witnessed the changes first-hand. For much of his career, Baer received all the necessary resources to recruit foreign contacts. However, in the 1990s, CIA leadership discouraged recruiting agents due to the paperwork and hassle that it entailed. He also cites a lack of political will to recruit human sources. Rather than risk the consequences of a failed recruitment, such as host nation hostility, the CIA increasingly favored much safer technological means. In his opinion, “the CIA had fallen in love with technology. The theory was that satellites, the Internet, [and] electronic intercepts … would tell us all we needed to know about what went on beyond our borders” (Baer 2002, xvii). Legitimate attempts made to recruit human sources and collect actionable intelligence were almost nonexistent in many of the
stations he visited. The CIA had effectively adopted a new policy, “Big ops, big problems. Small ops, small problems. No ops, no problems” (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 134.) As the 9/11 Commission Report (2004, 88) notes, “[d]espite the problems that technology creates, Americans’ love affair with it leads them to also regard it as a solution. But technology produces its best results when an organization has the doctrine, structure, and incentives to exploit it.” The CIA lacked just that.

Even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a continued lack of HUMINT capabilities hampered the United States’ ability to make sound decisions. Politicians relied heavily on intelligence estimates of Iraq’s WMD capability prior to the invasion. These estimates were found to contain an enormous number of errors. Furthermore, the United States’ inability to accurately predict the emergence of an Iraqi insurgency highlighted failures to gain a true understanding of the conditions on the ground, a direct result of underdeveloped HUMINT assets and cultural understanding.

In analyzing the state of Iraq’s WMD program, the intelligence agencies failed in three separate areas – the nuclear program, the biological program and the chemical program. Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the question of Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability was at the forefront of the intelligence community. However, there was a severe lack of information on both Iraq’s intentions and capabilities. Unfortunately, the majority of past intelligence collected on Iraq was not focused on its nuclear capability, “a second priority for the overstretched U.S. intelligence network” (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 80). While the United States had an abundance of information on Iraq’s air defenses and communications network, “it did not have an effective network of intelligence operatives and spies” that could have provided valuable intelligence on its nuclear program (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 80). A 1998 assessment noted similar conditions, stating that “there was limited and often contradictory human intelligence reporting on Iraqi nuclear efforts” (WMD Commission 2005, 54). The failure to draw reliable conclusions also indicates the difficulty of overcoming the inherent uncertainty of limited human sources. As a result, intelligence organizations had only a rough idea of the status of Iraq’s nuclear program.

The inability of technological intelligence assets to provide insight into the nuclear program compounded the problem. As noted in a report by a commission on the WMD intelligence failures,
technology provided little help in assessing the nuclear program. The report stated that “although signals intelligence played a key role in some respects … on the whole it was not useful. Similarly, though imagery intelligence showed some construction at a possible suspect nuclear site in or around 2000, imagery provided little helpful insight into the purpose of that activity and nothing beyond that” (WMD Commission 2005, 65). Only a robust network of human sources and foreign contacts could have provided insight into the true intentions of the nuclear program. However, United States intelligence agencies were most deficient in this area. As a result, analysts had to rely heavily on their own opinions, without the benefit of additional sources of information. Unfortunately, many of these opinions proved incorrect.

The problems associated with the biological warfare estimate prior to the invasion of Iraq stemmed from the degraded state of HUMINT. As Robert Baer (2002, 181) noted, just “three years after scores of nations and more than half a million coalition forces had gone to war against Saddam Hussein, the CIA didn’t have a single source in Iraq … [or] in the neighboring countries … who reported on Iraq.” Absent multiple sources within Saddam Hussein’s regime, United States intelligence agencies overwhelmingly relied on a single source’s information in the creation of their intelligence reports. Even without direct contact with the source (a foreign intelligence agency ran the source), the Defense HUMINT division chief was “shocked” by discussion regarding the source’s reliability (WMD Commission 2005, 89). Unfortunately, the information gained from the source was indeed false. In response, the commission on United States WMD intelligence (2005, 110) stated that “we need more and better human intelligence,” so that we are not relying on a single source.

The inaccuracy of intelligence reports on the chemical weapons capability of Iraq highlights two main problems regarding technology’s influence on intelligence. First, the limitations of imagery intelligence became blatantly obvious. United States intelligence agencies were able to collect imagery of suspected Iraqi chemical facilities and identify the presence of Samarra-type trucks.†

†Samarra-type trucks are “a distinctive type of tanker truck … which were regularly associated with CW [chemical warfare] shipments in the late 1980s and during the Gulf War (WMD Commission 2005, 117)” They are mentioned extensively in the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Although these trucks were capable of carrying chemical warfare shipments, they also had other uses. While the images successfully established the presence of the Samarra-type trucks, they were completely useless in determining the contents of the trucks. Analysts incorrectly assumed Iraq was using the trucks for chemical weapons transportation. In this case, effective HUMINT was the best means of gaining knowledge on the contents of the Samarra-type trucks, a capability the intelligence community did not have.

Second, many analysts did not “understand fully the limitations of technical collection,” and were unable to accurately create reports based on these assets (WMD Commission 2005, 122). After the discovery of activity around several suspected chemical sites, satellite imagery collection increased in order to obtain more precise intelligence. However, analysts misinterpreted the increase in the collection as an increase in activity at the site. According to the commission on the WMD intelligence (2005, 125), prior to the invasion of Iraq, “to only somewhat oversimplify the matter, it wasn’t that the Iraqis were using Samarra trucks more often in 2002 – it was that in 2002 the United States was taking more pictures of places where the Samarra trucks were being used.” This example demonstrates that a more thorough understanding of the limitations of imagery intelligence is clearly required.

The limitations of technological assets in accurately predicting the emergence of an insurgency are also significant. The Iraq Study Group Report (2006) addresses this issue in great detail, highlighting the need for immediate changes, two of which are noteworthy. First, the Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community need to place more emphasis on non-technological intelligence assets. In preparing for the war, Saddam Hussein dispatched heavily armed, autonomous Fedayeen units all over the country to quell any local rebellions. These units also served as paramilitary enclaves to defend against the American invasion force. A comprehensive summary on the invasion of Iraq viewed U.S. intelligence efforts as a major failure:

Saddam’s Baath Emergency Plan was a profound evolution in Iraq’s security forces, but the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition was not detected by spy satellites and the U.S. intelligence community missed the significance of the Fedayeen organization. It was a striking omission … but understandable given the CIA’s dearth of human sources
and overreliance on satellite and other forms of reconnaissance (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 62).

The situation has yet to improve. At the time of The Iraqi Study Group Report (2006, 94), a senior commander estimated that HUMINT in Iraq is roughly at a third of its full capacity.

Second, the DOD and intelligence agencies must allocate resources that aid in understanding the insurgency. While Congress allocated $2 billion to study improvised explosive devices in 2006, there was not a similar “request to invest comparable resources in try[ing] to understand the people who fabricate, plant, and explode these devices” (The Iraq Study Group 2006, 94). Furthermore, the Defense Intelligence Agency contained fewer than ten analysts with two or more years of experience studying the insurgency. Clearly, intelligence agencies are “not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and provincial level” (The Iraq Study Group 2006, 94). As the report also notes, “an essential part of better [human] intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills” (The Iraq Study Group 2006, 94). This mirrors the discussion of the 9/11 Commission: the lack of language and cultural skills was a major problem in preventing the 2001 terrorist attacks as well. Once again, the focus on technology limited the effectiveness of United States’ intelligence gathering.

As mentioned in the discussion of technological limitations on the tactical level, satellite imagery and signals intelligence have distinct and useful purposes. Unfortunately, these capabilities are not entirely useful in unconventional warfare. Colonel Westermann’s quotation applies just as much to the strategic level analysis of the counterinsurgency as it does to the tactical level. Despite the vast amount of technological assets dedicated to the invasion of Iraq, field commanders had to learn the most useful information on their own, due to HUMINT shortfalls. The best example of this includes the tactics that the insurgents used, from dressing as civilians to using cars as battering rams. As a reporter and retired general jointly wrote, “[t]he Iraq war is a story of … high-technology and cultural ignorance” (Gordon and Trainor 2006, xxxii).

Many of the intelligence failures prior to the invasion of Iraq were a direct result of the changing nature of the means employed to gather intelligence. Clearly, the intelligence on Iraq’s WMD capabilities was incorrect. The situation is much the same regarding the intelligence on the insurgency. Due to their nature, technological
assets have little usefulness in discerning political sentiments and attitudes. As a result, the emergence of a formidable insurgent force took many by surprise.

**Recommendations**

Despite recent failures on both the tactical and strategic levels by several DOD and civilian organizations, there are definite and reasonable ways in which the relationship between technology and intelligence can improve the United States’ ability to provide accurate and timely intelligence. Not surprisingly, the most effective path to improved intelligence gathering capabilities includes both a reemphasis on and restructuring of the country’s HUMINT practices and a decrease in the reliance on technological intelligence assets. These changes are not agency or organization specific, but require implementation across various intelligence agencies and departments in order to be most effective.

The DOD, much like the rest of the country, has spent recent years obsessed with technology. The service members participating in Operation Anaconda and in current operations in Iraq have learned this lesson the hard way. Relying heavily on satellite imagery, surveillance aircraft, and communications monitoring equipment, soldiers have often paid the price for faulty intelligence. A change needs to occur in order for intelligence capabilities to match the current threat faced by United States’ forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Regarding the CIA, a definite shift back to recruiting human sources from foreign countries is needed. The CIA needs to again focus on the street, by recruiting sources and gaining the intelligence that will prevent the next major attack from occurring. For Robert Baer (2002, 271), the decision is obvious:

> The CIA doesn’t have a choice but once again to go out and start talking to people – people who can go where it can’t, see what it can’t, and hear what it can’t. That’s the CIA I joined in 1976, not one enamored of satellite technology … but one with the guts to walk into the wilderness and deal with what it finds there. That’s the CIA we need today.

Such reforms would lead to an agency better prepared to detect future threats and better able to perform strategic analysis.
While technology offers a wide array of new and breathtaking capabilities, it should not be used as a substitute for HUMINT. Furthermore, the intelligence gained from technological assets should not be considered foolproof, as it is not free of the inherent fog and friction that Clausewitz discussed. Thousands of years ago, Sun-Tzu addressed the difficulties in obtaining accurate intelligence, reaching a conclusion from which the United States would benefit. Intelligence, Sun-Tzu (2000, 123) stated, “must come from people – people who know the enemy’s situation.”

However, it is important not to view an increase in HUMINT as the sole means to improving the United States’ intelligence capability. The most effective intelligence is often the result of a combination of sources, ranging from signals intelligence and satellite imagery to human sources. Technological assets offer innovative methods that can be utilized to gain important intelligence; this innovation needs to continue. A corresponding movement to understand and fully utilize these new technologies is also necessary. Especially with the difficulties in collecting HUMINT in current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all possible means of obtaining intelligence should be pursued. However, until the United States dedicates itself to increasing its HUMINT capabilities and relying less on technology, the current imbalance in the intelligence community will continue to misguide the country down a dangerous path.

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Too Much Cleavage? Regional Implications for Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Ukraine

Alexander Jakubow, University of Richmond*

By examining democratic institutional developments within post-communist Ukraine, this paper challenges the conventional political wisdom positing that patterns of democratization are necessarily inhibited by high levels of societal fragmentation. In the case of Ukraine, these societal cleavages only become inimical to greater democratic institutionalization when combined with the variety of preexisting administrative and institutional characteristics within the Ukrainian political system. Such factors include the nature of Ukraine’s problematic semi-presidential model of government, a weak and fragmented political party system, and the abuse of administrative resources by political incumbents. The effects of such intervening factors are measured by analyses of parliamentary voting patterns, presidential-parliamentary interactions, and coercive clientelistic linkages under the Kuchma presidency with respect to a quadraregional model. Secondly, from a methodological perspective, this paper contends that conceptualizing societal cleavages in regional, as opposed to ethnic or linguistic, terms is a more accurate unit of analysis to be used in the examination, comparison, and categorization of social difference.

The socio-political foundations of the modern Ukrainian state rest precariously upon a heterogeneous substructure of ethnolinguistic, economic, and regional variance. For Ukrainian political leaders and state-builders, the successful accommodation of the multifarious, often conflicting interests that emerged from these social and geographic realities within an appropriate institutional framework has hitherto remained elusive. Ukraine’s road to democracy, therefore, occupies a unique space within the collective narrative of Eastern European, post-communist political development. In

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addition to deconstructing a wide array of Soviet legacies that prove almost exclusively inimical to democratic development—such as weak civil societies, bloated and overbearing bureaucracies, and no rule of law—Ukraine, many experts argue, must further contend with the destabilizing effects particular to its many ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages.

In a comprehensive study examining patterns of post-communist democratization, John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes (2002, 114) contend that “in addition to the weak commitments to political and economic reform of its post-communist political leaders, several aspects of Ukraine’s situation in terms of religious, linguistic, and cultural divisions might seem less auspicious.” Similar attitudes reinforcing the antithetical nature of Ukraine’s societal cleavages vis-à-vis democratization also pervade many media publications and productions. Failed attempts at political and administrative reform are portrayed as the inevitable resultants of the incompatibility between Ukraine’s monolithically pro-European, western region and its pro-Russian eastern region.

While it is undeniable that such societal cleavages certainly have come to define the Ukrainian social polity, this paper challenges the notion that these differences have inherently negative spillover effects within the Ukrainian political realm, specifically as it pertains to attempts at democratic consolidation. It is alternatively hypothesized that, with respect to efforts at strengthening the democratic institutions of the Ukrainian state, Ukraine’s societal cleavages exert no direct influence over the process of democratization. The politicization of these divergent Ukrainian social realities occurs only on the initiative of those groups or individuals seeking to exploit social difference for private gain and/or as a direct result of institutional design flaws that enable these nominal cleavages to become substantively divisive.

Because these various cleavages assume a wide variety of forms (ethnic, linguistic, regional) and because each cleavage may affect the processes of democratic consolidation in different ways, it is incumbent upon us to first determine both the potential magnitude and vector of the political implications germane to each cleavage.

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After such an assessment has been made, for the sake of simplicity, only the societal cleavage with the greatest explanatory value in characterizing Ukraine’s social fragmentation and the most latent power for disrupting the process of further democratization within post-communist Ukraine will be selected for further analysis.

**Conceptualizing Consolidation**

The term “democratic consolidation” permeates the scholarly literature on democracy and democratization studies in political science. Despite such ubiquity, discussions of democratic consolidation often eagerly delve into vibrant, adroit explanations of the mechanisms by which greater democratization occurs without explicating what “consolidation,” itself, actually means. In the democratization literature, therefore—as in many other subfields within the vast discipline of political science—descriptive energies must be equally distributed between the conceptual ends as well as the means by which we account for those ends. Therefore, what precisely do we mean by “democratic consolidation,” why, or on what accounts, is Ukraine not to be considered consolidated, and what constitutes the underlying theoretical arguments maintaining that social cleavages might complicate such consolidation?

While interpretative nuances abound in the manner in which democratic consolidation is defined and operationalized in the extant scholarly literature, the concept is best understood for the purposes of this study as a synthesized outcome of what Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) call the dual transformative processes of democratization and liberalization. The former emphasizes the procedural dimensions of a democratic system informed by the overarching principle of citizenship. Citizenship “involves both the right to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with respect to the making of collective choices and the obligation of those implementing such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7). The authors also adroitly maintain that the inherent right-obligation binary of citizenship not only applies to the ruled, but that it protects the rulers, as well. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 8) contend, citizenship also “imposes obligations on the ruled, that is, to respect the legitimacy of choices made by deliberation among equals, and rights on rulers, that is, to act with authority…to promote the effectiveness of such choices, and to protect the polity from threats
to its persistence.” A democratized polity is therefore one in which popularly-elected leaders are representative of and accountable to the consent of the governed and in which the governed respect as legitimate the authority and choices of their leaders. Liberalization, in turn, emphasizes the importance of establishing efficacious individual and collective rights that protect social entities from “arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7). Such rights include freedoms of expression, belief, association, collective dissent, property, conscience, as well as many legal rights and protections, such as habeas corpus.

In drawing from the analysis of O’Donnell and Schmitter, consolidated democracies contain certain procedural (democratization) and protective (liberalization) elements. However, for the purposes of this study, consolidated democracies are also institutionally-sound. Institutions “exert patterned higher-order effects on the actions, indeed the constitution, of individuals and organizations without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities” (Clemens and Cook 1999, 444-45, emphasis added). This implicitly means that institutional arrangements are self-reinforcing structures because the individuals and organizations to which they apply willingly respect such arrangements as valid and legitimate. In a consolidated democracy, its aforementioned systemic procedural and protective components are not merely enshrined in a constitutional document. A constitution, after all, is just a piece of paper. Constitutions become powerful, binding determinants of political, social, and economic behavior to the extent that individual and collective actors consider their provisions legitimately authoritative. Consolidated democracies, therefore, necessarily presuppose a strong rule of law to ensure that, whatever the nature of the personal beliefs and opinions of political actors vis-à-vis particular institutional structures and practices, such actors will nonetheless recognize and respect the legitimacy of such frameworks. Any and all revisionist designs upon the preexisting institutional order must similarly occur, not in an arbitrary, capricious, or ad hoc manner, but rather in accordance within recognized, formal procedural parameters. In sum, a consolidated democracy is that which contains both procedural mechanisms of representation and accountability and protective mechanisms for guaranteeing individual and collective rights and freedoms that are institutionalized components of the political
regime.

In the case of Ukraine, the characterization of its political system as a consolidated democracy fails almost exclusively with respect to this third, institutional criterion. As will be discussed below, Ukraine has displayed great progress in the procedural and protective realms of democracy. Electoral competitions have become freer and fairer since Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian constitution contains an extensive and robust list of provisions guaranteeing and protecting individual and collective rights and freedoms. Instead, frequent breakdowns and gaps in the rule of law in Ukraine, particularly evinced by widespread corruptive, clientelistic, and nepotistic practices, have impeded efforts at further democratization. The 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of businesses’ and country analysts’ perceptions of corruption ranging between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean), ranks Ukraine, with a paltry score of 2.7, at 119th place out of a possible 179 (Denker and Sidwell 2008).

Conventional wisdom maintains that Ukraine’s highly fragmented society, by its very nature, necessarily confounds attempts at strengthening the rule of law because its numerous and pervasive societal cleavages, and the disparate political interests that lie therein, complicate efforts at reaching political compromise and consensus. Frustrated political incumbents, in turn, will often be tempted to pursue and implement their defeated agendas through extra-constitutional, arbitrary, and/or extortionist means. This is particularly relevant for nascent democracies like Ukraine in which underlying rules and power structures of the political regime are new and may therefore be perceived as more malleable in the minds of revisionist political actors. Political frustrations with democracy run especially high in the post-communist realm where idealized and romanticized visions of democracy as a panacea for the multiple socio-economic and political ills of the communist experience have often foundered a more sobering reality of political deadlock, internal quibbling, and inefficiency (Stokes 1993). Many countries,

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1 Or when such elections were not free and fair, as was the case in the 2004 presidential election between independent candidate Viktor Yuschenko and the Party of Regions candidate Viktor Yanukovych, such abuses were promptly identified and denounced, and the flawed electoral results were subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

2 See Chapter II (Articles 21-68) of the Constitution of Ukraine.
such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, have overcome such setbacks and have made significant strides towards greater democratization in recent years, most notably by their entry into the European Union. Others, like Russia, have responded to similar stimuli via authoritarian regression. Ukraine’s position on the democratic spectrum is far more ambiguous, and its seemingly perpetual state of inchoate democratic development has often been described as a function of its various societal cleavages.

However, instead of changing the composition of Ukrainian society—the proximate cause of the country’s incomplete experiences with democratic consolidation—it would be far easier and more efficacious to change the institutions that enable these nominal regional cleavages to exert deleterious political effects upon the progress and stability of Ukrainian democracy. The identification of these problematic, preexisting administrative and institutional characteristics is therefore the primary task of this paper. Yet, this cannot be achieved without first identifying a coherent methodological prism for conceptualizing and analyzing social cleavage in post-communist Ukraine.

**Adopting the Regional Framework**

Most studies previously conducted on the nature of Ukraine’s various social disjunctions discuss three main social demographic variables—ethnicity, language, and region. This section, by means of a comparative examination of these potential cleavages, ultimately concludes that a regional classification of Ukraine’s societal differences constitutes the best mode of analysis for accurately reassessing the relationship between societal fragmentation and democratic development in post-Communist Ukraine.

Ethnicity\(^1\) has long constituted the primary means by which political scientists have classified social difference within Ukraine. Ukraine’s population, being only approximately 75% ethnically Ukrainian, hosts a fairly sizeable ethnic Russian minority (20% of the overall population), which is typically concentrated in southern and eastern Ukraine. Ethnic Russians so heavily saturate this area of Ukraine that Russians actually constitute the *majority* ethnic group within the Semi-Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Kubicek 2000).

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\(^1\)Ethnicity here is used in very strict sense based upon biological lineage and kinship ties.
As the dominant evaluative paradigm of the early- to mid-1990s, conceptualizing Ukraine’s social divide in solely ethnic terms was particularly well-adapted to the political realities of the time. Because the maintenance of Ukraine’s *de jure* independence vis-à-vis the Russian Federation was far from a political certainty in the immediate wake of the Soviet Union’s turbulent collapse, couching Ukraine’s principal social cleavage in ethnic terms accurately reflected political apprehensions over whether or not Ukraine’s ethnic Russian population could and would pull Ukraine, in whole or in part, back into an institutional arrangement under Russian suzerainty (Barrington 2002).

However, during the early- to mid-1990s, as the coalescence of the new Ukrainian polity proceeded along in a relatively stable manner, such irredentist specters, and the political implications of their ethnic exponents, were eventually laid to rest. This depoliticization of Ukraine’s ethnic divide was similarly fostered by changing conceptualizations about the nature of Ukrainian statehood within both academic and political circles. In an attempt to ensure that the administrative, social, and economic capacities of the state were not undermined by fractious domestic disputes surfacing along Ukraine’s various societal fault-lines, political elites understood the importance of casting the institutional mold for the new Ukrainian state in unitary, yet multiethnic, terms. The promotion of Ukraine as a multiethnic state, in which national identity was emphasized in a civic, as opposed to ethnic, context, effectively precluded the motivation, cultivation, and cooption of ethnic nationalisms for political purposes (Barrington 2002). These ideals concerning the state’s multiethnic orientation are most notably manifest in the passage of its Law on National Minorities in 1992. This law not only reserves for Ukraine’s ethnic minorities the right to use their own native languages and cultural practices, but it also calls for state support of such minority groups. In a recent paper, Olena Semyorkina (2004, 121), director of the Center for Legal Reform and Legislative Drafting at Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice, concludes that “the Ukrainian legislation in force sufficiently provides for maintenance and development of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of national minorities.” According to a survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Social Monitoring Center in May of 2004, approximately 70% of all respondents, when asked about the existence of interethnic conflicts in Ukrainian society, responded that there were no or very minor conflicts.
From a sociological perspective, the latent ability of Ukraine’s ethnic cleavage to seriously hamper efforts at democratic consolidation is further undermined by the manner in which the Ukrainian citizenry convincingly exudes what Ray Taras, Olga Filippova and Nelly Pobeda (2004) call “transnational values.” While Russian national identity was created, rationalized, and disseminated by the state, the development of Ukrainian national consciousness occurred along a far more syncretic, heterogeneous path. Because of Ukraine’s long historical development under Russian and, later, Soviet tutelage, the Ukrainian peoples often had to contextualize and develop their own national interests within the bounds of a preexisting imperial framework, a skill which would lend itself nicely to the construction of Ukraine’s multiethnic, or “transnational,” state dynamic in the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Taras, Filippova and Pobeda 2004). In a more modern context, the narrative of Ukraine’s relationship with Western Europe provides further impetus for the cultivation of transnational thinking. Since the collapse of communism, a number of supranational institutions, particularly the EU and NATO, have actively promoted the pan-European, transnational paradigm. Taras, Filippova, and Pobeda (2004) contend that as Ukraine endeavors for closer, if not de jure, integration into these and other pan-European institutions, the implications of its international discourse are refracted into the domestic arena, as well, whereby the transnational perspective is further internalized by Ukrainian society.

As the ethnic paradigm, as applied to the Ukrainian context, begins to lose critical and explanatory value, conceptualizing Ukraine’s societal differences in linguistic terms is often considered to be a viable analytical alternative. Although Ukrainian is the only official language currently recognized by the Ukrainian constitution, nearly half of the country’s total population cites Russian as their first language (Khmelko and Wilson 1998). Language, by virtue of its ability to transcend ethnic boundaries, is considered to be a more accurate organizational framework for representing social difference in Ukraine. Ukraine occupies a unique position among most modern multiethnic states in that members of the ethnic majority are divided by language. Usually we would find the opposite to be true, whereby the linguistic patterns found within any given ethnic minority are split between those who use their native language and those who speak the language of the titular majority group (Barrington 2002).
Coupled with the shortcomings of the ethnic approach to understanding and representing Ukraine’s societal divisions (as outlined above), language is often conceptualized by many political scholars as a more accurate predictor of political predispositions. As authors Peter Craumer and James Clem (1999, 18) contend, the “Russian-speaking population of Ukrainian ethnicity [has political] attitudes more like those of Russians than those of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians.”

However, the high prevalence of Russian as a medium of social discourse is best conceptualized, not so much as an intrinsic feature of Ukraine’s social identity, but rather as an outcome of Soviet-era education policies that intentionally sought the promotion of the Russian language in schools, academia, and the media. Since independence, Ukraine’s political elites have actively pursued the deconstruction and reversal of such practices. In Kyiv, for example, while 80% of all students were taught in Russian-language schools before independence, by the early 1990s, approximately 90% of all first-graders attended schools where Ukrainian constituted the medium of instruction (Barrington 2002). This process of de-Russifying Ukrainian schools has deprived the Russian language of a critical institutional apparatus for its perpetuation within Ukrainian society. This, coupled with the language’s incremental eradication by means of generational renewal, has incrementally undermined the sharpness of Ukraine’s linguistic divide.

Conceptualizing Ukraine’s societal cleavages in regional terms, by contrast, escapes many of the aforementioned problems associated with an ethnically- or linguistically-driven analytical framework. First of all, if properly operationalized, the regional approach can escape the simple dichotomous, analytical framework particular to ethnic or linguistic approaches (Ukrainian vs. Russian). The complex intersection of social forces that ultimately shape an individual’s sense of identity imply nuances that cannot be accurately detected nor represented by methodologies which operate solely on the basis of dualistic paradigms. The construction of a regional identity, therefore, not only takes into account demographic distinctions (urbanization rates, age, gender, ethnic and linguistic composition, education, etc.), but also considers the importance of historical experience, geographic proximity to other centers of social influence (such as the EU or Russia), and economic variation.

From a theoretical perspective, some scholars posit that a wide array of characteristics that are inherently region-specific—such as
economic livelihood and conditioning, shared historical memory, and patterns of social interaction—overwhelm any alternative identification that is ethno-linguistically oriented (Popson 2002). For example, ethnic Russians living in the Crimea may not necessarily have similar sociopolitical outlooks as ethnic Russians living in Kyiv. As Nancy Popson (2002, 194) maintains, “local or regional populations may share historical memories and daily experiences that transcend divisive identities.”

Such theorizations are further reinforced by a significant body of quantitative research that confirms the superiority of conceptualizing Ukraine’s societal cleavages in a regional context, both for esoteric purposes and with respect to a wide range of dependent variables. Conducting a comprehensive analysis of attitudinal poll data that seeks to identify respondents’ positioning vis-à-vis a wide array of hypothetical policy initiatives concerning the role of language and ethnicity within the Ukrainian state, Craig Weller (2002) concludes that it is primarily the respondents’ regional, as opposed to ethnic or linguistic, identities that account for the greatest degree of variation amongst their responses. In a second seminal study, Lowell Barrington (2002) examines the relationship between three social variables—ethnicity, language, and region—and sentiments concerning Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. As counterintuitive as it may seem, the results of Barrington’s OLS regression analysis reveal that region, after holding ethnicity and language constant, explains the greatest amount of variance in, and is subsequently the best predictor of, Ukrainian attitudes vis-à-vis Russia. The findings of these and similar quantitative studies therefore empirically verify the advantages inherent in conceptualizing and analyzing Ukraine’s multifarious societal differences in a regional framework.

Organizing the Oblasts: Beyond the East-West Paradigm

After having established the superiority of the region-based methodological approach to categorizing and explaining Ukrainian

**The concept of region, as employed in Barrington’s study, is operationalized using such empirically-measured, nominal- and ordinal-level variables as locality type (ordinal measures from village through very large city), education levels, personal economic standing, religiosity, age, and gender. Barrington employs a nine-region model, and the regions are organized as follows: West, West-Central, Kyiv City, Central, North-East, East, South-East, South, and Crimea.**
societal cleavage, this section of the paper will include a brief, yet detailed, explication of how the regional concept will be operationalized in this study. When assigned the task of “regionalizing” Ukraine into its constituent parts, both quantitative and qualitative considerations are of paramount importance. The principal methodological problems therefore become: 1) How many regions are there/should there be; and 2) Upon what criteria shall this determination be based? In the pursuit of answers to these vexing procedural problems, we shall briefly examine how other scholars have approached the very same issue.

Initial investigative forays into Ukrainian regional identity conceptualized the divide in dichotomous terms between a predominately agricultural, pro-European, ethnically- and linguistically-Ukrainian western region and an industrial, pro-Russian, ethnically- and linguistically-Russian eastern region. In this manner, the Dnipro (Dnieper) River generally constitutes the principal geographic marker separating these western and eastern identities (Barrington 2002). Such a conceptual framework, however, glosses over a much more nuanced, complex reality and is therefore scarcely better, methodologically-speaking, than the dichotomous ethnic or linguistic approaches.

Over time, however, political scientists have begun to subdivide Ukraine into an increasingly greater number of regions, in order to better accommodate demographic, economic, and geographical variation. Weller’s (2002) study, for instance, employs a seven-region design, †† in which Kyiv and Crimea are treated as distinct regions. The treatment of Kyiv as an independent regional category illuminates the importance of the urban-rural divide in influencing an individual’s sense of identity, as well as the fact that political and social attitudes are influenced by the degree of heterogeneity (cultural, economic, ethnic, linguistic, and otherwise) inherent in any target population. Weller also contends that Crimea is deserving of its own region because: 1) Compared to anywhere else in Ukraine, in Crimea Russians constitute the largest ethnic group; and 2) Crimea is institutionally distinct by virtue of its status as Ukraine’s only semi-autonomous republic. Barrington (2002), by contrast, uses a nine-

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††Weller’s regions are classified as: West, Center, North, East, South, Crimea, and Kyiv. For more information about the specific methodologies and findings of both Barrington’s and Weller’s studies, please consult their reference entries at the end of this article.
region framework, contending that his approach best incorporates contiguous oblasti (administrative districts) into sensible regions. Numerous other categorical nuances exist, but the main objective of this brief, limited methodological survey has been to provide an overview of the qualitative and quantitative factors that influence the construction of a regional-analytical framework and to underscore that, as of yet, no definitive, authoritative conceptual method exists for regionalizing Ukraine.

For the investigative and analytical purposes of this study, a fairly common four-region framework will be adopted. The four regions are as follows: West, Central, South, and East. While this model perhaps lacks the refinement and sophistication of Barrington’s or Weller’s multi-regional models, it still escapes some of the inherent problems of a purely dichotomous, East-West framework. Furthermore, the adoption of the four-region model was also heavily influenced by the availability of data, as many of the statistical studies that inform this investigation were also based upon a four constituent (West-Central-South-East) model. Some basic demographic data, with respect to each individual region, is categorized in Table 1.

As illustrated in Table 1, the data clearly indicate that even a quadraregional model still successfully reveals some of the nuances overlooked by the dichotomous approach. For example, despite its reputation as having a predominately agricultural economy, the western region contributes a smaller share of total output than both the central and, more surprisingly, eastern regions. Compared to the high degree of variation across industrial output (std. deviation = 19.9), levels of agricultural output are far more equitably distributed across all regions (std. deviation = 7.1). Furthermore, the central region, with respect to many variables (GDP per capita, urbanization rates, and size of Russian minority), constitutes an intermediary step between the poor, ethnically-Ukrainian, rural western region and the wealthier, more-Russofied, urban eastern region. Accurately representing the extent of intra-regional variability within post-communist Ukraine is indispensable for the goals of this study. Regional difference needs to be fully and properly contextualized before we may proceed with our primary investigation into the supposedly “negative” implications of region upon democratic

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Barrington’s regions are classified as: West, West-Central, Kyiv City, Central, North-East, East, South-East, South, and Crimea.
consolidation.

**Table 1: Regional Comparison Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West**</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>2087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>2730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>3157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>2350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2001; author’s calculations); Kubicek (2000, 275).

*In this sense, oblasti includes Ukraine’s 24 oblasts, the Semi-Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the two cities of special administrative status: Kyiv and Sevastopol.

**West: Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmenlnytsky, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, Zakarpattia.

Central: Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Kyiv [City], Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr.

East: Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk.

South: Crimea [SAR], Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odessa, Sevastopol [City], Zaporizhia.

**Other Factors Inhibiting Democratic Consolidation**

After having created an appropriate conceptual framework that accurately captures the nature of Ukrainian patterns of regionalization, this section will attempt to illustrate how Ukraine’s regional fragmentation exerts no direct influence upon the processes of national democratic consolidation. It will be shown that a variety of intervening variables, such as the disconnect between electoral and parliamentary voting patterns, the weakness of Ukraine’s party system, poor institutional design, and recourse to administrative resource, particularly during the Kuchma era, exacerbate and politicize regional differences to the extent that democratic processes are interrupted and subsequently compromised.
Exposing the True Drivers of Parliamentary Voting

Given the underdeveloped nature of Ukrainian civil society, as is common to nearly all post-communist states, voting constitutes one of the few viable conduits available to the public for the expression of their political sentiments. According to voting results taken from the 1998 proportional-representation and single-member district parliamentary elections (Tables 2 and 3, respectively), we see that party support strongly coalesces along regional lines.

Table 2: Regional Distribution of Party Support, Proportional Representation, 1998 Parliamentary Elections*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Bloc</th>
<th>Percentage of party’s overall representation vote received in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Only the five parties that passed the 4 percent threshold in the 1998 parliamentary elections and were still active in the parliament in June 2000 are included here.

From the tables it is revealed that Batkivishchina, Trudova, the Communist Party (CPU), and the National Democratic Party (NDP) performed extremely well in the East—with the latter two garnering nearly 50% of the vote in proportional representation and all four parties obtaining roughly half of all possible seats in single-member districts. The electoral successes of this bloc are largely regionally-dependent, as we observe more modest electoral performances in the southern and central regions and very weak results in the West. Conversely, Rukh’s overwhelmingly popular performance in the western region contrasts sharply with its poor inroads among southern and eastern electorates. Both factions of the party left the 1998 electoral cycle without any single-member district representation from either constituency. The Socialist Party (SPU) performed extremely well in the central portion of the country—at
least with respect to the distribution of proportional representation voting—although, the SPU had a far less commanding presence in the other three regions.

**Table 3**: Regional Distribution of Party Support, Single-Member Districts, 1998 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party*</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>% of Seats from East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPU</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh-K</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukh-U</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batkiv.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trudova</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*For definitions of the party acronyms/abbreviations used above, as well as a brief summary of each party’s specific platform, please refer to the Appendix.

While the above electoral data certainly confirm the reality of serious regional cleavages within the Ukrainian state, it remains to be proven that these differences correspond to, and are subsequently responsible for, patterns of parliamentary fragmentation. In order to seek a proper answer to this question, political scientist Paul D’Anieri (2007) contends that if regional cleavages truly drive parliamentary voting behaviors, all political parties that depended upon the votes from eastern regions will vote similarly within parliament. In testing his hypothesis, D’Anieri compiled a frequency table that illustrates the rates at which Ukrainian political parties voted together during a series of sixty-eight roll-call votes held between March and May of 2000. Some of these results are reproduced in Table 4.